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Abstract 
Attempts to comprehend contemporary world finance are confronted by 
a dual problematic: inquiry encounters not only significant change that cannot 
easily be captured, but also the predominance of neo-classical economics as a 
mode of knowledge. By taking as its starting point existing research in the field 
of International Political Economy (IPE) and grounding inquiry in an 'Historical 
IPE' approach, 'World Financial Orders and World Financial Centres' offers an 
alternative mode of knowledge of contemporary world finance. 
An Historical IPE of world finance proceeds by focusing upon the 
changing organisation of world credit practices since the seventeenth century. 
World credit practices are organised in the context of the structures of power in 
successive social orders, that is, world financial orders. Relative stability in 
world financial orders is reproduced by structures of authority which articulate 
interdependent relationships between state, civil and market institutions in the 
organisation of world credit practices. World financial centres (WFCs) are 
identified as necessary to an understanding of world finance in two main senses. 
First, WFCs are the key social spaces for world finance, where world credit 
practices and the material, ideational and institutional forces that frame them 
become centralised. Second, WFCs are key spaces of authority in world 
finance, the social loci for the reproduction of world financial orders. It is 
shown that periods of relative stability in successive world financial orders tend 
to coincide with the dominance of a single WFC. With the present standing of 
New York, London and Tokyo as a 'triad' of WFCs, contemporary world 
finance is characterised by its 'unstable reproduction'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Apprehendina World Finance: Problematics and Prospects 
The Problematics of Apprehending World Finance 
"Worrying about international financial markets is a thriving industry of 
its own, quite literally for financial journalists as well as for bankers who 
write for the financial press while also advertising in it. But it is 
significant that the focus of anxiety keeps shifting in a neurotic way, 
never fixing permanently on any single aspect. Many people have an 
instinctive feeling that they should be troubled by markets which have 
grown so quickly, which are so big and in many ways so little 
understood. But they are unsure precisely what it is they ought to be 
nervous about and so a limited number of topics succeed each other 
endlessly as the fashionable concern of the moment. Each is discussed 
learnedly, exhaustively, and inconclusively until attention switches to the 
next' '(Mendelsohn 1980: 45 original emphasis). 
"Worrying" and "anxiety" about world finance that is "so little 
understood" is to be expected. In a simple sense, the struggle to apprehend 
world finance would appear to result from a structural transformation in the very 
nature of contemporary world finance that cannot easily be captured. Further, 
attempts at comprehension are straight-jacketed by the predominant 'mode of 
knowledge'. ' Endeavours to apprehend contemporary world finance encounter 
not only significant structural change, but also the imperialism of neo-classical 
economics amongst western bankers, financial journalists, and across the social 
sciences. ' Within the social sciences in particular, the teleology of neo-classical 
economics is extended by the use of 'globalisation' as an arresting metaphor to 
provide explanation and understanding of the nature of contemporary capitalism 
(Amoore et al 1997). Under this reading, structural changes in contemporary 
world finance - as in so many areas of social life - are captured under the rubric 
of globalisation. The neo-classical globalisation of world finance is effectively 
naturalised, cast as the benign and inevitable result of the expansion of the 
1 The notion of different 'modes of knowledge' is taken from Cox (1985/1996: 51). The 
existence of different modes of knowledge is a recognition that different understandings are built 
upon different ontological, epistemological, and theoretical grounds. 
2 'Economic imperialism' is "the attempt to extend the core ideas of neoclassical economics to 
cover the social sciences as a whole. ... It is based on the belief that the idea of 'rational 
economic man' is appropriate to social science as a whole" (Hodgson 1994: 2 1). 
rational logic of the market mechanism as the most efficient means of allocating 
resources. Under the predominant mode of knowledge, then , 6'worrying" 
is 
necessarily perpetuated at the margins as no research agenda is suggested which 
addresses the sources of "anxiety". 
As the recent wave of chaos in world finance emanating from the Asian 
region has once again illustrated, however, contemporary world finance is far 
from benign (Goldstein 1998; Haggard & MacIntyre 1998; Bevacqua 1998). 
"Worrying" and "anxiety" at the margins in itself becomes insufficient. 
Explanations of world finance that naturalise structural change and reify the 
market will continue to predominate unless alternative modes of knowledge are 
articulated. Once in place, alternative modes of knowledge may lead to contests 
over the concepts used to account for contemporary world finance. Such 
"conceptual contestation" (Rosow 1994: 472) may (re)socialise and (re)politicise 
the practices, structures and institutions of world finance. ' The neo-classical 
facade is questioned once world finance is recognised to be historically 
constructed and resting on social and power relations. In moving beyond 
"worrying" and "anxiety" to have some influence over future structural change, 
or at least to work towards forestalling the worst eventualities of change, 
alternative modes of knowledge which apprehend world finance are essential. It 
is against this backdrop of the dual problematics of world finance - that is, 
inquiry encounters not only significant structural changes that cannot easily be 
captured, but also the predominance of neo-classical economics as a mode of 
knowledge - that this thesis should be seen. 
Apprehending World Finance: The Prospects of International Political 
Economy 
The mode of knowledge of world finance offered here is at once broadly 
situated within, and built upon an engagement with, International Political 
Economy (IPE). IPE is "an area of investigation, a particular range of questions, 
and a series of assumptions about the nature of the international 'system' and 
how we understand this 'system"' (Tooze 1984: 2). The roots of the rebirth of 
3 Of course, the capacity of an alternative mode of knowledge to hold an emancipatory and 
transformative potential is likely to rest upon connections to shifting social and power relations. 
As Gill (1997: 6) asserts, "A widespread sense of transformation may provide no more than the 
opportunity for theoretical innovation - and thus fall short of emancipatory potential - unless innovations-in-thought are related to and rooted in the real movement of social and political 
forces, institutional ised in civil society ...... 
2 
IPE as a field of inquiry lay in the crisis of the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) in the early 1970s (Payne & Gamble 1996: 3). " The breakdown of 
the world economy during this period could not be accounted for within IR's 
research agenda that was locked into Cold War security concerns (Ashley 1986). 
IPE emerged to fill the gap which resulted from the neglect of 'the economic' as 
an area of international study. Given that the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
fixed-exchange arrangements was a key feature of the breakdown of the world 
economy, IPE has become established as a central avenue for inquiry that seeks 
to apprehend world finance. In practical terms, then, IPE provides fertile soil 
from which to begin to account for contemporary world finance. 
In addition to the more practical benefits of engaging with the existing 
body of scholarship of world finance that IPE has to offer, our concern here with 
the need to establish an alternative mode of knowledge when apprehending 
world finance are assisted by ontological, epistemological and theoretical 
debates within IPE. ' While IPE is widely accepted as a field of inquiry and set 
of questions, such debates create considerable disagreement amongst IPE 
scholars as to what questions should be posed and what assumptions should be 
made. These debates, in turn, have resonated across inquiry in IPE that seeks to 
apprehend world finance. For our purposes, the struggle of what has been 
labelled "new IPE" to establish itself in the face of the predominant "orthodox 
IPE" is particularly informative (Murphy & Tooze 1991; Payne & Gamble 
1996: 3-10). It is the way that ontology, epistemology and theory come together 
for each of these loose groupings that give orthodox and new IPE their 
respective standings as conflicting modes of knowledge within the field. Given 
that orthodox IPE shares much of its ontology and epistemology with neo- 
classical economics, the critique of these features of orthodox IPE offered by 
new IPE offers a firm basis from which to begin to generate an alternative mode 
of knowledge of world finance. 
4 Clearly, however, the intellectual and historical roots of IPE stretch back to the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries to debates over national development and wealth creation, the division of 
labour and comparative advantage initiated by the mercantilists and carried through by Adam 
Smith, Karl Marx and Friedrich List among others. For an introduction to IPE that emphasises 
the intellectual and historical roots of IPE, see Pettmann (1994). 
5 'Epistemological' questions are concerned with how we know what we know, while 
contological' questions with how we configure what we want to know within an assumed basic 
structure of the significant entities and the relationships between them (Murphy & Tooze 199 1; 
Cox 1992/1996: 144). Of course, such debates within IPE also reflect wider debates across the 
social sciences. 
3 
Orthodox IPE and World Finance 
The ontology of orthodox IPE is derived from neo-classical economics. 
This suggests that the international economy is the cumulative product of 
exchange between national communities of rational individuals. When 
combined with a state-centric understanding of politics received from the 
ascendant theory of neo-realism within IP, the ontology of orthodox IPE tends 
to be expressed as the 'politics of international economic relations' (PIER) 
(Strange 1988: 12). The central object for inquiry becomes the manner in which 
the politics of national economic policy-making and international economic 
agreements impinge upon the exchange relations between national economi es. 
Although they are considered together, then, politics and economics or states 
and markets remain largely opposed forms of social organisation (Gilpin 
1987: 4). 
In epistemological terms, orthodox IPE tends to share with IR a 
combination of empiricist epistemology with positivist methodology (Smith, 
Booth & Zalewski 1996). Subject and object are separated in inquiry so that the 
truth of a theoretical statement is determined by how well it corresponds to an 
objective material reality (Krasner 1996: 108-9). " Under the individualism of 
positivist methodology and informed by assumptions of utility maximisation 
derived from neo-classical economics, the object of inquiry is explained in terms 
of the rational and egoistic action of 'individual' agents. Framed by the theories 
of orthodox IPE, the 'individual' agents are usually either states, in line with 
neo-realism, or a wide range of institutional actors, in line with liberal 
institutionalism (Krasner 1994: 14). ' The legitimacy of the knowledge created by 
orthodox IPE is, then, "primarily and initially derived from mainstream 
economics" (Murphy & Tooze 199 1 a: 17). 
6 Orthodox IPE has not remained isolated from epistemological debates across the social 
sciences. However, even when confronted by the importance of subjective ideas as suggested by 
the hugely influential work of Kuhn (1962/1970), ideas tend to remain purely in the subjective 
realm and divorced from objective reality under orthodox IPE (Murphy & Tooze 1991a: 22-3). 
The result is an endless debate between realism, liberalism and Marxism as the three main sets of 
theory in which none can be held to be wrong other than in terms of capacity to reveal truth 
through testable hypotheses. This leads to what Strange (1991: 34) has termed "a dialogue of the 
deaf' within orthodox IPE. 
7 Where agents are recognised to exist within context of structures, for instance research which 
has built on the influential work of Waltz (1979), structures themselves are theoretically posited 
unchanging laws. 
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In terms of apprehending world finance, orthodox IPE has yielded a 
fairly distinct mode of knowledge. Guided by its ontological basis, the principal 
concern for orthodox IPE has been with understanding the creation and 
maintenance of stable international monetary relations (Cohen 1977; Block 
1977; Calleo 1982). The concern with international monetary relations follows 
from the neo-classical privileging of exchange, as monetary arrangements are 
defined as "the sum of all the devices by which nations organize their 
international economic relations" (Block 1977: 1). In this sense, "international 
money matters" because stable international monetary relations are "the critical 
nexus" which facilitates stable exchange relations (Gilpin 1987: 118). ' Informed 
by a positivist search for observable laws, international monetary stability tends 
to be held by orthodox IPE to hinge upon the provision of certain key 
prerequisites as 'public goods'. These include a supply of adequate liquidity for 
balance-of-Payments financing, an appropriate adjustment mechanism to resolve 
national balance-of-payments disequilibria, and confidence in the reserve 
currency or currencies (Cohen 1977: 28; Gilpin 1987: 118-9). It is the changing 
patterns of domination, co-operation and conflict between the principal states as 
rational agents which determine the availability or otherwise of the key 
prerequisites. 
Theoretically, building on a seminal analysis of the inter-war years by 
economist Charles Kindleberger (1973), orthodox IPE accounts of international 
monetary stability have been dominated by hegemonic stability theory (HST). 
Indeed, such has been the theoretical grip of HST that orthodox IPE more 
broadly "has become a discourse constructed around a particular view of the 
hegemonic state" (Payne & Gamble 1996: 4). HST suggests that a states system 
in which a single state is hegemonic is the most conducive to the provision of 
the public goods necessary for stable international monetary relations. " As 
Gilpin (1987: 74) asserts, 
8 In this sense, then, the concern of orthodox IPE with international monetary relations 
supplements the main focus of orthodox IPE which, following neo-classical assumptions, has 
been international trade relations. For the classic statement of the centrality of international 
trade to orthodox IPE inquiry, see Cohen (1990). 
9 For a wide-ranging discussion of hegemonic stability theory and its development in IP, see 
Guzzini (1992). 
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"... the hegemon or leader has the responsibility to guarantee provision of 
the collective goods of an open trading system and stable currency. ... a 
liberal economic system cannot be self-sustaining but must be 
maintained over the long term through the actions of the dominant 
economy" (Gilpin 1987: 74)). 
As a consequence, periods of instability - such as the inter-war years - reflect a 
leadership vacuum generated by the decline of one hegemonic state and the rise 
of another. The changing distribution of wealth and power between states is 
linked to changes in economic efficiency that generate divergent national growth 
trajectories. As such, in the absence of a hegemonic state in the contemporary 
era of international capital mobility, international co-operation and co- 
ordination of national monetary policies becomes essential in contributing 
towards economic stability (Goodman 1992; Webb 1994). 
In our terms, the utility of orthodox IPE accounts of world finance lies in 
the raising of questions as to the patterns of domination and subordination in 
world finance. In particular, there is a questioning of how these patterns are 
reflected in the authority and roles of actors in the organisation and management 
of world finance (Walter 1993: 27). However, the effective separation of politics 
and economics restricts the capacity of orthodox IPE to reflect upon the 
questions which it raises. While states are indeed likely to be of central 
importance, states tend to be assumed to be the only actors capable of exercising 
authority in the organisation of world finance regardless of historical and 
structural context. 
Further, as a mode of knowledge, an orthodox WE of world finance 
tends not to question or consider alternatives to neo-classical economics. The 
"problem-solving" (Cox 1981/1996) bias of orthodox IPE, deeply rooted in 
empiricist epistemology and positivist methodology, tends to legitimate inquiry 
that acts as an adjunct to neo-classical economics. " Guided by problem-solving 
10 The notion of "problem-solving theory" is taken from Cox (1981/1996). Problem-solving 
theory "takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the 
institutions into which they are organized, as the given fi-amework for action (1981/1996: 88). 
Cox counters the purposes of problem-solving theory against "critical theory", which is "critical 
in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order 
came about. ... It is directed toward an appraisal of the very 
framework for action, or 
problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters" (1981/1996: 88). The two- 
types of theory are not mutually exclusive, but lend themselves to addressing different concerns 
within the overall process of critical inquiry. Problem-solving theory lends itself to limited 
spheres of action "which are amenable to relatively close and precise examinatioif' 
(1981/1996: 88). Critical theory leads to consideration of "a larger picture of the whole of which 
6 
theory, the general aim of inquiry is to make existing "relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble" (Cox 1981/1996: 88). The predominant neo-classical mode of 
knowledge of world finance becomes supplemented by orthodox IPE accounts 
that suggest that the sources of instability in world finance are to be found in the 
system of states, and not within the contradictions of world finance itself 11 As 
such, according to orthodox IPE, the problems of instability in contemporary 
world finance can be 'solved' by increased international co-operation in key 
policy areas in the absence of a single hegemonic state. 
New IPE and World Finance 
In contrast to the mode of knowledge offered by orthodox IPE, accounts 
of world finance in new IPE have been built upon alternative ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical foundations. In ontological terms, new IPE 
rejects neo-classical understandings of its subject mater. For new IPE, the sum 
of the basic structure that is the field of IPE is both greater than its national parts 
and subject to considerable change over time. New IPE has expressed this 
variously through concerns with, for instance, "global political economy" (Gill 
& Law 1988), "world systems" (Wallerstein 1974) and "world orders"(Cox 
1987). While remaining diverse in the concepts used, new IPE scholars are, in 
the main, ontologically united by a belief in the need to move beyond the PIER 
approach to capture the transnational nature of the enterprises, social 
movements, social forces, and markets that they wish to study (Strange 
1988: 21). 
In epistemological terms, new IPE has embraced a wide range of post- 
positivist epistemologies that are all willing to recognise the essential 
subjectivity of the social sciences (Murphy & Tooze 1991: 6). As Payne and 
Gamble (1996: 6-7) note, the work of Robert Cox (1981/1996) proved especially 
significant in liberating new IPE from the confines of the empiricist 
epistemology and positivist methodology of orthodox IPE. As a consequence, 
there is an acceptance that inquiry is open to claims and counter-claims, and that 
the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of 
change in which both parts and whole are involveV (1981/1996: 89). 
11 In this sense, the original assumptions of Kindleberger's (1973) analysis which suggested that 
a hegemonic state was necessary to bring about international monetary stability due to the 
inherent instability of financial markets is effectively turned on its head. For Gilpin (1987) and 
other orthodox IPE scholars, the need for a hegemonic state to bring about international 
monetary stability results not from inherent instability in financial markets, but from instability 
generated by the assumed anarchical nature of the states system. 
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such debate is part of the processes of knowledge construction that have 
important political implications for society at large. In addition and in 
opposition to the individualism of positivist methodology, new IPE has sought 
to engage with debates across the social sciences which have addressed the 
problematic inseparability of structure-agency (Cerny 1990; Jones 1995). Here, 
structures become recognised as changing constraints and opportunities 
expressed through political agency (Gamble 1995: 522). 
Finally, in theoretical terms, new IPE has sought to challenge the 
theoretical closure that results from retaining close links to IR. As with its 
ontological and epistemological bases, new IPE seeks to retain an essential 
topenness' to cross-disciplinary theoretical insights (Strange 1984). New IPE 
remains, however, united in its commitment to what could be termed 'genuine 
political economy'. New IPE shares with orthodox IPE a belief in the 
inseparability of politics and economics. The genuine political economy of new 
IPE nevertheless rejects the assumption of orthodox IPE that politics and 
economics are opposed forms of social organisation (Gilpin 1987: 4). The 
genuine political economy of new IPE recognises politics and economics to be 
united as part of the same processes of social and historical change. 
In terms of apprehending world finance, the alternative ontologies of 
new IPE have informed alternatives to orthodox IPE at three interrelated levels. 
First, new IPE accounts of world finance have tended to assert that international 
monetary relations can only be apprehended in the context of contemporary 
global financial relationships in which transnational markets predominate 
(Cerny 1993; Underhill 1997). In short, "structural change" in world finance 
realises "paradigmatic muddle" for orthodox IPE (Cemy 1994). " Second, given 
that "separate national currencies themselves are increasingly inextricably 
locked into wider financial trends and structures" (Cerny 1994: 591), it follows 
that the focus for inquiry should not be on 'money' narrowly defined as the 
determination of currency values and the system used to exchange currencies. 
Instead, the focus of new IPE accounts has been upon "the field of finance", that 
is, "the system by which credit is created, bought and sold and by which the 
direction and use of capital is determined" (Strange 1990: 259). Finally, taking 
as a starting point the wider angle of vision suggested by their alternative 
ontologies, some new IPE scholars have critiqued the explanatory power of 
12 For a partial rejection of this ontological position by an orthodox IPE scholar, see Cohen 
(1996: 295-6). 
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orthodox IPE in apprehending world finance prior to the contemporary em 
(Walter 1993; Germain 1997). Transnational financial relationships are 
recognised to have existed and impinged upon international monetary relations 
for centuries, and the mode of knowledge represented by orthodox IPE is 
rejected for apprehending both past and present. 
Stemming from a theoretical commitment to what has been termed here 
6genuine political economy', new IPE accounts of world finance have been 
largely shaped by concerns with the restructuring of inter-relationships between 
states and markets in the organisation of world finance. While rejecting HST, 
states and markets approaches have tended to concur with the orthodox IPE 
view that the foundations of contemporary world finance are largely a political 
creation. Market and technological forces of change are held as significant, but 
states, as the principal aggregations of political power, constitute the 'bottom 
line' in determining the nature of market structures (Frieden 1987; Helleiner 
1994; Sobel 1994; Strange 1986). " The key distinction from orthodox IPE is, 
however, that markets are recognised as necessarily socially and politically 
embedded (Underhill 1991). In short, the 'states and markets' approach of new 
IPE contrasts with the 'states against markets' approach of orthodox IPE. " 
Against this theoretical backdrop, the contemporary coexistence of transnational 
markets and nationally-bounded state authority has stimulated concerns with 
both the potential loss of state authority in finance (Frieden 1991), and the new 
political arrangements through which world finance is organised. These new 
arrangements incorporate a range of state, inter-state and non-state institutions 
(Porter 1993; Underhill 1997a). Instability in world finance tends to be held to 
result from the inability of existing political arrangements to both prevent 
13 Considerable debate does, however, surround the motivations behind state official's decisions 
to change financial market structures. For instance, contemporary world finance has been 
marked by the liberalisation and deregulation of national financial market structures. For 
Helleiner (1994), these decisions were taken by the American and British state officials to 
further their respective national interests, which in turn generated structural pressures on other 
state officials to follow suit. Alternatively, for Sobel (1994), the decisions were motivated by a 
reordering of domestic societal forces that pushed the interests of financiers onto the political 
agenda. Cohen (1996) labels these alternative approaches respectively the 'outside-in' and 
'inside-out' models of change. 
14 The notions of 'states and markets' (Strange 1988) and 'states against markets' (Boyer & 
Drache 1996) are taken from the titles of two IPE publications. For orthodox IPE, debate 
centres on "the role of markets versus the role of governments in the management of 
international capital" (Cohen 1996: 280), while for new IPE, "markets and politics are not 
opposing principlesý' (Underhill 1997: 3). 
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speculative excess in the financial markets, and ensure that the credit needs of 
society are met (Strange 1986). 
Building on the capacity of the states and markets approach to illustrate 
that the political foundations of world finance extend well beyond state 
institutions, some new IPE scholars have begun to disaggregate 'states' and 
'markets' as analytical categories to reveal their various and changing social and 
institutional bases. The focus for inquiry becomes the actual practices of credit 
creation themselves and the public and private institutions of finance through 
which they are organised. For instance, Porter (1993) has linked contemporary 
changes in the organisation of credit practices through market institutions to 
changes in regulatory practices organised through civil, state, inter-state and 
transnational institutions. Not dissimilarly, Germain (1997) has focused on the 
changing roles of public and private monetary agents within institutionalised 
credit networks. It is these credit networks, and in particular the way in which 
they come together in principal financial centres, which form the basis of the 
international organisation of credit. Disaggregating states and markets in this 
way means that the social and power relations which underlie the organisation 
of world finance can be shown to take a wide range of institutional forms across 
different periods, and be related to the changing nature of credit practices 
themselves. 
Outline of the Thesis 
In the context of the dual problematics of apprehending contemporary 
world finance, then, attempts to apprehend world finance by new IPE scholars 
provide an appropriate starting point for inquiry here. The seven chapters that 
constitute the main body of this thesis are divided into three substantive Parts. 
Part I, comprising chapters one and two, begins the processes of (re)thinking 
world finance necessary for the articulation of an alternative to the predominant 
mode of knowledge derived from neo-classical economics. Considerable 
ontological, epistemological and theoretical debates within new IPE itself ensure 
important variations across new IPE as a mode of knowledge. Chapter one 
moves through and in support of an existing 'historical turn' in new IPE to 
develop what is termed an 'Historical International Political Economy'. This 
looks to history to provide an ontological and epistemological anchor for new 
IPE, rooted in a recognition of the epistemological consequences of an ontology 
of historicity that extends beyond the agents that are the object of inquiry to the 
historian or social scientist. The result is an 'historical' warrant for alternative 
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knowledge claims to those legitimated by empiricist epistemology and positivist 
methodology. From this basis, five principal interrelated dimensions that are the 
primary concern of Historical IPE inquiry are isolated: Structured Social 
Practices; Social Change; Social Space; Social Time; and Social Orders. Each 
dimension is rounded out theoretically through relevant new IPE scholarship. 
Chapter two continues the processes of (re)thinking world finance by 
pursuing an approach to world finance which follows from the five principal 
interrelated dimensions that are the primary concern of an Historical IPE. 
Inquiry proceeds by focusing since the seventeenth century on the organisation 
of modem world credit practices in the context of successive social orders, that 
is, world financial orders. World credit practices are held to be organised 
through the structures of power and authority within a world financial order, 
which is itself part of the wider world order. A relatively stable world financial 
order, recognisable as a coherent conjunction between the material, ideational 
and institutional structural forces that frame world credit practices, is 
reproduced through authority relations. World financial centres (WFCs) are 
identified as significant in successive world financial orders in two senses. 
First, WFCs are the key social spaces for world credit practices, where practices 
become centralised. Second, WFCs are key spaces of authority in world 
financial orders, the social loci for the reproduction of relatively stable world 
financial orders. It is posited that a relatively stable world financial order 
coincides with the dominance of a single WFC and that a relatively unstable 
world financial order, in which world credit practices undergo considerable 
restructuring, is marked by the decentralisation of the order between two or 
more centres at the apex of the hierarchy. 
Part 11, comprising chapters three, four and five, shifts to consider 
'World Financial Orders and World Financial Centres' in more concrete terms. 
The successive Amsterdam-centred (1600-1815), British (1815-1931), and 
American (1931-1973/4) world financial orders are addressed in turn. Inquiry 
proceeds across each world financial order by reflecting on: the rise of 
Amsterdam, London and New York respectively as the single, dominant WFCs; 
the predominant forms taken by world credit practices; the structures of power 
and their relationships to the making of the orders; the wider world order of 
which each order is part; the structures of authority and their relationships to the 
organisation of world credit practices and relatively stable reproduction of the 
orders; and the unravelling of the orders and the associated decentralisation and 
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restructuring of world credit practices. Tbroughout Part II, a comparative 
historical form of inquiry ensures that close attention is paid to both the 
continuities and differences that mark each world financial order. 
Four related historical insights emerge from the chapters that comprise 
Part Il which, in turn, guide inquiry into the contemporary world financial order. 
First, by comparison with the American world financial order in which world 
credit practices effectively took the form of inter-governmental and corporate 
capital exports, world credit practices have undergone intense restructuring to 
take the predominant forms of banking and capital and equity market practices. 
Second, the unravelling of the American world financial order was particularly 
distinctive. In contrast to the unravelling of the Amsterdam-centred and British 
world financial orders, the demise of the American world financial order was 
not simply characterised by the decline of New York and the rise to dominance 
of another WFC. New York has retained its standing as a WFC in the 
contemporary world financial order alongside a re-emergent London, with both 
joined in the 1980s by Tokyo to make a 'triad' of WFCs. Taken together, these 
first two historical insights prompt inquiry to consider the relationships between 
the changing forms of world credit practices and the emergence of the 'triad' of 
WFCs as key social spaces. This is the task of chapter six, the opening chapter 
of Part III, which begins to reveal the structural changes of contemporary world 
financial order and to generate an 'historical' alternative to the predominant 
mode of knowledge derived from neo-classical economics. 
The third insight to emerge from Part 11 that guides inquiry into the 
contemporary world financial order is concerned with the making of world 
financial orders. Part II shows that the making of previous world financial 
orders was characterised by a hierarchical structure of power. The social forces 
associated with Amsterdam, London and New York respectively occupied 
pivotal positions in the making of world financial orders. This reflected their 
material power, itself a consequence of the tendency for capital, knowledge and 
technology to be centralised in the dominant WFC of each order. Social and 
political power relations and the structures of the wider world order also framed 
the making of world financial orders. As a result, the unravelling of world 
financial orders - in which new WFCs rose to the apex of the hierarchy - were 
driven by the rise of competing state and societal forces. However, chapter five 
shows that the US state and New York' social forces remained pivotal to the 
unravelling of the American world financial order and the restructuring of credit 
12 
practices. Inquiry into the structure of power in the contemporary world 
financial order is, then, essential to apprehending the making of the order. 
Fourth, Part 11 shows that the reproduction of relative social stability in 
successive world financial orders rested upon a structure of authority centralised 
respectively in the dominant WFCs of Amsterdam and London and the 
Washington-New York axis. The institutionalised and less formal dimensions 
of the structure of authority came together, articulating interdependent 
relationships between state, civil and market forms of authority in the 
organisation of world credit practices. The unravelling of world financial orders 
coincided with the decentralisation of those orders and the proliferation of 
financial centres at the apex of the hierarchy. Inherent contradictions came to 
the surface in the absence of a centralised structure of authority to reproduce 
relative stability, reflected in the restructuring of world credit practices. Given 
the 'triad' of WFCs at the apex of the contemporary world finance, the 
contemporary world financial order would seem to contain an inherent 
contradiction that renders its reproduction relatively unstable. Taken together, 
the third and fourth historical insights prompt inquiry to consider the 
relationships between the decentralised structures of power and authority and 
the making and reproduction of the contemporary world financial order. This is 
the task of chapter seven, the final chapter of Part III, which closes our attempt 
to generate an alternative to the predominant neo-classical mode of knowledge 
of contemporary world finance. 
The thesis concludes by reflecting upon the prospects and problematics 
of an Historical IPE of world finance. In particular, this centres on the claim 
that the utility of an historical mode of knowledge of world finance lies in three 
main features. First, in contrast to the predominant knowledge derived from 
neo-classical economics and building upon existing new IPE scholarship, it is 
the social and political foundations of the organisation of world finance that are 
emphasised. The organisation of world credit practices is problematic and not 
the functional outcome of the operations of the international economy as 
assumed by neo-classical economists. Second, in contrast to the majority of 
existing new IPE scholarship, the social and political foundations of world 
finance are recognised to extend beyond the intersection of states and markets. 
'States' and 'markets' as categories are disaggregated to reveal their various and 
changing social and political bases. States and markets are unpacked by an 
Historical IPE of world finance through concern with world credit practices 
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themselves and the material, ideational and institutional forces framing them; 
the social and power relations shaping the organisation. of world credit practices; 
and the relationships between authority relations and the reproduction of world 
finance. Third, an Historical IPE of world finance offers a mode of knowledge 
of contemporary structural change that is anchored in history. The resulting 
historical mode of knowledge holds the potential of appropriating knowledge 
about the past in order to interpret that knowledge and so inform an 
emancipatory future. 
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PART I 
(Re)Thinking World 
Finance 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Towards an Historical International Political Economy' 
Introduction 
In this opening chapter we begin the processes of (re)thinking world 
finance. We have already highlighted the dual problematic of apprehending 
contemporary world finance: that is, inquiry encounters not only significant 
structural changes which cannot easily be captured, but also the predominance 
of neo-classical economics as a mode of knowledge. It was suggested that the 
field of International Political Economy (IPE) offered an appropriate avenue for 
inquiry in the light of this dual problematic. Apprehending world finance from 
within IPE offers the practical benefits of a strong body of existing scholarship 
concerned with world finance. In addition, given the close association of 
'orthodox IPE' with neo-classical economics, the critique of orthodox IPE by 
'new IPE' on ontological, epistemological and theoretical grounds provides a 
starting point from which to begin to construct an alternative mode of 
knowledge of world finance. Taking this starting point, the broad aim of this 
chapter is to advance what is termed an 'Historical International Political 
Economy'. An Historical IPE provides the ontological, epistemological, 
methodological and theoretical bases from which an alternative mode of 
knowledge of world finance will be generated in the subsequent chapters. 
An Historical IPE develops through, and necessarily supports, an 
existing 'historical turn' amongst new IPE scholars. Two related threads of this 
call to history in new IPE are distinguishable, united in their belief that history 
has more to contribute to the social sciences than simply providing a large body 
of facts against which existing theories can be tested. First, a recent call has 
been made to 'historicise' the field of IPE (Amin & Palan 1996). Here 
"Historicising IPE means seeing the present as a set of social practices situated 
in time and space", creating an IPE which is "deeply sensitive to the influences 
of context on issues examined ... " (Amin & Palan 1996: 212). In line with 
1 This chapter draws upon discussions with the other members of the Newcastle International 
Political Economy Working Group as part of a project entitled 'Historical Paths to International 
Political Economy'. Group meetings were held between October 1997 and June 1998. My 
thanks go to Louise Amoore, Richard Dodgson, Randall Germain, Barry Gills, Elizabeth 
Pallister, and lain Watson for participating fully in the Group's work. The 'Historical 
International Political Economy' approach developed here is, however, my own responsibility. 
For an example of the Newcastle Group's earlier work, see Amoore et al (1997). 
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historicism and a broadly based institutionalist perspective, it is the essential 
historicity of the "agents-in-institutions" and "institutions-in-agents" involved in 
social practices which is emphasised. ' The concerns of this thread of the 
historical turn in new IPE tend to be shared by historical sociologists who have 
sought to 'bring history back in' to IR (Hall 1996: 24-9; Hobson 1997: 19-20). 
Second, the work of Cox (1976/1996,1981/1996,1985/1996), Gill 
(1991,1997) and Germain (1996,1997) has looked to history to provide an 
ontological and epistemological anchor for new IPE. Here the call to history is 
more ambitious. It constitutes one form of broadly critical reasoning that 
challenges the claims of orthodox IPE as to the focus of inquiry and the 
knowledge which it accepts as legitimate. ' This thread of the historical turn 
builds on the writings of Giambattista Vico, Antonio Gramsci and Fernand 
Braudel and the work of historians engaged in the philosophy of history. The 
key to the resulting "Coxian historicism" (Mittelman 1998; Sinclair 1996: 6-8) 
or "historical mode of thoughf' (Cox 1981/1996: 91; Germain 1997: 174) is an 
ontology of historicity. This extends not only the agents and institutions that are 
the object of inquiry, but simultaneously to the historian or social scientist. As 
such, while the first thread of the call to history in IPE addresses largely 
methodological concerns, the second thread combines these with the 
epistemological issues raised by human beings participation in history and their 
unique position to understand and communicate its contours. It is through and 
in support of this second thread specifically that the Historical IPE approach 
outlined here is developed. 
Part I of the chapter addresses and expands upon the notion of an 
historical mode of thought. An ontology of historicity is explored through an 
engagement with the philosophy of history, and the epistemological and 
methodological implications elaborated upon. The result is an 'historical' 
2 'Historicism' in this sense is "the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any 
phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained through considering it in 
terms of the place it occupied and the role which it played within a process of development" 
(Mandelbaurn 1971, in Ankersmit 1995: 143-4). Such an understanding of historicism is in 
contrast to that of Popper (1957/1960) which critiques historicism as the belief that prediction is 
the main aim of history and the social sciences, and that the so-called speculative philosophies of 
Hegel, Marx or Spengler offer such predictions. 
3 As Germain (1996: 202,22 1) has observed, by seeking a mode of knowledge in IR and IPE that 
rests on a commitment to accept the epistemological and methodological consequencies of the 
historicity of thought and action, this thread of the call to history is complementary with 
applications of both Habermasian Critcal Theory (Linklater 1996) and constructivism. (Burch & 
Denemark 1997). 
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warrant for alternative knowledge claims to those legitimated by an empiricist 
epistemology which underpins positivism as the methodology of neo-classical 
economics and orthodox IPE. Part II, 'An Historical International Political 
Economy' develops an approach to IPE inquiry which is ontologically consistent 
with an historical mode of thought. As such, an Historical IPE is illuminated 
along the five principal interrelated dimensions which are its primary concern: 
Structured Social Practices; Social Change; Social Space; Social Time; and 
Social Orders. Each dimension is rounded out with reference to relevant 
existing new IPE scholarship. This serves to highlight the extent to which the 
ontological concerns of an Historical IPE resonate with existing new IPE 
inquiry, and to provide theoretical concepts to facilitate inquiry. 
Part I- An Historical Mode of Thought 
History 
To begin it is clearly appropriate to question the reasons for grounding a 
mode of knowledge of IPE in history. First, in a simple sense, the call to history 
is supportive of IPE's aspirations as an open and interdisciplinary field of 
inquiry (Strange 1984). ' Following Braudel (1980: 26,38), history can be seen 
as uniquely placed amongst the social sciences to seek "an explanation of 
society in all its reality". The vast expansion of the subjects studied by 
historians in the twentieth century beyond traditional concerns with 'great men', 
such as kings, generals and popes, has rendered history often indistinguishable 
from the rest of the social sciences in terms of subject matter (Stanford 1994). 
As Wallerstein (1979: ix) has argued, history and the social sciences are "one 
subject matter, requiring "historical social science". 
Second, the call to history in IPE forms part of a general dissatisfaction 
with the predominant mode of knowledge of the international realm that rests 
upon empiricist epistemology and positivist methodology (Smith, Booth & 
Zalewski 1996). As Smith (1996: 11-14) makes clear, this predominance has 
implications not only for questions of epistemology and methodology, but also 
shapes what can be studied as it determines what things exist as knowable. ' For 
4 The opening editorial statements of several of IPE's recently launched journals provide clear 
expressions of these interdisciplinary aspirations. See Review of International Political 
Economy launched in 1994, and New Political Economy launched in 1996. 
is 
Cox (1981/1996: 86-7), for example, an historical mode of thought is a necessary 
accompaniment of shifting inquiry from the traditionally narrow focus of IR on 
inter-state relations towards a wider focus on global power relations in which 
state-society complexes are the basic entities. Similarly, in seeking to 
"illuminate and explain the present global transformation", Gill (1997: 5 original 
emphasis) calls for "a historical perspective, drawing upon the imaginations of 
historians and critical theorists of the past". 
This second reason for grounding a mode of knowledge of IPE in history 
becomes more apparent once we ask E. H Carr's (1964) prescient question 'what 
is historyT. It is through reflection upon this question that history becomes "a 
way of knowing, or a mode of knowledge" (Stanford 1994: 112 original 
emphasis). What Carr (1964: 9) called the "commonsense view of history" 
suggests that history is the past, reconstructed by narrative accounts based on 
documented facts that tell it like it was. Such an understanding of history in 
these terms is underpinned by the epistemology of empiricism derived from 
Locke and Hume. " Carr's (1964) purpose, however, was to question what it is 
about the past that makes it knowable to historians. This led him to recognise 
the dual meaning of history as both the past and the study of the past in the 
present. History becomes neither one nor the other, but "an unending dialogue 
between the present and the past" (Carr 1964: 30). Other historians who have 
also effectively sought to question 'what is historyT and, therefore, engaged 
with the philosophy of history, have broadly supported Carr's work. ' For 
instance, Collingwood (1946: 2), elaborating on Croce's famous dictum that 'all 
history is contemporary history', holds that history "is neither the past by itself, 
5 In this sense, the call to history is part of a wider project that seeks to bring "post-positivism" 
to bear in International Relations in order to open up the field of inquiry to previously neglected 
issues such as development (Dickson 1997). 
6 "The empirical theory of knowledge presupposes a complete separation between the subject 
and object. Facts, like sense-impressions, impinge on the observer from outside, and are 
independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is passive: having received the data, 
he then acts on them. ... History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts" (Carr 1964: 3). 
7 The term the 'philosophy of history' was first used by Voltaire, and is taken by Carr (1964: 19) 
to mean his answer to the question 'what is historyT. The explicit engagement with the 
philosophy of history of which Carr (1964) is part only really began in the early twentieth 
century with the work of Croce in Italy. This intensified in the 1920s and 1930s as part of the 
wider questioning of the self-confidence which had marked the liberal nineteenth century (Carr 
1964: 20-1). The philosophy of history forms the third of the three major veins of historiography 
identified by Stanford (1994: 5). The first two are "descriptive historiography" and "historical 
historiography" concerned, respectively, with the methods of historical writing and the different 
ways history has been written across time and space. The third, "analytical or critical 
historiography ... discusses the concepts and philosophical problems arising from history". 
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... nor the historians thought about 
it by itself, ... but the two things 
in mutual 
relation". Post-modem writers such as Jenkins (1991: 5-26) have taken this one 
step ftirther, arguing that history is not the past but a range of competing 
discourses about the past. In short, by posing the question 'what is historyT, the 
utility of an historical mode of thought for legitimating a different kind of 
knowledge claim in IPE to that which is legitimated by an empiricist 
epistemology begins to be revealed. 
Historicity 
The critique of an empiricist epistemology by an historical mode of 
thought provides the foundations for an alternative to positivist forms of 
knowledge (Cox 1976/1996). ' At the roots of this critique is the recognition of 
the coexistence of past and present in historical inquiry, an ontology of 
historicity which recognises the reflective agency of both the human agents in 
the past that are the object of inquiry and the historian him/herself in the present 
(Carr 1964: 31-55). Both human agents and the historian are necessarily 
reflective, as 'historicity' is not only being situated historically but also the 
awareness of that situation (Stanford 1994: 50-1). Marx's famous dictum that 
'Men make their own history ... but under the given and inherited circumstances 
with which they are directly confronted' operates, then, in both past and present. 
The historicity of human thought and actions will be explored below through an 
engagement with the philosophy of history. 
As Collingwood (1946: 9) has emphasised, history in the first instance is 
the "science of res gestae, the attempt to answer questions about human actions 
done in the past". An historical mode of thought identifies the historicity of 
human thought and actions that are necessarily concretely situated in time and 
Following Smith (1996: 14-18), 'positivism' is recognised as having three main chronological 
variants. First, that developed by Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth century as a project of 
applying the methods of the natural sciences to society in the search for causal laws to explain 
phenomenon. Second, that of 'logical positivism' that emerged in the 1920s as the starkest form 
of positivism which denied all knowledge that was not scientifically observable. Third, the form 
of positivism that has been dominant in the social sciences over the last fifty years associated 
with the work of Hempel and Popper that combines deductive logic, emprical verification to find 
the truth, the separtion of theory and observation, and the belief that causation is the result of 
relationships between observed events. As such, positivism becomes understood as "a 
methodological view that combines naturalism (in either its strong (ontological and 
methodological) or its weak (methodological) sense), and a belief in regularities. It is licensed 
by a strict empiricist epistemology itself committed to an objectivism about the relationship 
between theory and evidence. ... which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they 
are empirically warranted" (Smith 1996: 17). 
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space. For instance, for Carr (1964: 33) 'human nature' is "a historical 
phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and conventione'. 
Similarly, for Thompson (1978: 200) human beings are necessarily part of the 
wider and changing processes of "social being" which inform the conditions, 
concepts and expectations for human experience. Not only do the "prevailing 
social conditions" and "social being" frame human actions as social actions, but 
the 'social' is "in constant process of creation and transformation by man 
himself' (Carr 1964: 138). An historical mode of thought is concerned, then, 
with the changing relationships between social actions and the societies within 
which they take place. 
The relationships between social actions and the societies within which 
they take place have usually been expressed in the social sciences as a concern 
with the agency-structure problematic. " The recognition of the essential 
historicity of social actions and thought by the historical mode of thought 
informs a particular approach to the agency-structure problematic. First, in 
contrast to both atomism and structuralism, agency and structure are 
acknowledged as inseparable in order to reveal the ways in which social 
structures are constructed and reconstructed by social thought and actions. 
Structures are patterns of constraints and opportunities both real and perceived 
by agents themselves which, in turn, may change over time as a result of social 
actions. " Second, a significant aspect of the historicity of social thought and 
actions is the human capacity to reflect on structural conditions. Structures are 
recognisable as the appreciation of relative constraints and opportunities by 
reflective agents themselves within a particular context. In this sense, the object 
of inquiry for an historical mode of thought extends beyond the relationships 
between individual agents and material structures to what Braudel (1980: 39) has 
termed the "unconscious history", that is the social reality that stands behind and 
gives meaning to human actions as social actions. " 
' For an overview of attempts to address the agency-structure problematic across the social 
sciences, see Hay (1995). 
10 In this sense, an historical approach to agency-structure complements and reinforces other 
currents of thought across the social sciences that share the goal of linking agency and structure 
in dialectical synthesis. See, for example, Anthony Gidden's theory of structuration and its 
development by new IPE scholars (Cemy 1990; Porter 1993). 
11 In this sense, an historical approach to agency-structure shares many of the concerns of 
constructivism. Constructivism is "the view that the manner in which the material world shapes 
and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world' (Alder 1997: 322 original emphasis). For constructivist 
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Third, the demand of an historical approach for inquiry into the 
processes whereby agents reflect upon their structural circumstances throws 
open promising avenues for consideration of the individual and collective nature 
of agency. Individual reflection does not and cannot take place in isolation. 
Everyday individual social actions are necessarily informed by collectively held 
assumptions and perceptions within a wider social order (Collingwood 
1946: 223). Material conditions may be confronted in different ways by different 
sets of collective assumptions. As Braudel's (1980: 39) notion of unconscious 
history suggests and as Carr (1964: 48-9) affirms, individuals often do not act 
upon motivations of which they are fully conscious. The notion of 'social 
practices' will be employed here, then, as recognition of the influence of 
collectively held assumptions and perceptions on sets of everyday structured 
social actions within a social order. Furthermore, the identification of the 
historicity of thought and action also highlights the contingent nature of 
collective forms of agency such as classes and institutions. As Thompson's 
(1963) notion of 'social consciousness' in the making of the English working 
class illustrates, the formation of conscious collective agency requires shared 
self-awareness of existing social relations to form collective motivations. It is 
the widespread absence of such 'social consciousness' that persuades Carr 
(1964: 50) that it may be more appropriate to consider 'social forces' - that is, 
"individuals acting more or less unconsciously, together rather than classes 
as collective forms of agency. 
The main elements of the historical approach to the agency-structure 
problematic outlined above all rest on a clear sense that the changeable 
relationships between social actions and social structures are, at once, part of 
and contribute to the processes of historical change. In this sense, then, an 
historical mode of thought is concerned with historical change understood in the 
first instance as social change (Carr 1964: 55; Hobsbawrn 1997: 72-5). Drawing 
on historical materialist historiography, social change is understood as the 
outcome of an historical dialectic. Existing structures contain contradictions 
and sources of conflict. For Marx, contradictions and conflicts originated in the 
economic base and 'the contradictions of capitalism' narrowly defined. 
However, as Collingwood (1946: 123) has posited, the processes of history are 
constituted by a number of interdependent and parallel histories - social, 
approaches to IPE, see Jones (1995) and Burch and Denemark (1997). For an alternative 
"strategic-relational" approach to agency-structure in sociology that also emphasises the relative 
nature of structures and the reflective quality of human agency, see Jessop (1995). 
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economic, political, religious, artistic and so on - each of which is connected to 
the others in an "organic unity". As Gramsci's notion of 'organic crises' 
suggests, contradictions and crises can arise amongst any aspect of these parallel 
histories. " It is reflection upon these contradictions and the resolution of 
conflicts within an existing social order which generate structural and social 
change. 
In addition, the processes of social change are recognised to contain 
continuities as well as discontinuities, the "general" and the "unique" (Carr 
1964: 62-6). In the course of social change, structures are both transformed and 
preserved, containing within them further contradictions and sources of conflict. 
Amongst historians, Braudel's (1980: 27-33) notion of the plurality of social 
time facilitates consideration of the complex interplay of continuity and 
discontinuity in the relationships between social actions and social structures. 
Braudel distinguished between three speeds of the experience of social time by 
agents. First, "Phistoire ivenmentielle", that is, the "short-time span, 
proportionate to individuals, to daily life, to our illusions, to our hasty awareness 
... " (Braudel 1980: 28). Second, "conjunctural" time, that 
is, cycles, movements 
and perceptible rhythms which tend to span between ten and fifty years. Third, 
the "longue durie", that is, those routinised patterns of action and thought which 
establish the 'limits of the possible' of social life across centuries. What clearly 
interested Braudel was the way in which the structures of the longue durie, 
which changed only very slowly, interacted with the more immediate and 
flexible constraints and opportunities of the medium- and short-time spans. In 
our terms, then, over the longue durie social practices are likely to display 
considerable continuities, while exhibiting considerable con unctural. j 
discontinuities. 
A defining feature of an historical mode of thought is that the historicity 
of human thought and action identified above is extended to the thought and 
action of the historian him/herself. As Carr (1964: 24) asserts, "The historian is 
of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence". 
Similarly, Hobsbawm (1997: 229) highlights that "Every historian has his or her 
12 As Murphy (1994: 27) has observed of Gramsci, "He argued that ideas, culture, politics, and 
laws are more than simple functions of economic interests and the powers granted to people by 
their roles in production; these superstructures have an independent existence and force. 
Moreover, Gramsci believed that no economic system can fully develop - not even the 
contradictions within its inner logic can fully develop - outside of a conducive political and 
cultural environmenf'. 
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own lifetime, a private perch from which to survey the world". The historicity 
of the historian as a social scientist necessarily has ramifications for his thought 
and action, as perceived and real structures frame his "angle of vision over the 
past" (Carr 1964: 36). Both interpretations of the past and the manner in which 
they are communicated are manifestations of the values, ideas and analytical 
tools of the social scientist as opposed to those of the past social practices that 
are the focus of inquiry (Carr 1964: 36). Accounts of the past become an 
expression of the pre-occupations of the present (Thompson 1978: 211; 
Collingwood 1946: 233). As such, historians who have either denied or lacked 
an awareness of the historicity of their own writings have been criticised for 
consciously and unconsciously contributing to the reproduction of the social 
relations within which they are embedded (Jenkins 1991: 20-21). For a 
genuinely historical mode of thought, then, the identification of the historicity of 
human thought and action undeniably extends to both observer and observed. 
Historical Knowledge 
Rooted in an ontology of historicity, an historical mode of thought also 
provides the epistemological and methodological warrant for the construction of 
a certain kind of knowledge. Following Collingwood (1946: 218), we shall term 
this "historical knowledge", a mode of knowledge which contrasts with that 
which tends to be generated on the basis of empiricist epistemology and 
positivist methodology. 
To begin, epistemological and methodological implications stem from 
the historicity of those human thought and actions that are the focus of inquiry. 
The individualism of positivism in both its ontological and methodological 
forms is rejected. Ontological individualism, sometimes referred to as strong 
naturalism, tends to be posited by more extreme forms of positivism and 
suggests an unchanging essence of 'human nature'. " As Collingwood 
(1946: 205-9) highlights, such a "science of human nature" cannot be conducted 
once the historicity of human thought and action is accepted. Similarly, 
methodological individualism, or weak forms of naturalism, which rest upon the 
assumption of empiricist epistemology that, as unobservable phenomenon, 
social structures do not form part of legitimate inquiry is also overturned. 
13 The view that individual human nature is key to understanding human actions stems from the 
Renaissance and spiritual individualism in the western world, later becoming re-cast under 
capitalism, Protestantism and liberal theories of utilitarianism. In each instance, individualism 
appealed to those groups within society whose interests in served (Carr 1964: 33-5). 
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Further, the identification of the historicity of thought and action also 
provides the basis for objections to positivist approaches to causation. Rooted 
in empiricist epistemology, positivism reduces historically situated human 
thought and action to events as externally observable phenomenon. Causation is 
explained through the relationships between events. As a consequence, the 
interplay of agency and structure in social change is denied (Cox 1976/1996: 64). 
For Collingwood (1946: 213), it is the inability of positivist methodology 
derived from the natural sciences to link events to actions and thought that 
distinguishes what he terms "historical science" from natural science. Historical 
science seeks understanding of the meaning of historical change, not causation. 
Finally, the recognition of the historicity of human thought and action also leads 
to a rejection of the belief in regularities or universalism of positivism. Such 
universalism assumes that society contains a rationality that can be discovered 
through the identification of regularities among observable phenomenon. The 
discovery of regularities allows the formulation of general laws in the form of 
consequences that are believed to be predictable under prescribed conditions 
(Cox 1976/1996: 63). Once again, this search for laws contrasts with the 
demand of an historical mode of thought for the understanding of social change 
as the interplay of structure and agency. 
The objections to positivist methodology through the recognition of the 
historicity of social practices are suggestive, essentially, of a rejection of the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to the social sciences. This 
critique is elaborated once the historicity of the social scientist is incorporated. 
Positivist methodology is built around the separation of subject and object in 
inquiry, the division of observer from observed. An historical mode of thought, 
by contrast, posits the inseparability of subject and object (Carr 1964: 119-132). 
In the first instance, this inseparability stems from the qualitative difference 
between the social and natural sciences. As Vico highlighted in the eighteenth 
century by distinguishing between human history and natural history, the social 
sciences are unique in involving human actions and thought as both subject and 
object (Carr 1964: 73). The human thought and actions done in the past which 
are the focus of inquiry for an historical mode of thought have necessarily taken 
place and, as such, are not an object in the same sense as the objects of inquiry 
for the natural sciences (Thompson 1978: 209; Collingwood 1946: 218). In the 
construction of historical knowledge, subject and object effectively belong to the 
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same category and are reciprocally related to one another in the course of 
inquiry. 
The reciprocal relationship between sub ect and object in an historical j 
mode of thought leads to a rejection of the empiricist distinction between fact 
and value. Historical knowledge is necessarily not objective knowledge as fact 
and value are intertwined. " In rejecting the objectivity of knowledge, however, 
an historical mode of thought does not descend into "hapless relativism7' which 
suggests that any one interpretation is as valid as another (Jenkins 1991: 25). 
Instead, following the insights of Croce (Rowse 1963: 124-5), the attempt to 
generate historical knowledge which explains historical change is held to be part 
of a wider attempt to foster "human self-knowledge" (Collingwood 1946: 10) 
which is capable of informing those conscious subjects who actually effect the 
future. As Carr (1964: 27) asserts, "Knowledge is knowledge for some purpose. 
The validity of knowledge depends upon the validity of purpose". The purpose 
of historical knowledge lies in the appropriation of the past to inform the present 
and future (Carr 1964: 121-2; Jenkins 1991: 59-70). It is in these terms that the 
value of historical knowledge is to be judged. In particular, the explicit 
recognition of the significance of the connection between human action, 
knowledge and reflection by an historical mode of thought opens the potential 
for a politically motivated, transformative form of historical knowledge. Such a 
transformative historical knowledge translates an emancipatory commitment by 
the historian, which itself emerges out of his/her "moral involvement" (Carr 
1964: 125) in history, into a challenge to existing and dominant modes of 
knowledge which legitimate existing social power relations. At the same time, 
transformative historical knowledge must remain sensitive to the historicity of 
the present and not be utopian in form. 
In methodological terms, the creation of this form of historical 
knowledge begins with "a reflective three-way dialogue" (Germain 1997: 175) 
between the meanings and understandings attached to social practices by human 
agents themselves, the evidence pertaining to the focus of inquiry, and the 
commitments and perspective of the historian or social scientist. The historian 
14 In this sense, then, an historical mode of thought should not be confused with those historians 
who, while recognising the essentially subjective nature of historical knowledge, have effectively 
sought to maintain the fact/value distinction of empiricist epistemology by appealing to 
methodological rigour. Central here has been the claim of responsiveness to the 'facts' of the 
past in an effort to minimise the intrusion of the subjective and give legitimacy to their claims to 
the truth. See, for example, Marwick (1970) and Hobsbawm (1997: 266-277). 
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is dealing with what Anthony Giddens termed "a pre-interpreted world", in 
which the meanings and understandings of active subjects enter into the actual 
construction of that world (in Trimberger 1984: 229). It follows that social 
practices are meaningless to the historian unless he/she can understand the 
thought processes that lay behind them (Carr 1964: 22), and that "Thought and 
being inhabit a single space, which space is ourselves" (Thompson 1978: 211). 
As Collingwood (1946: 218) asserts, 
"Historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the 
past, and the same time it is the redoing of this, the perpetuation of past 
acts in the present. Its object is therefore not a mere object, something 
outside the mind which knows it; it is an activity of thought, which can 
only by known in so far as the knowing mind re-enacts it and knows 
itself as so doing. To the historian, the activities whose history he is 
studying are not spectacles to be watched, but experiences to be lived 
through his own mind; they are objective, or known to him, only because 
they are also subjective, or activities of his own". 
The inclusion of evidence within the three-way dialogue is likely to assist in 
inquiry. The reconstruction of individual conscious thoughts will necessarily be 
incomplete and is unlikely alone to reveal the unconscious history behind 
motivations and intentions that are formed within societies (Carr 1964: 51-2). 
Indeed, given that "the historian is necessarily selective" (Carr 1964: 6), what 
constitutes evidence and its interpretation is also open to debate. It is the self- 
referential nature of this methodology that ensures its consistency with an 
ontology of historicity in the creation of historical knowledge. 
For historical knowledge to realise a transformative dimension also 
requires the incorporation of a comparative historical method. Comparison 
between the past and present and the present and the past generates historical 
knowledge that can inform future social action (Carr 1964: 66-8; Collingwood 
1946: 10; Hobsbawrn 1997: 24-36). As Braudel (1980: 37) asserts, "Past and 
present illuminate each other reciprocally". A comparative historical method 
should not be confused in this sense with the assumption that past and present 
are in some way the same. Past and present are not examined through the 
application of a pre-given theory or to produce a fixed general theory to guide 
future social action. Instead, the value of comparative history lies in the 
capacity of the use of historically informed theoretical concepts to realise a 
transformative mode of knowledge. Given that theoretical ideas should seek to 
illuminate the "development potential" (Cox 1985/1996: 53) of present 
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structures, this may seek to challenge the mechanisms by which present 
structures are reffied and naturalised by existing and predominant (ahistorical) 
modes of knowledge. Alternatively, it may be possible to highlight potential 
"structural opportunities" (Gills 1994) which may be utilised through social 
action to help transform the very structures which frame social life. 
In sum, then, the defining feature of the historical knowledge generated 
by an historical mode of thought follows from an ontology of historicity. While 
this has the epistemological and methodological implications addressed above, 
it also has considerable consequences for our main concerns in IPE as a field of 
inquiry. Following from an ontology of historicity, five principal interrelated 
dimensions are held as guiding the focus for inquiry of an Historical IPE: 
Structured Social Practices; Social Change; Social Space; Social Time; Social 
Orders. Each of these dimensions is rounded out below with reference to 
relevant existing new IPE scholarship. While not providing the only historical 
pathway to new IPE inquiry, this serves to highlight the extent to which the 
ontological concerns of an Historical IPE resonate with existing new IPE inquiry 
and provides theoretical concepts to facilitate inquiry. 
Part II - An Historical International Political Economy 
Structured Social Practices 
History as the science of res gestae leads an Historical IPE to, in the first 
instance, focus inquiry upon structured social practices. In this sense, the field 
of IPE becomes revealed across time as human experience, which itself is 
understood through the actual historical subjects who are constituted through 
collectively imbricated structured social practices. A focus for IPE inquiry upon 
structured social practices raises the question as to which practices, if any, are to 
be privileged. New IPE scholars tend to be united in their opposition to the 
privileging of the practices of both security and trade which have marked 
traditional IR and orthodox IPE inquiry respectively (Murphy & Tooze 
1991a: 24-7). Alternatively, new IPE scholars of different hues have asserted a 
variety of different sets of social practices as primary. For instance, new IPE 
approaches drawing on new institutional economics suggest a broad focus upon 
economic practices as social practices embedded in institutionalised social and 
cultural relations (Tool 1994; Hausner 1995). From a materialist position, Cox 
(1987) and other historical materialists (Rupert 1995) have focused on the social 
practices that constitute collective human responses to the production and 
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reproduction of material life. However, constructivists (Burch and Denemark 
1997) and the critique of historical materialism by Habermasian Critical 
Theorists (Linklater 1996: 284-290) effectively remind us that the privileging of 
certain sets of social practices risks marginalising the experiences of women and 
other minorities that tend to be excluded by the major ontologies of IR and IPE. 
It is in this spirit of openness and eclecticism that Strange (1988) 
identifies the practices of security, production, finance and knowledge as 
together constituting the four intersecting principal structures of IPE. While 
inquiry into other sets of structured social practices remains legitimate, 
ultimately this has to be related to the intersection of the four principal 
structures. This serves to reinforce Cox's (1981/1996: 85) point that the study of 
sets of structured social practices is an "initial subdivision of reality" which 
should not be treated as "separated objects of knowledge", but as a starting point 
"for constructing a structural and dynamic view of large wholes". In addition, as 
Strange (1988: 25-6) highlights, the utility of a focus on structured social 
practices and the social and power relationships involved in their organisation 
also lays in prompting inquiry which cuts across the false dichotomy between 
politics and economics which is maintained by IR's narrow focus on the security 
structure. 
The ontology of historicity of an historical mode of thought demands a 
certain understanding of agency-structure in social practices. Ibis diverges 
most sharply with understandings of agency-structure which tend to be present 
amongst orthodox IPE scholars. In the main, orthodox IPE draws upon realist 
and liberal institutionalist theory to generate atomistic approaches which assert 
the "independent standing" (Krasner 1994: 14) of its agents (Murphy & Tooze 
1991a: 19-21). Alternatively, where structures are identified, as under Waltz's 
(1979) influential realist structuralism and by world-systems theorists 
(Wallerstein 1979), they tend to exist prior to investigation as abstract systemic 
properties and structural constraints which determine social and political action 
regardless of historical context (Jones 1995: 187; Amin & Palan 1996: 210). In 
contrast, new IPE scholars, drawing variously upon structuration theory (Cerny 
1990), constructivism (Jones 1995), and institutionalism (Amin & Palan 1996), 
tend to recognise a reciprocal relationship between agency-structure. Not 
surprisingly, however, it is Cox's (1981/1996: 97-101) notion of "historical 
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structures" which draws on an historical mode of thought that provides the most 
appropriate conceptualisation of agency-structure for an Historical IPE. ` 
For Cox (1981/1996: 100) an historical structure constitutes an 'abstract', 
ideal-type representation of a "limited totality ... a particular sphere of 
human 
activity in its historically located totality". In our terms, then, it can be seen as a 
snap shot of persistent social thought and actions, constraints and incentives - in 
short, equivalent to a set of structured social practices. Historical structures are, 
however, 'real' and concrete in that they are produced by recurrent social 
practices as agents respond to the actual or imagined circumstances they face. 
As abstract representations, Cox (1981/1996: 98-9) identifies three categories of 
forces - material capabilities, ideas, and institutions - as the reciprocally related 
basic components that interact within an historical structure. While historically 
situated shared ideas shape and hold the potential to change social practices, 
practices must draw upon existing material capabilities; be grounded in new 
ideas which give meaning and may justify innovation; and relate to or challenge 
existing institutions, as social practices are more often than not institutionalised. 
Material capabilities are "productive and destructive potentials" (Cox 
1981/1996: 98) that include dynamic capabilities, in particular technology; 
accumulated resources which dynamic capabilities can transform, such as 
natural resources, industrial and military equipment; and funds, both capital and 
credit, capable of commanding and mobilising these. Material capabilities 
establish the "material limits of the possible" (Murphy 1994: 30) for social 
practices. " Cox (1981/1996: 98-9) identifies two types of ideas which, while 
never wholly distinct, are distinguished for analytical clarity - intersubjective 
meanings and rival collective images of social order. Intersubjective meanings 
tend towards universality, shaping shared norms, values, consciousness and, 
thereby, defining social and historical reality. " Rival collective images of social 
15 For a wide ranging overview of the agency-structure problematic which asserts it centrality to 
IR and IPE inquiry, see Wendt (1987) 
16 The notion of 'material limits of the possible' would appear to have its theoretical roots in 
Braudel's (1981: 27) notion of "the limits of the possible". He states "Can it not be said that 
there is a limit, a ceiling which restricts human life, constraining it within a frontier of varying 
outline, one which is hard to reach and still harder to cross? This is the border which in every 
age, even our own age, separates the possible from the impossible, what can be done with little 
effort from what cannot be done at all. ... And men did not even explore the limits of what was 
possible". 
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order, or competing "world views" (Augelli & Murphy 1993: 13 1), are 
propagated in an historical structure and serve to highlight the congruence 
between the aspirations of the social forces they serve and the wider interests of 
societies. In effect, competing world views legitimate alternative forms of 
prevailing social and power relations, as they are specific to the material, social 
and political conditions of social forces. " Social institutions, both 'public' and 
'private', are "the broadly understood and accepted ways of organizing 
particular spheres of social action ... social practices ... routinized 
into specific 
sets of rules" (Cox 1992/1996: 149). "' As such, the processes of 
institutionalisation reflect the inequalities of social and power relations that exist 
at their point of construction, embedding and perpetuating a social order. As 
rules sustained by sanctions which may range from the pressure of opinion to 
enforceable law, institutions may become naturalised, coming to "take on a life 
of their own; they become the battleground for opposing tendencies, or rival 
institutions may reflect different tendencies" (Cox 1981/1996: 99). As a research 
program, then, an Historical IPE, seeks in the first instance to reveal the sets of 
structured social practices framed by material, ideational and institutional forces 
which are characteristic of particular eras. 
Social Change 
Following from an historical mode of thought, an Historical IPE is 
concerned with historical change. In particular, interest extends to the 
changeable relationships between soc 
, 
ial actions and social structures that are, at 
once, part of and contribute to the processes of social change. A concern with 
social change resonates clearly with the attempts of new IPE scholars to get 
'beyond' IR and orthodox IPE (Murphy & Tooze 1991a: 29). Indeed, the 
emergence of new IPE has been necessarily intertwined with seeking 
17 Some parallels can be drawn between intersubjective meanings and the 'informal' social 
institutions highlighted by new institutionalism that realise correlated behaviour. See, for 
example, Tool (1994: 409-10). 
18 Cox's concern with competing collective images of social order strikes a chord with a wide 
body of research across the social sciences. For instance, see Gidden's (1979: 193-5) work on 
dominant discourses. Competing world views cannot, of course, be simply imposed by 
prevailing social forces. This is illustrated by Drainville's (1994: 1114) analysis of neo- 
liberalism as the world view propagated by social forces associated with transnational money 
capital in the late twentieth century. While neo-liberalism as an abstract idea contains 
universalist tenets, these manifest themselves differently across time and space as they cannot be 
separated from the material limits of the possible and the institutions of concrete historical 
structures. 
19 For a new IPE analysis of the expansion of industrial capitalism that emphasises the 
interdependent nature of 'public' and 'private' institutions, see Murphy (1994). 
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understanding of contemporary structural change (Gill & Mittelman 1997). 
Frustration with the inability of the predominant neo-realist theory of IR and 
orthodox IPE to sufficiently address social change has not, however, been 
limited to new IPE scholars. IR writers themselves have been aware of the 
essentially ahistorical nature of much IR inquiry, and of its inability to 
conceptualise historical change (Buzan & Jones 1981; Ruggie 1985; Little 
1994). Following Scholte (1993), four main interrelated reasons are identifiable 
for the widespread underdevelopment of the study of social change in the 
international realm. First, the ontology of statism that pervades in IR and 
orthodox IPE leads to a concern with inter-state relations and not social change. 
Second, the concern with inter-state relations leads to a focus upon politics 
narrowly defined, not upon societies. Third, for atomistic neo-realist IR and 
orthodox IPE the principal agents are states, and "other actors are a 
manifestation of the preferences and capabilities of states" (Krasner 1994: 14). 
As a consequence, the 'whole' is conceptualised as constituted by inter-state 
relations, preventing the study of transnational societal relations. " Fourth, the 
epistemological and methodological warrant for neo-realism provided by the 
combination of empiricism and positivism translates into the positing of 
fundamental continuities, such as the rise and fall of the great powers and the 
anarchy of the inter-state system. These lead to the acceptance of the possibility 
of social change, but the negation of social change as structural change. The 
transience of social forms is, thus, effectively denied. 
The study of social change is, then, incompatible with the 
conceptualisation of the subject matter of IPE offered by orthodox approaches 
(Cox 1985/1996: 52-3; Gill 1997: 7-8). In response, new IPE scholars have 
offered a range of alternative ontologies that share the purpose of casting the 
subject matter of IPE as a social entity at a world or global scale. These have 
included, for instance, world orders (Cox 1987), world-economy (Germain 
1996), global political economy (Gill & Law 1988) and global order (Underhill 
1994). Such ontologies have been essential to facilitating the study of social 
structural change in a manner that accepts the interconnectedness of the 
domestic and international, politics and economics. States are not displaced 
from the centre of IPE inquiry, but re-conceptualised as part of wider social and 
power relationships that exist from the global to the local scales. For instance, 
Cox (1987) focuses on the changing forms of states under pressure from 
20 See, for example, Bull's (1977) influential work on international society, where society is 
understood as a society of states. 
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structural changes in both their respective civil societies and wider world orders. 
Not dissimilarly, the first order question of neo-structuralist IPE is to ask "how 
global processes interact with other processes of state-societal transformation 
occurring at many other levels of the world system" (Gills & Palan 1994: 3). 
States are the key focal points for social conflict and the main institutional 
means for the exercise of authority in the course of global social change. 
For an Historical IPE, then, an understanding of change within a set of 
structured social practices requires that this is related to an understanding of 
wider structural change at a world-scale. Following Cox (1981/1996), this is 
facilitated by an ontology of 'world orders'. " Change within an historical 
structure cannot be isolated from wider world order change. Further, remaining 
consistent with an historical mode of thought, an Historical IPE asserts the 
interplay of agency-structure in social change. Once again, there is a wide body 
of new IPE scholarship which, from a variety of perspectives, serves to reinforce 
this claim. For instance, approaches drawing upon new institutional economics 
have sought to advance an "interactive" approach to social change which 
highlights the interplay of "agents-in-institutions" and "institutions-in-agents" 
(Hausner 1995; Amin & Palan 1996). Not dissimilarly, neo-Gramscian IPE 
posits that "history is always in the making, in a complex and dialectical 
interplay between agency, structure, consciousness and action" (Gill 1993: 8-9). 
In our terms, and following Cox (1985/1996: 53-4; 1976/1996: 77-8), existing 
historical structures have inherent contradictions and give rise to social conflicts 
which are central to their transformation. Attempts to resolve these antagonisms 
are bound by wider social and power relations in the prevailing world order. 
Not only does the research program of an Historical IPE seek to reveal those sets 
of structured social practices which characterise specific eras, but also to trace 
their dialectical transformation as part of wider social change. 
Social Space 
An historical mode of thought insists on the historicity of social thought 
and action in time and space. The spatial dimension of historicity has, however, 
tended to be overlooked by new IPE scholars generally and even by those who 
21 ... World' designates the relevant totality, geographically limited by the range of probable 
interactions (some past 'worlds' being limited to the Mediterranean, to Europe, to China, etc. ). 
'Order' is used in the sense of the way things usually happen (not the absence of turbulence); 
thus disorder is included in the concept of order. ... The term is used in plural to indicate that 
particular patterns of power relationships which have endured in time can be contrasted in terms 
of their principal characteristics as distinctive world orders" (Cox 1981/1996: 116-7). 
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have been part of IPE's 'historical turn'. Drainville (1995) has recently 
highlighted this spatial deficit amongst new IPE scholarship. While new IPE 
has offered a variety of ontologies that effectively define the subject matter of 
IPE as a world-scale social phenomenon, the space of social relations tends to be 
assumed rather than viewed as constituted through social processes. Recent 
cross-disciplinary debates illustrate that a clear, explicit conception of space 
forms an indispensable part of any social theory (Simonsen 1996). IPE, 
however, tends to implicitly adopt what Agnew (1994) has termed "the 
territorial assumptions of IR7', whereby space is equated with territory. Such a 
state-centric conceptualisation of space sits awkwardly with new IPE ontologies 
that go beyond the inter-state system in their definition of the subject matter of 
IPE. 
For an Historical IPE, space is understood not in the sense of the 
geographical environment which conditions social actions. Such a 
conceptualisation of space presents it as both passive and ahistorical, as the 
things and substances used in social actions regardless of historical context. 
Instead, following the philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1991) and 
the development of his work in IPE by geographers Agnew and Corbribge 
(1995), space is understood as 'social space'. That is, space is recognised as an 
integral part of all social actions - "a dimension of all social life" (Simonsen 
1996: 505 original emphasis). Tberefore, social space is itself produced and 
reproduced over time through social processes. As Lefebvre (1991: 73) asserts, 
"(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among 
other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses 
their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity - their 
(relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence 
and a set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of simple 
object. ... Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet 
others". 
Space is recognised as fashioned, shaped and invested with social thought and 
action, inseparable from it and, as such, only understandable in its historically 
concrete existence as social space. For Agnew and Corbridge (1995), such a 
conceptualisation of space both exposes the implicit territorial assumptions of 
IR and supports the view that the division of the world into discrete territories 
has been a matter for social construction. ' 
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Lefebvre (1991) has developed a 'conceptual triad' which provides the 
basis for his understanding of the production and reproduction of social space. 
The three concepts - 'spatial practice', 'representations of space', and 
(representational space' - are dialectically related, none is given primacy and 
each is suggested by the others. Each contributes to the production of space in 
different ways according to their qualities and attributes, to the society in 
question, and to the historical moment concerned (Lefebvre 1991: 46). First, the 
inseparability of social action and social space is made explicit through the 
notion of 'spatial practice'. Spatial practices are the material flows and 
interactions of a society which are the fundamental features of economic 
production and social reproduction, and which necessarily have, and develop, 
spatial contexts (Lefebvre 1991: 38). In our terms, sets of structured social 
practices are spatial practices because they are embedded in the perceptions of 
space generated by this dialectical interaction. 
Second, 'representations of space' are "conceptualised space", the codes 
and terms which shape the understandings of space embodied in spatial practice, 
forming and expressing the spatial element of the dominant discourse of society 
(Lefebvre 1991: 38). For an Historical IPE, such representations of space form 
part of the intersubjective meanings which frame sets of social practices. 
Finally, Lefebvre's notion of 'representational space' introduces 
conceptualisations of space which are likely to constitute a challenge to 
dominant representations of space. Agnew and Corbridge (1995: 7) summarise 
representational space as "'imagined geographies' that inspire changes in the 
representation of space with an eye to the transformation of space practices". 
For an Historical IPE, such representational space may form part of world views 
propagated by social forces to legitimate social and power relations which 
themselves entail a restructuring of a set of social practices as spatial practices. 
Social space is a generic term encompassing the uncountable sets of 
social space generated by different sets of social practices (Lefebvre 1991: 86). 
Within each set of social practices and their associated social space, key 
22 In this sense, an Historical IPE's concern with social space may open up potential linkages 
with those scholars engaged critically in re-interpreting International Relations in a rapidly 
changing world (for overview, see George 1994). Overcoming the territorial assumptions of IR 
here is a key problematic. For instance, Walker's (1993: ix-x) work is informed by "a sense that 
our understanding of these transformations, and of the contours of alternative political practices, 
remains caught within discursive horizons that express the spatio-temporal configurations of 
another era7. 
35 
interconnected 'social spaces' emerge as the "social locus" for social practice 
(Lefebvre 1991: 87). The primacy of these social spaces is likely to be 
reinforced by those representations of space that form the dominant 
conceptualisation of space with regard to the set of social practices concerned. 
Key social spaces cannot, however, be considered in isolation of the wider 
social space of which they are part. As Lefebvre (1991: 86-7) asserts, "Social 
spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon one 
another". Contrary to the territorial assumptions of IR and orthodox IPE, the 
key social spaces for sets of structured social practices may not correspond to 
the boundaries of territorial states. " 
Social Time 
An historical mode of thought posited the utility of Braudel's (1980: 27- 
33) notion of the plurality of social time to facilitate consideration of the 
complex interplay of continuity and discontinuity in the changing relationships 
between social actions and social structures. In particular, for an Historical IPE, 
social change is to be considered over the long-time span of the longue duree. 
In this sense, an Historical IPE shares a time frame for inquiry with world- 
systems analysis (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn 1989). Unlike the 
appropriation of Braudel's work by world-systems scholars, however, an 
Historical IPE seeks to maintain the original historicity of Braudel's concepts. 
World-systems scholars have tended to adopt Braudel's concepts in such a 
manner as to render them abstract and ahistorical, as historicity is sacrificed for 
definitional precision (Germain 1996: 204). An Historical IPE recovers 
Braudel's concepts by remaining consistent with an historical mode of thought 
and, in this sense, pays close attention to the appropriation of Braudel's notion 
of the plurality of social time by new IPE scholars who have already contributed 
to the field's historical turn. 
The notion of durie itself signifies lived experience, the speed of social 
time over which it is fitting to consider sets of structured social practices (Cox 
1996a: 150,1996b: 25). Considered over the longue durie, social practices retain 
a distinctive sense of continuity represented by the enduring features of what 
23 As Lefebvre (1991: 42) asserts, "We should have to study not only the history of space but 
also the history of representation, along with that of their relationships - with each other, with 
practice, and with ideology. History would have to take into account not only the genesis of 
these spaces, but also, and especially, their interconnection, distortions, displacements, mutual 
interactions, and their links with the spatial practice of the particular society or mode of 
production under consideration". 
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Braudel termed the mentaliti, that is, "the mental framework which guides the 
way human collectivities exploit their natural and social circumstances" 
(Germain 1996: 206). As such, for an Historical IPE, the length of the longue 
durie depends upon the sets of social practices that are the initial focus of 
inquiry. Further, capturing change in sets of structured social practices requires 
the inclusion of Braudel's notion of the conjuncture. As the neo-structuralist 
approach to IPE has highlighted by elevating the concept of the "historical 
conjuncture" to assist in apprehending structural change, a set of social practices 
over the longue durie does not dance to "the tune of one logic and uniform 
rhytW' (Gills & Palan 1994: 7). Social practices in different periods display 
variations in the meanings and values that inform and shape them. " Following 
Cox (1996b: 25), for an Historical IPE, conjunctural time corresponds to the 
irregular span -of those historical structures which together comprise a world 
order. Conjunctural time is, therefore, effectively re-conceptualised not simply 
in Braudelian terms as the ten to fifty year span of an economic cycle, but as the 
span of a configuration of social and power relations which is less predictable in 
duration. " 
Conjunctural inquiry into a set of social practices as an historical 
structure and wider world orders proceeds along two dimensions. As Sinclair 
(1996: 8) has noted, the notion of historical structures is designed to incorporate 
and integrate both the static, or synchronic, and dynamic, or diachronic, aspects 
of structures. The synchronous corresponds to I'histoire ivenmentielle, the 
simultaneous realm of events and individuals. In this sense, synchronic inquiry 
into an historical structure involves explanation within its own, day-to-day terms 
of the thought and action of social practices. The diachronous dimension is that 
of re-curing social patterns, the exact form of which remains historically 
specific. In this sense, diachronic inquiry into an historical structure relates day- 
to-day practices to the development potential of the structure (Sinclair 1996: 8). 
24 This point is informed ýY Strange's (1988: 17) concern with variations in the hierarchy of 
values of security, freedom, wealth and justice at different periods. While the essence of social 
practices may change only slowly from the perspective of the longue durde, considerable 
variations in values are visible at different historical conjunctures. 
25 This understanding of conjunctural time is also informed by the work of Overbeek (1990). 
Overbeek (1990: 22-3) identifies what he terms "stages of developmenf' as the realm of the 
medium-term perspective, where "Stages of development are distinguished by specific 
configurations of social and political institutions, each with their own characteristics. More 
precisely, stages of capitalist development are defmed by reference to a historically specific 
combination of relations between social classes and class fractions, forms of state power and 
ideological hegemony, and of the capitalist world economy and the inter-state system". 
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In short, diachronic understanding focuses upon potential and actual structural 
change and those social and power relations that underpin and determine social 
change (Cox 1996a: 150). Such diachronic understanding is likely to be 
facilitated by comparative historical inquiry between successive historical 
structures over the longue durie. As Cox (1985/1996: 54) has noted, diachronic 
inquiry which seeks to understand "the contradictions and sources of conflict 
within existing structures ... may be aided by an understanding of 
how structural 
transformations have come about in the pasf'. 
Social Orders 
A diachronic understanding of historical structures requires not only that 
the dialectical transformation of a structure is related to wider social change in 
the corresponding world order, but that a historical structure itself is recognised 
as a complex of social and power relations which contribute to directing change. 
In short, in diachronic terms, an historical structure can be seen as a social order. 
For an Historical IPE, such a concern with historical structures as social orders 
is clearly rooted in an historical mode of thought. In particular, an historical 
mode of thought is aware that social actions are informed by collectively held 
assumptions and procedures which, themselves, are manifestations of the social 
and power relations of a social order (Collingwood 1946: 223). Social and 
power relations surround the manner in which sets of social practices come to be 
organised. 
An understanding of social and power relations in an historical structure 
as a social order requires that the significance attached to material capabilities, 
ideas and institutions as the forces that interact within a structure is extended to 
the diachronic moment. In a diachronic sense, material capabilities are not a 
neutral requirement of social practices, but potential sources of power with 
dominating and subordinating dimensions. Power relations surround material 
resources, conferring material power on those who occupy positions of 
ownership, control or access. Material power relations combine with social and 
political power relations to engender social forces. " A basic structure of power 
26 "The notion of social forces represents an attempt to go beyond the conventional Marxist 
notion of the social relations of production, although clearly this is its conceptual source. ... a 
social forces approach is concerned with the intersection of three dimensions of power: (1) that 
concerning the productive process, (2) that concerning the relations between classes - social 
power, and (3) that encompassing political power - control over the state. It is from this power 
matrix, ... that particular constellations of social forces emerge in the world7' (George 1994: 178). See also Cox (1987), especially chapters I and 10. 
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emerges within a social order, then, which holds an "enforcement potential" 
(Cox 1981/1996: 99) which ensures the domination of the strong over the weak 
in the organisation of social practices. 
However, a social order characterised by domination alone is likely to be 
rendered relatively unstable by social confliCt. 21 As Maier (1987: 154) has 
asserted, relative stability in a social order is not simply a matter of "societal 
inertia", but itself has to be produced and reproduced. It is for this reason that, 
following Gramsci, Cox (1981/1996: 99-100) seeks to distinguish between 
hegemonic and non-hegemonic historical structures, where a hegemonic 
structure is marked by the integration of social forces and widespread 
acceptance of prevailing social and power relations as legitimate . 
2' Hegemony 
is identifiable in an historical structure as "a coherent conjunction or fit between 
a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order 
... and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance 
of universality" (Cox 1981/1996: 103). The coming together of material, 
ideational and institutional forces into a 'fit' corresponds to periods of 
hegemony, while non-hegemonic periods realise an unravelling of this 'fit' and 
contradictions and conflicts emerge. In seeking to explain relative stability and 
instability of successive world orders, Cox (1987) focuses on the changing 
intersection between historical structures corresponding to the three spheres of 
production, forms of state, and world order. On the one hand, his inquiry 
considers how the wide range of social relationships generated by production 
processes as the primary sets of structured social practices engender social 
forces that can become the bases of power in states and world orders. On the 
other hand, the reverse is considered in terms of how power institutionalised in 
world orders and states shape and control the development of production 
relations. 
27 The need to extend consideration to the relationship between the structure of power in a social 
order and the manner in which social practices come to be organised is informed by Mann's 
(1986: 2-3 original emphasis) concern with what he terms "a more concrete, sociospatial and 
organizational level of analysis. The central problems concern organization, control logistics, 
communication - the capacity to organize and control people, materials, and territories, and the 
development of this capacity throughout history". 
29 "Gramsci's hegemony is the ability of a social group to exercise the function of 'political and 
moral direction' in society. Other groups acknowledge the hegemon as having a leading role in 
society and a relatively wide political consensus supports the hegemon's policy goals" (Augelli 
& Murphy 1993: 130). Gramsci's notion of hegemony is rooted in a Machiavellian 
understanding of power, whereby rule by force and/or fraud and deception alone is classed as 
domination, while hegemony necessarily involves consent as well as coercion (Cox 
1983/1996: 126-7). 
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For an Historical IPE, the utility of Cox's approach to understanding the 
relative stability or instability of an historical structure as a social order is 
mainly two-fold. First, the need to consider a social order in the context of 
wider forms of state and world order is reinforced. Although inquiry for an 
Historical IPE begins with a structured set of social practices, understanding 
change within these practices cannot be divorced from wider changes in social 
and power relations. Second, through Gramsci's notion of hegemony, attention 
is drawn to the necessity of the legitimation of prevailing power relations if a 
social order is to be relatively stable. Specifically, this is shown to entail a 
coherent fit between the material, ideational and institutional forces of an 
historical structure. However, as Maier (1987: 262) has asserted, a stable social 
order implies a tendency to reproduce itself. Cox's approach lends itself 
particularly to inquiry into the making and unravelling of social orders, but not 
necessarily to the reproduction of social orders. An Historical IPE is concerned 
as much with continuity in the organisation of sets of structured social practices 
as with discontinuity. 
In an attempt to facilitate greater understanding of the more continuous 
tendency of social orders to be reproduced, an Historical IPE effectively 
historicises or disaggregates the coherent fit between the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of a hegemonic historical structure. In particular, it is asked 
how this fit manifests itself in terms of the daily organisation of social practices. 
Put another way, there is greater integration between synchronic and diachronic 
explanations. To do this, an Historical IPE concerns itself with what is termed 
here a 'structure of authority' in a social order. This is underpinned by Moore's 
(1987: 2) assertion that arriving at an explanation of the relatively stable 
reproduction of a social order requires an understanding of "social relationships 
of authority". " Power relations are always present in a social order, but tend to 
be visible as binding authority relations in a relatively stable social order. Power 
relations shape the form of a social order, but not its content as a set of 
structured social practices. 
29 Moore's (1987) work itself draws upon a wide-ranging tradition within philosophy that tends 
to invoke the notion of authority "to help define the nature of the cohesion or unity 
characteristics of human societies. Neither coercion nor rational argument, nor both together, 
seem capable for accounting for the co-ordination of wills required for a society to exist" 
(Frieden 1990: 57-8). 
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The 'meaning' of authority as a notion has been greatly disputed in both 
philosophy and across the social sciences (Friedman 1990: 56). Cutler (1997), 
following Friedman (1990: 59), isolates the state-centric nature of authority and 
its identity as a social construction as the two significant inseparable elements 
that tend to be shared by predominant liberal understandings of authority. In the 
first instance, authority by its nature requires the "surrender of private 
judgement" (Friedman 1990: 65-8) not as a result of coercion but as consequence 
of a recognition that others are entitled to obedience. Authority can, therefore, 
only be exercised through the state as, under liberalism, private individual 
judgements are essential to freedom and justice within society. Such an 
understanding of authority forms the 'common sense' in IPE inquiry. Strange 
(1988: 22), for instance, talks of changes in "the authority-market and the 
market-authority nexus". In the second instance, authority is a social construct, 
as the recognition that others are entitled to obedience stems from a "normative 
arrangement" (Friedman 1990: 71) amongst the members of a social order. 
As Cutler (1997) emphasises, two principal problems stem from this 
essentially liberal understanding of authority. First, it rests upon a separation of 
the public and private spheres that is unsustainable. Second, it obscures the 
extent to which asymmetrical power relations determine the nature of 
(normative arrangements' through which authority is constructed. State and 
society are necessarily intertwined. While authority exercised through the state 
is likely to be significant, this is also likely to be interdependent with other non- 
state (both civil and market) institutional forms of authority in the organisation 
of social practices in a stable social order. As Weber's notion of "legal 
authority" suggests, normative arrangements that legally legitimate the exercise 
of authority through institutions are not reserved to state institutions (Blau 
1963: 308-9). The manner in which state, civil and market forms of authority are 
articulated will be specific to different social orders and different periods. 
Central to this articulation will be the processes whereby a predominant world 
view informs the normative arrangements upon which the exercise of authority 
is based. 
Following Moore (1987: 14-5) and Gill (1991: 282), then, a structure of 
authority is held to embody intertwined but analytically separate 'formal' and 
'informal' dimensions. " It is the way that formal and informal authority come 
30 The identification of the formal and informal dimensions of authority is also built upon a 
recognition that the scope of authority extends across both 'action and belief. As Friedman 
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together in different periods that determines the structure of authority in a social 
order. Formal authority is authority that is consciously exercised through 
socially accepted state, civil and market institutions in the organisation of social 
practices. Informal authority is that which is found in a variety of social 
mechanisms, including institutions, that mould those social convictions which 
frame social practices around prevailing norms, values and meanings. The 
notion of informal authority is effectively a recognition that those institutional 
and ideational forces that frame social practices have a degree of autonomy. All 
institutions cannot be simply reduced to an expression of power relations and 
distributional conflicts. Similarly, while reflecting changing social and power 
relations, shifting patterns of shared meanings and understandings are not 
simply directed in a 'top down' manner by dominant social forces. An 
explanation of a structure of authority within a social order requires that both the 
formal and informal dimensions of authority are considered, as concern lies with 
how the reproduction of a stable social order manifests itself in the organisation 
of social practices. 
Conclusions 
In sum, this chapter has undertaken the beginnings of the groundwork 
necessary for the (re)thinking of world finance. From within the field of new 
IPE, and particularly in support of an historical turn amongst new IPE scholars 
that has looked to history to provide an epistemological and ontological anchor 
for inquiry, an Historical IPE approach has been advanced. An Historical IPE 
takes as its starting point an ontology of historicity which forms the key plank of 
an historical mode of thought. The historicity of social thought and action is 
recognised to extend to both the thought and actions that are the focus of 
inquiry, and the thought and action of the historian him/herself Following from 
the historicity of social thought and action, structured social practices, social 
change, social space, social time and social orders are developed as the main 
interrelated dimensions along which Historical IPE inquiry is pursued. 
An Historical IPE proceeds by focusing over the longue durie upon sets 
of social practices conceptualised as successive historical structures which span 
(1990: 57) asserts . ..... a person may be said to 'have authority' in two distinct senses. For one, he may be said to be 'in authority', meaning that he occupies some office, position, or status 
which entities him to make decisions about how other people should behave. But, secondly, a 
person may be said to be 'an authority' on something, meaning that his views or utterances are 
entitled to be believed (including, to complicate matters, beliefs about the right and wrong way 
of doing thingsy'. 
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irregular conjunctures. In synchronic terms, social practices are identified as 
framed by and drawing upon material, ideational and institutional forces. Social 
practices also necessarily assume and entail social space which itself is 
constituted through social processes. In diachronic terms, an historical structure 
is identified as a complex of social and power relations, that is, as a social order. 
As such, social practices come to be organised in the context of a social order. 
While power relations are always present, authority relations tend to characterise 
the reproduction of a relatively stable social order in which a coherent 
conjunction emerges between the material, ideational and institutional forces of 
a historical structure. In different periods and different social orders, this 
conjunction is disaggregated through the notion of a structure of authority. The 
manner in which the formal and informal dimensions of a structure of authority 
come together manifests itself in the organisation of social practices. A coherent 
conjunction of forces unravels as a consequence of a combination of the 
dialectical transformation of an historical structure, in which inherent 
contradictions and conflicts surface, and social change in the wider world order. 
The 'historical knowledge' that is produced by an Historical IPE rests on 
an alternative epistemological and methodological warrant to that which 
underpins the ahistorical knowledge claims of neo-classical economics and 
orthodox IPE. An ontology of historicity leads to a critique of empiricist 
epistemology and positivist methodology that, in particular, posits the 
reciprocity of subject and object and the subjective dimension of all historical 
knowledge. The value of historical knowledge lies in its contribution to human 
self-knowledge, the appropriation of the past to inform the emancipatory 
transformation of the present. Such knowledge is based upon a methodology 
that combines a comparative historical method with a reflexive three-way 
dialogue between the thoughts of social agents that are the focus of inquiry, the 
perspective of the historian, and the evidence. For such a mode of knowledge of 
world finance to be offered requires that the utility of the categories along which 
Historical IPE inquiry proceeds are developed ftu-ther. This is the purpose of the 
following chapter, which will complete the groundwork necessary for 
(re)thinking world finance. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
An Historical International Political Economv of World Finance 
Introduction 
This chapter will continue the processes of (re)thinking world finance. 
The broad aim is to develop the utility of an Historical IPE approach for 
apprehending contemporary world finance in the light of the dual problematic 
identified at the outset of this thesis: that is, inquiry encounters not only 
significant structural changes that cannot easily be captured, but also the 
predominance of neo-classical economics as a mode of knowledge. 
From within the field of IPE, the Historical IPE approach outlined in the 
previous chapter looked to history to provide the ontological and 
epistemological anchor for IPE inquiry. Following from the identification of 
historicity of social thought and actions, structured social practices, social 
change, social space, social time, and social orders were isolated as the main 
interrelated dimensions for inquiry. An Historical IPE proceeds by focusing 
over the longue durie upon sets of social practices conceptualised as successive 
historical structures which span irregular conjunctures. In synchronic terms, 
social practices are identified as framed by and drawing upon material, 
ideational, and institutional forces. Social practices also necessarily assume and 
entail social space that itself is constituted through social processes. In 
diachronic terms, an historical structure is identified as a complex of social and 
power relations, that is, as a social order. As such, social practices come to be 
organised in the context of a social order. While power relations are always 
present, authority relations tend to characterise the reproduction of a relatively 
stable social order in which a coherent conjunction emerges between the 
material, ideational and institutional forces of a historical structure. In different 
periods and different social orders, an Historical IPE unpacks this conjunction 
through the notion of a structure of authority. The manner in which the formal 
and informal dimensions of a structure of authority come together manifests 
itself in the organisation of social practices. A coherent conjunction of forces 
unravels as a consequence of a combination of the dialectical transformation of 
an historical structure, in which inherent contradictions and conflicts surface, 
and social change in the wider world order. 
44 
This chapter is subdivided into three main parts. Following an Historical 
IPE approach, the starting point for inquiry is to clearly ascertain the set of 
structured social practices that comprise world finance. In Part I, an 
understanding of finance in terms of credit practices is presented. In particular, 
five sets of credit practices undertaken at a world scale are identified as together 
constituting world finance: commercial credit practices, the practices of 
international clearance, money-market practices, corporate credit practices, and 
sovereign credit practices. Considered over the longue durie of social time, 
these world credit practices are held to have taken on their contemporary, 
modem configuration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The notion of 
'forms of credit' is utilised to reflect conjunctural variations in credit practices, 
that is, periodic differences in the nature of the credit instruments employed and 
the institutionalised forms which credit practices take. In addition, reflecting an 
Historical IPE's concern with social space, world financial centres are identified 
as the key social spaces for credit practices. 
In Part II, the credit practices of world finance are conceptualised as 
successive historical structures that span irregular conjunctures. In synchronic 
terms, credit practices are framed by and draw upon material capabilities, ideas 
and institutions as the basic forces of an historical structure. The specific nature 
and configuration of these forces is recognised to differ considerably in concrete 
terms. Nevertheless, a somewhat abstract understanding is developed of the 
relationships of credit practices to capital, knowledge and technology as material 
capabilities; intersubjective meanings and world views as types of ideas; and 
market, state and civil institutions. Material, ideational and institutional forces 
are held to tend to become centralised in world financial centres as the key 
social spaces for credit practices. 
Part III develops an Historical IPE's concern with social change and 
social orders. In diachronic terms, historical structures are conceptualised as 
complexes of social and power relations, that is, social orders, within which 
credit practices come to be organised. As such, modem world finance becomes 
understood as successive world financial orders that span irregular conjunctures. 
A stable world financial order is held to reflect the emergence of a coherent fit 
between the material, ideational and institutional forces within that order. It is 
the structure of authority in each world financial order that ensures its relatively 
stable reproduction, facilitating the organisation of world credit practices. 
Given that material, ideational and institutional forces tend to be centralised in 
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world financial ccntres, world financial centres are identified in diachronic terms 
as key spaces of authority in world financial orders, the social loci for the 
reproduction of relatively stable world financial orders. Ultimately, it is posited 
that a relatively stable world financial order coincides with the firm 
centralisation of that order in a single world financial centre. The unravelling of 
a world financial order, in which relatively unstable dialectical structural 
transformation takes place, is held to coincide with the fall of the previously 
dominant world financial centre and the rise of one or more others. Both the 
relative stability and instability in world financial orders are related to the 
changing social and power relations of wider world orders. 
Part I- The Social Practices of World Finance 
Credit Practices 
In seeking to isolate the structured social practices that comprise world 
finance, the wide-ranging body of IPE scholarship in this area provides a 
touchstone from which to begin. Aside from orthodox IPE concerns with 
international monetary relations (Cohen 1977; Block 1977; Calleo 1982), two 
broad threads of IPE research into world finance are distinguishable. ' First, 
orthodox IPE research into world finance has tended to follow from an 
understanding of finance derived from neo-classical economics. The primary 
function of international finance for neo-classical economics is "to transfer 
accumulated capital to where the marginal rate of return is highest and where it 
can therefore be employed most efficiently" (Gilpin 1987: 306). In the 
contemporary era, such an understanding of international finance has translated 
into research into international capital mobility and the consequences for 
national economic wealth and national state policy-making of increased cross- 
border capital flows (Goodman & Pauly 1993; Andrews 1994; Webb 1994). 
Second, Strange's (1990: 259) definition of "the field of finance" as "the system 
by which credit is created, brought and sold and by which the direction of the 
use of capital is detennined" has tended to guide new IPE inquiry. In the 
contemporary era, the result is concern with the volatility of world finance and 
its consequences for the wider world order (Strange 1986; Cerny 1993; 
Helleiner 1994; Underhill 1997; Germain 1997). 
1 Orthodox IPE's attention to international monetary relations follows from the neo-classical 
privileging of exchange, whereby the international economy as the proper subject matter of IPE 
is understood as the cumulative product of exchange between national communities of rational 
individuals. Monetary relations form the "critical nexus" (Gilpin 1987: 118) which facilitates 
international economic exchange. 
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In our terms, the utility of IPE research in world finance is three-fold. 
First, new IPE scholars draw attention to the organisation of the practices that 
create, allocate, buy and sell credit as constituting world finance. The capital 
flows that are the focus of orthodox IPE inquiry into finance are effectively 
revealed by new IPE as structured social practices. Second, new IPE 
scholarship in world finance recognises the consequences of the organisation of 
world finance for wider world orders. This is rooted in the ontological 
assumption of new IPE that the proper subject matter of inquiry is not the 
international economy as conceived by neo-classical economics, but what Cox 
(1987: 244) terms the "world-economy model". In short, "Where the 
international-economy model focuses on exchange, the world-economy model 
focuses on production" (Cox 1987: 244). New IPE scholars of world finance 
tend, then, to share an awareness of the social and economic significance of 
credit which extends beyond its contribution to exchange to include its 
importance to production. The pioneering work of Susan Strange (1986,1990, 
1998) has, in particular, been central to the development of this awareness. ' 
Third, both orthodox and new IPE are attentive to the inequalities that abound in 
world finance. This takes various forms. For example, substantial debate 
surrounds the relative power in world finance of America and Japan as the 
principal states (Gilpin 1987; Strange 1990; Helleiner 1992), the power of 
private financial markets over public authorities (Cerny 1993; Germain 1997), 
and the 'structural power of capital' more broadly considered (Gill & Law 
1989). The three-fold utility of IPE research into world finance is pursued in 
greater detail below as the basis for a working conceptualisation of 'finance'. 
Derived from new IPE scholarship, an understanding of world finance as 
credit practices contrasts sharply with conceptualisations of money and credit in 
neo-classical economics. As Guttmann (1994: 16,22) notes, neo-classical 
economists begin from the assumption that money is just another good which 
2 In seeking to place finance at the heart of IPE inquiry, Strange has engaged with 
understandings of credit from across the social sciences. This has led her to assert that "Every 
materialist society, whether capitalist or socialist or a mixture of both, has to have a system for 
creating credit. Credit is literally the lifeblood of a developed economy. Like blood in the 
human anatomy, money in the predominant form of credit has to reach and renew every part of 
the economy. It has to circulate regularly and reliably. It has to stay healthy and stable or the 
society suffers, just as the body suffers if there is disorder in the blood or too much or too little 
ofif'(1988: 89-90). For a review of Strange's work that emphasises her contribution in bringing 
finance to the centre of new IPE inquiry, see Cox (1992a/1996). 
47 
provides its holders with liquidity to facilitate exchange. The supply of the 
stock of money is fixed by the monetary authorities of a state - the so-called 
(state theory of money' (Walter 1993: 29). As a consequence, the existence of 
money as a good only affects price levels and has no long-term impact on 
equilibrium conditions in the 'real' spheres of production and exchange. For 
neo-classical economists, money merely facilitates exchange and, therefore, has 
four main functions -a medium of exchange, a means of payment, a unit of 
account and a store of value. When credit is considered, it effectively becomes 
the use of holdings of money as a store of value (i. e. savings) to facilitate further 
exchange. As Guttmann (1994: 28) asserts, 
"According to neoclassical theory, credit has a stabilizing influence. It 
mobilises otherwise unutilized funds, which as savings would leak out of 
circulation, to finance current spending. Credit is treated here as a 
passive residual, an automatic transfer mechanism which equates saving 
and investment (at a market-clearing rate of interest) and thereby 
maintains macroeconomic equilibrium". 
The identification of finance as a set of credit practices also stands in 
direct contrast to neo-classical economist's understandings of credit as an 
automatic passive residual. As research into the sociology of money and finance 
highlights, credit itself is a resource that is socially constructed specific to 
different times and different places (Mizruchi & Brewster Steams 1994). Credit 
rests upon both a set of social practices which actually create and allocate it, and 
wider norms and values which render the creation of credit socially acceptable. 
Credit creation is, then, far from automatic and "embodies a social relation of 
interdependence and conflicf' (Guttmann 1994: 28). Creditors and debtors are 
interdependent is the sense that they both share the gains and losses associated 
with credit, while conflicts surround the rate of interest, size and length of a 
stream of credit. At the heart of social relations of interdependence and conflict 
would appear to lie the inherent risks of credit creation. Contrary to neo- 
classical economics, an essential property that distinguishes the creation of 
credit from the creation of commodities is that the former involves "an exchange 
of funds by one party for a promise of a return in the future" (Stiglitz 1989: 59 
original emphasis). Risk is involved in the creation of credit that is not present 
in the exchange of commodities, as uncertainty necessarily surrounds the Riture 
capacity of borrowers to fulfil their obligations. At different times and in 
different places, credit is socially constructed in specific ways as different sets of 
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credit practices which organise the social relations of credit and which seek to 
overcome the inherent risks of credit creation. ' 
New IPE scholarship's awareness of the social and economic 
significance of credit to the world economy is suggestive of a connection with 
Marxist and neo-Marxist understandings of credit. Central to Marx's critique of 
the classical liberal political economy of Smith and Ricardo was a belief that 
money, particularly in its credit form, was a central unifying element of political 
economies. Following Marx, Harvey (1982: 262-70) has identified four 
principal contributions of credit to the capitalist mode of production. First, it 
enables the mobilisation of capital for productive purposes that would otherwise 
lay idle. Second, it reduces the time and cost of the circulation of commodities 
in a manner that money in its commodity or fiduciary forms cannot. Third, 
credit accelerates the rate of commodity production and consumption by both 
providing for productive investment and granting purchasing power. Finally, 
credit facilitates the creation of 'fictitious capital', whereby capital usually made 
available for productive investment is extended indefinitely (typically through 
the issue of shares). New IPE accords with the Marxist attention to credit 
practices as facilitating both production and exchange. 
Credit, then, holds the potential to make the material life of societies a 
great deal easier. As Galbraith (1975: 70-1) has pointed out, 
"The function of credit in a simple society is, in fact, remarkably 
egalitarian. It allows the man with energy and no money to participate in 
the economy more or less on par with the man who has capital of his 
own. And the more casual the condition under which credit is granted 
and hence the more impecunious those accommodated, the more 
egalitarian credit is". 
The potential contributions of credit to social life also extend beyond the 
material to the political realm. As both Plato and Aristotle long ago recognised, 
credit potentially facilitates political freedom within societies that seek to extend 
individual liberty alongside economic wealth, promoting a shift from oligarchy 
to democracy (Millet 1991: 6). However, societies are far from "simple". As 
IPE research into power in world finance has emphasised, vast inequalities both 
3 As Thrift and Leyshon (1994: 302) assert, assessing and dealing with risk are dynamic and 
ever-changing social processes, whereby risk becomes "a shifting ensemble of meanings about 
the timing and spacing of credit and debt that depict whether a credit/debt relation is viable". 
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in terins of the creation of and access to credit have ensured that its allocation 
has proved neither "casual" nor "egalitarian". In sum, 'finance' is constituted 
socially in specific ways by unevenly distributed sets of social practices that 
organise the social relations through which credit as a key resource in social life 
is created, allocated, brought and sold. 
World Credit Practices 
An understanding of world finance derived from such a 
conceptualisation of finance as constituted by unevenly distributed sets of credit 
practices requires that inquiry focuses upon those credit practices which are 
organised at a world scale! Five sets of world credit practices are identified 
here through consideration of the inter-linkages between world finance and 
wider world orders. In particular, consideration of the relationships of world 
finance to the international economy of commodity exchange, the world 
economy of production, and state-societies is central to the formation of the 
focus of inquiry. The five sets of credit practices outlined below that constitute 
world finance are commercial credit practices, the practices of international 
clearance, money-market practices, corporate credit practices and sovereign 
credit practices. They are held to have taken on their contemporary, modem 
form in the specific setting of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. 
Thrift's (1987) analysis of what he terms the "international intermediary 
economy" is informative as to the inter-linkages between world finance and the 
international economy of commodity exchange. This is a close set of 
relationships, reflected in the majority of early modem financiers beginning as 
merchants before moving into the financial side of commerce (Braudel 1977: 61; 
Kindleberger 1974/1978: 72; Bagehot 1873/1991: 5). This is the realm of 
(commercial capital' broadly defined which mediates in the circulation of 
commodities and credit for a fee, including both merchant capital and money- 
dealing capital. -' From Thrift's (1987: 206-8) analysis of commercial capital, 
three sets of credit practices are identified as significant here. First, the delay 
between the production and consumption of commodities traded over long 
4,, 
... geographical scale is the focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for a specific 
social claim, activity or behaviour" (Agnew 1997, in Hudson 1998: 537). 
... commercial capital mediates in the circulation of commodities for a fee. It does not retain 
any direct or long-term ownership or control of these commodities. Commercial capital can be 
subdivided into merchant capital which mediates in the circulation of commodity capital of 
various kinds, and money dealing capital which mediates in the circulation of money capital of 
various kinds... " (Thrift 1987: 204). 
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distances and the resulting lag in payment establishes a demand for a set of 
credit practices concerned with the mediation of commodity exchange. Such 
commercial credit practices have contributed considerably to the expansion of 
international trade. Commercial credit practices include the creation of credit 
through bank loans, short-term capital market instruments (most notably bills of 
exchange), associated secondary trading practices, and commodity ftitures 
contracts. 6 
Second, as credit facilitates commodity exchange, a set of credit 
practices that organise the clearance of payments is indispensable in world 
finance. VVbile clearance practices are usually regarded as contributing to 
international monetary arrangements in the sense that they act to organise 
payment (Guttmann 1994: 27), they are also essential to the realisation of the 
claims and obligations arising from credit practices (Kindleberger 
1984/1993: 19). In addition, as Braudel's (1981: 470) notion of "scriptual 
money" suggests, by contributing to the efficiency of credit practices, clearing 
practices actually facilitate the creation of credit on a scale that would not 
otherwise be possible! The increasing division of the world into state-societies 
from the seventeenth century has also involved an expansion of clearance 
practices (Ingham 1984: 94-5). The denomination of credit in different 
currencies ensures a close relationship between clearance practices and those 
associated with foreign exchange. 
Third, the holding of working balances of capital to fulfil outstanding 
obligations by all parties engaged in credit relations has stimulated another 
significant set of credit practices. Money-market practices enable otherwise idle 
working balances to be put to profitable use. Money-market practices stand at 
the nexus between other credit practices, "lending to those who lend" (Bagehot 
6 Bills of exchange are promissory notes created through commercial credit practices given by 
the purchaser of a commodity to the vendor (Michie 1992: 70; Kindleberger 1984/1993: 41). 
Once created, bills of exchange could be sold by the vendor at a discount on their face value 
through secondary trading practices (hence 'discount market') in order to obtain immediate 
payment for goods sold. Meanwhile, the purchaser was given time to dispose of their goods and 
the holder of the bill obtained renumerative employment for his temporary funds, measured in 
terms of the level of discount obtained. Commodity futures are fixed-time, fixed-price contracts 
which can be used to insure against price fluctuations, or are alternatively purchased for 
speculative purposes through secondary trading practices. 
7 "Scriptual money" or "book money" is "created by the process of book-keeping, by 
transferring money from one bank account to another (Braudel 1981: 470). 
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1873/1991: 3). The coming together of capital facilitates money-market 
practices that, in turn, support practices that provide commercial, sovereign and 
corporate credit. As a consequence, money-market practices are often referred 
to as the inter-bank market. As Bagehot (1873/1991: 8-10) emphasised of 
Lombard Street as the London money-market in the late nineteenth century, the 
great contribution of money-market practices to world finance lies in their 
capacity, through the continual manipulation of capital, to support long-term 
credit creation through short-term capital. 
Consideration of the inter-linkages between world finance and the 
productive practices of the world economy is illustrative of a fourth set of credit 
practices as significant to world finance, that is, corporate credit practices. 
Since the beginning of industrial production, capital for large-scale productive 
investment that necessarily precedes revenues has been facilitated through 
recourse to long-term credit. ' A wide range of literature concerned with 
comparative state-finance-industry relations illustrates (see, for example, 
Zysman 1983; Cox, A 1986) that such industrial credit practices have tended to 
be organised at a national-scale, a consequence of variations in patterns of 
industrialisation and the processes of the consolidation of state-societies as 
national political economies. However, long-term industrial credit has been 
organised at a world-scale to service the capital requirements of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). ' Such corporate credit practices facilitate the 
expansionary strategies of MNCs whether pursued through foreign direct 
investment (FDI), foreign acquisitions, or cross-border joint ventures. 
8 "Long- is ordinarily distinguished from short-term capital by the nature of the financial 
instrument, with long-term capital operating through equities and debt instruments of more than 
one year's maturity. ... The usual division of long-term capital is into new issues, trade in 
existing securities, both bonds and shares, and direct foreign investment! ' (Kindleberger 
1987: 13). 
9 There is a long history of production spanning across politically demarcated spaces. For 
instance, during the fourteenth century the Hanseatic League organised German merchants in the 
conduct of west European and Levantine commerce that, in addition to commodity exchange, 
involved them in agricultural production, iron smelting and general manufacturing (Hirst & 
Thompson 1996: 18-19). Similarly, while the great Dutch and British joint-stock companies of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were primarily engaged in commodity exchange, they 
also organised limited productive ventures. However, as Hirst and Thompson (1996: 19-20) 
observe . ..... it is generally agreed that manufacturing multinationals appeared in the world 
economy after the mid-nineteenth century and that they were well established by the First World 
War. International business activity grew vigorously in the 1920s and the truly diversified and 
integrated MNC matured, but it slowed down during the depressed 1930s and war-tom 1940s, 
and began a fluctuating expansion again after 1950". 
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Finally, consideration of the inter-linkages between world finance and 
state-societies in successive world orders illustrates the significance of sovereign 
credit practices to world finance. For states, the making of war and the 
construction of human (education, health, welfare, law and order) and physical 
(transportation and communication) infrastructures alongside insufficient 
revenues from their respective societies has necessitated recourse to long-term 
sovereign credit (Walter 1993: 29-31). In addition, sovereign credit practices 
have also provided short-term credit for balance-of-payments deficits. Most 
twentieth century political economists writing on financial matters have tended 
to play close attention to the provision of sovereign credit and, in particular, to 
the relationship between 'finance and foreign policy' (Feis 1930/1964; Polanyi 
1944; Chapman 1984). For instance, Feis's (1930/1964) detailed study of 
British, French and German investment from 1870 to 1914 illustrates the extent 
to which governments sought to link private finance to the affairs of state. Not 
dissimilarly, with reference to contemporary world finance, IPE scholars have 
traced inter-linkages between the restructuring of state-societies to the re- 
organisation of world credit practices (Frieden 1987; Underhill 1991; Helleiner 
1994). 
An Historical IPE suggests that the five sets of credit practices which 
constitute world finance and form the focus of inquiry here should be considered 
over the longue duree. De Goede's (1998) analysis of world finance as a 
discourse is particularly informative as to the formation of the mentaliti that 
frames contemporary world credit practices. De Goede (1998) holds that the 
contemporary concepts and values which frame both the organisation of world 
credit practices and the understandings of the purposes to which credit is put 
emerged in the specific setting of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. 
While these concepts have been dynamically articulated and re-articulated since, 
leading to considerable conjunctural variations in the forms of credit practices, 
the essentially modem nature of contemporary world finance can be dated from 
this point. For the first time, world credit practices became subject to the 
modem assertions of rationality and reason associated with the collapse of 
medievalism (Neal 1990). " Rationality and reason facilitated the invention of 
'0 The view that world credit practices became subject to the assertions of rationality and reason in this historical setting is clearly not meant to imply that decisions regarding the creation, 
allocation buying and selling of credit were actually made on a rational basis. As Guttmann 
(1994: 2 1) asserts, it is "futile to assume, as the neo-classicists do, that individuals form 'rational' 
expectations which do not correspond to their own experience. Nor can we argue that the 
economy will follow automatic rules, detached from subjective and inherently volatile 
assessments of its participants". As Pohle (1995) has argued with reference to nineteenth 
53 
risk as a calculable entity as distinct from general uncertainty. The professional 
financier became viewed as dealing in risk, undertaking increasingly 
sophisticated practices including insurance, commodity futures, short-selling 
and puts and calls (options to buy or sell credit instruments at a stipulated price 
over a stipulated period of time). As such, the professional financier became 
perceived as distinct from the gambler who dealt in uncertainty (Leyshon & 
Thrift 1997: 17). In our terms, then, the mentalitj which has framed modem 
world credit practices over the longue duree, effectively establishing the 'limits 
of the possible', dates from this time. " 
Forms of Credit 
While an Historical IPE of world finance proceeds by focusing over the 
longue durie upon the sets of credit practices outlined above, conjunctural 
variations in credit practices are recognised. The notion of 'forms of credit' is 
utilised to reflect these variations, that is, differences in the nature of the credit 
instruments employed and the institutionalised forms which credit practices 
take. In different periods, different forms of credit tend to predominate. 
Credit practices exist in many forms, the simplest of which is loans. 
Savings created through capital accumulation become reserves against which 
credit in the form of loans is created and allocated to a borrower, in return for 
principal and interest repayments over the short- or long-term. The practice of 
creating credit in the form of a loan tends to be institutionalised through the 
financial market institutional networks of banks. " Contrary to the neo-classical 
century finance in Western Europe, it is through the appeal to rationality and reason in 
legitimating credit practices that rationality becomes significant. 
11 The subjecting of the credit practices of world finance to rationality and reason clearly 
formed part of the wider social processes of the onset of modernity. As Carr (1964: 135) notes, 
"In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries man had already become fully conscious of the 
world around him and of its laws. They were no longer the mysterious decrees of an inscrutable 
providence, but laws accessible to reason". The distinction made here between here between 
pre-modem and modem finance on the basis of the influence of rationality and reason of credit 
practices contrasts with distinctions which typically hinge upon "the predominance of the 
monetarized sector of the economy and the presence of fiduciary money issued by a central 
bank, or of a decentralized banking system performing a corresponding function, and of 
organisations such as corporations enjoying limited liability" (Goldsmith 1987: 3). Based on 
such a distinction, modem finance dates roughly from the early eighteenth century in western 
Europe, the late eighteenth century in the rest of Europe and the Americas, and the nineteenth 
century in Australia and south and east Asia. 
" in specific conjunctures, loans as a form of credit practices have also been institutionalised 
within state and inter-state institutions. For instance, in the post-1945 era, the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank have provided short-term loans to states experiencing balance- 
of-payments deficits, long-term loans to facilitate state-societal restructuring in response to 
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portrayal of banks as intermediaries that intervene in the re-cycling of capital by 
aggregating the deposits of individuals for the purpose of lending, banks are 
more than simple intennediaries. The granting of loans through a bank involves 
the creation of credit, not simply the equation of savings with investment 
(Guttmann 1994: 33). As a consequence, bank's standard operating procedures 
of short-term lending on long-term deposits, undertaken in an attempt to 
minimise the risks associated with loans as a form of credit, can have 
considerable repercussions for the availability or otherwise of credit. 
Credit practices also take the form capital and equity market instruments, 
institutionalised within a wide range of market and civil institutions. A vast 
array of capital market instruments provide streams of credit of varying size and 
length. For instance, short-term commercial credit has traditionally been 
provided through the issuing of bills of exchange. Bills of exchange were 
quickly joined by finance bills, effectively bills that were drawn but not based 
on any underlying commercial transaction. Alternatively, long-term corporate 
and sovereign credit has been provided through bonds, that is, fixed-term loans 
that are issued and can be traded but with no right to claim ownership on a 
borrower's assets. The value of a bond to its holder at any one moment is the 
future stream of interest payments, with the return of the principal becoming due 
at the bond's maturity. The practices of creating both short- and long-term 
capital market instruments tend to be institutionalised within the market 
networks of investment banks. In addition, corporate credit is also raised 
through equities that match long-term capital requirements with short-term 
funds via their issue on a stock exchange as a civil institution. Equities do not 
entail any obligation for the repayment of funds, but usually involve an 
ownership claim on the issuer. 
Further, two other key features distinguish capital and equity markets 
from loans as forms of credit. First, unlike loans, capital and equity market 
forms of credit tend to involve the practices of buying and selling of credit 
instruments. " Such exchanging of ownership claims through so-called 
'secondary markets' is an essential feature of capital and equity market forms of 
credit, increasing liquidity and facilitating a diversification of the holdings of 
adjustment problems and financial crises, and long-term loans to facilitate economic 
development. 
13 A caveat here is that since the early-to-mid 1980s, a range of existing loans have become 
'securitised', that is, collectively re-packaged as financial assets to be brought and sold on 
secondary capital markets. For details of the contemporary Isecuritisation', see Sinclair (1994a). 
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investors (Stiglitz 1989). Increases in liquidity allow for an even larger inverted 
pyramid of credit to be created on top of a capital base (Dow 1994: 155). 
However, there is a long history of speculation and arbitrage in secondary 
markets which, while generating massive short-term returns, can destabilise 
credit practices as expectations surrounding future gains collapse (Kindleberger 
1978; Portes & Swoboda 1987). Second, equity market forms of credit in 
particular differ from loans in the manner in which they seek to overcome the 
risks inherent in credit creation. While risk is shared between the bank and 
borrower under loans as a form of credit, risk is distributed more widely 
amongst the holders of shares under equity forms of credit. 
World Financial Centres: Key Social Spaces 
An Historical IPE advanced a concern with social space as a principal 
dimension along which inquiry should proceed. In terms of world finance, this 
leads to the recognition of the inherent spatiality of world credit practices. 
Spatiality tends to be omitted from inquiry into world finance across the social 
sciences. " Credit practices necessarily assume and entail social space at a world 
scale, with key interconnected social spaces emerging as the social loci for 
credit practices. As such, world financial centres (VTCs) are conceptualised 
here as the key social spaces for credit practices. The significance of WFCs as 
key social spaces has been recognised by the dominant representations of space 
in modem world finance which frame comprehension of the relationship 
between credit practices and space. The status of a WFC corresponds to the 
domination of the sets of world credit practices outlined above. As such, 
alternative WFCs emerge in different periods. It becomes possible to 
distinguish WFCs from national and regional financial centres, and to arrange 
financial centres in a hierarchy. 
A conceptualisation of WFCs as social spaces contrasts with those 
understandings of financial centres present in economics. As Reed (1981: 1) 
14 The general absence of concern with spatiality is reflected in the exclusion of financial centres 
from inquiry. As both Kindleberger (1974/1978) and Reed (1981) have highlighted, financial 
centres as a phenomena fall between the mainstream reference points of the disciplines of 
economics and urban studies in the social sciences. Within IPE, scholars tend to recognise the 
significance of WFCs but tend to omit them from study. For instance, the introduction to a 
recent edited volume in IPE concerned with contemporary world finance described New York 
and London as "the crucibles of global trends" (Underhill 1997: 6), but none of the following 
twelve chapters addressed world financial centres directly. In the main, the absence of financial 
centres from IPE inquiry in world finance reflects the failure of IPE to take questions of space 
and spatiality seriously (Drainville 1995). For a notable exception, see Germain (1997). 
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observes, financial centres are usually defined in economics as "a central 
location where the financial transactions of an area are co-ordinated and 
cleared". This is illustrated by Kindleberger's (1974/1978: 71) somewhat 
functional definition of financial centres, whereby 
"Financial centres are needed not only to balance through time the 
savings and investments of individual entrepreneurs and to transfer 
financial capital from savers to investors, but also to effect payments and 
to transfer savings between places. Banking and financial centres 
perform a medium-of-exchange function and an interspatial store-of- 
value function". 
Not dissimilarly, a conceptualisation of WFCs as the key social spaces for world 
credit practices also contrasts with understandings of financial centres suggested 
by the 'world cities paradigm' in economic geography and urban studies (Knox 
& Taylor 1995; Sassen 1991,1994). Defined as "centres of transnational 
corporate headquarters, of their business services, of international finance, of 
transnational institutions, and of telecommunications and information 
processing" (Knox 1995: 6), world cities are understood as key spaces in 
structural as opposed to social terms. " As with economic definitions of 
financial centres, the result is a somewhat 'functional' understanding of WFCs 
that contrasts with the more 'Political' conceptualisation of WFCs as social 
spaces. ` As social spaces, WFCs are neither reified by analysis of world 
finance nor configured homogeneously in a structural relationship to world 
finance that is the likely outcome of a functional understanding of WFCs. As 
Pryke and Lee (1995: 333-4) have asserted, financial centres "are dynamically 
reproduced, not merely in a mechanical way, through their success in sustaining 
accumulation, but socially and culturally". Through a conceptualisation of 
WFCs as social spaces, an Historical IPE demands that inquiry acknowledges 
15 Structural conceptual isations of space view geographical entities such as cities as having 
spatial effects that stem from their interrelationships to one another (Agnew 1994). Such an 
understanding of space is present in the world cities paradigm, where world cities become the 
nodal points for global control and a pre-requisite for the continuation of capital accumulation in 
the world-system as a result of their structural relationships to peripheral geographical areas. 
16 As Palmer and Friedland (1987: 146) highlight, approaches to the study of cities tend to 
diverge between what they term 'functional' and 'political' theories - "Functional theories tend 
to focus upon the way social activities are organised in a social system without regard for the 
actors or structures which control these activities. When functional theories do examine 
structures, these structure's attributes (including their location) are derived from the functions 
they perform for the system. Political theories tend to focus upon actors or structures whose 
interests and powers and the conflicts between them, shape the organisation of activity and hence 
the system ...... In this sense, the approach to financial centres here is essentially 'political'. 
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the social processes which produce and reproduce specific WFCs and the 
relationships of these processes to the making and unravelling of world finance 
as a social order. 
Part II - The Structures of World Finance 
An Historical IPE approach conceptualises those sets of social practices 
which, considered over the longue duree, form the focus of inquiry as 
successive historical structures which span irregular conjunctures. In synchronic 
terms, social practices were identified as framed by and drawing upon material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions as the basic forces of an historical structure. 
It is these forces as categories that are elaborated upon here in relation to credit 
practices. Capital, knowledge and technology are identified below as the 
principal material capabilities, intersubjective meanings and world views 
distinguished as ideas, and market, civil and state institutions detailed. 
Following from the inherent spatiality of credit practices, it is held that the 
material, ideational and institutional forces of world finance as an historical 
structure tend to come together and are centralised in WFCs as the key spaces in 
world finance. Given that the specific nature and configuration of structural 
forces in world finance varies considerably across different conjunctures, it is 
accepted that the understanding of the structures of world finance developed will 
be somewhat abstract. 
Capital 
The basic material resource that both frames credit practices and upon 
which credit practices must draw is accumulated capital in its monetary form. 
Credit practices in the form of loans are reliant upon the concentration of capital 
as deposits, with the volume of loans that can be granted limited by the scale of 
deposits. While in the contemporary era banks have expanded the volume of 
credit created against their capital bases (Dow 1994: 155), capital as deposits 
continues to constitute the "raw material" of credit practices in the form of loans 
(Guttmann 1994: 32). Similarly, credit created through capital and equity market 
practices is reliant upon the availability of capital on a sufficient scale. 
Individual and, increasingly, institutional investors such as pension funds, 
insurance companies and hedge funds mobilise much of the capital upon which 
capital and equity market practices rest. 
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Considerable temporal and spatial dynamics surround capital as a 
material resource for world credit practices. Periods of sustained capital 
accumulation in the world economy expand the material basis for credit 
creation, simultaneously generating incentives to create credit in the expectation 
of future economic growth. On the other side of the coin, periods of economic 
stagnation and slow growth limit the availability of capital as a material resource 
and realise disincentives for credit creation. These temporal variations in terms 
of capital as a material resource are closely related to spatial dynamics. Vast 
inequalities in rates of wealth creation across the world economy - which 
Storper and Walker (1989) have termed "the inconstant geography of 
capitalism" - ensure that the capital upon which world credit practices rest tends 
to be concentrated in different regions at different times. " Given that 
accumulated capital has become concentrated in the national networks of retail 
banks and institutional investors with the development of state-societies and 
consolidation of national political economies since the seventeenth century 
(Epstein 1996; Bosworth 1993), world credit practices during different periods 
tend to be dominated by the institutions of ascendant national political 
economies (Helleiner 1993a). 
In spatial terms, capital as a material resource also tends to become 
centralised in world financial centres as the key social spaces for world credit 
practices. The centralisation of capital in WFCs is partly related to the 
'inconstant geography of capitalism', as the rise of national financial centres to 
world status corresponds with the ascendancy of their respective national 
political economies. Capital becomes centralised in national financial centres as 
the likely 'hubs' of national retail banking networks and the sites of major 
securities exchanges, with the potential effect that the financial centre of an 
ascendant national political economy is catapulted to world status (Kindleberger 
1974/1978). However, the capital that becomes centralised in WFCs also 
emanates from two other main sources. First, WFCs tend to be world centres 
for commodity exchange. Amsterdam, London and New York are all examples. 
Capital accumulated through world trade is centralised in WFCs, reflected in the 
17 "The geography of capitalism is uneven, to be sure; but it is, above all, inconstant. The 
dynamism of capitalist growth keeps industries on the move, and periodically send them hurtling 
down new paths of spatial development. ... each new wave of 
industrialisation brings into 
existence new growth centers and growth peripheries, stimulates disinvestment in some areas 
and the radical restructuring of others, and reshuffles spatial production relations and patterns of 
territorial income distribution and politics. In doing so, it gives new life to capitalism" (Storper 
& Walker 1989: 4-5). 
59 
long tradition of merchants turning their backs on trade in favour of credit 
practices (Kindleberger 1983: 79-80). Second, assuming an 'open' world 
economy in which restrictions on the movement of capital are largely absent, 
capital becomes centralised in WFCs as a consequence of what Brown 
(1940: 154), with reference to London as the WFC of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, terms "deposit-compelling power". Foreign capital is 
directed to and maintained in a WFC as a consequence of the capacity of the 
credit practices centralised there, in particular money-market practices, to offer 
relatively high rates of return on capital investment. 
Knowledge 
While the availability or otherwise of capital is likely to establish the 
material baseline for credit practices, knowledge also constitutes a key resource. 
As Dodd (1994) argues, social networks of knowledge allow credit practices to 
take place, as knowledge networks facilitate the collective assessment of the 
risks inherent to the creation, allocation, buying and selling of credit. While 
varying in nature according to the borrower concerned, the significance of 
knowledge as a material resource stems from the need for qualitative and 
quantitative information which spans the micro-, meso- and macro-economic 
dimensions in the support of credit practices. As Sinclair (1994: 143) asserts, 
contrary to neo-classical economics, information is necessarily imperfect and 
often vague, ambiguous and difficult to interpret. Consequently, "raw 
information is not the most important consideration". Ideas in the form of texts, 
analytic frameworks and less formal social advice establish shared meanings 
that bring understanding, with the effect that information becomes knowledge. 
Knowledge is not simply being able to gain access to the 'facts', but 
"understanding their causal and consequential relationships" (Strange 
1988: 118). Knowledge networks, then, not only hold necessary but imperfect 
information for credit practices, but also the capacity to communicate 
information successfully as knowledge. 
The availability of knowledge as a material resource for credit practices 
remains relatively simple while credit practices are localised at a small scale, 
wherein the personal face-to-face exchange of knowledge is both sufficient and 
relatively unproblematic. For credit practices organised at a world scale, 
however, access to knowledge becomes more problematic. This is reflected in 
the identification by neo-classical economists of information as an important 
cost in financial markets. Improvements in information flows leading to greater 
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market efficiency develop from external economies of scale, which themselves 
emerge out of the spatial proximity of financial market institutions to 
competitors and firms engaged in related activities (Davis 1990; Grilli 1989). In 
our terms, then, the networks that provide knowledge as a significant material 
resource for world credit practices tend to become centralised in WFCs. 
The conceptualisation of WFCs as the key social spaces for world credit 
practices leads to the recognition that the informational economies of scale in 
financial centres identified by neo-classical economists are themselves a matter 
for social production and reproduction (Thrift 1994; Pryke & Lee 1995). The 
communication of information as knowledge as a material resource is also a 
social process, involving "the creation of networks of interpersonal and 
intercorporate communication" (Pryke & Lee 1995: 330). The centralisation of 
knowledge in WFCs results from the overlapping of knowledge networks that 
include civil, commercial, corporate and financial institutional networks. 
Building upon Smith's (1984) notion of Amsterdam as an "information 
exchange" in the seventeenth century, it becomes possible to identify WFCs as 
standing as the principal 'knowledge exchanges' in world finance. 
Technology 
Technology potentially constitutes the most dynamic material resource 
which both frames credit practices and upon which they must draw. The 
significance of technological change is not limited to the contemporary period 
where scholars have identified close linkages between changes in world credit 
practices and the emergence of a global information and telecommunications 
infrastructure based around telematics (Warf 1995; McKenzie & Lee 1991; 
Wriston 1988). " For instance, as Parsons (1989) has observed, the development 
of telegraphy in the 1880s facilitated the internationalisation of economic 
information. In terms of world credit practices, innovations in information and 
communications technologies have, in particular, facilitated the movement of 
funds (both capital and credit), the creation and communication of knowledge, 
the development of new and complex credit instruments, and increases in the 
speed and volume of Practices. 
Strange's (1990) distinction between modes, means and channels of 
communication can be utilised to illustrate the impact of technology on world 
18 'Telematics' is the linkage of computerised and digital data banks to telecommunications 
technologies (Graham & Marvin 1996: 14). 
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credit practices in different periods. " Technological innovations in the means 
and channels of communication have tended to encourage the expansion of the 
numerate mode of communication in modem world finance. For instance, the 
twice-weekly criss-crossing of mail packet boats between Amsterdam and 
London in the eighteenth century carried price details that ensured that the stock 
markets of the two financial centres became reasonably well integrated (Neal 
1990). During the nineteenth century the introduction of the telegraph across 
the USA encouraged the rapid assessment of shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange through a series of numerical indicators (Hamilton 1986: 41). The 
initial introduction of computers within financial market institutions in the 
1960s sought to improve the efficiency of numerate modes of communication by 
easing the massive flows of paper involved in credit practices (Hamilton 
1986: 33). Similarly, the automation and computerisation of clearing practices 
has allowed accounts to be credited and debited electronically. Since the late 
1970s, digitalised technologies have reinforced the predominance of the 
numerate mode of communication further. Essentially, these technologies allow 
types of knowledge to be processed and transmitted in the form of the 'bit' 
steams of binary code used in computers - i. e. as a series of zeros and ones. 
It is held here that contrary to predictions of their demise in the face of 
contemporary technological innovations (O'Brien 1992), WFCs have and 
continue to be the main spaces within which technological innovations in world 
finance have become centralised. As the sites of the latest technical skills and 
scientific knowledge (Braudel 1977: 89-90), world financial centres constitute 
the "technopoles" (Petrella 1991; Castells & Hall 1994) of world finance in two 
interrelated senses. First, technological innovations have tended to become 
centralised in WFCs in order to facilitate credit practices within the space of the 
centre itself. For instance, on its completion in 1903, the New York Stock 
Exchange building in Broad Street included massive annunciator boards that 
were backed by 247 miles of wiring and 6 miles of pneumatic tubes within the 
walls and ceilings. This carried trading reports from the trading floors to the 
ticker tape system (Buck 1992: 95-6). Similarly, while the contemporary period 
19 Modes of communication are the signs, literate modes (languages and words), and numbers 
through which people communicate; means of communication are employed for literate and 
numerate modes of communication and "include speech, both face-to-face and at a distance ... 
and writing both by hand and by various kinds of machine beginning with the printing press and 
going on to typewriters and computers"; and channels of communication are the methods 
through which "speech and writing are transmitted from person to person when these are not face 
to face", including postal services, telegraph cables, radio, telephone lines, satellites and fibre- 
optics (Strange 1990: 263). 
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has been marked by the emergence of electronic exchanges existing in 'hyper- 
space' and accessed by apparently footloose computer terminals, such as 
NASDAQ (North American Security Dealers Automated Quotation System), the 
vast majority of trading is undertaken from the dealing rooms of market 
institutions centralised in the major financial centres. " Second, technological 
innovations have tended to become centralised in WFCs as the key social spaces 
for credit practices to facilitate inter-linkages with the wider social space of 
world finance. For instance, the automated Clearing House Interbank Payments 
System (CHIPS) founded by the New York Clearing House Association in 1970 
enabled claims and obligations arising from dollar-denominated credit created 
elsewhere in the Euromarkets to be cleared more efficiently. As Moss (1987) 
stresses, the reach of telecommunications outwards from VyTCs in the 
contemporary period has provided the channels for the increased 
interconnectedness and integration of world credit practices. 
Ideas 
Material capabilities that frame world credit practices and upon which 
they must draw cannot be separated from the ideational forces of world finance 
as successive historical structures. Shared or intersubjective meanings 
effectively frame the terrain of world finance, establishing widely held 
understandings as to the parameters and motivations of credit practices and the 
language with which they are discussed. A simple historical comparison 
between pre-modem and modem intersubjective meanings is illustrative of their 
significance. For instance, in ancient Athens the idea of reciprocity was central 
to informing attitudes to, and understandings of, credit. The equivalent 
Athenian term for credit - 'pistis' - implied trust, faith, belief, confidence, 
honesty, proof and pledge (Millet 1991: 7). In contrast, modem attitudes to and 
understandings of credit tend to be dominated by narrow rational economic 
calculations of the efficient allocation of credit and associated concerns with 
risk, obligation and rates of interest (de Goede 1998). 
The research of IPE scholars is suggestive of an interaction between 
competing collective images of social order - world views - and intersubjective 
meanings in the latter's transformation in modem world finance as a succession 
of historical structures. For instance, Ruggie (1982) and Strange (1994: 51) 
stress the inseparability of support for 'embedded liberalism' by the principal 
20 On this point I am indebted to the insights of a representative of a London-based, American- 
owned investment bank. Confidential interview, London, 2nd June 1998. 
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western states and social forces in the post-1945 era from the close reign of state 
institutions over credit practices. Not dissimilarly, Kapstein (1992) and 
Helleiner (1994) highlight the impact upon contemporary world credit practices 
of the propagation of a neo-liberal world view by an 'epistemic community' of 
central bankers engaged in the monthly meetings of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS). " 
Unpacking the interaction between changes in intersubjective meanings 
and world views in concrete tenns requires, however, that inquiry moves beyond 
the propagation of world views by dominant social forces to consider the 
processes of belief and value formation. " In this respect, Parsons (1989) 
analysis of the role of the financial press since the early nineteenth century as "a 
platform for the dissemination of economic theories and discourse" (1989: 4) is 
informative. Through fluctuations in the content of the financial press, Parsons 
(1989) highlights that points at which shared meanings surrounding world credit 
practices began to change coincided with economists entering into social and 
political debates through the financial press. Parsons (1989) work is illustrative 
of the need to move beyond the existing IPE agenda in world finance that 
focuses primarily on the propagation of world views through state institutions. 
Those social processes associated with the interaction between 
intersubjective meanings and world views in world finance also contain a spatial 
dimension. This can be seen at two interrelated levels. First, as key social 
spaces in terms of knowledge and communication in world financial orders, 
world financial centres become key social spaces for the propagation of world 
views. To become dominant, a world view must become embedded in those 
texts, mental frameworks and social networks which are contained in the 
intersubjective meanings which surround the construction of knowledge and its 
communication. In this sense, world financial centres constitute important 
66epistemic communitiee' in world finance, defined as "occupational 
communities with their own specialised vocabularies, rhetorics, knowledges, 
21 'Epistemic conununities' are "networks of knowledge based experte' or "thought collectives" 
(Haas 1992). 
22 This point is informed by Drainville's (1994: 116) research into the contemporary propagation 
of neo-liberalism as a world view. He asserts "Neo-liberalism is not a constituted project 
implemented in the world economy, a thing that fills structures. As a political reality, neo- 
liberalism is both a broad strategy of restructuring and a succession of negotiated settlements, of 
concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of structures, as well as to the political possibilities of 
the momenf'. 
64 
practices and texts" (Thrift & Leyshon 1994: 349-50). This is reinforced by the 
centralisation of channels of communication in world financial centres, as 
gaining access to these is essential to the wider propagation of a world view. 
Included within these processes are the international financial press which in 
contemporary world finance includes Euromoney, The Banker, The Economist, 
and The Financial Times, all based in London. 
Second, those intersubjective meanings that define credit practices 
contain, albeit often implicitly, representations of space that constitute the 
dominant conceptualisation of the relationships of credit practices to social 
space. Consequently, the centralisation of world credit practices in world 
financial centres has tended to be reinforced by representations of space that 
offer understandings as to why such a centralisation is necessary. For instance, 
while offering alternative interpretations, public policy guidelines (CRP 1995), 
economists (Davis 1990) and academics from across the disciplines concerned 
with world financial centres have all tended to contribute to this representation 
of space in the contemporary period. Alternative conceptualisations of social 
space - i. e. representational spaces - have, however, also been put forward as 
part of the wider challenge of an alternative world view. This suggests that 
given the mobility and fungibility of finance capital, technological changes are 
likely to generate a'deterritorialisation! (Agnew & Corbridge 1995) of financial 
activity. However, as Sassen (1991) argues, far from 'deterritorialisation', 
contemporary world finance has been marked by an intensification of the 
centralisation of world credit practices in the principal VTCs. 
Institutions 
Within world finance as a succession of historical structures, 
institutional forces stand alongside material capabilities and ideas in framing 
credit practices. Indeed, world credit practices have and continue to be 
institutionalised within the social institutions of market, state and civil society. 
The relative significance of market, state and civil institutions has waxed and 
waned in different periods of modem world finance, with the nature of the 
interplay between them tending to be formalised through regulation (Strange 
1988: 88). A focus here on the conjunctural manner in which credit practices 
become institutionalised and their relationships to material and ideational forces 
contrasts with existing research in IPE which demands that state-market 
relations are the proper object of inquiry. ' Following an Historical IPE 
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approach, it is the actual practices of world finance that are the focus of inquiry 
in the first instance, not their institutional manifestations. 'State' and 'market' 
as overarching'analytical categories are effectively unpacked to reveal their 
institutional, material and ideational bases. 
The analytical distinction made here between market, state and civil 
institutions builds upon a reading of the identification by Gramsci of three major 
interconnected realms of social life, that is, economic, political and civil society. 
Market institutions are those which are the broadly understood and accepted as 
ways of organising social practices in the economic realm undertaken for profit. 
State institutions are those which are the broadly understood and accepted ways 
of organising social practices in the political realm undertaken to administer 
social life. ' Civil institutions are those which are the broadly understood and 
accepted ways of organising social practices in the civil realm undertaken 
voluntarily in support of socio-economic aspirations. " As such, social 
institutions are distinguished not by the functions they perform in any abstract 
sense, but in terms of how they are understood and accepted in specific 
historical contexts. 
By way of illustration, central banks are often classified by somewhat 
ahistorical, functional explanations of the social institutions of finance to be 
state institutions regardless of historical and social context. The alternative 
basis for distinguishing between social institutions utilised here facilitates the 
recognition that the identity of central banks as social institutions is often more 
problematic. For instance, the Bank of England in the nineteenth century is 
usually regarded as an institution of the British state. However, Bagehot's 
(1873/199 1) account of 'Lombard Street' has a strong sense of the troublesome 
identity of the Bank, fearing that its private structure did not necessarily serve its 
public responsibilities. In our terms, the Bank could be viewed as a market 
23 For recent reviews of IPE literature in world finance that emphasise and reassert this 
commanding orthodoxy, see Cohen (1996) and Dombrowski (1998). 
24 'Political society' was equated by Gramsci with the 'state proper', that is the administrative, 
executive and coercive institutions of government within a society (Cox 1987: 409). 
25 For Grarnsci, "civil society is the social realm in which abstract economic interests ... take on 
their actual, concrete, and particular forms as specific aspirations linked to specific world-views. 
It is the realm of voluntary associations, of the norms and practices which make them possible, 
and of the collective identities they form, the realm where T becomes 'we"' (Murphy 1994: 3 1). 
Murphy (1994: 14) extends Gramsci's notion of national civil society to the international level, 
whereby international civil society consists of those institutions through which national civil 
societies have been linked for several centuries. 
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institution, a joint-stock company concerned with profitability and dividend 
payments. Further, the Bank could also be held to be a civil institution. The 
Court of Directors that managed the Bank's affairs were drawn, in the main, 
from the ranks of London's most prominent merchants and financiers, 
representing their perceived shared interests. Classifying the institutions that 
contribute to framing world credit Practices remains an historical question. 
Market Institutional Networks 
Throughout modem world finance, credit practices have been 
institutionalised within financial market institutions. The notion of market 
institutional networks reflects the extent to which undertaking credit practices at 
a world scale has involved networks of institutions which extend throughout the 
relevant geographical range of world credit practices in different periods (Sassen 
1991: 104; Pryke & Lee 1995: 337). The identification of the significance of 
market institutional networks is also recognition of the collective and 
hierarchical nature of world financial markets. Contrary to understandings of 
markets offered by neo-classical economists as the interaction of individuals as 
rational utility maximisers, world credit practices tend to be collectively 
organised through a relatively small number of market institutions. For 
instance, Braudel's (1977,1984) analysis of world finance between the 
thirteenth and nineteenth century stresses the domination of credit practices by 
the major European financial families. In the contemporary era, large market 
institutions that enjoy so-called advantages of scale which lower the risks 
involved in credit creation continue to dominate (Strange 1988: 13 1). Typically, 
the top twenty market institutions within any sector of credit practices account 
for between forty and sixty percent of world-wide transactions (Smith 1992). 
As Braudel (1977: 111) asserts, financial market institutions have always 
circumvented the market understood in neo-classical terms. 
Another aspect of the collective and hierarchical nature of world 
financial markets that is often overlooked is the manner in which linkages with 
national political economies tend to underpin the relative standing of specific 
market institutional networks. The notion of 'stateless' market institutions 
pursuing opportunities for profit the world over is something of an 
oversimplification. Given the inconstant geography of capitalism, relatively 
high rates of economic growth in a national political economy tend to act as a 
'springboard' for the financial market institutions embedded in that economy to 
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dominate world finance. " Capital in the form of money has and continues to 
reside within national retail market institutions (Germain 1996: 214-5; Zysman 
1996: 173). The linkages of market institutional networks to their respective 
'home' political economies consequently impacts on their strategies and 
competitiveness at a world scale (Smith 1992; Martin 1994: 265-6). Modem 
world finance has been dominated in different periods, then, by Dutch, British, 
west European, American and Japanese market institutional networks. 
While market institutional networks tend to be united by their 
organisation of credit practices based on changing perceptions of the potential 
profits and risks involved, market institutions have traditionally specialised in 
different sets of credit practices. Commercial banks have tended to be involved 
in taking largely retail deposits, granting overdrafts and issuing primarily short- 
term corporate loans. Merchant banks have tended to take wholesale deposits, 
issue large loans to corporate and sovereign customers, and underwrite the issue 
of short- and long-term capital and equity market credit. Investment banks have 
tended to act as brokers, dealers and underwriters in capital and equity markets. " 
In contemporary world finance, these traditional demarcations have, at least to 
some extent, become undercut by a wide range of processes including 
'disintermediation' and 'decompartmentalisation'. Disintermediation, whereby 
the flow of funds between borrowers and lenders avoids the direct use of banks 
as financial intermediaries (Sinclair 1994: 136), erodes the capacity of 
commercial banks in particular to collect deposits and grant loans (Economist 
1992). Decompartmentalisation, whereby regulatory barriers subdividing credit 
practices by institution that were erected in an attempt to prevent a crisis in one 
sector spreading to another are removed (Cerny 1993a: 54), offers opportunities 
for market institutions to establish financial conglomerates and broaden the 
range of credit practices which they organise (Economist 1994). 
The institutionalisation of world credit practices within market 
institutional networks also has a significant spatial dimension. The principal 
26 On the 'embeddedness' of multinational enterprises within their respective national political 
economies see Sally (1994) and Pauly and Reich (1997). 
27 A more precise breakdown of the specialisations of market institutional networks is mitigated 
against by the impact of the emergence of state-societies and the consolidation of national 
political economies on the identities and strategies of market institutions. See, for instance, 
Zysman's (1983) comparative typology of the historical development of distinct configurations 
of state-finance-industry relations as 'capital market systems', 'negotiated credit systems', and 
'credit-based systems'. 
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market networks in different periods of world finance have tended to centralise 
their credit practices in the world financial centre of the period. Explanations of 
this centralisation in neo-classical economics draw upon discussions of 
informational economies in dispersed markets, whereby the search for the 
lowest price by buyers and the search for buyers by sellers are identified as 
important costs incurred in a market. The centralisation of market institutional 
networks is thus seen as reducing the costs of access to market information, 
realising external economies of scale (Davis 1990: 7). In our terms, however, as 
key social spaces for world credit practices, the external economies of scale in 
world financial centres are a matter for social construction and reproduction. As 
Pryke & Lee (1995: 330-1) assert . ..... external economies 
do not just happen to 
exist in the air or appear automatically as geographical clustering proceeds 
within financial centres; they are socially generated ...... Such social 
construction and reproduction rests on the centralisation of material and 
ideational forces in WFCs, and the wider production and reproduction of WFCs 
as part of world finance as a social order. 
State and Civil Institutions 
At the outset of modem world finance in seventeenth century Europe, 
world credit practices were largely institutionalised within market institutional 
networks and enjoyed "a certain latitude" from state institutions (Abu-Lughod 
1989: 17). As Braudel (1984: 50) has noted, at this time states lacked the 
"diabolical power" of penetration into world credit practices. Practices were, 
however, also institutionalised within civil institutions, in particular, stock 
exchanges and clearing houses. Stock exchanges provided important 
institutional parameters within which capital market practices were organised, 
standing at once as markets, self-regulatory institutions and cartels (Ultz 
1997: 6-10). Clearing houses meanwhile provided the institutional parameters 
for the organisation of payment practices, effectively supervising the meeting of 
obligations arising from the practices of creating credit which were themselves 
institutionalised within market networks. 
While the extent to which world credit practices have been 
institutionalised within state institutions has fluctuated since it is clear that, from 
the 'financial revolution' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, state 
institutions have become increasingly involved in world finance (Dickson 1967; 
Gilpin 1987: 122). The financial revolution involved the issuing of fiduciary 
money in which credit also became denominated. Credit practices, therefore, 
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affected the value of fiduciary money. Given that financial market institutions 
are first and foremost in competition in the pursuit of profits, market institutions 
required regulation and supervision to hopefully prevent 'over-banking' and the 
imprudent expansion of credit (Strange 1988: 95; Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 49). In 
the absence of such management by state institutions, the value of fiduciary 
money may be brought into question. 
While the penetration of credit practices by state institutions has 
followed diverse patterns across national political economies, "operational 
capacity" and "design capacity" stand out as two common features of state 
institutions (Vipond 1993: 187). The former concerns attempts to control the 
levels of credit creation in response to monetary and growth targets, the preserve 
of central banks based upon the granting of monopoly privileges in the issuing 
of fiduciary money and government debt. " Central banks seek to restrain the 
over-banking tendency by manipulating the cost of borrowed reserves in the 
form of fiduciary money and thereby emitting interest rate signals (Dow 
1994: 155). In the advent of panic surrounding the solvency of financial market 
institutions, central banks may also perform the role of 'lender of last resort' by 
injecting liquidity (Gilpin 1987: 309). At a world scale, credit creation and 
commodity transactions in different periods have tended to be largely 
denominated in a single national currency as 'world money' (Strange 1976). 
The central banks with monopoly over the issue of world monies have, 
therefore, been key state institutions framing world credit practices. The 
operational capacity of key central banks has been assisted by co-operative 
monetary arrangements and institutions, such as those associated with the 
international gold standard in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and 
macro-economic policy co-ordination. 
The "design capacity" of states concerns the establishment of the rules 
and regulations governing financial market institutions. It is this aspect of the 
28 As Walter (1993: 37) summarises, "A basic theme of modem monetary theory is that an 
economy in which there was no central bank money but only credit money issued by individual 
banks would be inherently unstable, as individual banks would have no incentive to limit credit 
creation and prices would tend to infinity. Monetary stability is seen to derive from the central 
bank's ability to control the overall level of credit creation by the banking system, by 
determining bank's reserve ratios (the ratio of required holdings of central bank money to 
deposits). In this orthodox view, financial hierarchy and in particular the central bank's 
monopoly on the issue of base money are prerequisites for monetary stability". For a radical 
challenge to the monopoly privilege enjoyed by central banks since the seventeenth century 
based upon the ideas of Hayek, see Dowd and Timberlake (1998). 
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framing of world credit practices by state institutions which has received most 
attention from IPE scholars (Underhill 1991; Helleiner 1994). Drawing largely 
on the insights of Karl Polanyi (1944) into the necessary role of the state in 
establishing and maintaining markets, what this vein of research serves to 
highlight is the extent to which state policies frame the manner in which credit 
practices become institutionalised within market institutions. " Once regulatory 
parameters have been established by the state, much of the day-to-day 
supervision of credit practices institutionalised within market networks has 
traditionally been organised through a complex and nationally diverse mix of 
civil institutions. Liltz (1997: 10-15) characterises this predominance of civil 
institutions as "self-regulated cartels". The combination of widespread national 
deregulation and the global extension of market institutional networks in the 
contemporary period has both transformed and transplanted these arrangements. 
A range of inter-state arrangements has emerged which regulates and supervises 
world credit practices that themselves are institutionalised within market 
networks (Porter 1993; Underhill 1997b). According to Moran (199 1) and LtItz 
(1997), this has involved a growing codification, institutionalisation and 
juridification of many previously self-regulatory arrangements as cartels have 
been broken up. 
Part III - World Financial Orders: Authority, Stability and Instability 
This final Part of the chapter develops the concerns of an Historical IPE 
with social change and social orders with reference to world finance. Following 
an Historical IPE, the conceptualisation of modem world finance offered here as 
a succession of historical structures that span irregular conjunctures is extended 
to the diachronic moment. World finance becomes a succession of social orders 
- what will be termed 'world financial orders' - that is, complexes of social and 
power relations which shape the manner in which world credit practices come to 
29 Cerny (1993b: 155 original emphasis) provides an excellent summary of the insights of Karl 
Polanyi in this respect. What Polanyi pointed out was that "the establishment of a capitalist 
market economy, and of the kind of financial system that is needed to create and sustain it, does 
not happen by itself. It is a political act, in two complementary ways. In the first place, the 
capitalist market is only one concrete dimension or potential form of social organization, and its 
predominance over other dimensions and forms requires the necessary norms and structural 
conditions be imposed or collectively adopted. In the second place, a range of critical and 
necessary preconditions for the organization and operation of a stable and efficient market 
require the backing of the state. These include the establishment within a circumscribed territory 
of clearly defined and enforceable property rights, common standards of value such as weights 
and measures, a currency for exchange and accumulation, a system of contracts, a legal system to 
enforce the above, and a coercive state apparatus to sanction predators". 
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be organised in different conjunctures in the context of wider world orders. 
Each world financial order, then, has a structure of power. 
Structures of Power 
Power in world finance has tended to be understood by IPE scholars in 
largely state-centric terms. Helleiner's (1993a) inquiry into the nature of what 
he terms "financial power" provides a clear and typical example. Helleiner 
(1993a: 208) identifies five common features of the United Provinces, Britain 
and the United States as the successive hegemonic states in world finance. First, 
each was the leading creditor economy of its period. Second, each had the key 
public institutions in the organisation of world finance. Third, each was 'home' 
to the dominant market institutional networks. Fourth, each was host to the 
dominant world financial centre. Fifth, each of their respective currencies 
operated as world money. 
While illustrative of the diverse sources of power in world finance, such 
a state-centric approach remains problematic. For instance, drawing on Weber, 
Ingham (1994) highlights the problems of equating market forms of power, that 
is, the first, third and fourth common features of financial power identified by 
Helleiner, with state power in the organisation of world finance. In our terms, 
state-centric approaches to power in world finance collapse material and 
political power into state power. The significance of social power is also 
neglected, particularly in terms of its contribution to shaping the purposes to 
which political power is put. As Ruggie's (1982) analysis of world financial 
and monetary arrangements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries recognises, 
the "social purposes" which frame the exercise of political power has significant 
bearing on the manner in which world finance comes to be organised. The 
pattern of interacting social forces underpinning the 'purpose' of state policy 
cannot be captured by state-centric approaches where the purpose of state policy 
is assumed and unchanging in an anarchical system of states. Following Cox 
(1981/1996: 103 original emphasis), an Historical IPE approach embraces a 
genuinely political economy understanding of the structure of power in a world 
financial order. Here "power is seen as emerging from social processes rather 
that taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities, that is the 
result of these processes". " The exercise of political power through states in 
30 On the 'emergent' nature of power from concrete social relationships, see also Mann (1986: 4- 
6). 
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world financial orders is therefore not the sole explanatory factor, but a 
significant part of what is to be explained. 
Material power in successive world financial orders emerges from social 
relations surrounding capital, knowledge and technology as the principal 
material capabilities of world finance. In a diachronic sense, material 
capabilities are not a neutral requirement of world credit practices, but potential 
sources of material power. Social relations surrounding material capabilities 
ensure that power is conferred upon those who occupy positions of ownership, 
control or access to material resources. In terms of capital, vast inequalities and 
variations in rates of accumulation realise changing patterns of material power 
both within and across state-societies. The material power of social forces in 
world finance is also related to their capacity to hold, manipulate and 
communicate knowledge. As Sinclair (1994: 143-4) has asserted, knowledge is 
"a form of social organisation with dominating and subordinating dimensions". 
Strange's (1988: 117) notion of the 'knowledge structure' captures the 
significance of the social and power relations surrounding knowledge which "... 
determine what knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, and who 
communicates it and by what means to whom and on what terms". Power is 
drawn, in particular, from the ability to deny others access to knowledge. 
Further, unequal social relations surrounding access to new technology also 
confer material power upon social forces. Technological innovation is not 
exogenous to society but fully inscribed in social relations (Castells 1989). In 
world financial orders, access to state-of-the-art technologies provides social 
forces with the material power to change the manner in which credit practices 
come to be organised. 
Further, the centralisation of material capabilities in world financial 
centres as key social spaces leads to a spatial dimension to material power 
relations in world financial orders. The capacity of social forces to exercise 
material power in world finance becomes in large part determined by their 
ability to access key social spaces. Traditionally, those social forces that, 
through their material power, have dominated in world financial orders have 
also been associated with the dominant WFC. Polanyi (1944) effectively 
captured this in his analysis of the Hundred Years Peace (1815-1914). He 
identified the position of hautefinance as social forces which, alongside state 
and inter-state institutions, contributed to the production and reproduction of the 
Peace. For Polanyi (1944: 17), haute finance was understood not as a factor of 
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production as under neo-classical economics, but as "a specific entity", as a 
class and political category (Gill 1991: 282; Arrighi 1990: 372). At the roots of 
the formation of the perceived shared interests of haute finance, and of their 
position within the world financial order and wider world order of the period, 
was their centralisation in London. As Polanyi (1944: 11) asserted, London 
stood as "the international center, hautefinance proper". 
In addition to material power emerging from the unequal social relations 
surrounding material capabilities, social and political power also contribute to 
the basic structure of power in a world financial order. The capacity of the 
dominant social forces of haute finance in a world financial order to exercise 
material power is dependent upon wider social and political power relations. 
Social power emerges from the patterning of social forces, that is the manner in 
which different social forces come together. Social power relations impinge on 
the way in which world finance comes to be organised. For instance, despite the 
material predominance of New York's social forces in the post-1945 world 
financial order, the manner in which the order came to be organised did not 
reflect their perceived shared interests. The integration of other social forces 
including industrialists and organised labour both within American society and 
across western Europe undercut the social power of New York's social forces 
(Ruggie 1982). Further, given the significance of state institutions in framing 
world credit practices, whoever holds political power, that is "the power to 
control the machinery of the state or to influence government policy" (Cox 
1987: 18), is likely to be of particular importance. For the social forces of the 
dominant WFC to occupy a strong position within the structure of power 
requires that they hold considerable political power. As Braudel (1977: 64) 
posits, "Capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, 
when it is the state". " An understanding of the forms of state emerging from 
state-societal relations and the relationships between material, social and 
political power is essential, then, to identifying the structure of power within a 
world financial order. 
31 It should be noted that Braudel's (1977) usage of 'capitalism' differs considerably from its 
usual identification with a mode of production. For Braudel, capital is identified with capital 
goods (especially money) that are invested for their reproduction, while 'capitalists' are those, 
primarily merchants and financiers, who seek to reproduce their own capital for the purpose of 
accumulation. Hence 'capitalism' describes one realm of social life, not its totality as implied by 
the notion of the capitalist mode of production (Germain 1996: 224). 
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Following an Historical IPE approach, the structure of material, social 
and political power in a world financial order is understood in the context of the 
corresponding wider world order. Aside from wider social and political power 
relations, of particular significance for world financial orders is the nature of 
inter-state relations. At the most extreme, periods of international war can have 
major implications for world financial orders. As Kindleberger (1984/1993: 7) 
asserts, "Financial history cannot escape dealing with war. War is a hothouse 
and places enormous strain on resources, which finance is used to mobilise. 
Financial innovation occurs in wartime". In our terms, major international wars 
tend to contribute to a broad re-articulation of power relations that resonates 
through a world financial order as part of the wider world order of the period in 
question. Alternatively, periods in which there is an absence of major 
international conflict tend to present opportunities for inter-state co-operation. 
For instance, the agreement concluded at the Bretton Woods Conference of 
1944 between the governments of the western states to establish a fixed- 
exchange rate system and the resulting commitment to extend wartime capital 
controls into peacetime had major consequences for the post-war world financial 
order. 
Structures of Authority 
An Historical IPE approach also suggests, however, that a relatively 
stable social order does not simply result from the enforcement potential of a 
structure of power. While power relations are always present within a relatively 
stable social order, power relations tend to be visible as binding authority 
relations that render them legitimate. Following Cox (1981/1996: 103), an 
Historical IPE identifies a relatively stable social order as one in which a 
coherent 'fit' emerges between the material, ideational and institutional forces of 
that order. It is also posited that to understand how this fit is reproduced in a 
stable social order and manifests itself in the organisation of social practices 
requires attention to the formal and informal dimensions of the structure of 
authority. 
Material, ideational and institutional forces in world financial orders 
tend to be centralised in the dominant world financial centre. Authority 
relations in world financial orders legitimate the prevailing social and power 
relations that emerge from these forces considered in diachronic terms. It is 
largely as a consequence of the formal and informal authority of the dominant 
social forces associated with the dominant WFC that a relatively stable world 
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financial order is reproduced. To return to Polanyi (1944: 18), in the 
organisation of world credit practices hautefinance held both formal authority, 
as exercised through the principal market institutional networks such as that of 
Rothschilds, and the informal authority to shape "the universally accepted 
principles upon which this organization rested". Formal and informal authority 
come together in a structure of authority which organises world credit practices 
in a manner consistent with a coherent fit between the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of a world financial order. In addition to their standing as 
key social spaces for world credit practices, then, world financial centres are key 
spaces of authority in world financial orders, social loci for the reproduction of 
relative stability. It is posited, therefore, that a relatively stable world financial 
order coincides with the predominance of a single WFC as a key space of 
authority. 
A somewhat fragmentary body of research broadly supports the notion of 
world financial centres as key spaces of authority in the reproduction of 
relatively stable world financial orders. Ingham (1994) highlights the 
significance of WFCs for understanding the stable reproduction of world 
monetary orders by stressing the detrimental consequences of the failure of New 
York between 1945 and 1971 to replicate the role played by London between 
1870 and 1914. Further, subsequent to the publication in 1973 of his classic The 
World in Depression, Kindleberger (1974/1978; 1983) seems to have revised his 
initial state-centric argument that relative instability in world money and finance 
was caused by the absence of a single hegemonic state. Although based on a 
somewhat functional understanding of WFCs, this leads him to suggest that the 
manner in which state, civil and market authority comes together in the 
dominant financial centre is pivotal to an understanding of relative stability in 
world finance. 
"... the financial centre associated with the leading currency had certain 
functions to perform: the distribution of additions to world reserves, the 
accumulation and allocation of short- and long-term capital and, in time 
of crisis, serving as lender of last resorV' (Kindleberger 1983: 87). 
Hence, for Kindleberger (1983: 82), the Great Depression was not 
understandable simply in terms as a consequence of the transfer of power and 
responsibility from the British to American state, but occurred "in the midst of 
the transfer of financial leadership from London to New York! '. Brown's (1940) 
research is, perhaps, the most supportive. Having established that the most 
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significant factors facilitating the smooth operation of the pre- 1914 international 
gold standard were efficient movements of credit for adjustment, Brown (1940) 
argues that the very efficiency of movements of credit resulted from the firm 
centralisation of what he terms the 'world credit structure' in London. For 
Brown (1940), the key to the disruptions to the international gold standard 
caused by the First World War therefore lay in the subsequent decentralisation 
of the world credit structure between London and the emergent New York. 
Not only does a relatively stable world financial order tend to coincide 
with the dominance of a single WFC as a key space of authority, then, but the 
unravelling of a world financial order coincides with the decentralisation of the 
order and proliferation of financial centres at the apex of the hierarchy. Inherent 
contradictions within a world financial order come to the surface in the absence 
of a centralised structure of authority to reproduce relative stability. The rise 
and fall of WFCs echoes conflicts between ascendant and descendent social 
forces which themselves reflect slowly shifting patterns of power relations. As 
Braudel (1984: 32) highlights, the rise to prominence of one financial centre and 
the decline of another "always meant a massive historical shift of forces, 
revealing the precariousness of the previous equilibrium and the strengths of the 
one it was replacing". A decentralised world financial order is characterised by 
relative instability and the intense restructuring of credit practices. 
'Crises' of world finance are, therefore, conceptualised as largely a 
diachronic development associated with "structural disruptions" to the 
regularities of world credit practices and not "superficial fluctuations" 
(Overbeek 1990: 19). This contrasts with usual understandings of 'financial 
crises' as a largely synchronic development, the outcome of a shift from 
euphoria to panic in the psychology of market actors (Kindleberger 1978; Portes 
& Swoboda 1987; Dombrowski 1998: 5-6). " Financial crises understood in the 
latter sense as "superficial fluctuations" are likely regardless of whether world 
financial orders are relatively stable or unstable. The wider significance of 
financial crises in this sense does, however, depend largely on the extent to 
which a world financial order is centralised in a single WFC. A financial crisis 
that occurs within a centralised world financial order is, by virtue of the capacity 
32 For instance, Eichengreen and Portes (1987: 10) define 'financial crises' as "a disturbance of 
financial markets, associated typically with falling asset prices and insolvency among debtors 
and intermediaries, which ramifies through the financial system, disrupting the markets capacity 
to allocate capital within the economy. In an international financial crisis, disturbances spill 
over national borders, disrupting the markets capacity to allocate capital internationally". 
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of the structure of authority to reproduce relative stability, likely to bring about 
only a temporary change in credit practices. In a centralised world financial 
order, the authority relations that frame the organisation of credit practices are 
not in question. A financial crisis within a decentralised order, on the other 
hand, is capable of reinforcing diachronic crisis tendencies towards structural 
transformation. 
Conclusions 
Following from the ontological significance attached to the historicity of 
social thought and actions by an Historical IPE approach, Historical IPE inquiry 
is concerned with five main interrelated dimensions of world finance: structured 
social practices, social change, social space, social time, and social orders. An 
Historical IPE of world finance proceeds by focusing since the seventeenth 
century upon commercial credit, corporate credit, sovereign credit, money- 
market and clearance practices as the principal social practices which constitute 
modem world finance. World finance is conceptualised in both synchronic and 
diachronic terms as a succession of historical structures that span irregular 
conjunctures. In synchronic terms, world credit practices are framed by and 
draw upon capital, knowledge and technology as material resources; 
intersubjective meanings and world views as ideational forces; and market, state 
and civil institutional forces. In diachronic terms, world finance is understood 
as a succession of social orders, that is, world financial orders. World credit 
practices come to organised in the context of the structures of power and 
authority within a world financial order which itself forms part of a wider world 
order. A relatively stable world financial order in which a coherent conjunction 
emerges between material, ideational and institutional forces is reproduced by 
the coming together of the informal and formal dimensions of the structure of 
authority. 
An Historical IPE of world finance identifies the significance of world 
financial centres in world financial orders in two senses. First, in synchronic 
terms, WFCs stand as the key social spaces for world credit practices. The 
practices that create, allocate, buy and sell credit on a world-scale and the 
material, ideational and institutional forces which frame these practices tend to 
be centralised in a WFC. Second, in diachronic terms, WFCs are key spaces of 
authority in world financial orders, the social loci for the reproduction of 
relatively stable world financial orders. Rooted in the centralisation of material 
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resources in WFCs, those social forces that dominate world financial orders tend 
to be associated with the dominant WFC. It is through the informal and formal 
authority of these social forces that a relatively stable world financial order is 
reproduced. Consequently, a relatively stable world financial order coincides 
with the predominance of a single WFC, while a relatively unstable world 
financial order in which credit practices are restructured is marked by 
decentralisation between two or more financial centres at the apex of the 
hierarchy. 
In terms of apprehending contemporary world finance, then, the potential 
utility of an Historical IPE is primarily three-fold. First, in contrast to 
predominant understandings of world finance derived from neo-classical 
economics and building upon existing IPE scholarship, it is the social and 
political foundations of the organisation of world finance that are emphasised. It 
is suggested that the organisation of world credit practices is essentially 
problematic and not the functional result of the operations of the international 
economy. Second, in contrast to the majority of IPE scholarship, the social and 
political foundations of world finance are held to extend beyond the intersection 
of 'states and markets'. 'State' and 'market' as analytical categories are 
unpacked through a focus upon world credit practices themselves, the material, 
ideational and institutional forces framing practices, the social and power 
relations shaping the organisation of world credit practices, and the relationship 
between authority relations and the relatively stable or otherwise reproduction of 
world finance. In each respect, pivotal to moving beyond states-markets is the 
recognition of the centrality of world financial centres to world financial orders. 
Third, an Historical IPE of world finance offers the potential of an historical 
mode of knowledge of world finance capable of appropriating the past to inform 
the future. In particular, comparative historical inquiry across concrete world 
financial orders is likely to advance emancipatory understanding. It is to such 
concrete inquiry that Part II of this thesis now turns. 
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PART 11 
World Financial Orders 
and 
World Financial Centres 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Amsterdam: The Makina and Unravellina of the Amsterdam-Centred 
World Financial Order 
Introduction 
Through an Historical IPE approach, Part I developed the tools to 
facilitate the apprehension of contemporary world finance. This followed in the 
light of the dual problematic identified at the outset: that is, inquiry encounters 
not only significant structural changes which cannot easily be captured, but also 
the predominance of neo-classical economics as a mode of knowledge. An 
Historical IPE approach to world finance focuses over the longue durie upon 
commercial, corporate, sovereign, money-market and clearing practices as the 
principal sets of social practices which comprise world finance. Modem world 
finance since the seventeenth century is conceptualised as a succession of 
historical structures that span irregular conjunctures. In synchronic terms, world 
credit practices are framed by and draw upon material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions as the basic forces that interact in an historical structure. World 
financial centres are identified as the key social spaces for world credit 
practices, the spaces where the practices and forces of world finance as a 
historical structure become centralised. In diachronic terms, world finance is 
posited to be a succession of social orders, that is, world financial orders. World 
credit practices are seen to be organised in the context of the structures of power 
and authority within a world financial order, which itself forms part of a wider 
world order. It is postulated that a relatively stable world financial order is 
identifiable as a coherent conjunction between material, ideational and 
institutional forces, reproduced by the coming together of the informal and 
formal dimensions of a structure of authority in the organisation of world credit 
practices. World financial centres are perceived as key spaces of authority, the 
social loci for the stable reproduction of a world financial order. Ultimately, it 
is proposed that a relatively stable world financial order coincides with the 
dominance of a single WFC, while a relatively unstable world financial order is 
marked by the decentralisation of that order between two or more financial 
centres at the apex of the hierarchy. 
This chapter initiates our concrete historical inquiry into world financial 
orders and world financial centres, beginning with Amsterdam as the WFC in 
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 'Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order' is the appropriate point for inquiry over the longue durie to 
commence, as an Historical IPE approach to world finance suggests that world 
credit practices took on their 'modem' form in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries - becoming for the first time legitimated by the principles of rationality 
and reason (Neal 1990; de Goede 1998). However, in terms of the relationships 
of world financial centres to world finance, the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order was a continuation of the tendency since the fourteenth century 
for great mercantile cities to rise to the position of WFC - fourteenth and 
fifteenth century Venice, Antwerp and Genoa in the sixteenth century (Braudel 
1977; Arrighi 1994; Amin 1996; Goldsmith 1987: 198). As such, despite world 
credit practices taking on their modem form in the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order, world finance from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries 
maintained a broad structural coherence. Further, the unravelling of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order during the late eighteenth century, and 
the concurrent rise of London as the WFC of the 'British world financial order' 
which became established in the first decades of the nineteenth century, marks a 
structural transformation in the nature of world financial orders. In addition to 
its position as the centre for world trade, London stood, first and foremost, as 
the financial centre of the British national political economy (Braudel 1984: 35; 
Kindleberger 1974/1978: 79-83). From the nineteenth century, with the 
increased interpenetration between states and societies as part and parcel of the 
processes of the making of state-society complexes, consolidated national 
political economies came to form the foundations of both the world financial 
order and the world economy more broadly. 
Inquiry into the making and unravelling of the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order, then, facilitates an understanding of modem world credit 
practices, the significance of the centralisation of a world financial order in a 
single WFC for relative stability, and the "massive shift of historical forces" 
(Braudel 1984: 32) which coincides with the fall from predominance of a single 
WFC and relative instability in a world financial order. The latter is particularly 
informative as to the structural transformation that marks the end of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order and the beginning of the British world 
financial order that followed. To these ends, the chapter is divided into three 
main parts. The focus for Part I is the rise of Amsterdam as a WFC, the 
predominant forms of credit practices, and the material capabilities that framed 
credit practices in the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. Part II moves 
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to consider the structures of power and authority in the Amsterdam-centred 
world financial order and their relationship to the relatively stable making and 
reproduction of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order in the context of 
the wider world order. Finally, Part III concentrates on the simultaneous rise of 
London and decline of Amsterdam as WFCs and the associated unravelling of 
the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. 
Part I- Amsterdam: Key Social Space 
From the early seventeenth century there appears little doubt that 
Amsterdam stood at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of financial centres, the world 
financial centre. The stream of cosmopolitan financiers and merchants into 
Amsterdam, including French Protestants, Antwerpers, and Jews from Spain and 
Portugal, who brought with them capital, knowledge and expertise, was both 
symbolic of Amsterdam's rise and contributed to its rapid take-off (Braudel 
1984: 147; Barbour 1963: 56-7; Kindleberger 1984/1993: 41). As the key social 
space, the world credit practices associated with commercial credit, sovereign 
credit, corporate credit, money-markets and the clearance of credit transactions 
all became centralised in Amsterdam. Other financial centres, most notably 
London, Paris, Genoa, Geneva and Frankfurt were all significant as spaces for 
social practices, but none rivalled the dominance of Amsterdam. 
Forms of Credit 
Amsterdam's position as the entrepOt centre for world trade ensured the 
domination of commercial credit practices throughout the seventeenth century. 
The bill of exchange remained the pre-eminent instrument for the creation of 
commercial credit. The associated secondary trading practices including the 
discounting of bills that lead to their circulation far beyond the original creditors 
and debtors through endorsement were well established in Amsterdam before 
1700 (Riley 1980: 31). In no other financial centre "was the bill of exchange 
used so freely and flexibly, and no other city in this century had a business in 
them equal to Amsterdam's" (Barbour 1963: 53-4). The key practices in the 
provision of commercial credit for world trade were in the so-called 
'commission' and 'acceptance trades' (Braudel 1984: 241-5; Chapman 1984: 1- 
3). ' Commission agents utilised commercial credit for both the purchase and 
1 The commission trade meant the handling of goods on the behalf of another person, while the 
acceptance trade focused on the underwriting of bills of exchange. 
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sale of goods, either granting credit to others when purchasing goods or 
advancing proportions of payments when receiving goods for sale. 
Despite the declining comparative position of Amsterdam as a centre for 
world trade from the end of the seventeenth century, the centralisation of the 
practices of the acceptance trade in Amsterdam ensured continued dominance of 
commercial credit practices (Riley 1980: 28; Chapman 1984: 1-2). ' Acceptance 
houses centred in Amsterdam institutionalised the creation, allocation, buying 
and selling of commercial credit throughout much of the eighteenth century. 
Merchants engaged in world trade, for instance British merchants in London, 
sought the endorsement of their bills of exchange by Amsterdam's acceptance 
houses in order to make them acceptable both to their debtors and to bankers at 
home or abroad. Merchants drew a bill of exchange (usually of three or six 
months duration) on Amsterdam with payment becoming due when the bill 
matured, while the acceptance houses occasionally held the bill until maturity 
but more often than not discounted it with bill traders. The growing significance 
of the acceptance trade during the eighteenth century mirrored the wider shift in 
the nature of Amsterdam from an entrep6t world mercantile and financial centre 
to a WFC of a more pure, specialised form. 
Closely associated with Amsterdam's domination of commercial credit 
practices was the firm centralisation of clearance and money-market practices in 
Amsterdam throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Clearance 
practices concerned with the settlement of credit obligations served to integrate 
transfers of bullion and specie with commercial and sovereign credit creation. 
Clearing practices were institutionalised largely with the Amsterdam Exchange 
Bank, supplemented by private cashiers who acted as agents of collection and 
payment (Riley 1980: 28). Formed in 1609, the Exchange Bank effectively 
became the world's clearing house and, as a consequence, the most important 
dealer in precious metals. This has led Goldsmith (1987: 214-6) to describe the 
Amsterdam Exchange Bank as the world's most significant financial institution 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The City of Amsterdam decreed 
that all bills of exchange of 600 florins or more issued in Amsterdam be cleared 
through the Bank (Kindleberger 1984/1993: 50). As such, the Bank acted to 
both transfer obligations through its books, with the volume of transfers through 
2 For a brief summary of debates surrounding the economic decline of the United Provinces 
generally and particularly in relation to the position of Amsterdam in world trade, see 
Kindleberger (1996: 1004). 
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the Bank's books standing at 10- 12 million florins a day in 1776, and as a secure 
depository for payments (Riley 1980: 28). At any one point in time, the Bank 
covered outstanding obligations with coins, bullion and securities to maintain 
confidence in the system. As a secure depository, the Exchange Bank 
effectively stood as the key institution for money-market practices, attracting 
capital from all over Europe that sought a safe haven from social and political 
upheaval (Barbour 1963: 44-6; Wallerstein 1980: 57-8). The Bank's role as a 
depository, then, reinforced its capacity to stand as the world's clearing house 
for commercial and financial obligations. 
Sovereign credit practices were also centralised in Amsterdam during 
this period, particularly, although not exclusively, in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. During the seventeenth century the ease with which the state 
officials of the United Provinces could raise sovereign credit through 
Amsterdam was unrivalled by the other European states (Barbour 1963: 81-2). ' 
In addition, substantial foreign sovereign credit was provided to the 
Brandenberg elector and the royal and princely borrowers of Denmark, Sweden, 
Britain, Hamburg, Bremen, Emden and East Friesland (Chapman 1984: 2; 
Barbour 1963: 106-11). This often led to the situation where sovereign credit 
created in Amsterdam was supporting both sides in a war. Defaults were 
common, however, and despite the backing of sovereign credit with collateral 
including land, jewels, bullion and coins, the risks involved ensured that the 
provision of foreign sovereign credit remained relatively unattractive in 
Amsterdam during the seventeenth century (Riley 1980: 5). An escalation of 
wars between the European sovereigns by the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, combined with the changing horizons of Amsterdam's financiers as part 
of the shift of Amsterdam to an entrepot WFC of more pure form, led to a rapid 
expansion in the provision of foreign sovereign credit (Braudel 1984: 246-7; 
Arrighi 1994: 142; Riley 1980: 14-16). By the 1780s states including Britain, 
Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Russia, Poland, Spain, France and the United States 
had become the principal debtors on the Amsterdam capital market, 
institutionalised through the Amsterdam bourse. In addition, Amsterdam-based 
market institutional networks such as Hope & Co. organised sovereign credit 
issues throughout Europe, channelling Dutch capital into foreign issues abroad 
(Chapman 1984: 3). By 1790, the Dutch held between 500 and 700 million 
3 For instance, in 1664 when war with England was looming, a sovereign loan of one million 
florins to the United Provinces at three percent interest was subscribed within Amsterdam in two 
days (Barbour 1963: 81-2). 
85 
111"! i It 
florins worth of foreign assets, of which around 200 million florins represented 
issues and loans raised on the Amsterdam capital market (Kindleberger 
1984/1993: 211-2; Goldsmith 1987: 214). 
The sovereign credit of the European states was not, of course, provided 
single-handedly through credit practices centralised in Amsterdam (Braudel 
1982: 395; Riley 1980: 8). With the exception of the United Provinces, the large- 
scale sovereign credit requirements of the European states could not be fulfilled 
completely from within their own societies. Practices institutionalised at a 
world-scale and incorporating the main financial centres of Europe were a 
necessary feature of sovereign credit provision. For instance, during the middle 
period of the eighteenth century Genoa rivalled Paris as the main financial 
centre for those practices that created French sovereign credit. Frankfurt and 
Vienna were also important centres for foreign sovereign credit practices (Riley 
1980: 8). However, Amsterdam remained at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of 
Europe's financial centres in terms of sovereign credit creation. Amsterdam 
stood as the "pivot" (Braudel 1982: 395) around which foreign sovereign credit 
practices were organised. Based upon Amsterdam as a foundation stone, those 
market institutional networks through which foreign sovereign credit practices 
were undertaken extended across Europe's other main financial centres. 
Corporate credit practices remained relatively small-scale during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when compared to their explosion during 
the industrialisation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, the 
Amsterdam Bourse was the first stock market in permanent session (Arrighi 
1994: 138-40). Shares on the Bourse were the first to take the form of a 
permanent investment, that is, modem 'fictitious capital', as opposed to 
recoverable subscription money (Barbour 1963: 79). Listed on the Amsterdam 
Bourse, the Dutch East and West Indies Companies, with share capitals of six 
and seven million florins respectively, were the only two institutions in the 
seventeenth century that approximated to the form of the modem corporation 
(Goldsmith 1987: 21 9). 4 Alongside these innovations, the form of capital and 
4 The earliest forms of business organisation included sole proprietorships, partnerships, silent 
partnerships, and loose and temporary federations of merchants. The joint-stock company 
developed in response to the large-scale capital and credit necessities of long distance trade. 
While joint stock companies had existed before as temporary federations, formed in 1602 the 
Dutch East India Company (sometimes referred to as the VOC, that is, Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie) was the first permanent joint-stock company. While the use of stock in corporate 
credit practices was not widespread in Amsterdam, the techniques developed were utilised on a 
86 
equity practices themselves underwent considerable change. Secondary trading 
practices in corporate and sovereign credit based upon perceptions of risk 
began 
to take hold. Initially, investors and speculators tended to trade in equities in an 
attempt to profit from potential price fluctuations, but by the latter half of the 
eighteenth century so-called 'speculation in the wind' took off (Barbour 
1963: 76; Riley 1980: 29-30; Kindleberger 1984/1993: 209). Speculative 
practices in this sense involved the buying or selling of actions - that is, options 
to buy or sell - by persons who did not actually own equities but sought to profit 
from risk-taking on potential future price fluctuations. 
Capital 
The rise of Amsterdam as the key social space for the predominant forms 
of world credit practices was underpinned by the centralisation in Amsterdam of 
capital, knowledge and technology as the material resources upon which these 
practices drew. The relative abundance of capital in Amsterdam ensured that 
from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century at least, rates of interest 
on credit were lower in Amsterdam than elsewhere in Europe (Braudel 
1982: 386; Goldsmith 1987: 218). Based upon Dutch naval and shipping 
supremacy, the centralisation of capital in Amsterdam was first and foremost the 
outcome of its position as a mercantile entrepot centre, "the warehouse of the 
world" (Braudel 1984: 184) by the early seventeenth century. The capital that 
became centralised in Amsterdam as a result of these mercantile networks was 
supplemented by the more immediate sources of the high rates of saving 
amongst the Dutch populace and the profits from Dutch high quality textile 
production (Barbour 1963: 28-9; Braudel 1984: 179). 
Three great mercantile trading networks overlapped in Amsterdam in 
terms of exchange and distribution (Germain 1997: 40). First, the Baltic trade in 
fish, salt, grain, timber and shipbuilding materials was warehoused in 
Amsterdam and distributed throughout Europe and the Americas (Braudel 
1984: 190,207; Arrighi 1994: 132). Second, Amsterdam was the pole around 
which the North Atlantic trade and exploitation of the 'New World' revolved, 
especially the shipment of bullion and plantation products from the Americas. 
Third, the Far East trade in luxury goods such as pepper, spices, silks and pearls 
was largely monopolised during the seventeenth century by the Dutch East 
Indies Company that was based in Amsterdam (Israel 1995; Goldsmith 
large scale in London to finance industrial expansion during the nineteenth century (Neal 
1990: 226; Riley 1980: 242-9). 
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1987: 219-20). Significantly, the intersection of the three great trading networks 
proved mutually reinforcing (Germain 1997: 41). The bullion from the New 
World that was used to pay for goods warehoused in Amsterdam flowed 
onwards to the Far East to purchase luxury goods which were, in turn, shipped 
to Amsterdam. 
From the turn of the eighteenth century, Amsterdam's position as an 
entrep8t centre for world trade became increasingly undercut, by-passed by the 
trading networks established by British, French and German competitors. 
Having effectively served their apprenticeship to the Dutch in the seventeenth 
century, British merchants and joint-stock companies in particular came to 
dominate the great trading networks in the course of the eighteenth century. ' 
Significantly, however, despite the gradual erosion of Amsterdam's commercial 
predominance and the potential decentralisation of capital away from 
Amsterdam, world credit practices all remained centralised in Amsterdam 
throughout the eighteenth century. This highlights that as part of a slow shift in 
the nature of Amsterdam during the eighteenth century from an entrep6t centre 
for trade and finance to an entrep6t WFC of more specialised form, something 
of a virtuous circle of expansion was generated. World credit practices 
centralised in Amsterdam themselves generated capital as investments brought 
returns (Wallerstein 1980: 57). Further, the Amsterdam-centred credit practices 
also expanded the demand for capital, serving to encourage the "mobilisation 
and rerouting of surplus capital from all over Europe" to the Exchange Bank, 
Bourse and their associated market institutional networks (Arrighi 1994: 138). 
In short, Amsterdam displayed "deposit-compelling power" broadly comparable 
with that of London in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Brown 
1940: 154). As a consequence, until the last decades of the eighteenth century, 
Amsterdam remained the key space where mobile capital in search of profitable 
use - upon which credit practices are based in an entrep6t WFC - became 
centralised. 
5 Amsterdam's position as the world's mercantile entrep6t centre had been visible in the 
breakdown of British trade at the end of the seventeenth century, when the United Provinces 
were Britain's principal export market, receiving goods valued at fl, 500,000 out of the total 
value of British exports of E3,500,000. By 1775 a major transformation had taken place as 
British exports and re-exports had become firmly centralised in London and Liverpool, with only 
fl, 000,000 worth of British exports bound for the United Provinces out of a total value of 
E14,800,000 (Haley 1988: 160-1). 
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Knowledge and Technology 
The centralisation of information in Amsterdam, its collation and 
analysis to realise knowledge, also provided an essential material resource for 
Amsterdam-based credit practices. Smith (1984) has highlighted that a series of 
more or less institutionalised networks served to establish Amsterdam as an 
"information exchange" during the seventeenth century. These included private 
mercantile networks which extended across Europe, the Far East and the 
Americas; networks of financiers and financial market institutions centralised in 
the Exchange Bank and the Bourse; the vast institutional edifice of the Dutch 
East Indies Company; and the active commercial press that both informed and 
fed off these networks. Information concerning economic and political 
conditions throughout the world was processed both privately and publicly in 
Amsterdam yielding, for instance, the commodities price list of the Amsterdam 
Exchange as a key source of knowledge for the world's merchants (Goldsmith 
1987: 217). Further, while few innovations were made in information and 
communications technologies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
existing lines of communication of packet boats and stage coaches which carried 
regular postal correspondence between Europe's major cities ensured flows of 
knowledge in, through and out of Amsterdam (Israel 1995a; Neal 1990: 20). 
Alongside Amsterdam, London also developed as a 'knowledge 
exchange' that enabled credit practices during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Indeed, share and bond prices appear to have been systematically 
publicly listed in London from the late seventeenth century, well in advance of a 
similar service in Amsterdam (Neal 1990: 27-9; Braudel 1982: 103). The flows 
of knowledge between Amsterdam and London largely carried by the twice 
weekly criss-crossing of mail packet boats ensured that, except for disruptions 
caused by wars, trade disturbances and financial panics, the stock market 
practices of the two centres became reasonably well integrated during the 
eighteenth century (Neal 1990). Throughout the period, however, it was 
Amsterdam's knowledge exchange that provided much of the knowledge which 
informed world credit practices relative to London's more nationally-based 
knowledge networks (Meyer 1991: 101). Linkages with London did become 
increasingly important for Amsterdam-based credit creation, especially as under 
British domination the great trading networks came to be centred in London and 
Liverpool, but it appears that Amsterdam retained much of the knowledge 
89 
essential for credit creating practices on a world-scale up until the turn of the 
nineteenth century. 
Part 11 - The Making and Reproduction of the Amsterdam-centred 
World 
Financial Order 
While the centralisation of material capabilities in Amsterdam was vital 
in terms of the synchronic, day-to-day practices of credit creation, in diachronic 
terms, capital, knowledge and, to a lesser extent, technology provided the basis 
for the material power of social forces associated with Amsterdam. The social 
relations surrounding material resources ensured that power was conferred upon 
those social forces in Amsterdam which occupied positions of ownership, 
control and access to the material resources centralised there. From these 
material roots, the social forces of Amsterdam were able to authoritatively 
influence the nature of those ideational and institutional structures that framed 
the practices of credit creation throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Shared norms and meanings surrounding credit practices centralised 
in Amsterdam became diffused throughout the world financial order; the values 
and ideology of Amsterdam's social forces became imprinted on the world 
financial order; and the major civil and market institutions centred in 
Amsterdam served to stabilise the world financial order through their position in 
the organisation of world credit practices. As such, the centralisation of 
ideational and institutional forces in Amsterdam, alongside material resources, 
can be seen as the realising a coherent conjunction of forces upon which the 
status of Amsterdam as the key space of authority in the reproduction of the 
world financial order rested. The standing of Amsterdam as the key space of 
authority was underpinned by the structures of the wider world order of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, in particular, by the relationships of 
the Dutch state and Amsterdam's social forces to that order. 
Informal Authority 
Those intersubjective norms and meanings that informed Amsterdam- 
centred credit practices became diffused and emulated somewhat fitfully 
throughout the world financial order, particularly during the eighteenth century. ' 
6 Neal (1990: 5-9) has shown that outside of Amsterdam, social practices associated with 
commercial, sovereign and corporate credit and the clearance of credit transactions "were 
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On the one hand, the norms and meanings surrounding credit practices 
in 
Amsterdam were fairly similar to those which had predominated in the major 
financial centres of Europe since at least the fourteenth century (Braudel 
1977: 66-7). On the other hand, however, innovations were made in Amsterdam 
that contributed towards the transformation of understandings of the practices of 
credit creation and the motivations that lay behind them. Credit practices 
became subject to calculations of risk rooted in assumptions of rationality. For 
instance, Joseph de la Vega published his Confusion de Confusions in 
Amsterdam in 1688, the first treatise on futures contracts, hedging, and options 
for puts and refuses (Neal 1990: 16). This coincided with a universalisation and 
intensification of world credit practices which served to set the Amsterdam- 
centred world financial order apart from pre-modem world finance (Braudel 
1982: 3 90-5,1984: 244; Barbour 1963: 140,142). 
In the context of the endemic European wars of the eighteenth century, 
two related developments appear to have lay at the cutting edge of the diffusion 
of modem understandings of credit practices. First, European state elites sought 
to emulate the large-scale expansion of the sovereign credit of the United 
Provinces through Amsterdam. Second, the overthrow of absolutism and the 
creation of limited monarchies reduced the risks associated with sovereign credit 
practices (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 18-19). Europe's governments, either 
chronically bankrupt like Spain and Austria, or tottering on the edge of 
bankruptcy like Stuart England, came to recognise their disadvantage in war 
making when compared to the United Provinces (Barbour 1963: 80; Arrighi 
1994: 140; Cox 1987: 115). From the seventeenth century changes in the nature 
of warfare between states had taken place which conferred considerable benefits 
on the Dutch state, holding as it did close relationships with the Amsterdam 
capital market and the sovereign credit that this provided. ' For Europe's 
adopted only fitfully by other European states over the course of the seventeenth century". 
Further, even during the eighteenth century, the diffusion and emulation of norms and values 
from Amsterdam through the world financial order was far from uniform. For instance, the 
intersubjective meanings surrounding credit creation in Amsterdam contrasted throughout the 
nineteenth century with the almost restricted organisation of the creation of credit in Paris, where 
social norms discouraged lending and borrowing (Braudel 1982: 389). 
7 The significance of reliable access to sovereign credit in state war making had been noted 
prior to the seventeenth century. For instance, Sir Thomas Gresham, an English merchant and 
financier, had noted in the course of the crash of Antwerp (1557-62) that reliance upon foreign 
sources of sovereign credit was a serious weakness of both the English state and English finance. 
This led him to propose a mutual alliance between financiers and state to Elizabeth I and to set 
about establishing a bourse in London in response. The bourse became known as the Royal 
Exchange, reflecting this mutual alliance (Arrighi 1994: 190-1). As the nature of warfare 
changed in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the need for such a mutual 
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governments, the raising of wartime sovereign credit had traditionally been 
associated with a combination of emergency borrowing from a narrow pool of 
loyal lenders and recourse to foreign credit (Riley 1980: 2-3). As such, 
sovereign credit practices were widely regarded as hazardous and defaults were 
common. However, within Amsterdam during the seventeenth century an 
alternative set of shared norms and meanings informing sovereign credit 
creation developed (Barbour 1963: 80-1). Buoyed by rational assumptions that 
the risks of credit creation were calculable, particularly for limited monarchies, 
sovereign credit practices came to be regarded as a relatively safe investment. 
This facilitated both a widening of the pool of lenders upon which sovereign 
credit was based throughout the United Provinces, and longer-tenn credit 
planning by the Dutch state through instruments which included annuities, 
bonds and lottery loans (Riley 1980: 3). ' It was these alternative arrangements 
for sovereign credit, and the modem norms and meanings upon which they 
rested, that that other European governments, more or less consciously and with 
varying success, sought to emulate alongside continued recourse to the foreign 
sovereign credit provided by Amsterdam's merchant bankers. 
Amsterdam's social forces also perceived a set of shared values 
regarding the organisation of credit practices which became imprinted on the 
world financial order more generally, contributing to Amsterdam's standing as a 
key space of authority. The cosmopolitan make-up of Amsterdam's financiers 
was reflected in their cosmopolitan values. Any loyalties to native towns and 
provinces had tended to be severed by the seventeenth century wars of religious 
convictions. Consequently, 
"The Dutch investor of the seventeenth century was uninhibited by 
considerations of patriotism or economic nationalism. In this period the 
Dutch were content to trade with the enemy and even invest in privateers 
that would not hesitate to attack Dutch shipping" (Kindleberger 
1984/1993: 212). 
alliance became intensified and was confirmed by the successes of the United Provinces. As 
Neat (1990: 12) notes, "Starting with the Thirty Years' War (161848), the wars of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were increasingly international in scope, even world-wide, 
because armed conflicts could occur anywhere that citizens of the warring nations came into 
contact. Within Europe, men and arms on a large scale had to be moved quickly to distant battle 
sites, and military success usually depended on the success of merchant bankers in moving funds 
to purchase and sustain mercenaries near the enemy's strong points". For an approach to inter- 
state conflict that emphasises the significance of the availability of sovereign credit in successful 
war-making, see Kennedy (1989: 98-111). 
8 Kindleberger (1984/1993: 156) has suggested that 65,000 different individuals invested in 
Dutch goverrunent securities. 
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Even the provision of sovereign credit for enemies in times of war did not 
escape these cosmopolitan values. For instance, Amsterdam's financiers 
provided sovereign credit for the British government during the seventeenth 
century and the French at the turn of the eighteenth century (Barbour 1963: 13 1). 
The cosmopolitan values of Amsterdam's social forces became taken up 
by the Dutch state as the central tenet of what Riley (1980: 17) has termed "a 
mercantilist expedient approach to state finance". ' The beliefs of the Dutch 
state elite that the power and prosperity of the state could be enhanced by the 
accumulation of capital had its roots in the bullionist doctrine of state-making of 
the late sixteenth century. However, the Dutch state differed in that for other 
states the bullionist doctrine tended to inform a policy of accumulating capital 
by importing specie and precious metals with the effect of generating a balance 
of payments surplus. For the Dutch, the 'mercantilist expedient approach' was 
associated with the free flow of specie and credit to foreign borrowers in order 
to accumulate capital (Braudel 1984: 170). " As Wallerstein (1980: 58) has 
asserted, 
"Regarding the restrictions on the export of bullion, the United Provinces 
was the great exception among states in the era of mercantilism: bullion 
could flow out of the United Provinces quite as easily as it could flow in. 
This was precisely why so much of it flowed in, and of course this policy 
was only possible when bullion did flow in". 
For instance, as early as 1586 to 1659, of the 2.5 million florins worth of coins 
minted by the Dutch every year, between two- and three-fifths were exported 
(Goldsmith 1987: 213). The mercantilist expedient approach both reinforced the 
deposit-compelling power of Amsterdam and, in the process, the authority of 
Amsterdam's social forces to organise the world financial order. 
9 "In the vast welter of explanations of mercantilism in the seventeenth century, two aspects of 
this concept are agreed on by virtually everyone. Mercantilism involved state policies of 
economic nationalism and revolved around a concern with the circulation of commodities, 
whether in terms of the movement of bullion or in the creation of balances of trade (bilateral or 
multilateral). What the facts were regarding the true relation of 'profit and power' is what the 
debate is about - among men of the time and among analysts today" (Wallerstein 1980: 37-8). 
10 Ingham's (1984: 100) distinction between "early mercantilism", "where national wealth was 
achieved through hoarding precious metals and heavy taxation was levied to meet current 
expenditure", and "developed mercantilism". in which "precious metals are also seen as 
instruments of the pursuit of trading surpluses", is also illustrative of this point. On the unique 
nature of Dutch mercantilism during the seventeenth century, see also Kindleberger (1996: 97). 
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That the financial Policies of the Dutch state reflected and effectively 
reinforced the authority of Amsterdam was part and parcel of the political and 
social power of Amsterdam's social forces within the somewhat fragmentary 
state-society of the United Provinces. Amsterdam's merchants and financiers, 
along with the merchants of the towns across the United Provinces, had realised 
a commonality of interests with the dynastic social forces of the Regent House 
of Orange and the anti-Rome sentiments of the Calvinists during the Dutch 
revolt against Spanish rule (1572-1609) which led to the establishment of the 
United Provinces. " Thereafter, although struggle between Amsterdam's 
merchants and financiers and the House of Orange were endemic (Braudel 
1984: 193-5), the fragmented institutional structure of the state apparatus and the 
linkages between the wealth of Amsterdam and the power of the Dutch state 
ensured that "the aristocracy of the Regents governed for the benefits and even 
according to the directives of the businessmen, merchants, and money-lenders" 
(Braudel 1977: 64-5). 12 
Wider World Order 
The cosmopolitan values of Amsterdam's social forces and of the Dutch 
state also resonated with the intellectual and moral climate of inter-state 
relations within the wider world order. The notion of 'freedom' had been a key 
ideological tenet upon which the Dutch revolt against Spanish rule had been 
based (Israel 1995: 4). This appeal to 'freedom' was taken up by the leaders of 
Europe's other dynastic states and found its expression in the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648), which effectively came to define the nature of inter-state 
relations during this period. The Treaty was based upon the acceptance of, and 
provided the legitimisation for, several broad principles including religious 
toleration, the recognition of the respective rights of governments over mutually 
exclusive territories, and the associated understanding that civilian nationals 
were not necessarily involved in the conflicts of sovereigns. 
" In the course of the war of independence against the Spanish Hapsburgs, the Union of Utrecht 
(1579) effectively established the United Provinces as consisting of the seven provinces of 
Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijessel, Friesland and Groningen. 
12 The focal institution within the "jerry-built and seemingly ineffectual state machinery" 
(Wallerstein 1980: 38) of the United Provinces was the States General comprised of delegates 
from the seven provinces. Legislation depended upon the unanimous consent of delegates from 
throughout the provinces. The merchant and financial interests of the provinces of Holland and 
Zeeland could not be easily compromised by the interests of the House of Orange which 
dominated the other five provinces (Riley 1980: 10; Tilly 1990: 32; Kennedy 1989: 85-6; 
Wallerstein 1980: 624). 
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Significantly for the Amsterdam-centred world financial order, the 
principle that civilian nationals were not necessary involved in the conflicts of 
sovereigns extended to finance and commerce. Confronted by states such as 
France, Britain and Spain which were more powerful militarily, the Dutch state 
retained a "neutral foreign policy" (Helleiner 1993a: 220) with regard to world 
credit practices. This led broadly to a "divorce of international finance from 
diplomatic considerations" (Riley 1980: 58). The effect was in large part to 
insulate credit practices from territorial wars and, significantly, to reinforce the 
authority of Amsterdam in the organisation of social practices. As E. H Carr 
noted, 
"Tbe eighteenth century witnessed many wars; but in respect of the 
freedom and friendliness of intercourse between the educated classes in 
the principal European countries, with French recognised as the common 
language, it was the most 'international' period of modem history, and 
civilians could pass to and from and transact their business freely with 
one another while their respective sovereigns were at war" (in Arrighi 
1990: 381). " 
That the climate of inter-state relations mirrored the cosmopolitan values 
of Amsterdam's social forces and supported Dutch mercantilist expediency has 
tended to be interpreted as the outcome of the hegemony of the United 
Provinces. Wallerstein (1980) and Arrighi (1990,1994), for instance, in the 
company of other world-systems writers have suggested that the central position 
of the Dutch state in the wider world order constituted a hegemonic position. 
This was developed by "leading a large and powerful coalition of dynastic states 
toward the liquidation of the medieval system of rule and the establishment of 
the modem interstate system" (Arrighi 1990: 380). However, whether the 
United Provinces can be seen as hegemonic continues to be debated even 
amongst world-systems scholars themselves. For instance, Amin (1996: 234) 
comments that "To speak of the hegemony of the ... Netherlands, ... ignores the 
realities dictating the insertion of these countries into the systems (regional, and, 
particularly, global) of the time". 
13 Considerable debate does surround this point. Polanyi (1944: 15) suggests that trade in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century was subject to greater mercantile interference relative to the 
free trade of the nineteenth century. He asserts with reference to the nineteenth century that "In 
the past the organisation of trade had become military and warlike; it was an adjunct to the 
pirate, the rover, the armed caravan ... the colonial armies of the chartered companies. Now all 
of this was forgotten. Trade was now dependent upon an international monetary system which 
could not function in a general war". 
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It is clear that the Dutch state elite and the social forces of Amsterdam 
had strong common interests with the other Dynastic states in 'modernisation' 
and the destruction of the claims to rule of the pope and emperors based upon 
divine right. While the Dutch state was not hegemonic, it was clearly central to 
the wider world order. Inter-state relations in this period were 'multi-polar', 
dominated not by a single state but by the short-term inter-state alliances of war. 
Regular inter-state wars were in this sense 'coalition' wars, with the United 
Provinces pivotal (Kennedy 1989: 94). " As Braudel (1984: 256-60) suggests, the 
pivotal position of the United Provinces stemmed from the commercial and 
financial strengths of the Dutch form of state. These effectively undercut the 
capacity of the more overtly mercantilist English and French forms of state to 
transform the nature of inter-state relations. Policies of disrupting Dutch 
commercial and financial networks tended to harm the English and French as 
much as they did the Dutch. In terms of the relationship of the Amsterdam- 
centred world financial order to the wider world order, then, 
"The connection with the ring of second-rank powers, that is Europe, 
operated smoothly with no need for undue pressure: the attraction and 
mechanisms of exchange, the interplay of capital and credit sufficed to 
keep it in working order" (Braudel 1984: 263-6). 
However, as English and French commercial and financial strength increased, 
particularly from the 1720s and 1730s, the prevalence of cosmopolitan values in 
inter-state relations did gradually erode. 
Formal Authority 
The capacity of Amsterdam-centred market and civil institutions to 
contribute to the relative stability of the world financial order as a key aspect of 
Amsterdam's standing as a space of authority was underpinned, then, by the 
prevalence of cosmopolitan liberal values across the wider world order. The 
authority of Amsterdam was effectively guaranteed by the authority of the Dutch 
state and its position in the wider world order. The networks of market 
institutions that emanated from Amsterdam, in particular the major merchant 
banks such as Hope and Co., provided the institutional basis through which 
14 For much of the eighteenth century up until 1770s, United Provinces had tended to side with 
Britain against France, an alliance that had been cemented by the accession to the British throne 
of William and Mary in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Siding with a British state that was 
characterised by "the principles of financial rectitude and 'economical' government" (Kennedy 
1989: 103) tended to reinforce position of Amsterdam's social forces and the Dutch form of state. 
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formal authority was exercised, manifested in their role in the organisation of 
world credit practices throughout the world fmancial order. " As had been the 
case with the networks of the Bardi and Peruzzi of fourteenth century Florence 
and the networks of the nobili vecchi of sixteenth century Genoa, large-scale 
demands for credit could not be met without their capital, family contacts and 
expertise (Braudel 1982: 392-5; Arrighi 1994: 167-9). For instance, given the 
uncertainties and risks surrounding the direct issue of credit by sovereign 
borrowers, institutions such as Hope and Co. organised the technicalities of both 
the issue and placement of bonds directly and via the principal stock exchanges 
(Born 1977: 28). 
The intersection of Amsterdam's market networks with the Exchange 
and Bourse as civil institutions in the organisation of world credit practices 
further contributed to the relative stability of the world financial order. The 
clearing of credit claims through the Exchange Bank acted as an unofficial form 
of regulation of world credit practices (Born 1977: 27). Risks were reduced by 
ensuring that obligations were met. This providing a level of security and 
adjustment that was rare in this period (Barbour 1963: 44-7; Riley 1980: 28-9). 
Such security was particularly significant in the context of the economic 
slowdown in the world economy in the seventeenth century and its associated 
monetary disturbances (Wallerstein 1980: 57). In a not dissimilar vein, the 
Bourse, as the key institutional edifice through which the capital necessary for 
long-term credit creation was mobilised, acted as "the central regulatory 
mechanism through which idle capital was rerouted" (Arrighi 1994: 140). 
The intersection of market and civil institutions also lay at the heart of 
ad-hoc attempts to manipulate the organisation of world credit practices in 
periods of superficial financial crises. Market institutional networks mobilised 
their capital resources in support of those institutions whose assets inspired 
potential confidence (Riley 1980: 32). Further, during the 1763 crisis the 
Exchange Bank took the unprecedented step of accepting gold and silver ingots 
in an attempt to increase the coverage of outstanding claims and, thereby, to 
increase confidence (Braudel 1984: 269). Superficial crisis management was 
supported by the 'reach' of the Amsterdam-centred structure of authority 
throughout the world financial order. This tended to encourage the support of 
15 Hope and Co. stood as Amsterdam's major merchant bank, based on private capital that grew 
rapidly in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Between 1762 and 1769, the capital of Hope 
and Co. increased from 4.3 million florins to 6.8 million (Riley 1980: 13). 
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London-centred institutions in instances of crisis. For example, in the course of 
the crisis of 1763, the Bank of England and London-centred market institutional 
networks granted credit to their counterparts from Amsterdam. The volume of 
the credit created was greater than that which had previously been allocated to 
Amsterdam. Similarly, when the 1772 financial crisis reached its peak in 
January 1773, the Bank of England allowed specie to be drawn on the 
presentation of Dutch government stock certificates (Kindleberger 1978: 1834). 
In our terms, London-centred assistance was significant as it reflected the 
relative stability of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. Not only did 
London's social forces not question the Amsterdam-centred structure of 
authority that reproduced the order, but moved in support of it. 
Further, the intersection of market institutions with civil institutions 
reinforced the capacity of Amsterdam's social forces to authoritatively organise 
the world financial order. The clearance of transactions through the Exchange 
Bank gave increased flexibility and rapidity of turnover to the practices of 
Amsterdam's market institutions, extending their authority (Braudel 1984: 240). 
The capacity of the Exchange Bank to capture and hold massive volumes of 
specie both maintained confidence in Amsterdam-centred credit creation and 
limited the basis upon which credit could be created in and through rival centres 
such as London and Genoa (Kindleberger 1984/1993: 52). In the context of the 
relatively stable world financial order, then, the authority of Amsterdam's social 
forces over the organisation of social practices in the world financial order 
rested in the first instance upon their own market institutional networks. A 
complex intersection was also generated between Amsterdam's market networks 
and the civil institutions of Exchange Bank and Bourse. The structure of 
authority that reproduced the relative stability of the world financial order was 
firmly centralised in Amsterdam, interdependent with the structures of the wider 
world order and the position of the Dutch state within that order. 
Part III - The Unravelling of the Amsterdam-Centred World Financial 
Order: The Decline of Amsterdam and the Rise of London 
The relative stability of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order 
was based upon the centralisation of the material, ideational and institutional 
forces of that order in Amsterdam as the single, predominant VYTC, underpinned 
by the structures of the wider world order and the position of the Dutch state 
within that order. The centralisation of these forces led to a coherent 
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conjunction between them that found expression in the informal and formal 
authority of Amsterdam' social forces over the organisation of world credit 
practices. Despite the decline of Amsterdam as a commercial centre during the 
eighteenth century, this conjunction was maintained through until the 1780s by 
the virtuous circle that developed, particularly from the 1740s, in which mobile 
capital was re-routed to Amsterdam. As a consequence, Amsterdam was able to 
stand as the key space of authority in the world financial order for several 
decades after it had lost its position at the apex of world trade. 
On the one hand, then, attracting mobile capital formed a virtuous circle 
upon which Amsterdam maintained its position as the WFC in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century. As Wallerstein (1980: 57) notes, the shift of Amsterdam 
from an entrep8t commercial and financial centre to a more specialised entrep6t 
WFC that this entailed was a sign of the strength of Amsterdam in attracting 
accumulated capital. On the other hand, however, this capital provided the 
material resources for a 'vicious circle' of speculative expansion. "' From the 
1740s, credit creation in Amsterdam "seems to have enjoyed a degree of 
autonomy vis-A-vis the economy in general" (Braudel 1984: 267), whereby credit 
expanded and nourished itself. Indeed, such speculative expansion and the 
potential profits on offer formed a necessary feature of continuing to attract 
mobile capital to Amsterdam. Amsterdam underwent a gradual shift from an 
entrep6t commercial and financial centre to an entrep6t WFC which specialised 
increasingly in the provision of foreign, particularly sovereign credit (Riley 
1980: 25). Amsterdam's merchants became the first masters of a set of social 
practices that in the nineteenth century were to become known as merchant 
banking (Chapman 1984). 
From a world-systems perspective, Arrighi (1994: 87) characterises this 
vicious circle of Amsterdam-centred speculative expansion as one instance of a 
recurring "financial expansion" that he views "as announcing not just the 
maturity of a particular stage of development of the capitalist world-economy, 
but also the beginning of a new stage". " Arrighi draws directly on Braudel 
16 Keynes distinguished between two different types of economic expansion - what he termed 
'virtuous' (productive expansion) and 'vicious' (speculative expansion). Vicious circles of 
expansion were seen as profoundly destabilising to both government policy-making and 
economic activity generally. For an understanding of contemporary world finance building upon 
this aspect of Keynes work, see Henwood (1997). 
17 From a similar perspective Amin (1996) characterises instances of speculation in world 
financial orders as the process of a "financialization of capitar'. However, Amin doubts the 
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(1984: 246) who casts "the stage of financial expansion" in Amsterdam as "a 
sign of autumn". The utility of this understanding of the unravelling of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order lies in highlighting the emergence of 
an inherent contradiction in the final decades of the order. The continued 
centralisation of the order in Amsterdam rested upon attracting large volumes of 
accumulated capital that fed speculative practices. This was revealed by a series 
of sporadic financial crises. In each instance, crisis was followed by attempts to 
encourage inflows of capital in the form of silver and gold in order to try to 
restore confidence. The crises, then, can be read as the immediate 
manifestations of the contradictory nature of the vicious circle of speculative 
expansion through which the material basis of Amsterdam's authority had been 
maintained since the 1740s. 
The first crisis came in 1763 in the aftermath of the Seven Years War. 
During wartime, the United Provinces had remained 'neutral' throughout and 
Amsterdam-centred practices had provided much of the sovereign credit needs 
for Britain and France. Fears that the resulting obligations could not be met in 
peacetime, as the war had led to disruptions to trade networks, commodity 
prices and flows of bullion, revealed themselves in the bankruptcy of two of 
Amsterdam's major financial market institutions A. Joseph & Co. and de 
Neufville (Braudel 1984: 269-70; Riley 1980: 32-3). In the second crisis of 
1772-3, Clifford and Zoonen, one of Amsterdam's most prestigious financial 
market institutions, was forced to suspend payments. Clifford's solvency was 
eroded as obligations resulting from plantation loans were not met and sharp 
falls in the value of British East India Company stock damaged its capital base 
(Braudel 1984: 270-2; Riley 1980: 33-4). 
Not dissimilarity to the previous crises, in the course of the fourth 
Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-83, the market institution of van Faerelinks was 
forced into bankruptcy after an over extension of credit. Significantly, however, 
cyclical nature of such "firiancializations" and seeks to differentiate between them both in their 
nature and consequences for the world-system. Debates surrounding the nature of 'financial 
expansions' amongst world-systems scholars arise from a wider set of assumptions surrounding 
hegemonic cycles, whereby financial hegemony is viewed as the final stage of state hegemony. 
Wallerstein (1980: 38) provides a useful summary - "Tbe pattern of hegemony seems 
marvellouslY simple. Marked superiority in agro-industrial productive efficiency leads to 
dominance in the sphere of commercial distribution of world trade, with correlative profits 
accruing both from being the entrep6t of much of world trade and from controlling the 
'invisibles' - transport, communications, and insurance. Commercial primacy leads in turn to 
control of the financial sectors of banking (exchange, deposit, and credit) and of investment 
(direct and portfolio). Iliese superiorities are successive, but they overlap in time". 
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two aspects of this crisis proved destabilising for the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order. First, the intricate Amsterdam-centred institutional edifice 
which had managed previous superficial crisis was found wanting. The 
Exchange Bank failed as unprecedented extensions of credit in support of the 
Dutch East Indies Company undermined confidence in its capacity to cover 
outstanding deposits (Kindleberger 1984/1993: 50). Second, unlike in the 
previous two major crises, London-centred support for crisis management failed 
to materialise. This was not surprising given the on-going Anglo-Dutch war 
(Kindleberger 1978: 184). As Amsterdam-centred credit creation became 
increasingly speculative and the reproduction of the relative stability of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order became dependent upon inflows of 
capital, then, the very speculative nature of credit practices proved contradictory. 
In the absence of institutions to reign in speculation, this "basic instability" 
(Riley 1980: 34) did gradually undermine Amsterdam's position as the key space 
of authority in the latter half of the eighteenth century. However, it was only in 
the course of the financial crisis of the 1780s that this contradiction came to the 
surface, as the capacity of the Amsterdam's formal authority to stabilise the 
order through the manipulation of the organisation of world credit practices 
failed. 
The incapacity of the Amsterdam-centred structure of authority to 
continue to reproduce the relative stability of the world financial order was itself 
related to three structural changes in the wider world order. Elements of the 
wider world order that had previously underpinned the Amsterdam-centred 
world financial order were no longer present. First, the rise of London and the 
British national political economy challenged the material basis of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order. World-systems explanations of the 
rise tend to emphasise Amsterdam's 'financial expansion' as providing the basis 
for the rise of the British national political economy. For instance, Wallerstein 
(1980: 281) posits a "symbiotic relationship" between the United Provinces and 
England, which provided "graceful retirement income for the one and a crucial 
push forward against its rival for the other". Amsterdam-centred credit creation 
had contributed to the sovereign credit needs of the British state following the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, expanding rapidly from the 1720s through to the 
1770s (Haley 1988: 165; Riley 1980: 14). Clearly, the expansion of credit 
allocated to Britain - particularly through its contribution to the financing of 
wartime sovereign credit, the Bank of England, British East India and South Sea 
companies - did give the British state an advantage in their on-going wars with 
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the French state (Braudel 1984: 261-2). Contemporary observers did recognise 
the significance of Arnsterdam-centred credit creation in supporting British 
victories over France in the wars of 1739-48 and 1756-63 (Haley 1988: 167). " 
Such an understanding, however, fails to recognise the extent to which the rise 
of London at the heart of the British national political economy was largely 
independent of the vicious circle of speculation centred in Amsterdam. As 
Chapman (1984: 9) notes of the rise of London in the eighteenth century, 
"It had been steadily gaining ground on Amsterdam for much of the 
century, but in the last two decades several developments accelerated this 
process. The diversion of capital across the Atlantic during the American 
War of Independence curtailed the supply to London, and the French 
Wars almost severed it altogether, forcing London into independence. 
Meanwhile, the 'take-off of British industrialisation further reduced 
British dependence on Dutch supplies and opened up other export 
markets". 
In our terms, then, a narrow focus on Amsterdam-centred 'financial expansion' 
alone is insufficient to explain the unravelling of the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order. 
Second, the United Provinces began to lose its pivotal position in inter- 
state relations as the English and French mercantilist forms of state gained 
ground. From the 1770s, the close alliance between the United Provinces and 
Britain in opposition to France that had marked inter-state relations for nearly a 
century unwound. This culminated in the Dutch entering the American War of 
Independence in 1780 on the French side. As a result, credit practices 
effectively became bifurcated between the Amsterdam-centred creation of 
foreign sovereign and corporate credit for speculation, and the largely 
independent London-centred creation of credit to finance British trade and 
sovereign spending. "' An uneasy coexistence began to emerge in which both 
Amsterdam and London stood at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of financial 
centres, a situation that was to remain until the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. 
Further, British and French mercantilist expansionism also disrupted Dutch 
commerce that, in turn, undercut the material basis of relative stability in the 
18 For details of capital and credit flows from Amsterdam to London during the Dutch world 
financial order, see Haley (198 8), Barbour (1963: 125), Arrighi (1994: 207) and Riley (1980: 14). 
19 For instance, the demands of the British state for credit to finance the Napoleonic wars were 
met without much recourse to foreign borrowing, with only E20 million out of a total national 
debt of L500 million under foreign ownership in 1807-10 (Haley 1988: 168-9). 
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world financial order. For instance, the collapse of the Amsterdam Exchange 
Bank amidst the financial crisis that coincided with the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war 
was closely associated with attacks on shipping of the Dutch East Indies 
Company by the British navy. It was these attacks that had stimulated the 
emergency step by the Exchange Bank of extending credit in the first place. 
Third, the relative success of the British and French form of state 
exposed relative weaknesses in the United Provinces which, in turn, undermined 
the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. The somewhat fragmentary 
machinery of the Dutch state did not lend itself to the intensified mercantilist 
rivalry. As Kindleberger (1996: 103) notes, in contrast to the seventeenth 
century, federalism "was inadequate to the changed circumstances". As the 
scale and nature of warfare placed increased demands upon Amsterdam-centred 
credit creation, traditional arrangements for raising Dutch sovereign credit were 
found wanting. Insufficient capital was centralised in Amsterdam to cope with 
these demands, particularly with the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars in 1793 
(Riley 1980: 198). In contrast, London, as the financial centre of the British 
national political economy that was becoming consolidated through the 
mercantilist policies of the British state, could draw on material resources for 
credit creation which dwarfed those centralised in Amsterdam. For instance, in 
1793 sovereign credit was raised in London by the Austrian government which 
was the equivalent of 36 million florins, far outstripping the regular issues of 3 
million florins worth of sovereign credit raised in Amsterdam (Riley 1980: 197- 
8). 
The transformation that these structural change in the wider world order 
implied for the nature of world financial orders - i. e. that national political 
economies were to stand as the foundations for future world financial orders - 
was, however, far from inevitable. It was to take the dramatic changes in the 
wider world order brought about by the Napoleonic wars, and their 
consequences for the world financial order, to bring about the conditions for 
such a transformation. The Napoleonic wars had three principal sets of 
consequences that fed the concurrent processes of the unravelling of the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order and establishment of the London- 
centred British world financial order. First, the Napoleonic wars dissolved the 
social and political power of Amsterdam's social forces within the United 
Provinces which had previously underpinned their authority in the Amsterdam- 
centred world financial order. The French invasion of Amsterdam and the 
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ensuing establishment of the 'Batavian Republic' served to restrict Amsterdam- 
centred foreign credit creation (Kindleberger 1984/1993: 7; Neal 1990: 225-6). 
Through a series of forced loans, levies and the regulation of foreign loans, the 
Dutch state gained considerably greater authority over credit creation in 
Amsterdam. The share of sovereign credit created in Amsterdam that was 
allocated to the Dutch state increased from 33% (1787-95) to 80% (1795-1802) 
(Riley 1980: 197). 
Second, the wars led to the destruction of the institutional networks that 
had manipulated and stabilised credit creation in the Amsterdam-centred world 
financial order. The upheaval throughout Europe during wartime fuelled the 
disintegration of the networks of financiers that had spread across Western 
Europe in the previous two centuries. While Europe's cosmopolitan financiers 
did, in the main, become centralised in London to shelter from Napoleonic 
expansion (Neal 1990: 198), an institutional edifice capable of stabilising the 
world financial order did not become centralised in London during wartime. For 
instance, in terms of the practices of clearing credit obligations, the Hamburger 
Bank flourished between 1795 and 1805 when the Amsterdam Exchange Bank 
was forced to suspend its operations (Born 1977: 27). 
Third, the victory of the dynastic British state over the Napoleonic 
empire finally sealed the fate of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order 
and heralded the beginning of a transformation in the foundations of future 
world financial orders. While the French state remained reliant upon foreign 
sovereign credit, the victory of the British state over the French rested largely 
upon the its independence from the Amsterdam-centred world financial order 
(Kennedy 1989: 101-3). The material resources of the British national political 
economy, and the particularly the capacity of the British state to draw on them 
through direct taxation introduced under the exigencies of war, provided the 
basis for this independence (Riley 1980: 199-200). As such, British victory 
displaced the assumed benefits of the 'mercantilist expedient approach to state 
finance' and the relations between state and society that this entailed which had 
been pre-eminent in the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. From the 
nineteenth century, with the increased interpenetration of states and societies as 
part and parcel of the processes of the making of state-society complexes, 
consolidated national political economies came to form the foundations of both 
the world financial order and the world economy more broadly. British victory 
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in the Napoleonic wars finally shattered the broad structural coherence that had 
marked successive world financial orders since the fourteenth century. 
Conclusions 
In synchronic terms, Amsterdam has been shown to have been the key 
social space for world credit practices and the space where the material, 
ideational and institutional forces that frame credit practices became centralised 
from the early seventeenth century to the final decades of the eighteenth century. 
In diachronic terms, the centralisation of material, ideational and institutional 
forces in Amsterdam led to a coherent conjunction between them and a 
relatively stable world financial order, reproduced through the authority of 
Amsterdam's social forces. The standing of Amsterdam as the key space of 
authority in the reproduction of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order 
was underpinned by the social and political power of Amsterdam's social forces 
within the United Provinces, and the position of the Dutch state within the wider 
world order. In particular, the significance of the authority of Amsterdam's 
social forces is revealed by the continued position of Amsterdam as the social 
locus for the reproduction of the world financial order for several decades after 
the commercial standing of the city had been eclipsed. Despite its decline as a 
commercial centre from early in the eighteenth century, Amsterdam continued to 
stand as the key space of authority in the world financial order through to the 
final decades of the eighteenth century. The utility of placing WFCs 
conceptualised as key spaces of authority at the heart of an understanding of the 
relative stability of world financial orders is illustrated, as such insights could 
not have been gleaned from approaches which focus on state-market relations. 
The unravelling of the world financial order and the relative instability 
that marked the final decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of 
the nineteenth century has been shown to have been closely related to the 
simultaneous decline of Amsterdam and rise of London as WFCs. Neither stood 
as predominant during this period. The relative stability of the Amsterdam- 
centred world financial order was undercut by a combination of both 
contradictions in the order itself, and structural changes in the wider world 
order. Attracting mobile capital to Amsterdam on the basis of the potential 
returns offered by speculation proved destabilising for the world financial order. 
An uneasy coexistence emerged in which credit creation became decentralised 
between Amsterdam-centred speculative practices in the creation of foreign 
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sovereign and corporate credit, and the largely independent London-centred 
creation of British commercial and sovereign credit. This reflected structural 
changes in the wider world order that were eventually to lead to national 
political economies becoming the foundations of world financial orders. 
However, the conditions for such a transformation were only confirmed by 
British victory in the Napoleonic wars and the consequences that this had for the 
world financial order. Indeed, British victory itself was greatly assisted by the 
independence of British commercial and sovereign credit requirements from the 
Amsterdam-centred world financial order. Only after 1815 did the London- 
centred British world financial order that is the subject of our next chapter 
become consolidated. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
London: The Making and Unravelliniz of the British World Financial 
Order 
Introduction 
The previous chapter initiated our concrete historical inquiry into world 
financial orders and world financial centres through an explanation of the rise 
and demise of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. This illustrated the significance of world financial 
centres for an explanation of the organisation of world financial orders. In 
synchronic terms, Amsterdam was shown to have been the key social space for 
world credit practices and the space where the material, ideational and 
institutional forces that framed those practices became centralised. In 
diachronic terms, the centralisation of material, ideational and institutional 
forces in Amsterdam led to a coherent conjunction between them. As such, the 
relative stability of the world financial order was understood to rest upon the 
centralisation of the order in Amsterdam, reproduced through the authority of 
Amsterdam's social forces. 
The Amsterdam-centred world financial order, however, coincided with 
the end of a period from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries which has been 
characterised from a broad range of perspectives as the era of city-centred world 
economies (Braudel 1977; Tilly 1990; Cox 1987: 117). As our account of the 
demise of the Amsterdam-centred world financial order suggested, the rise of 
London as a WFC to challenge Amsterdam - and the relative instability that this 
generated in the world financial order - marked a structural transformation in the 
nature of world financial orders. The London-centred, British world financial 
order that was produced and reproduced after 1815 had at its foundations the 
consolidated national political economies that emerged out of the increased 
interpenetration of states and societies within the wider world order. With the 
consolidation of national political economies and, in particular, through the 
development of 'state' or 'fiduciary' money which formed an important element 
in the processes of consolidation (Giddens 1985), ' state institutions are widely 
1 Gidden's (1985) argues that alongside the development of centralised arrangements for legal 
affairs and taxation, the emergence of fiduciary money, organised and policed through state 
institutions, formed a key element in the emergence of nation-states. 
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assumed to have gained increased authority over organisation of credit creation. 
For instance, Leyshon and Thrift (1997: 18-20) have termed the nineteenth 
century the era of 'state credit money'. Not dissimilarity, Gilpin's (1987: 308-9) 
state-centred approach to the explanation of successive world financial orders 
leads him to date "the first era of international finance" from the latter half of 
the nineteenth century. 
For our purposes, then, concrete inquiry into the making and unravelling 
of the British world financial order is crucial to developing further our 
understanding of the significance of WFCs in the organisation of world financial 
orders. How was London's position at the apex of the hierarchy of financial 
centres related to the British national political economy? In what ways did 
London's standing as a key space of authority in the reproduction of the British 
world financial order interact with new state-based forms of authority in the 
reproduction of a relatively stable world financial order? Part I of the chapter 
provides an explanation of the rise of London as a WFC. In synchronic terms, 
London is shown to have been the key social space for the predominant forms of 
world credit practices. In addition, London was the space where the material, 
ideational and institutional forces that framed credit creating practices were 
centralised from the early nineteenth century through to the outbreak of World 
War I in 1914. The standing of London as the WFC of the British world 
financial order rested upon the dominant position of London within the British 
national political economy and the ascendance of the British national political 
economy in the world economy. 
Part II moves to consider the making and reproduction of the British 
world financial order. In diachronic terms, the centralisation of material, 
ideational and institutional forces in London is shown to have led to a coherent 
conjunction between them and a relatively stable world financial order. The 
relative stability of the British world financial order is shown to have been 
reproduced by the authority of London's social forces, underpinned by the 
policies of the British government and the position of the British state within the 
structures of the wider world order. In contrast to the popular portrayal of the 
British world financial order as the era of 'state credit money', it is the 
interdependent nature of state and London-centred market and civil forms of 
authority which is emphasised in leading the reproduction of the British world 
financial order. 
108 
Part III of the chapter develops an explanation of the unravelling of the 
British world financial order. The First World War is held to have irretrievably 
ruptured the relative stability of the British world financial order. The war 
heralded structural changes which both brought to an end the coherent 
conjunction of forces centralised in London. It also undermined the conditions 
in the wider world order that had supported London's standing as a key space of 
authority in the reproduction of the order. While the British national political 
economy had been declining relative to the American and German political 
economies prior to the war, it was only in the course of the war that New York 
began to challenge London at the apex of the hierarchy of financial centres. The 
gradual unravelling and restructuring of the British world financial order after 
1918 took place, then, in a 'decentralised' (Brown 1940) world financial order 
in which an uneasy co-existence developed between London and New York as 
the WFCs at the apex of the order. The decentralisation of the British world 
financial order is held to have been pivotal in leading to the relative instability 
of the post-1918 British world financial order and the eventual collapse of the 
order amidst the European financial crisis of 193 1. 
Part I- London: Key Social Space 
In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, London stood at the apex of the 
hierarchy of the world's financial centres, a position that it was to occupy 
throughout the 'hundred years peace' between 1815 and 1914. This standing as 
the WFC of the period rested upon both the rise of London as the financial 
centre of the emergent British national political economy, and the centralisation 
in London of the business operations of Europe's great merchant and financier 
families. London had a tradition as a centre for trade and finance that stretched 
back centuries (Kindleberger 1974/1978: 76-83). However, as part and parcel of 
the increased interpenetration of British state-society and the emergence of a 
genuinely integrated national political economy, London became the key social 
space for the financing of British trade with the rest of the world by the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century (Chapman 1984: 9). Given British dominance 
of the great trading networks, the upheavals of the Napoleonic wars in 
continental Europe produced a migration to London and Britain's other 
commercial centres of Ashkenazi Jews and merchants of German dissent. The 
immigrants brought with them capital, expertise in credit creation, and 
experience and contacts in commercial trading networks that, hitherto, had been 
lightly touched by British-based merchants and financiers (Meyer 1991: 101; 
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Chapman 1984: 4). London, as the financial centre of the leading national 
political economy and the world's commercial centre, became the key social 
space for world credit practices. 
Considerable academic debate surrounds whether London shared its 
position as at the apex of the hierarchy of WFCs with Paris during the British 
world financial order, evidenced in the main by the consistently lower levels of 
short-term interest rates in Paris up to 1914. However, as Walter (1993: 89) 
highlights, lower short-term interest rates in Paris are illustrative of the greater 
liquidity of the Paris money-markets, based on the higher levels of gold reserves 
maintained by the Bank of France, rather than the pre-eminence of Paris as a 
financial centre. Interest rates on long-term credit were consistently lower in 
London than Paris, reflecting the greater efficiency of London's credit practices. 
This view is supported by Kindleberger (1984/1993: 263) who states that 
"London was a world financial center; Paris was a European financial 
center. London was an efficient financial market, handling an enormous 
body of transactions on a small money base. Paris was a rich money and 
capital market, efficient in the sense that it could mobilise savings and 
pour them in a given direction, such as the Thiers rente or czarist bonds, 
but inefficient in its much higher ratio of gold reserves to total financial 
transactions as compared with London". 
Paris may have stood alongside London at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of 
financial centres for a brief period from the 1850s through to the Franco- 
Prussian war and the suspension of the convertibility of the franc in 1870 
(Bagehot 1873/1991: 63; Kindleberger 1996: 136). 
London was the key space for world credit practices, then, and Paris and 
Berlin formed, at least from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a second 
tier of regional financial centres on the European continent. London retained a 
near monopoly on the provision of long-term credit and capital exports on the 
European continent up until the 1850s, from when the main focus for London- 
centred credit practices began to shift to North America and the territories of the 
British Empire (Bom 1977; King 1990: 78). ' Credit practices in Paris were 
dominated by servicing the needs of French trade and industry, although after 
1870 long-term credit practices became increasingly subject to the 
2 The declining allocation of credit to the European continent is reflected in the figures for 
British foreign investment in Europe, which fell from 66% of total foreign investment in 1830, to 
55% in 1854,25% by 1870 and as low as 5% in 1900 (figures from Kindleberger 1996: 13 5). 
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considerations of French foreign policy that led to large extensions of sovereign 
credit to Russia. Similarly, Berlin-centred credit practices remained orientated 
to the needs of Gerinan trade and industry, while relatively small amounts of 
long-term credit were created for Russia and the Near East after 1890 (Germain 
1997: 55-6). Some of the remaining 'third tier' European financial centres 
developed niche positions. For instance, Brussels became established as the key 
centre for the issue of tramways securities (Michie 1992: 110). 
Forms of Credit 
London stood as the key social space for world commercial credit 
practices. The predominant form of commercial credit practices was the issue if 
bills of exchange, institutionalised in London-centred merchant banking 
networks. London's standing as the key space for commercial credit practices 
was an outcome, in the first instance, of the symbiotic relationship between 
commercial credit provision and trade. London was the world's commercial 
centre, and commercial credit was necessary for both the 'direct' involvement of 
London's merchants in the handling of goods and their more 'indirect' 
involvement in the futures trade in commodities such as cocoa, rubber, tin, 
copper, lead, zinc and oil (Michie 1992: 30-3,52-3). Commercial credit 
practices centred in London were not, however, solely devoted to servicing the 
credit requirements of London's merchants. In the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, London had emerged as the key space for the provision of 
commercial credit for British exports, particularly from Liverpool and 
Manchester. London's merchant banks which specialised in commercial credit - 
so-called acceptance houses such as Barings, Brown Shipley & Co., and Wiggin 
Wilson and Wildes - co-ordinated British exports closely with networks of 
commission agents spread throughout the world's commercial centres 
(Chapman 1984: 8-15). ' From this initial development of London as a national 
financial centre for commercial credit provision, the gradual institutionalisation 
of commercial credit practices within the expanding networks of London's 
merchant banks across Europe, North and South America saw London emerge 
as an entrep8t centre in the financing of the world's trade by the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Of the commercial bills outstanding in London which 
totalled; E518 million in 1913-4, two-thirds represented credit allocated for trade 
3 The acceptance houses both accepted bills for consignments of goods to be shipped to all parts 
of the world, and created the credit through which the commission agents were able to provide 
British producers with the advances they expected. The commission agents charged a fee to 
British producers in return for effecting foreign transactions, while London's bill brokers 
prospered through the discounting of acceptance bills. 
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that did not touch British shores, even for re-export (Michie 1992: 72-3). This 
compared to commercial credit practices in Paris and Berlin which tended to 
finance the commerce of their respective countries, particularly within the 
continent of Europe (Cassis 1991: 54). 
Sovereign credit practices were also centralised in London during this 
period. London-centred sovereign credit practices had remained domestically- 
orientated during the eighteenth century (Riley 1980: 8; Arrighi 1994: 160). As 
such, the demands of the British mercantilist state for credit to finance the 
Napoleonic wars were met without much recourse to foreign borrowing, with 
only E20 million out of a total national debt of E500 million under foreign 
ownership in 1807-10 (Haley 1988: 168-9). The growing volume of sovereign 
credit creation associated with the Napoleonic wars also fuelled the emergence 
of a group of London-based sovereign credit contractors! The merchant banks 
of Barings, Rothschilds and JS Morgan (which became Morgan Grenfell after 
1869) all emerged from the war as the key institutions through which London- 
centred sovereign credit practices were organised. It was through these 
institutions, and their networks which came to expand across Europe, North and 
South America in the first half of the nineteenth century, that foreign sovereign 
credit creation in the form of bond issues would come to be organised for much 
of the next one hundred years. Indeed, the role of Barings in leading the 
organisation of the credit for French, Russian, Prussian and Austrian loans in the 
afterinath of the Napoleonic wars had the effect of broadening the mental and 
institutional horizons of British investors and merchant banks to the 
opportunities for returns presented by sovereign credit creation for foreign 
governments (Kindleberger 1984/1993: 214-5). This was reflected in the surge 
of sovereign credit created in London for the former Spanish and Portuguese 
colonies in Latin America in the 1820s (Kindleberger 1996: 135). 
In addition to the provision of sovereign credit, London-centred long- 
term credit creation also provided the backing for large-scale industrial ventures, 
particularly from the latter half of the nineteenth century. Most productive 
ventures in Europe and North America were either self-financed or based on 
short-term local credit arrangements between private banks and producers while 
textile production stood at the 'cutting edge' of industrialisation during the first 
decades of the nineteenth century (Born 1977: 46-52). As such, sovereign credit 
4 According to Bank of England figures, the number of people dealing in government bonds 
increased from 430 in 1792 to 726 by 1812 (Chapman 1984: 4). 
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dominated long-term credit provision in London during this period. ' Corporate 
and sovereign credit practices in London did, however, provide large volumes of 
the credit necessary for railway construction and other long-term infrastructural 
undertakings throughout Europe, Africa, North and Latin America. Between 
1865 and 1914, f. 4.1 billion worth of securities of foreign corporations and 
governments were issued in London, of which 70% went to finance 
infrastructural development. These issues were organised through the 
institutional networks of London's great merchant banks and their linkages with 
their foreign counterparts, in conjunction with the brokers and jobbers of the 
London Stock Exchange (Michie 1992: 109). For instance, a near-complete 
network of railway lines across Europe stretching from Paris and Madrid in the 
west, Leige and Magdeburg in the north, Lemberg and Kronstadt in the east, and 
Marseilles and Bari in the south emerged which was all financed by the 
Rothschilds (Born 1977: 43). 
Aside from the provision of credit for major infrastructural 
developments, London-centred corporate credit practices did, however, remain 
fairly limited at a world-scale. As part and parcel of the consolidation of 
national political economies, the increased demands for credit associated with 
more capital-intensive industrial production such as mining, iron and metal 
working across Europe and North America were largely satisfied by nationally- 
orientated corporate credit practices, institutionalised within joint-stock and 
universal banks (Bom 1977: 46-52). Corporate credit creation in London came 
in the latter stages of the hundred year's peace to focus, in the main, on the 
provision of credit for productive ventures that sheltered under the umbrella of 
British imperial expansion. 
Given London's dominance of world credit creation, clearance practices 
were also centralised in London. As such, Braudel's (1984: 608) claim, 
supported by other French historians, that for much of the nineteenth century 
Paris stood as the centre for international clearance between Britain, continental 
Europe and the United States rather "stretches belief' (Kindleberger 1996: 136). 
5 The dominance of sovereign credit creating practices during this period is apparent in the 
changing nature of the London Stock Exchange. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the 
Stock Exchange had been essentially an institution through which sovereign credit practices 
were organised, as the share of British sovereign credit of the nominal value of securities quoted 
on the exchange stood at around 70% (1850). By 1913 this figure had fallen to 10%, reflecting 
the declining demand for sovereign credit in a period of general international peace and the 
increased role of the exchange in the organisation of corporate credit provision (Michie 
1992: 104). 
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London had already. become established as the leading centre for the clearance 
of payments in the British national political economy in the eighteenth century, 
as banks centred their clearing practices in London by settling balances with 
each other both on their own accounts and through Bank of England notes. 
These practices became institutionalised in the London Clearing House in 
Lombard Street from 1773, which reinforced their intense centralisation 
(Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 25-6). ' After the Napoleonic wars London came to 
stand as the "one major clearing house of universal scope" (Anderson 1987: 33), 
where the world's bullion and credit markets met (Brown 1940: 142). As Brown 
(1940: xv) asserts of the period up to 1914, 
"London was the world's clearing center before the war. The process of 
remittance from country to country was simplified to perfection by the 
fact that, notwithstanding the existence of numerous different currencies, 
the transfer of funds the world over could, from the point of view of 
banking technique, ultimately be effected by the debit and credit entries 
on the books of banking institutions in the one world center, London". 
The London Clearing House and its membership of 'clearing banks' 
institutionalised the practices of clearing the claims and obligations of the 
world's merchants, bankers and central bankers who maintained large sterling- 
denominated working balances in London! As Bagehot (1873/1991: 17) noted, 
"At whatever place many people have to make payments, at that place those 
people must keep money". These balances formed a kind of revolving fund of 
working capital that was used in the conduct of clearing operations (Brown 
1940: 10-11; Germain 1997: 5 1). The centralisation of clearing practices brought 
increased efficiency to London-centred credit creation that, in turn, extended the 
cumulative range and extent of credit practices. 
6 "Clearing was clearly slow to form in London but in time it became an institution, based on a 
tightly regulated micro-space of specific distances (only offices within one-halfamile of the 
clearing house were allowed in the system) and specific times (the afternoon settlement 
deadline), integrated by the 'walks' of messengers and couriers around the offices picking up 
drafts and cheques to take to the clearing house for settlement" (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 26). 
7 The London Clearing House cleared the settlements between its members at the close of the 
day and balanced the accounts of its members every evening. Payments were settled in Bank of 
England notes and later, following the Bank of England's membership of the Clearing House in 
1864, through transfers with the Bank. Membership was restricted, and the considerable 
concentration of British banking in the latter stages of the nineteenth century realised a fall in 
members from 125 (1867) to only 17 (1913). The remaining 'clearing banks' earned 
commission for clearing the settlements of the other merchants, banks and central banks which 
centralised their settlement practices in London. 
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The working capital balances of merchants, banks and central banks held 
in London provided much of the material basis for money-market practices. 
Given London's dominance of international clearance, the London money- 
market was by far the largest! As Bagehot (1873/1991: 3) notes, the important 
feature of these balances held on 'Lombard Street' was that, in the main, they 
were "borrowable money". The idle balances became an important source of 
credit themselves, as the money-market institutions were able to match the 
supply of short-term funds searching for returns with the demand for long-term 
credit (Brown 1940: 142,535). As such, Brown (1940: xvii) has characterised 
the London money-market as "where the whole world was both borrower and 
lender". In particular, the jobbers of the London Stock Exchange borrowed 
short-term through money-market practices at a lower rate of interest and 
invested long-term in securities that potentially yielded a higher rate of interest. 
As such, they played the risk of price fluctuations off against the possible profits 
to be made from interest rate differentials (Michie 1992: 75-7). 
Capital 
London's rise as the key social space for world credit practices rested 
upon the material resources of capital, knowledge and technology centralised in 
London. In a not dissimilar manner to Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, 
the relative abundance of capital centralised in London during the nineteenth 
century was in part a result of London's standing as the world's commercial 
centre. London's merchants had been pivotal in establishing British dominance 
over the Baltic and Atlantic trading networks in the course of the eighteenth 
century, controlling supplies of fish, salt, tobacco, cotton, sugar, gold and slaves 
(Arrighi 1990,1994; Amin 1996). However, as Braudel (1984: 35) notes of the 
rise and fall of successive world commercial and financial centres, "With 
London, we move into a completely different context; this great city had at its 
command the English national market ...... The centralisation of capital in 
London was an outcome not simply of its own predominant position in the 
world's trading networks, but the degree to which London dominated the British 
national political economy which, in turn, dominated industrial production and 
trade for much of the nineteenth century (Germain 1997: 44-5). ' As such, the 
a Bagehot (1873/1991: 2) suggests that based on those banks that published figures for deposits, 
London held balances to the value of L120 million, compared with; E40 million for New York 
and L 13 million for Paris. 
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massive sums of capital which became centralised in London by virtue of 
Britain's position as 'the workshop of the world' were far in excess of those that 
had been at the disposal of Amsterdam's financiers a century earlier. The 
capital accumulated throughout the British national political economy was 
channelled to London through the institutional networks of the private 'country 
banks', which also organised credit provision throughout Britain (Kindleberger 
1984/1993: 79-81). From the latter stages of the nineteenth century the networks 
of the London-centred joint-stock banks undertook a similar role (Michie 
1992: 70-1). 'o The effective extension of the British national political economy 
through the British Empire further expanded the volume of capital that became 
centralised in London. " 
From its position as 'the workshop of the world', the British national 
political economy began a period of relative decline in the 1870s. The standing 
of the British political economy was undercut by German industrial exports in 
continental Europe and the consolidation of the American national political 
economy. This relative decline did not result, however, in a weakening of the 
volumes of capital centralised in London. " Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, the 
"high period" (Germain 1997: 47) of London's standing as a WFC from 1870 to 
1914 coincided with the relative decline of the British national political 
economy and the associated unravelling of the 'Pax Britannica' (Imlah 1958; 
9 This view is supported by Kindleberger (1996: 128) who states that "Along with the French 
commerce, British trade boomed in the eighteenth century, but British primacy cannot be said to 
have begun until the industrial revolution". 
10 According to Michie (1992: 68-71), by 1913 the 8910 bank branches in Britain held L1032 
million in deposits of which around half swelled the capital available in London's money- 
markets. 
11 On the British Empire, see Barrat Brown (1988) for an approach that emphasises the 
agricultural and industrial importance of the Empire, and Anderson (1987) for a reading 
emphasising the commercial and financial aspects of Empire. On the significance of the linkages 
with the British Empire for the rise of London as a commercial and financial centre, see King 
(1990). 
12 The relative decline of the British national political economy from the 1870s is visible in 
terms of the British share of world industrial production. In 1870, the British national political 
economy generated 32% of world industrial production, compared with 23% for the United 
States, 13% for Germany and 10% for France. By 1913, Britain's share had fallen to 14%, 
compared with 30% for the United States, 16% for Germany and 6% for France (Walter 
1993: 87). Britain did retain its position as the most important importer and exporter of 
industrial goods and importer of raw materials up until 1914, whereupon Britain's involvement 
in world trade was paralleled in terms of share of total trade by Germany. However, the 
maintenance of this position relied increasingly heavily on trade within the British empire - by 
1913 40% of British exports were made to Canada, Argentina, South Africa, Australia and New 
Zealand (King 1990: 76-7) - while British exporters were unable to compete in the 'cutting edge' 
electrical and chemical industries. 
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Polanyi 1944: 19; Cox 1987: 151). As both Brown (1940: 159) and Feis 
(1930/1964: 16-17) have identified, after 1870 something of a gradual transition 
took place in the nature of the capital centralised in London. Credit creation in 
London became materially less reliant upon capital newly accumulated through 
the trade and industrial production of the British national political economy and 
took place largely on the back of mobile capital in general, and particularly that 
generated by and through previous rounds of credit creation. " 
As had happened to Amsterdam during the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, albeit in a different context, London underwent a gradual shift from a 
world commercial and financial centre to an entrep6t WFC of a more pure, 
specialised form. At the heart of this shift lay a virtuous circle whereby 
London's position as the key social space for world credit practices both 
generated capital and attracted mobile capital in search of the most profitable 
returns. As Michie (1992: 75) has asserted, "it was only London that could offer 
the blend of liquidity, security, mobility and return that allowed otherwise idle 
funds to be employed ...... London displayed what Brown 
(1940: 154) has 
termed "deposit-compelling power", whereby capital was attracted to and 
maintained in London principally on the basis of the efficiency of London- 
centred money-market practices and their capacity to offer relatively high 
returns. The material basis of London's high period as a WFC was not, then, 
simply a continued reflection of its standing as the financial centre of the British 
national political economy, but also closely related to its own 'independent' 
development as an entrep6t WFC. " 
13 The build up of the deposits of foreign and colonial joint-stock banks in London, totalling 
fl. 9 billion by 1914 (almost twice the level of British bank deposits), is illustrative of the 
general inflow of mobile capital into London (figures from Michie 1992: 74). The particular 
significance of the centralisation of capital in London generated by previous rounds of foreign 
lending is visible in terms of the breakdown of British foreign earnings. By 1913, around E200 
million net in interest, dividends and repayments were returning to Britain from abroad, 
accounting for 22% of British foreign earnings in that year (figures from Michie 1992: 111). 
14 It was not the simple case that London-centred credit creation was based materially upon 
purely British capital up until the 1870s, as is illustrated by Britain's position as a marginal net- 
debtor state in the short-term throughout much of the nineteenth century (Germain 1997: 54). 
See Imlah (1958: 42-81) for details of British balance-of-payments between 1816 and 1913. 
However, the significance of foreign capital centralised in London did clearly increase, reflected 
in the growing significance of the invisible earnings generated by London-centred credit creation 
in British the balance-of-payments (Cassis 1994: 7). 
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Knowledge and Technology 
The information centralised in London, and its analysis to realise 
knowledge, was also a key material resource upon which world credit practices 
were based. As a 'knowledge exchange', London rivalled Amsterdam by the 
end of the eighteenth century and had surpassed both Amsterdam and Paris by 
the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars (Neal 1990: 20). Several more or less 
institutionalised networks overlapped in London, ensuring the centralisation of 
knowledge. Merchant networks tended to be centralised in London's Baltic 
Exchange, generating "a commercial intelligence network unrivalled anywhere 
else in the world" (Michie 1992: 41). London's mercantile networks were 
supplemented by the closely related practices of insurance and shipping, with 
insurance practices, in particular, gathering information and creating knowledge 
in order to make assessments of risks. The world's insurance market centred on 
and was co-ordinated through Lloyds of London (Michie 1992: 148-54). More 
specialised networks also existed which provided knowledge specific to world 
credit practices. London's merchant banking networks were themselves able to 
base their practices upon a detailed knowledge of foreign finances, built up over 
generations through the increasingly institutionalised networks of family 
relations which spread across Europe, North and Latin America (Cassis 
1994: 43). The position of the London Stock Exchange at the centre of the 
network of the world's stock exchanges, linked by market institutional and 
telegraph networks, also reinforced the centralisation of knowledge in London 
(Michie 1992: 148-54). Knowledge-intensive 'client service' practices and 
institutions in London, most notably accountancy, provided knowledge of the 
financial positions of joint-stock companies through both general audits and 
assessments in times of potential bankruptcy, merger, and new credit issue 
(Michie 1992: 176-7). London's financial press, especially the Economist 
(1843) and the Financial Times (1888), both supplemented these networks and 
reported their knowledge throughout London (Parsons 1989). 
In addition, significant technological innovations in the second half of 
the nineteenth century with the introduction of the telegraph and telephone 
generated a variety of communications networks. The centralisation of these 
communications networks in London ensured that London was at the centre of 
the processes of an internationalisation of economic knowledge (Parsons 1989). 
The telegraph was first used by Paul Reuter in 1851 to exchange stock prices 
between London and Paris, while a permanent telegraph link was established 
between London and New York in 1866 (Michie 1992: 184-5; Thrift 1994: 344). 
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The first telephone exchange in Britain was introduced in London in 1879 - only 
three years after the telephone had first been tested - with the number of 
subscribers reaching 10,000 by 1910 (Thrift 1994: 344). The significance of 
these communications networks lay in their capacity to enable the more rapid 
transfer of knowledge in, through and out of London. Such knowledge 
informed London-centred world credit practices. 
Part 11 - The Making and Reproduction of the British World Financial 
Order 
VAiile providing the material resources framing world credit practices, 
the centralisation of capital, knowledge and technology also conferred material 
power upon social forces associated with London in diachronic terms. In a 
similar manner to the position of Amsterdam's social forces in the Dutch world 
financial order, albeit in a different context, this material power provided the 
basis for London's social forces to establish London as a key space of authority 
in the world financial order during the hundred years peace. " The ideational 
and institutional structures that framed the practices of credit creation in the 
British world financial order were centralised in London, subject to the 
authoritative influence of London's social forces and their perceived shared 
interests. The result was a coherent conjunction between the material, ideational 
and institutional forces that structured the British world financial order that 
contributed to the making of a relatively stable order. The shared norms, 
meanings and values of London's social forces became diffused throughout the 
British world financial order, and the civil and market institutions centralised in 
London served to manipulate and manage the British world financial order. The 
resulting cumulative standing of London as the social locus for the reproduction 
of the British world financial order further rested upon the relationships of 
London's social forces to the British state, and the position of the British state in 
the structures of the wider world order. 
15 The significance attributed here to the authority of London's social forces in contributing to 
the organisation of the British world financial order is both informed and supported by the 
inspirational analysis of Karl Polanyi (1944). Polanyi highlighted the position of what he termed 
'haute finance' as a class of London-centred financiers who contributed to the social and 
political organisation of the hundred years peace by the formal exercise of authority through a 
variety of private institutional networks, including the merchant banking networks of the 
Rothschilds, and by the more informal shaping of "the universally accepted principles upon 
which this organisation rested" (1944: 18). In a similar vein, Cox (1987: 147) casts London's 
social forces as "the managers of the world economy". 
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The emphasis placed here upon the role of London as key space of 
authority in the reproduction of relative stability in the British world financial 
order, and the intersection of London's social forces with the British state and 
the wider world order, contrasts with conventional understandings in IR and 
IPE. The key to understanding the organisation of credit practices in this period 
is usually held to be the international gold standard as the institutional 
infrastructure through which the hegemonic British state actively managed the 
organisation of international monetary relations (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 
1987). "' Enabled by the gold standard, the British state is viewed as providing 
an adequate supply of liquidity, overseeing international adjustment, playing the 
role of lender-of-last resort in periods of crisis, and stimulating confidence by 
maintaining the convertibility of sterling to gold at a fixed rate. However, as 
Walter (1993: 90) asserts in his excellent critique of the capacity of this 
conventional wisdom to explain the organisation of world credit practices, "... 
Britain's international financial dominance, while indisputable, needs to be 
qualified". 
It is held here that the first step of such a 'qualification' is the 
recognition that the gold standard developed within and as part of the British 
world financial order, and the material, ideational and institutional forces that 
framed that order. This view is effectively supported by those who have 
identified that the gold standard was, in practice, a sterling exchange standard 
(Brown 1940; Ingham 1994). " An adequate supply of liquidity was dependent 
upon the provision of sterling-denominated credit, rooted in world-wide 
confidence in the convertibility of sterling to gold. The second step is to 
16 This conventional wisdom itself is based on a critique of the classical theory of the gold 
standard which, resting on Hume's identification of the specie-flow mechanism, identified the 
automatic adjustments of the gold standard as bringing about monetary stability. Eichengreen 
and Flandreau (1997: 3 original emphasis) provide a concise summary of the classical theory of 
the gold standard - "Each country's money supply was linked to its gold reserves, and balance- 
of-payments adjustment was accomplished by international shipments of precious metal. Each 
country being subject to the same gold discipline, the system brought about a de facto 
harmonization of policies and an admirable degree of exchange rate stability". For Kindleberger 
(1973), the hegemony of the British state is held as a necessary feature of monetary stability 
given the inherent instability of international monetary order, while for Gilpin (1987) the need 
for a hegemonic state to generate a stable international monetary order results from the presumed 
anarchy of the system of states (see Walter 1993). 
17 This view is also supported in quantitative terms by the declining significance of specie 
money during the British world financial order. In 1800, credit in the form of bank notes and 
demand deposits accounted for less than half of the total monetary gold and silver in Europe. By 
1913, notes and deposits were nine times in excess of the metallic money in use (Walter 
1993: 36). 
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acknowledge that, contrary to Hume's specie flow mechanism, balance-of- 
payments disequilibria were adequately met largely by short- and long-term 
advances of credit and the clearance of credit and debt obligations (Brown 
1940: 775,777). According to Michie (1992: 78), from the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century, the increased used of finance bills, not trade bills, indicates 
that "the London money market was now more concerned with the maintenance 
of international equilibrium than the simple finance of commerce". " Given that 
London was the key social space for world credit practices during the British 
world financial order, these two steps of qualification bring London to the heart 
of an understanding of financial and monetary order in this period. " 
The third step of qualification is to problematise the assumed authority 
of the British state as a unitary actor in the reproduction of the world financial 
order. The conventional wisdom tends to assume that the hegemonic British 
state, through the Bank of England, more or less consciously managed the world 
financial order through the manipulation of domestic and international interest 
rates, leading to the stabilisation of currency values and credit creation 
(Kindleberger 1973). This view is underpinned by the assumption that as part of 
the consolidation of national political economies, the issue of state-backed 
fiduciary money as legal tender and the development of facilities to create public 
debt gave governments increased authority over money and credit creation 
(Kindleberger 1984/1993: 155-72). However, such a view tends to obscure the 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing nature of state, civil and market authority 
in the organisation of the British world financial order. The British world 
financial order - as part of the wider world order - saw a coming together of 
public and private and formal and informal authority in an interdependent 
relationship involving state, civil and market institutions (Gill 1991: 282). As 
is "... trade bills were based on goods and commodities in existence but not yet finally disposed 
of, ... finance bills represented loans where securities were the collateral. With many securities 
traded on more than one market, and simultaneous buying and selling made easy with 
telecommunications contact, a purchase in the securities market of one country and the sale in 
that of another would produce a transfer of funds in the direction of sale. The rights to these 
funds could then be sold in the form of a finance bill, created in response to a demand to make a 
payment in that centre, while the resulting easing or tightening of credit would produce the 
desired structural adjustment" (Michie 1992: 78). On the use of finance bills, see also Germain 
(1997: 52) and Brown (1940: 549-50). 
19 This view is supported and informed by Brown's (1940) monumental two volume study of the 
functioning of the gold standard in practice as part of what he terms the 'world credit and 
clearing structure. He draws a distinction between the stability of the pre-1914 gold standard 
that operated within a world credit structure that was firmly centralised in London, and the 
instability of the post-1918 gold standard which operated within a decentralised world credit 
structure in which neither London or New York stood as the predominant WFC. 
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Cox (1987: 111) has contended, in general terms, "... the world economy 
functioned through private agencies, centred mainly in the City of London, that 
were symbiotically related to the British state and to the Europe-centred state 
system". Given London-centred authority over the organisation of world credit 
practices, the reproduction of the social stability of the British world financial 
order rested on the intricate edifice of London as a space of authority, backed 
and guaranteed by the British state as part of the wider world order. This 
intricate' edifice manifested itself in what Ingham (1984: 128-151) terms the 
'City-Bank-Treasury' nexus. The authority of the City of London and the Bank 
of England and the state-based authority of the Treasury all became in part 
dependent upon the authority of the others for the reproduction of the British 
world financial order. 
Informal Authority 
The modem meanings, norms and values surrounding credit creation in 
London in the nineteenth century bore close resemblance to those that had 
predominated in Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Indeed, in the processes of diffusion of shared understandings and values during 
the Amsterdam-centred world financial order, London's social space had stood 
as something akin to an absorbent sponge. In part the diffusion processes were 
directly related to the movement of merchants and financiers from Amsterdam 
to London in the wake of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Neal 1990: 17). 
More broadly, the shared understandings and values surrounding credit creation 
in London reflected the relative success of British state officials and financiers 
in emulating the sovereign credit arrangements which had prevailed in the 
United Provinces. 20 
While the cosmopolitan values of Amsterdam-centred world financial 
order were at the roots of the meanings and understandings surrounding credit 
creation in London in the nineteenth century, these were given a more precise 
formulation by the rise of liberalism within British state-society. The liberalism 
of Adam Smith and David Ricardo gave a theoretical underpinning to more 
long-standing cosmopolitan values. This suggested that political restrictions on 
international loans were both harmful to the prosperity and power generated by 
world trade, and served to prevent them from assisting in bringing about an 
20 Cox (1987: 115) identifies British success in emulating the sovereign credit arrangements of 
the United Provinces as a key reason for the success of the British state in emerging victorious 
from the Napoleonic wars. 
122 
equilibrium in the world's balance-of-payments (Brown 1940: 157-8). " Further, 
the laissez-faire values of London's social forces also found expression in 
debates surrounding the restoration of the convertibility of sterling to gold in the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, as underlying monetary stability was essential 
for credit creation. As such, under the intellectual and political leadership of 
Ricardo, London's social forces proved successful in achieving the restoration 
of convertibility that was maintained by the British state through to the first 
decades of the twentieth century. 
The liberal values that informed credit practices in London were 
supported and reinforced by the liberal form of the British state (Cox 1987: 111- 
150). This was reflected in the economic policies of successive British 
governments from the 1840s that supported the movement to free trade, the 
adoption and promotion of the gold standard, and the maintenance of a balanced 
budget (Cassis 1994). The repeal of the Com Laws in the 1840s and the 
Navigation Acts in the 1850s provided the basis for British free trade which was 
maintained thereafter without reciprocity, even following the widespread 
adoption of protectionism in continental Europe from the late 1870s 
(Kindleberger 1996: 129-32). The adoption and promotion of the gold standard 
by the British state formed part of a deeper commitment to the maintain the 
value of sterling that stretched back to the sixteenth century, and was a 
necessary feature of sustaining confidence in sterling-denominated credit 
(Goldsmith 1987; Braudel 1984: 356; Arrighi 1994: 190). The tight control over 
public expenditure maintained by the Treasury limited the demands made by the 
British state for London-centred sovereign credit creation (Ingham 1994: 36-7). 
Through the combination of these liberal economic policies, British state 
officials sought to operationalise the separation of politics from economics 
which liberalism demands. Significantly for the British world financial order, 
this separation meant that the British state did not encroach significantly upon 
the organisation of world credit practices. In contrast to the political restrictions 
placed on credit creation by the governments of continental Europe (Brown 
21 Liberal values did not inform 'rational' decisions regarding everyday credit allocation as 
suggested by neo-classical economics. Decisions regarding creditworthiness appear likely to 
have been taken on the basis of the reputation of potential debtors when assessing the risks 
involved in credit creation, underpinned by common class, educational and social affiliations of 
London's social forces (see Pohle 1995; Cassis 1994: 139). The prevalence of liberal values, 
then, is of greater significance in diachronic terms as legitimating the more formal exercise of 
authority through market institutions. 
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1940: 158; Feis 1930/1965: 83-186), for British state officials "financial pressure 
was not a suitable instrument of foreign policy" (Imlah 1958: 10). For instance, 
financial obligations to Russia were still honoured despite involvement in the 
Crimean war. Such a separation of politics from economics served to enable 
and reinforce the authority of those London-centred civil and market institutions 
that lay at the heart of the reproduction of the British world financial order. As 
Cox (1987: 107) asserts, 
"... with the sponsorship and political support of the most powerful state, 
the world economy achieved autonomy, such that its own laws began to 
constrain state policies, particularly through the workings of international 
finance centred in the City of London". 
That successive British governments pursued liberal economic policies 
which supported the values of London's social forces and reinforced the 
authority of London's civil and market institutions over credit creation should 
not, however, be equated with the domination of the machinery of the British 
state by London's social forces in an instrumentalist sense. " A series of 
complex changes in British state-society relations from the 1820s appears to 
have underpinned the emergence of the liberal form of state. The interaction of 
the interests of various social forces in these processes does not, after close 
scrutiny of the social and political power of London's social forces, seem to 
reveal that the adoption of liberal policies is reducible to the triumph of those 
interests which either perceived or later accrued benefits from them (Anderson 
1987; Cassis 1994; Ingham 1984: 101-116). As Cassis (1994: 4) has asserted, "It 
is pointless to deny that the City bankers enjoyed a very high social status and 
that they were close to political power. But it is equally dangerous, on the basis 
of this evidence, to reinterpret British history in terms of the domination of City 
interests". For instance, while the extension of the British empire from the latter 
stages of the nineteenth century clearly generated considerable sums of capital 
which became centralised in London (King 1990), this expansion seems likely 
to have been driven by the general threat to British trade of increased 
protectionism across continental Europe (Ingham 1984: 125-6). The significance 
of the liberal policies of the British state, then, lies not so much in the 
manipulation of the British state by London's social forces, but in the manner in 
which they did not restrict the role of London as the key space of authority in the 
reproduction of the world financial order. 
22 For such an instrumentalist view, see Arrighi (1994). 
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Wider World Order 
The liberal values of London's social forces and the capacity of London 
to stand as the key space of authority in the reproduction of the British world 
financial order were also underpinned by the structures of the wider world order, 
and the position of the British state within that order. The chief characteristic of 
the wider world order was not the 'hegemony' of the British state, as has been 
suggested by realist (Gilpin 1987) and world-systems (Arrighi 1994; Taylor 
1996) writers. Rather, the wider world order was characterised by an inter-state 
balance of power in Europe in which the British state was pivotal (Polanyi 1944; 
Cox 1987; Imlah 1958). Re-establishing a balance of power in Europe had been 
a main objective of British state negotiators at the peace settlement following 
the Napoleonic wars, what Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh had called a 'just 
equilibrium' (Imlah 1958: 2). Indeed, British participation in the Napoleonic 
wars was framed within an understanding that Napoleonic expansionism had 
destroyed the previous balance of power (Cox 1987: 123-4). In terms of inter- 
state relations, the post-1815 balance of power rested upon British naval 
superiority and diplomatic manoeuvrings through the Concert of Europe 
(Polanyi 1944). Wider state-societal transformations were underway in the 
nineteenth century which also provided, more broadly, the "sociopolitical 
conditions for existence" (Gill 1991: 280) of the wider world order. The rise of 
mass politics across Europe and increased political freedoms of the press and 
judiciary - under the influence of classical statements of liberal political 
economy such as JS Mill's 'On Liberty' which resonated with the doctrines of 
the natural rights of man which had risen to prominence in France in 1789 - 
contrasted sharply with the reactionary, interventionist and militaristic nature of 
Napoleonic expansion that preceded the nineteenth century balance of power 
(Gill 1991: 280; Imlah 1958: 6). 
British centrality within the balance of power was rooted in the capacity 
of British state officials to draw on the economic and social resources of the 
consolidated British national political economy. However, this centrality did 
not find direct expression in the imposition of liberal economic policies upon 
the state governments of continental Europe. As Walter (1993: 90-1) has 
identified, within the British world financial order, the British state did not 
dictate the terms for economic policy-making. For instance, the British state 
proved unable to either undermine the assumption across continental Europe 
that credit allocation could be politically directed, or to arrest the shift to 
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protectionism following Bismark's Tariff of Rye and Iron in 1879. Instead, the 
structures of wider world order underpinned the liberal values of London's 
social forces and the position of London as the key space of authority somewhat 
indirectly through the adoption of the gold standard by the governments of 
continental Europe. Within the framework of the balance of power, Europe's 
governments adopted the gold standard once it became perceived as desirable as 
a means of emulating British economic and commercial success, as providing a 
potential solution to the maintenance of fixed exchange rates, as a means of 
competing for international financial business, and to improve their international 
creditworthiness (Walter 1993: 91-2,250-1). As Polanyi (1944: 14) stresses, the 
widespread adoption of the gold standard by the principal states effectively 
served to institutionalise the values of London's social forces across the British 
world financial order. A European balance of power subject to the constraints 
of the gold standard also served to insulate the authority of London from 
political disturbance. No single state could establish the Napoleonic-style 
empire to redirect the centralisation of capital from London and articulate an 
alternative to liberal political economy, both of which would have been 
necessary to undermine London's authority. 
Formal Authority 
The Bank of England stood at the heart of the intricate institutional 
edifice through which London, as the key space of authority, was able to 
reproduce the British world financial order. The Bank of England is 
conceptualised here as, first and foremost, a civil institution during the British 
world financial order. While the Bank as a joint-stock company could be 
regarded in functional terms as a market institution or, more typically, as a state 
institution granted a monopoly over the issuing of sterling as legal tender, those 
individuals who voluntarily participated in the Bank's operations broadly 
understood it to be necessary to support their socio-economic aspirations. The 
Court of Directors who managed the Bank, including the governor and deputy 
governor, were in the main recruited from London's most prominent merchants 
and financiers and, as such, represented the interests of London's social forces 
(Cassis 1994: 85-91). There was broad social acceptance of the Bank's standing 
as a civil institution, but considerable debate surrounded whether this 
contradicted its wider public responsibilities (Bagehot 1873/1991). This became 
reflected in the controversy surrounding the Bank Act of 1844 that separated the 
Bank's issuing and banking departments. 
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While the significance of the contribution of the Bank of England to the 
reproduction of the British world financial order is widely acknowledged - the 
'conductor of the international orchestra' in Keynes' famous phrase - existing 
accounts have tended to focus rather narrowly upon the position of Bank within 
the gold standard. This leads to an emphasis on the role of the Bank in the 
manipulation of liquidity through the Bank rate to set national and effectively 
international interest rates in the management of international adjustment 
(Gilpin 1987: 124); on the leadership role of the Bank in establishing a set of 
practices through the manipulation of gold points and gold devices that led to 
the long-term adherence to the discipline of the gold standard (Eichengreen & 
Flandreau 1997: 15-18); and upon the standing of the Bank as an international 
lender of last resort in the management of financial crises (Kindleberger 1973). 
However, given that the Bank's potential and actual sterling liabilities to 
foreigners were vastly in excess of its gold reserves (de Cecco 1974), the 
capacity of the Bank to provide liquidity and manage international adjustment, 
maintain the convertibility of sterling and gold, and act as lender of last resort 
appears to have rested more broadly on its position within London as a WFC 
(Williams 1963: 513-4). " As such, the contribution of the Bank of England to 
the reproduction of the British world financial order through the manipulation 
and management of the organisation of world credit practices was dependent 
upon the interlocking relationships of the Bank to the other market, civil and 
state institutions centralised in London. 
Alongside this wider support, the material basis for the practices of the 
Bank of England lay in its relationship to the institutions that organised clearing 
and money-market practices centralised in London. The capacity of the Bank to 
manipulate liquidity through the Bank rate rested broadly on the 'deposit- 
compelling power' of London at the apex of the hierarchy of financial centreS. 24 
The deposit-compelling power of London did not mean, however, that increases 
in the rate of interest in London and the subsequent effects on international 
adjustment translated into deflation across the main national political economies 
23 Fears that the Bank of England's gold reserves may be insufficient were present in debates 
from the 1890s up to 1914 amongst British financial intellectuals and politicians (Cassis 
1994: 82-3; de Cecco 1974: 101-2). 
24 The 'deposit-compelling power' of London meant thatý particularly from the 1870s, the 
'market rate' became increasingly significant, as opposed to the Bank rate, in determining 
foreign exchanges and therefore capital movements. As a result, the Bank was only be able to 
make the Bank rate effective at the high price of borrowing in the market to raise the price of 
money or by limiting the export of gold (Cassis 1994: 81-2). 
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of continental Europe. " The position of Paris and Berlin as second-tier regional 
financial centres and their ability as social spaces to attract capital from the 
third-tier centres of central Europe - the majority of which stood as the financial 
centres of national political economies which consistently ran payments 
surpluses up to 1914 - mitigated against the spread of deflationary pressures 
(Walter 1993: 102-3). " As Walter (1993: 104-5) emphasises, the provision of 
liquidity through an intricate institutional edifice centralised in London was 
clearly not the same as the Bank of England acting as the proxy central bank of 
the British world financial order. 
The capacity of the Bank to maintain confidence in the British world 
financial order, and to manipulate the organisation of world credit practices in 
times of crisis, also rested upon its relationship to the other market, civil and 
state institutions centralised in London. The careful regulation of the expansion 
of credit through London's merchant banks by the encouragement of sound 
banking practices contributed both to effective management of the organisation 
of world credit practices (Germain 1997: 48-9). This view is supported by 
Brown's (1940: 778) identification of "the development, empirically, under the 
leadership of the Bank of England, of a stable and conservative type of banking 
management" as one of the two "foundation stones" of the British world 
financial order. Such regulation by the Bank gave the authority of London a 
prudent edge, generating trust and confidence which appears to have acted as 
something of a substitute for gold reserves in the organisation of world credit 
practices (Ingham 1994: 34). 
Further, at points of crisis in the organisation of world credit practices, 
the Bank was reliant upon close co-operation with market, civil and state 
institutions centralised in London to manage these superficial fluctuations. For 
instance, when the solvency of Barings was threatened in 1890 following an 
over extension of credit to Argentina, the Governor of the Bank established an 
underwriting syndicate to prevent bankruptcy which included the Treasury, 
25 Clearly, the deposit-compelling power of London did, however, have detrimental 
consequences for those national political economies particularly outside Europe with balance-of- 
payments deficits before 1914 (Eichengreen & Flandreau 1997: 10). 
26 Indeed, as Brown's (1940: 7-8) description of the international movements of gold and capital 
during the months immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War illustrates, there 
may be a sense in which the hierarchical relationships between the world's financial centres 
mutually reinforced the stability of the British world financial order, particularly in Europe and 
North America. 
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Rothschilds and other leading market institutions (Ingham 1984: 165-6; Cassis 
1994: 6). Ultimately, as the crises of 1890,1907 and 1914 all illustrate, it was 
the deposit-compelling power of London that enabled the Bank to attract gold 
and internationally mobile capital to London in times of crisis without 
undermining the wider provision of credit to the world economy. 
The position of the Bank of England as a key institution for the formal 
exercise of authority in the British world financial order also has to be seen in 
the context of the European balance-of-power in the wider world order which, 
through the adoption of the gold standard by the principal states, served to 
somewhat indirectly reinforce the authority of London. In short, the 'reach' of 
the London-centred structure of authority extended throughout the British world 
financialorder. As Kindleberger (1978: 183-90,1983) effectively highlights, the 
commitment to the gold standard translated into support for the authority of the 
Bank of England in the management of the organisation of world credit 
practices by other European central banks. This was particularly the case during 
brief periods of financial crisis when the deposit-compelling power of London 
alone proved insufficient. Between 1824 and 1914, national central banks came 
to the assistance of the Bank of England on four principal occasions. First, in 
1825 the Bank of France channelled L400,000 worth of gold sovereigns to the 
Bank of England via the market institutional network of Rothschilds. Second, 
between 1836 and 1839, the Bank of England was able to draw credit of 
; E400,000 and U million from Paris and E900,000 from Hamburg in support its 
own liquidity. Third, in 1890, as the Bank of England prepared to announce the 
collapse of Barings, it was able to gain assurances from the Russian government 
that it would not withdraw L2.4 million worth of deposits that it held with the 
Bank while securing D million worth of loans from the Bank of France. 
Finally, the Bank of France assisted the Bank of England in 1906-7 by selling 
gold in the London markets. 
Within the institutional edifice of London's authority over the 
organisation of credit practices in the British world financial order, "The banks 
at the heart of the City were the cornerstone of the whole edifice ... " (Cassis 
1994: 5). The specialised market institutional networks centralised in London 
formed something of a complementary intersection in the organisation of world 
credit practices (Cassis 1994: 5-6). The clearing banks cleared obligations, 
provided short-term loans, and collected deposits that the discount houses 
accessed through money-market practices to discount bills of exchange. The 
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acceptance of bills of exchange, along with the prudent organisation of foreign 
sovereign and corporate credit practices, was the preserve of the great merchant 
banks of Rothschilds, Barings, C. J Hambro and Kleinworts (Germain 1997: 48- 
50). Securities issued through the merchant banks were, in turn, placed through 
the jobbers and brokers of the London Stock Exchange (Michie 1992: 109). 
Through institutional networks extending across continental Europe, North and 
South America, London's merchant banks dominated the creation of foreign 
sovereign and corporate credit during the British world financial order (Bom 
1977: 31,53,116). " Between 1860 and 1904, Barings and Rothschilds alone 
undertook 250 sovereign and corporate issues with a value of E1.9 billion 
(Michie 1992: 111). In the British world financial order, then, decisions 
regarding the creation and allocation of credit were largely institutionalised 
within the market networks of London-centred banks and financial houses. The 
institutional edifice of London's authority guaranteed these decisions. 
The role of London's merchant banking networks in the organisation of 
sovereign credit practices has, in particular, tended to inforni a widespread 
perception of their 'political identity'. " For instance, based on a reading of 
Polanyi (1944), Arrighi (1994: 167) suggests that haute finance as a class 
dominated by London's merchant bankers acted as "the 'invisible hand' of an 
imperial organisation", part of "the power apparatus through which Britain ruled 
the world". Bom (1977: 34-5) highlights that London's merchant banking 
networks, largely as a consequence of their sovereign lending to Europe's 
governments, sought to maintain peace throughout Europe. Not dissimilarly, 
Polanyi (1944: 10) asserts that "the secret of the successful maintenance of 
general peace lay undoubtedly in the position, organization, and techniques of 
international finance". The common feature of these perceptions is an 
assumption that London's merchant banking networks contributed not only to 
the organisation of world credit practices as part of the reproduction of the 
relative stability of the British world financial order, but to the balance of power 
within the wider world order more generally. In our terms, not only did 
London's authority rest upon the wider world order, but it also contributed to the 
maintenance of a balance of power within that order. 
27 London-centred banks had institutional networks world-wide that included between 1500 and 2000 foreign branches by 1913 (Cassis 1991: 55). 
28 The phrase 'political identity' and its application to market institutions is taken from Sally 
(1994). 
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Alongside the Bank of England and the networks of London's market 
institutions, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) also formed part of the intricate 
institutional edifice through which London stood as the key space of authority in 
the reproduction of the British world financial order. The LSE was the 
institution through which the capital necessary for long-term credit creation was 
mobilised. In particular, it was through the LSE that the vast sums of short-term 
capital residing in London's money-markets became organised for long-term 
credit creation. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the LSE emerged as 
the central institution in a reasonably well integrated world securities market. 
The significance of the civil authority of the LSE lay not in the universalisation 
of long-term credit creating practices around the LSE as a 'model', as the norms 
and meanings that informed the practices of stock exchanges tended to reflect 
local conditions. Instead, the authority of the LSE was rooted in its domination 
of long-term credit creating practices in the British world financial order, as the 
practices, and to some extent capital and price movements, of other stock 
exchanges were defined in relation to the LSE (Michie 1992: 134). The position 
of the LSE in the organisation of the world's long-term credit provision itself 
was underpinned by the rules and norms of the LSE, especially its limited 
regulations, negotiable structure for commissions, and willingness to expand 
membership to include foreign nationals. 
Part III - The Unravelling of the British World Financial Order: The 
Decline of London and Rise of New York 
It has been suggested here that the relative stability of the British world 
financial order rested upon the centralisation of the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of the order in London. This realised a coherent conjunction 
of forces in the British world financial order that was reproduced through 
London's authority over the organisation of world credit practices. The 
cumulative standing of London as the key space of authority was underpinned 
by the policies of the British government and the position of the British state 
within the structures of the wider world order. Given that the British world 
financial order was underpinned by the wider world order, however, the course 
of the First World War was to irretrievably rupture the relative stability of the 
British world financial order. The war had the effect of 'telescoping' structural 
changes that both undermined the conditions in the wider world order which 
supported London's authority, and ended the coherent conjunction of forces 
centralised in London. As Brown (1940: xiii) has asserted, the real significance 
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of the war for the British world financial order was the destruction of the high 
degree of centralisation of that order in London. The gradual unravelling of the 
British world financial order after 1914 and the associated restructuring of the 
organisation of world credit practices took place in a 'decentralised' (Brown 
1940) world financial order, as an uneasy co-existence developed between 
London and New York as the WFCs at the apex of the order. The 
decentralisation of the British world financial order would, then, appear to be 
pivotal to an explanation of the relative instability of the order after 1914. 
Neither London's social forces or those associated with New York were able to 
command sufficient material resources, articulate sets of ideas, or access the 
institutional means to claim the authority necessary to organise world credit 
practices after 1914. 
World War I and the peace settlement concluded at Versailles led to 
three sets of developments which were the immediate concerns of the 
governments of the major states in the post-1918 British world financial order, 
all of which hampered attempts to organise of world credit practices. These 
were the threat of inflation; the payment of inter-allied war debts and German 
reparations; and the restoration of the gold standard. First, the widespread 
printing of money by Europe's governments to fund their war efforts combined 
with the pent up demand of wartime to generate a brief inflationary economic 
boom between 1920 and 1921 (Kindleberger 1973: 32). As Germain (1997: 59- 
61) has noted, the use in line with liberal orthodoxy of high interest rates to curb 
inflation led to 'tight' conditions for the creation of credit which continued into 
the 1930s. 
Second, the war had been fought by the allied powers on an edifice of 
foreign sovereign credit organised largely through the New York capital market 
by the American government - so-called inter-allied debts - which required 
repayment in peacetime (Kindleberger 1973: 34-9). " The allied national 
political economies that had been devastated by war were unable to accumulate 
sufficient capital for repayment. As such, the British and French governments in 
particular became reliant on receiving German reparations in order to fulfil their 
obligations. As Bom (1977: 206) stresses, "the American government's 
29 The distinctive feature of inter-allied war debts was that they were ... political' debts" (Born 
1977: 204), in the sense that they were direct inter-state lending from government to government. 
The United States government was the principal lender and the only government to emerge from 
the war without any debt repayments. 
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unbending insistence on the repayment of inter-Allied debts resulted in the 
Europeans being no less flexible over German reparations". The result was a 
veritable "merry-go-round" (Born 1977: 227) of capital and credit flows, 
whereby New York-centred credit creation provided for German reparation 
payments that eventually found their way back, in theory at least, to the 
American government via the allied governments. Despite the Dawes Plan of 
1924 and the Young Plan of 1929 which attempted, with limited success, to 
address the problems of inter-allied war debt and German reparations, long-term 
credit creation in the post-1918 British world financial order remained greatly 
restricted by the burden of wartime debt. 
Third, the governments of the major states shared the assumption that 
the key to restoring the organisation of world credit practices in the post-1918 
British world financial order lay in the restoration of the international gold 
standard (Brown 1940: 165-74; Helleiner 1993: 21). Restoration was 
complicated by the devastation of Europe's national political economies during 
the war and by inflationary pressures which had eroded the value of the world's 
gold stocks. In response and following the Geneva conference of 1922, it was 
recognised that the reconstructed gold standard would take the form of 'gold 
exchange standard', in which central banks increasingly held reserves in the 
form of balances in foreign currencies in addition to gold. While after 1925 the 
return to the gold exchange standard did appear to generate confidence in 
currency values, the gold exchange standard remained something of a "facade" 
(Brown 1940: 389). The commitment to the restoration of the gold standard 
obscured the relative instability that was rooted in the decentralised nature of the 
post-1918 order and its consequences for the organisation of world credit 
practices. As Brown (1940: 137-8) has posited, 
"At the close of hostilities it was impossible to see the consequences of 
this decentralization. ... A whole new set of relations with the dollar was 
suddenly superimposed upon the old set of relations with sterling. The 
old sterling relations were based upon a long historical development and 
appropriate institutional techniques were established to regulate them. 
The new relationships with the dollar were emergency relations created 
by the sudden upheaval. They were not solidified by an appropriate 
credit system" (my emphasis). 
The mythic proportions of the gold exchange standard concealed the degree to 
which monetary stability was contingent upon the relative stability of the British 
world financial order which itself had begun to unravel through the processes of 
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decentralisation. It is to the post- 1914 emergence of this duality of London and 
New York as WFCs and its relationship to the unravelling of the British world 
financial order that we now turn. 
On the eve of the First World War in 1913, the United States produced 
over a third of the world's industrial output, just under the combined total of 
Britain, Germany and France (Hobsbawm 1994: 97). Despite the huge volumes 
of capital generated by the US national political economy, however, New York 
remained largely a national and regional financial centre, standing as a key 
social space for practices which provided credit for the United States and Latin 
America (Kindleberger 1974/1978: 114-19). " World credit practices remained 
embedded in the institutions centralised in London, despite the relative 
weakness of the British national political economy from the 1870s. While the 
simultaneous rise of New York's social forces and decline of London's social 
forces was inextricably bound up with the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
their respective national political economies as part of the contradictions of the 
"inconstant geography of capitalism" (Storper & Walker 1989), " it was to take 
the major upheavals of world war to offer New York's social forces a 'structural 
opportunity' to engage in credit creation on a world-scale. " 
The roots of the rise of New York lay firmly in the wartime expansion of 
commercial credit and foreign sovereign credit practices in New York. The war 
effectively brought a temporary closure of London as a WFC as part of the 
British state's attempts to finance its war effort. New York was the key social 
space for the creation of the foreign sovereign credit that was channelled to the 
30 Aside from London's continued predominance, the limited role of New York as a key social 
space for world credit practices prior to 1914 was also related to the processes of the 
consolidation of the American national political economy. In particular, New York's standing 
was undercut by the absence of a central banking system. Prior to the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913 there were major restrictions on the creation of bankers acceptances which mitigated 
against the development of New York as a key space for world commercial credit and money- 
market practices (Madden & Nadler 1935/1994: 164; Nadler, Heller & Shipman 1955/1994: 190- 
1). 
31 "The geography of capitalism is uneven, to be sure; but it is, above all, inconstant. The 
dynamism of capitalist growth keeps industries on the move, and periodically sends them 
hurtling down new paths of spatial development. ... each new wave of industrialisation brings into existence new growth centers and growth peripheries, stimulates disinvestment in some 
areas and the radical restructuring of others, and reshuffles spatial production relations and 
patterns of territorial income distribution and politics. In so doing, it gives new life to 
capitalism! ' (Storper & Walker 1989: 4-5). 
32 The notion of a 'structural opportunity' is taken from Gills (1994). 
134 
belligerent and neutral states of Europe by the American government (Brown 
1940: 143-5). New York was also the key social space for the creation of 
commercial credit during wartime. By 1917 there were $1 billion worth of 
dollar-denominated outstanding acceptances generated by commercial credit 
practices in New York, two-thirds of which were for foreign trade (Brown 
1940: 149). In addition, as a result of heavy allied purchases from the American 
political economy during the war, the working balances of foreign financial 
market institutions and central banks became centralised in New York (Brown 
1940: 152-3). 
The wartime growth in the significance of New York as a social space 
for world credit practices was to prove more than a temporary expediency. 
From 1918 New York stood as the key social space for long-term credit creation 
in the British world financial order. Between 1921 and 1924, the value of new 
issues of foreign securities in New York totalled $2,373 million, compared with 
$917 million in London (Germain 1997: 63). Similarly, from 1925 to 1929, 
foreign lending out of New York totalled $6,400 million, compared with $3,300 
million from London (Kindleberger 1973: 56). Long-term foreign credit created 
in New York tended to be allocated to Europe, North and South America, while 
that created in London tended to be allocated to the regions of the British 
empire. " In addition, long-term credit creation in London became increasingly 
orientated to the credit needs of the British national political economy. Between 
1924 and 1928, foreign issues on the LSE accounted for only 45% of total 
issues, compared with 82% in 1913 (Michie 1992: 113). Of the total securities 
listed on the LSE, the percentage of foreign securities fell from 60% in 1910 to 
43% by 1920 and 30% by 1938 (Michie 1992: 135-6). 
London, however, recovered in large measure its position as the key 
space for commercial credit practices in the British world financial order in the 
aftermath of the war (Born 1977: 228). The clearance of credit obligations and 
associated money-market practices became somewhat decentralised in the post- 
war years (Brown 1940: 538), although the restoration of the convertibility of 
sterling to gold in 1925 did lead to a partial re-centralisation of working 
33 Of the total foreign lending out of New York of $6,400 million between 1925 and 1929, 
$2,957 million was allocated to continental Europe, $1,597 million to Latin America and $1,231 
million to Canada and Newfoundland. The breakdown of the foreign credit of $3,300 million 
created in London during the same period was $1,365 allocated to Asia and Oceania, $706 
million to Europe, $528 million to Latin America and $437 million to Africa (figures from 
Kindleberger 1973: 56). 
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balances in London . 
34 The competitive duality of WFCs at the apex of the post- 
1914 British world financial order realised something of a "division of labour, 
which clearly indicated the different orientations of the two centres" (Ingham 
1994: 42). London remained, by and large, the key social space for short-term 
commercial credit, clearing and money-market practices. This was reflected in 
the relatively high rates of interest in London that attracted short-term mobile 
funds from New York. Meanwhile, New York was largely the key social space 
for long-term credit creation, reflected in the relatively low rates of interest that 
facilitated long-term borrowing. 
The duality of WFCs at the apex of the post-1914 British world financial 
order reflected a partial decentralisation of material resources from London. At 
the roots of the partial decentralisation of capital lay the relative decline of the 
British national political economy in terms of world trade and industrial 
production (Ingham 1984: 174). This undermined the capacity of London- 
centred credit practices to continue to satisfy demand for credit. For instance, 
portions of the $128 million worth of sovereign credit raised by the British state 
to finance its Boer War effort at the turn of the twentieth century were provided 
through New York. This was the first time since the Seven Years War of 1756- 
63 that a significant share of British sovereign credit had been provided for by 
foreign sources (Burk 1992: 359-60). 
After 1914, increased competition from New York as a WFC undercut 
the deposit-compelling capacity of London to attract internationally mobile 
capital, further undermining the centralisation of material resources in London 
(Brown 1940: 157). Such a partial decentralisation of material power was 
problematic for the organisation of world credit practices, as essentially it 
generated a "conflict between the technical requirements of the banking process 
itself and the actual distribution of resources" (Brown 1940: 533). The "critical 
mass" (Germain 1997: 65) of material resources necessary for world credit 
practices was no longer centralised in London, reflected in the short-term nature 
of credit creation. " In particular, the centralisation of internationally mobile 
34 For instance, following the restoration of sterling convertibility in 1925, German and Dutch 
working balances were increasingly held in sterling, returning from New York to London 
(Kindleberger 1973: 44). 
35 For example, when the European financial crisis of 1931 broke out, the short-term nature of 
credit creation was revealed as 57.8% of Germany's foreign debts were repayable within three 
months (Born 1977: 228). 
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capital in London that had tended to provide the resources for the manipulation 
of the organisation of world credit practices in times of crisis prior to 1914 had 
come to an end. London's loss of its deposit-compelling power led to a 
centralisation of capital in London that could only be retained by "deposit- 
attracting policies" of relatively high interest rates (Brown 1940: 157). In the 
context of a world economy in which the European political economies were 
slow to come to grips with the dislocation of wartime, such high rates of interest 
tended to translate into a deflationary spiral and detrimental consequences for 
world credit practices. In addition, the maintenance of large working balances 
in both London and New York in order to transact clearing operations also led to 
increased inefficiencies in world credit practices, as international adjustments 
became harder to offset (Brown 1940: 538). As Burk (1992: 364) notes of the 
decline of London and rise of New York, "in the end, capital told". 
The relative instability associated with the unravelling of the British 
world financial order after 1914 was also related to the loss of the institutional 
means through which London's social forces had been able to organise of world 
credit practices previously in the British world financial order. The war 
shattered the London-centred market institutional networks that had been built 
up throughout the nineteenth century and had formed an essential element of the 
institutional edifice of London's pre-1914 authority. Further, British state 
authority over London-centred credit creation increased (Born 1977: 231-55). 
Wartime demands for sovereign credit had led to an expansion in the use of 
treasury bills on the London money-markets at the expense of finance bills 
(Brown 1940: 156). In the post-1918 era the Bank of England continued to 
attempt to restrict the use of finance bills in favour of treasury bills (Michie 
1992: 79-80). The effect was to restrict the capacity of London-centred 
commercial credit practices to provide for world trade (Buck 1992: 121). This 
change of policy reflected a subtle transformation in the nature of the City-Bank 
of England-Treasury nexus that had underpinned the authority of London in the 
organisation of world credit practices prior to 1914. The Bank of England after 
the War came consistently to express the 'Treasury view' (Ingham 1994: 36-7; 
Brown 1940: 160-61). In the context of relative economic decline, the Treasury 
sought to tie credit creation in London to the needs of the British government 
and national political economy to a greater extent. As a consequence, the 
standing of London as the key space authority in the reproduction of the British 
world financial order was partially undercut. 
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The increase in British state authority over credit which undercut the 
formal authority of London's market and civil institutions in the reproduction of 
the British world financial order itself reflected state-societal changes in the 
wider world order. In short, the "sociopolitical conditions for existence" (Gill 
1991: 280) which had prior to 1914 underpinned the British world financial 
order had changed. World War I accentuated what Polanyi (1944) termed the 
"double movement" within state-societies, with attempts by social forces to 
resist and reverse the logic of the self-regulating market gaining ground. This 
had considerable consequences for the manner in which national political 
economies came to be organised after 1918. As Ingham (1984: 170) notes, 
"The First World War appeared to have hastened the transition from the 
competitive market capitalism of free trade under the discipline of the 
gold standard to a more controlled economic order eventually based on 
protection and state intervention in industry, which was now 
characterised by monopolies and joint stock companies". 
Drawing on Polanyi's (1944) analysis of this 'great transformation', Ruggie 
(1982) highlights the consequences of these changes for the British world 
financial order. The liberal ideas that were the basis for London-centred 
informal authority in reproduction of the British world financial order prior to 
1914 now "stood in contradiction to the transformation in the mediating role of 
the state between market and society, which altered fundamentally the social 
purpose of domestic and international authority" (Ruggie 1982: 392). 
While London's standing as the key space of authority in the British 
world financial order had been undercut in material, institutional, and ideational 
terms, then, Ingham (1994: 41) suggests that after 1918 New York's social forces 
also lacked the institutional means with which to construct an alternative 
American world financial order in the image of the British world financial order. 
Given the isolationist sentiments of American farmers, organised labour and 
medium-sized industrialists (Block 1977: 18), the US state neither facilitated the 
authority of New York's social forces nor encouraged or directed the prudent 
form of international lending that had marked the pre-1914 British world 
financial order. As a consequence, New York-centred world credit practices 
expanded "with much enthusiasm, no experience, and little in the way of 
guiding principles" (Kindleberger 1973: 32). New York-centred world credit 
practices were often highly speculative and irresponsible (Block 1977: 20-21). 
Any potential for the development of New York's standing as the key space of 
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authority in a reconstituted American world financial order - based on the vast 
material resources of the US national political economy - was finally blown 
away by the Wall Street crash of October 1929 and the subsequent New Deal 
legislation (Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and Banking Act of 1935) which 
strengthened the authority of the US state over American credit creation. 
The duality of London and New York as WFCs at the apex of the post- 
1914 world financial order manifested itself in relative instability, and the 
reproduction of the order became increasingly problematic. It was the crises of 
1931 that marked the apogee of the London-centred, British world financial 
order (Michie 1992: 80-1; Williams 1963). The roots of the European financial 
crisis of 1931 appear to have lay in the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the 
depression which followed feeding into the world economy (Block 1977: 22; 
Helleiner 1993: 21-2). " In the context of falling industrial production and 
commodity prices and the near collapse of world trade that followed the Wall 
Street crash (Hobsbawm 1994: 91-4), the indebted European national political 
economies were clearly vulnerable to defaulting on existing obligations. The 
conditions necessary for capital accumulation on a sufficient scale to service 
credit obligations had been swept away by the crash. The Austrian and German 
national political economies were particularly vulnerable due to the relatively 
large size of their short-term foreign credit obligations. For instance, Germany's 
short-term obligations were between $2.5 and $3 billion in 1931 (Block 
1977: 22). It was from the immediate threat of Austrian default that the crisis 
emanated. A series of loans organised through international central bank co- 
operation did prove successful in preventing an Austrian default. However, the 
relative instability associated with the decentralisation of the order combined 
with sensitivity over German reconstruction and continued inter-governmental 
wrangling between the US, France and Britain over inter-allied war debts and 
German reparations to ensure that a similar rescue package failed to materialise 
to prevent a German default (Born 1977). 
36 While considerable academic debate surrounds the question of whether the Wall Street crash 
actually caused the depression that followed (Kindleberger 1973: 108-127), what is clear is that it 
further complicated attempts to reproduce the world financial order in the context of relative 
instability. As Henwood (1997: 234) asserts . ..... the crash 
is best seen as the opening movement 
of the broader crisis - the unravelling of a monstrously leveraged financial structure. Credit had 
served to push stocks to unsustainably high levels; it had also allowed production to expand 
beyond the limits of consumption. The crash exposed these limits, announced the 
unsustainability of promises to pay, and rendered investments unprofitable and debts 
unserviceable". 
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The response by the German government was to introduce exchange 
controls and protectionist policies, effectively insulating the German political 
economy from the world economy and the world financial order. With the 
insulation of the German political economy, the crisis moved to London as 
confidence in the stability of sterling evaporated (Roberts 1991: 63-4). British 
liquid assets in Germany had been frozen and Europe's commercial banks, who 
had themselves lost liquidity as a result of German bad debts, sold sterling in an 
attempt to increase their gold reserves (Kindleberger 1973: 158). In contrast to 
the pre- 1914 British world financial order, London's social forces did not posses 
the material resources or institutional edifice to prevent these disturbances in 
world credit practices from reinforcing the more structural crisis tendencies of 
the post-1914 British world financial order. As Williams (1963: 519) posits, 
"In the face of external pressure, London had previously responded to 
demands for finance at times of general difficulty in two ways. First, by 
reducing its long-term foreign investment, while tending to maintain - or 
even increase - short-term foreign investment, and, secondly, by 
attempting to increase its borrowing from abroad. In the 1929-31 crisis 
London was successful in changing the structure of its foreign investment 
but failed to attract greater foreign investment in London. Only one part 
of the pre-1914 machinery was operative". 
In our terms, London's social forces had lost the deposit-compelling power that 
had enabled them to attract sufficient internationally mobile capital to manage 
crises prior to 1914. Further, reflecting the subtle changes in the nature of the 
City-Treasury-Bank of England nexus after 1918, the Bank of England was 
unable to increase the Bank rate in an effort to manage the crisis as concerns 
with the detrimental consequences for the British political economy had become 
increasingly prevalent. As Roberts (1991: 65) asserts, 1931 was "the end of an 
epocif 'for London and its relationship to world finance. 
Conclusions 
While the British world financial order marked a structural 
transformation in the nature of world financial orders, London's position as the 
key social space in the British world financial order paralleled Amsterdam's 
position in the world financial order of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
in several senses. In synchronic terms, London was the key social space for the 
world credit practices during the Hundred Years Peace. The material, ideational 
and institutional forces that framed credit practices were also centralised in 
140 
London as the key social space. In diachronic terms, the centralisation of 
material, ideational and institutional forces led to a coherent con unction 
between them and a relatively stable world financial order up to 1914 which was 
reproduced by London's social forces through a centralised structure of 
authority. London's standing as the key social space and space of authority 
rested upon the dominant position of London as the financial centre of the 
British political economy, the ascendance of the British political economy in the 
world economy, the policies of the British government, and the central position 
of the British state within the structures of the wider world order. Significantly, 
in a similar manner to Amsterdam from the 1740s through to Napoleonic wars, 
London retained its standing as the WFC of the British world financial order for 
over three decades after the relative decline of the British political economy 
began in the 1870s. For our purposes, then, this suggests that while the rise of 
WFCs is intimately related to patterns of capital accumulation emanating from 
world trade and industrial production, an understanding of the 'independent' 
development of a WFC as an entrep6t financial centre may also be significant in 
arriving at an explanation of continued dominance. 
The British world financial order saw an increase in the importance of 
state-based forms of authority in the reproduction of a relatively stable world 
financial order when compared to the Amsterdam-centred world financial order. 
However, as the continued standing of London as a WFC and space of authority 
after 1870 illustrates, interdependence between state, market and civil forms of 
authority remained essential to the reproduction of a stable world financial order 
in the era of 'state credit money'. In contrast to orthodox IPE explanations of 
the relative stability of successive world financial orders that typically focus 
upon the rise and fall of states and the organisation of their wealth and power, 
inquiry into the British world financial order appears to confirm the utility of 
focusing, in the first instance, on the hierarchical social organisation of world 
financial orders. 
Given that the British world financial order was underpinned by the 
structures of the wider world order, the relative stability of the British world 
financial order was irretrievably ruptured by the First World War. The War fed 
structural changes in both the financial order and wider world order. These 
served to both decentralise the credit practices and the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of the British world financial order between London and 
New York, and to provide New York's social forces with a structural 
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opportunity to catapult New York up the hierarchy of financial centres. The 
resulting duality of WFCs fed relative instability in the British world financial 
order after 1918. Neither London's nor New York's social forces held the 
material, ideational and institutional resources necessary for the reproduction of 
a stable world financial order. As such, while the centralisation of a world 
financial order in a single WFC appears to be a necessary condition for a stable 
world financial order that is, in turn, reproduced by the authority of that WFC, 
both remain subject to the limitations and potential dislocation imposed by the 
structures of the wider world order. The relative instability associated with the 
decline of London and the unravelling of the British world financial order 
became intense with the crises of 1929-193 1. The crisis of 1931 that marked the 
apogee of the London-centred British world financial order heralded a virtual 
collapse of credit creation at a world-scale. Governments of the major states 
increasingly looked 'inwards' to their respective national political economies for 
solutions to economic depression and credit shortages. Economic growth was to 
return to the principal national political economies during the late 1930s, but 
only came with large-scale military expenditures in the run up to the outbreak of 
the Second World War. It was only in the post-1945 era that the foundations for 
the production and reproduction of a relatively stable New York-centred, 
American world financial order were to be put in place. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
New York: The Making and Unravelling of the American World Financial 
Order 
Introduction 
The previous chapter continued our concrete historical inquiry into 
successive world financial orders, focusing on the London-centred British world 
financial order between 1815 and 193 1. The British world financial order 
marked a structural transformation in the nature of world financial orders in the 
sense that it saw an increase in state-based forms of authority over the 
organisation of credit creation at a world scale. It is suggested, however, that 
arriving at an understanding of the reproduction of the period of relative stability 
in the British world financial order requires attention to the interdependent 
nature of state authority with civil and market forms of authority centralised in 
London. As such, it was the decentralisation of the British world financial order 
between New York and London that, in the first instance, lay at the heart of the 
relative instability that marked the period 1914-193 1. Neither the social forces 
associated with London nor New York possessed the material, ideational and 
institutional resources to authoritatively reproduce a relatively stable world 
financial order. The financial crisis of 1931 confirmed both the end of the 
British world financial order and the fall of London from the pinnacle of world 
finance. 
Although New York was the principal WFC from the 1930s, the making 
of a relatively stable American world financial order did not begin in earnest 
until 1947 with the granting of Marshall Plan aid. Not only did it take the Great 
Depression and the Second World War, it also took perceptions of a deepening 
crisis of post-war west European reconstruction and the Cold War before the 
foundations of the American world financial order became solidified. For the 
best part of the next three decades, the American world financial marked "a new 
phase in international finance" (Nadler, Heller & Shipman 1955/1994), "a 
structural transformation in the organization of credit of the first ordee, 
(Germain 1997: 71). Three main interrelated elements are highlighted here as 
the key features of the structural transformation that marked the American world 
financial order. 
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The chapter is divided into three main 'parts. Part I develops an 
explanation of New York as the key social space for world credit practices in the 
American world financial order. This illuminates the first, synchronic feature of 
the structural transformation that characterises the American world financial 
order. The predominant form of credit practices in the American world financial 
order contrasts sharply with earlier world financial orders. Capital market and 
bank lending forms of credit that had been predominant previously became 
secondary to bilateral and multilateral government transactions and corporate 
foreign direct investment (FDI). As such, long-term inter-governmental and 
corporate capital outflows from the US national political economy were a 
defining characteristic of the American world financial order. 
Part II moves to consider the position of New York's social forces in the 
relatively stable making and reproduction of the American world financial order. 
Relative stability in previous world financial orders has been shown to have 
rested on a coherent conjunction between the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of the order, reproduced largely through the civil and market 
authority of the social forces associated with the dominant WFC. Viewed in 
comparative historical terms, this illuminates two diachronic features of the 
structural transformation that characterises the American world financial order. 
First, informal authority in the American world financial order rested not with 
New York's social forces, but with an intersection of social forces associated 
with American industry and labour. As a result, world credit practices came to 
be organised within the context of an "embedded liberal" (Ruggie 1982) world 
view rather than the liberal world view of New York's social forces. Second, 
and reflecting embedded liberalism, the American world financial order was 
largely reproduced by formal authority exercised through US state, corporate 
and inter-state institutions. In short, the structures of power and authority within 
the American world financial order diverged considerably from those of 
previous world financial orders. Reflecting the subordinate and yet supportive 
role of New York's social forces within the structure of authority, it was what 
will be termed the 'Washington-New York axis' that reproduced relative 
stability in the American world financial order. The reproduction of the 
American world financial order by the Washington-New York axis rested on US 
state-society relations and the position of the US state in the structures of the 
wider world order. 
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In sum, Parts I and II argue that the relative stability of the American 
world financial order was reproduced through the Washington-New York axis 
that organised long-term US capital outflows, all resting on US state-society 
relations and their insertion into the structures of the wider world order. In the 
context of our inquiry into world financial orders and world financial centres, 
this raises important questions as to the position of New York as the WFC 
within the American world financial order. It is argued that given the 
transformation of the forms of credit, the significance of New York's standing 
as the key social space for those practices was more 'indirect' than the position 
of VvTCs in previous world financial orders. While New York remained the key 
social space for credit creation and the clearance of credit transactions, the 
allocation of credit was subject to the largely state-based structure of authority 
that characterised the reproduction of the American world financial order. As 
such, the authority of New York's social forces played a more subordinate role 
as part of the Washington-New York axis by underpinning state-based forms of 
authority in the reproduction of the American world financial order, than, for 
instance, that of London's social forces in the British world order. Concrete 
inquiry into the American world financial order reminds us, then, that the 
standing of a WFC within a world financial order - that is, whether as a key 
social space or as a social locus for the reproduction of an order - must itself be 
produced and reproduced as part of the order. 
Part III considers the unravelling of the American world financial order. 
The roots of the unravelling of the American world financial order are held to 
lay in two key interrelated structural contradictions within the order. First, as 
Robert Triffin famously identified in 1960 through the so-called 'Triffin 
dilemma', long-term US capital outflows could not be maintained alongside 
continued confidence in the value of the dollar in which they were denominated. 
US capital outflows manifested themselves in continual long-term balance of 
payments deficits that had to be maintained by foreign holdings of dollar- 
denominated assets. ' Second, the Washington-New York axis failed to 
articulate sufficiently a role for the authority of New York's social forces in the 
reproduction of the American world financial order. The authority of New 
1 Germain (1997: 7) provides a concise overview of Triffin's position - "He argued that 
continued US balance of payments deficits would create a dollar overhang that must inevitably 
outgrow US gold stocks and prompt a crisis in the fixed value of dollar related to gold. The 
solution to this problem became known as the 'Triffin Dilemma', on the basis that any attempt to 
narrow or eradicate the US balance of payments deficit would necessarily compromise the 
provision of credit to the international economy". 
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York's social forces was only supportive of the reproduction of the American 
world financial order while credit creation remained centralised in New York. 
The perceived shared interests of New York's social forces were not met by the 
American world financial order once the US state responded to the Triffin 
dilemma by imposing capital controls from 1963, limiting New York-centred 
credit practices. The structure of authority framing the organisation of world 
credit practices subsequently became decentralised, as formerly New York- 
centred credit practices became organised through the civil and market authority 
of the off-shore Euromarkets. 
The destabilising consequences of these two contradictions were 
intensified by US state policies which adopted unilateral capital controls and 
supported the emergent Euromarkets. US state policies themselves contributed 
to the unravelling of the American world financial order. This combination of 
contradictions and policies presented London's social forces with a structural 
opportunity to re-establish London as the key social space for Euromarket credit 
practices. The partial decentralisation of the American world financial order 
between Washington and New York on the one hand and the London-centred 
Euromarkets on the other heralded the gradual unravelling of the order during 
the 1960s. It was not until 1973-4 amidst the relative instability of the wider 
world order, the disintegration. of the Bretton Woods monetary order, and the 
liberalisation of US financial policy that the American world financial order 
finally collapsed. 
Part I- New York: Key Social Space 
In the context of the Great Depression and the Second World War, credit 
creation at a world scale remained limited throughout the 1930s and the first 
half of the 1940s. The fall of London from the pinnacle of the hierarchy of 
WFCs and the final collapse of the British world financial order amidst the crisis 
of 1931 had left New York, at the heart of the predominant US national political 
economy, as the most significant WFC. However, credit creation in New York 
lay virtually dormant, crippled by bad debts accumulated through a combination 
of the Wall Street crash and the crisis of 193 1. For example, 70% of the foreign 
credit created in New York between 1926 and 1929, excluding that allocated to 
Canada, became bad debt (Henwood 1997: 107). By 1936 three-quarters of all 
US loans to Latin America and half of those extended to Europe were in default 
(Frieden 1987: 51). 
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A relatively stable American world financial order only emerged after 
1947. The predominant form which world credit practices came to take 
contrasted sharply with the previously ascendant capital market and bank 
lending forms of credit. As Mendelsohn (1980: 53) notes, the world's capital 
markets played only "a residual role" in the American world financial order. 
While short-term commercial credit practices remained organised through the 
institutional channels of the financial markets, long-term sovereign and 
corporate credit practices centred in New York created credit that was 
effectively allocated outside America through inter-governmental transactions 
and US corporate FDL As Gill (1991: 284) asserts, "the system was driven by 
the supply of international liquidity in the form of US capital exports, overseas 
military expenditures, and direct transfers". As such, in comparison with 
previous world financial orders, these changes in the predominant form of world 
credit practices were representative of the broad structural transformation which 
marked the American world financial order. 
The transformation of the predominant form of long-term credit 
practices under the American world financial order rendered New York only 
'indirectly' significant as the key social space for world credit practices. 
Foreign sovereign credit was mediated by US state and inter-state institutions, 
tending to take the form of bilateral and multilateral aid and loans rather than 
more direct issues and loans in New York. ' In this sense, "the government 
defined itself, rather than Wall Street, as the world's central barW' (Hawley 
1987: 8). For instance, in raising capital for the Marshall Plan in 1947, the 
Truman administration issued government bills and bonds in New York which 
were purchased by US banks and institutional investors. Once created, the 
credit was allocated by the Economic Co-operation Administration. New 
York's financial market institutions, then, tended to occupy a subordinate 
position in the allocation of sovereign credit. 
Not dissimilarly to this somewhat indirect position as the key social 
space for sovereign credit practices, an "ambivalent relationship" (Germain 
1997: 81-2) existed between New York and US MNC FDI which effectively 
2 The limited significance of New York as a social space for the creation of foreign sovereign 
credit is also reflected in the combination of the regional orientation and circumscribed nature of 
those issues that did take place. For instance, of the $14 billion worth of foreign issues in New 
York between 1946 and 1963, over half were shared between Canadian borrowers and the 
World Bank (Mendelsohn 1980: 209). 
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dominated corporate credit provision world-wide. On the one hand, the 
prevalence of direct investment as opposed to large-scale foreign corporate 
issues, loans and portfolio investment weakened the significance of New York 
as a social space, ensuring that the subsequent development of New York as a 
WFC would be subject to competitive pressures from London and elsewhere 
(Germain 1997: 82-3). On the other hand, however, given both the centralisation 
of the headquarters of many US MNCs in New York (Sassen 1991) and the 
pivotal position of New York's commercial and investment banks and Stock 
Exchange in the provision of American corporate credit, the prevalence of US 
MNC FDI was accompanied by the development of extensive networks of New 
York-centred market institutions. In particular, as the scale of US MNC FDI 
increased, 
"Traditional methods, such as the use of an agency to represent interest 
abroad or a correspondent to deal with transactions, were no longer 
sufficient. In order to finance the multinationals, the banks were forced 
to follow their customers and set up branches or obtain direct stakes in 
banks in the countries where the former had subsidiaries. The 
multinationalization of banks followed upon the multinationalization of 
industry" (Born 1977: 307). ' 
In short, on the one hand, New York was "an international capital market only at 
one remove" (Mendelsohn 1980: 54). On the other hand, New York-centred 
market institutional networks predominated in the provision of corporate credit. 
New York tended to underpin rather than dominate the outflows of long-term 
sovereign and corporate capital from the United States that characterised the 
American world financial order. 
Forms of Credit 
Sovereign credit practices in the American world financial order 
effectively took forms that were new to peacetime, such as aid and military 
assistance. The allocation of sovereign credit came to be organised through 
inter-state institutions and bilateral inter-state loan agreements. The $15 billion 
3 By 1971, the thirty largest US financial market institutions had over one hundred foreign 
branches in Europe alone (Bom 1977: 307). Once affiliates are included, the true extent of New 
York-centred market institutional networks can be comprehended. For instance, between 1955 
and 1965 the number of overseas offices and affiliates of the market leader Citibank had tripled 
to 163 (Frieden 1987: 77). Further, New York-centred market institutions had undergone a 
period of concentration (for example, the 1955 merger between Chase National Bank and the 
Bank of Manhattan to create Chase Manhattan) from the immediate post-war years through to 
the mid-1950s which underpinned their world-wide dominance (Bom 1977: 308-9). 
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of aid provided by the Marshall Plan to the governments of Western Europe 
dominated long-term outflows of funds from the USA between 1947 and 1952. 
As such, the Marshall Plan can be seen as the defining feature of sovereign 
credit creating practices in the initial years of the American world financial 
order. Whether viewed as a fundamental factor in west European 
reconstruction, or as cementing an economic recovery that was already 
underway by providing 'offsetting finance' to relieve balance of payments 
problems, it is clear from the volume of Marshall aid that it formed a central 
plank of the response the dollar shortage during this period. 4 
Marshall aid was primary amongst the wider practices of the effective 
provision of sovereign credit by the US state. As Burk (1992: 365) posits, 
"Public rather than private money was now the fuel". Between 1947 and 1950 
alone, US government long-term aid totalled $18 billion, compared with $10.5 
billion of long-term private outflows (Germain 1997: 78). The domination of 
US state authority over sovereign credit creation also took the form of military 
expenditure and grants. The disproportionate share of the financing of western 
military security accounted for by the US throughout the Cold War provided, de 
facto, a source of credit for other western governments! For instance, between 
1951 and 1954, US grants and military supplies and services provided to other 
states totalled $11 billion. Meanwhile official purchases of foreign goods and 
services by the US military combined with the purchases of US military 
personnel stationed abroad to total a further $8 billion (Nadler, Heller & 
Shipman 1955/1994: 195). 
While Marshall aid and US military grants and expenditures were 
significant, other state-based capital flows organised through the US-influenced 
4 In challenging the orthodox view that stresses the fundamental contribution of Marshall aid to 
west European economic reconstruction (see, for example, Kindleberger 1987a), Milward 
(1984) has highlighted that recovery was already underway. This was based upon high rates of 
domestic capital formation and the booming West German political economy providing both 
markets for European exports and relieving European dependence upon imports of US capital 
goods. In this context, the effect of the Marshall plan was to provide 'offsetting finance' which 
resolved balance of payments problems generated by a thirst for US imports. Helleiner 
(1994: 58-62) builds on Milward's (1984) revisionism by highlighting the large volumes of west 
European capital flight to the US which coexisted alongside Marshall aid. Hence, for Helleiner 
(1994: 58-9), "the economic significance of Marshall Plan aid was, in effect, simply to 
compensate for the US failure to institute controls on inflows of hot money from Western 
Europe". 
5 Of the total increases of US GNP between 1950 and 1969,15% were accounted for by defence 
spending. This was more than twice the level of the equivalent figures for Western Europe's 
major national political economies (Brett 1983: 164). 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) were also important sources of sovereign 
credit during the American world financial order. ' For example, between 1947 
and 1954, the IMF made a total 107 loans to the value of $2 billion to provide 
36 countries experiencing trade imbalances with offsetting finance (Nadler, 
Heller & Shipman 1955/1994: 195-6). By the 1960s, offsetting finance provided 
through the IMF and co-ordinated through the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) was extended to cover imbalances generated by short-term capital flows as 
well as trade (Helleiner 1994: 96-9). In contrast, the World Bank, which 
remained reliant upon private capital markets for credit, proved an inadequate 
source of long-term sovereign credit (Walter 1993: 159; Frieden 1987: 63). In 
short, during the American world financial order, sovereign credit creation was 
dominated by capital outflows from the US political economy. Allocation was 
organised through US state institutions, such as the Economic Co-operation 
Administration under the Marshall Plan, and US-influenced inter-state 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. 
From the middle period of the 1950s, the long-term capital outflows 
from the US political economy that characterised the American world financial 
order became predominantly private in nature. Nadler, Heller and Shipman 
(1955/1994: 196) have calculated that by the end of 1953, almost 60% of total 
net capital outflows from the US were private. Private long-term capital 
outflows from the US were dominated by US MNC FDI, in effect contrasting 
sharply with the provision of corporate credit under previous world financial 
orders. Between 1950 and 1954, US MNC FDI totalled $5.4 billion compared 
with portfolio investment valued at $1.2 billion over the same period (Nadler, 
Heller & Shipman 1955/1994: 196). US MNC FDI continued to be the major 
source of US long-term capital outflows throughout the American world 
financial order, with net outflows growing to $7717 million by 1971 (Germain 
1997: 79; Cooper 1968: 82). That the effective extension of foreign corporate 
credit took the form of US MNC FDI as opposed to bank lending, foreign 
securities issues or portfolio investment was a result of a range of factors: the 
inter-war experience of bond defaults; the erection of a common tariff around 
the European Common Market; the nature of US corporate and commercial 
expansion driven by Tordist' mass production and mass consumption 
dynamics; the restoration of currency convertibility from 1958 which guaranteed 
the unrestricted repatriation of FDI earnings; and the unilateral imposition of 
6 On US influence over the IMF via the voting structure that gave the US a veto, see Frieden 
(1987: 65-6). 
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capital controls in the United States from 1963 that both increased the costs of 
portfolio forms of investment and further advantaged FDI as a form of 
investment which rendered close state-based regulation problematic (Germain 
1997: 79-80,124; Hawley 1987: 45-86; Cooper 1968: 84-90; Frieden 1987: 76). 
The expansion of US MNCs, then, stood alongside the more state-based forms 
of sovereign credit provision as one of the major sources of the long-term US 
capital outflows that were pivotal in the American world financial order. 
In line with the structural transformation of the predominant form of 
credit practices in the American world financial order, clearing practices during 
the first decade of the order were also organised through state and inter-state 
institutions to a much greater extent than previously. Part and parcel of the first 
round of Marshall aid allocated to western Europe in 1948 was the 
establishment of an intra-European clearance mechanism called the European 
Payments Union (EPU). The EPU had been proposed by the US Economic Co- 
operation Administration as a way of moving beyond strict bilateral accounting 
payments between national central banks to a set of multilateral arrangements 
(Germain 1997: 83-4). The EPU, organised through the BIS and the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEED), gave monthly 
bilateral accounts of each member state and managed an initial $350 million 
worth of revolving credit facilities provided by the US state to assist deficit 
countries (Born 1977: 298). The EPU had the effect of establishing par values 
between European currencies and the provision of credit as revolving facilities 
constituted "a genuine addition to international liquidity" (Cooper 1968: 39-49). 
As such, Walter (1993: 162) describes the consequences of the EPU as "a major 
step in the liberalisation of trade and payments within Europe and beyond". 
It was only with the adoption of full currency convertibility by the major 
west European states from 1958 that clearing practices came to take a similar 
form to that which had characterised previous world financial orders (Cooper 
1968: 40). London's position as the principal European financial centre and the 
continued denomination of around 40% of world trade in sterling ensured that 
the clearance of European transactions once again became centralised in London 
(Nadler, Heller & Shipman 1955/1994). However, given the continued pivotal 
position of the US political economy in world trade and the associated 
institutionalisation of the US dollar as 'world money' (Strange 1976) under the 
Bretton Woods arrangements, New York remained the key social space for 
clearing practices during the American world financial order (Germain 
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1997: 85). Significantly, even with the emergence from the late 1950s of 
Euromarket' credit practices centralised in London, the dollar-denomination of 
this credit ensured that these transactions to had eventually to be cleared through 
New York (Klopstock 1973/1994: 215). ' 
Knowledge and Technology 
A significant factor in New York's standing as the key social space for 
world credit practices was the centralisation of knowledge as a material resource 
upon which credit creating practices must draw. The centralisation of 
knowledge in New York was an outcome of the overlapping of four more or less 
formalised institutional networks. First, New York stood as "the commercial 
heart of an expanding world economy" (Germain 1997: 87) throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, a commercial centre linking the most significant national political 
economy to the world economy (Shefter 1993). As a consequence, commercial 
networks centralised in New York provided a welter of knowledge on the 
conditions of world trade. Second, commercial networks were closely related to 
the expanding institutional networks of the many US MNCs based in New York. 
These provided a steady inflow of knowledge regarding political and economic 
developments in the wider world order and, in particular, informed world-wide 
corporate investment strategies. Third, the networks of New York's financial 
market institutions themselves ensured a centralisation of knowledge in New 
York. While in part this was related to the roving pre-eminence of New York- 
centred commercial banks such as Citibank, their increasingly multinational 
institutional networks also led to the accessing of knowledge centralised in other 
key banking centres such as London (Reed 1981). In particular, these financial 
market institutional networks provided US MNCs with knowledge of the 
economic, legal and regulatory conditions of foreign political economies that 
facilitated there multinational production strategies (Nadler, Heller & Shipman 
7 The term 'Euromarket' is used here as a generic term to describe offshore finance, that is, 
credit creating practices which take place beyond the reach of the regulations which apply in the 
'home' national political economy of the currency in which the credit created is denominated. 
Within the Euromarkets, distinctions are made between 'Eurocurrency markets' (offshore 
money-markets), 'Eurobonds' (offshore bond issues and trading) and 'Eurocredits' (offshore 
bank lending) (Mendelsohn 1980). What distinguishes the Euromarkets is that while banks have 
accepted deposits in non-local currencies for centuries, credit denominated in non-local 
currencies (especially US dollars which dominate the Euromarkets) is created instead of 
returning deposits to their respective money-markets (Strange 1976: 180). 
8 As Bareau (1979: 57) has noted, "it is self-evident that for every such 'offshore' deposit there 
must be, at the end of the line of re-depositors, a deposit with a bank in the country of the 
currency's origin". 
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1955/1994: 198-206). Fourth, the centralisation of a wide range of significant 
civil, state and inter-state institutions in New York also manifested itself in a 
centralisation of knowledge. These included the NYSE (Buck 1992), the Wall 
Street Journal and New York Times (Parsons 1989), the US Federal Reserve, 
and the IMF and World Bank. 
Capital 
Given that one of the defining characteristics of the American world 
financial order was outflows of long-term capital from the United States, it is 
clear that credit creation rested in large part on the capital accumulated in the 
US national political economy as a material resource. US predominance in the 
world economy was based upon a combination of the competitive advantages 
accrued from labour productivity, the organisational and technological 
leadership associated with the techniques of Tordist' mass production, and the 
sheer size of the US political economy (Rupert 1995). Consequently, in 1950, 
the GDP of the United Kingdom was less than a quarter of US GDP, while that 
of France and Germany was less than one-fifth (Walter 1993: 153). This 
predominance translated into the centrality of the US political economy in world 
trade. 
Massive volumes of capital accumulated in the US political economy did 
become centralised in New York, providing an essential material resource for 
New York-centred credit creation. 9 However, given the sheer size of the 
American political economy and its greater self-sufficiency when compared, for 
instance, with the British political economy, the tendency for American capital 
to become centralised in New York as the national financial centre was to some 
extent undercut (Mendelsohn 1980: 205-6; Helleiner 1993a: 220; Ingham 
1994: 41). This contrasts with the greater centralisation in London of capital 
accumulated in the British political economy under the British world financial 
order. As such, Mendelsohn (1980: 205) suggests that the more even 
distribution of accumulated capital in the American political economy acted as a 
structural constraint that may have manifested itself in the more 'indirect' 
significance of New York as the key social space in the American world 
financial order. 
9 The centralisation of the capital accumulated in the US political economy in New York is 
reflected in the 'depth' of the New York capital markets. During the American world financial 
order new securities issues valued at between $50 and $100 million were routinely absorbed in 
New York, compared with between $30 and $45 million in London which was New York's 
leading challenger at the apex of the hierarchy of WFCs (Cooper 1968: 131-2). 
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Further, and perhaps more significantly, a greater centralisation of 
capital in New York was mitigated against by the structures of power and 
authority in the American world financial order. This can be clearly seen in the 
brief period between 1958 and 1963 when New York did appear to be 
developing a position of more 'direct' significance as the centre for world credit 
practices in the American world financial order. On the basis of an increased 
centralisation of capital in New York and buoyed by the restoration of currency 
convertibility by the major west European states from 1958, New York-centred 
foreign securities issues, portfolio investment and bank lending began to 
expand. As Helleiner (1994: 85) has noted, in this period "New York's bankers 
... had finally achieved the position of 
lender to the world ...... In 1960, 
US 
banks had $8 billion worth of foreign loans outstanding and loans to the rest of 
the world were running at around $1 billion a year. Foreign bond issues added 
another $600 million a year. ' By 1963, new foreign bond issues and lending by 
US banks totalled over $2 billion (Frieden 1987: 77,84). Net US foreign 
portfolio investment accelerated dramatically during this period. Having 
averaged just $0.3 billion a year between 1950 and 1953 and reaching $1.1 
billion by 1957, net US foreign portfolio investment exploded to $4.1 billion by 
1964 (Cooper 1968: 114). 
The material basis for this expansion of foreign lending was an increased 
centralisation of domestic and foreign capital in New York. The combination of 
the restructuring of American finance - leading to the rising profile of 
institutional investors - and a boom in Wall Street throughout the 1950s led to 
increased amounts of the capital accumulated in the US political economy 
becoming centralised in New York (Buck 1992: 182). The boom on Wall Street 
lasted for much of the 1950s, with 1954 standing out as one of the great bull 
market years in the history of the NYSE as stock prices rose by 40% and finally 
surpassed the levels of 1929 (Burk 1992). The capital upon which the boom 
was based was linked to a restructuring of American finance that saw the rise to 
prominence of institutional investors. By the end of the 1950s institutional 
investors accounted for one-quarter of trading on the NYSE, with the value of 
10 Mendelsohn (1980: 54) suggests that the comparative weakness of foreign securities issues in 
New York in this period reflected some US investor resistance, the tough disclosure 
requirements imposed on securities issues by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
authoritative scrutiny of New York's credit rating agencies Moodys and Standard & Poors. 
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pension fund holdings of stock alone increasing from $1 billion to $12 billion 
between 1953 and 1959 (Bernstein 1992: 109-10). 
Following the restoration of convertibility by the major western 
European states and the associated removal of capital controls on current 
accounts, the 'deposit-compelling power' of New York began to be felt as short- 
term European capital in particular became centralised in New York in search of 
profitable returns (Cooper 1968: 132-4). " The holding of working balances in 
New York by west European central banks, financial market institutions and 
corporations meant that short-term capital outflows from Europe to the US far 
exceeded counter short-term flows during this period. Such deposit-compelling 
power had formed a significant aspect of the material basis of London's position 
as the WFC during the British world financial order. 
This brief period of more direct significance for New York as the key 
social space for world credit practices was eroded from 1963 by the imposition 
by the US state of a series of capital controls which restricted New York-centred 
world credit practices. In short, the indirect significance of New York as a key 
social space for much of the American world financial order was largely an 
outcome of structures of power and authority that, for the most part, restricted its 
role. As Mendelsohn (1980: 208) notes of the period from the 1930s through to 
the 1970s, "New York dominated the international capital market whenever it 
was allowed to and whenever there was an international capital market to be 
dominated". An explanation of the position of New York in the making and 
reproduction of the American world financial order, then, requires greater 
attention to the diachronic dimension of that order. The changed form of world 
credit practices in the American world financial order and the more indirect 
significance that this implied for New York as the key social space needs to be 
related to the diachronic realm of social power relations which shape historical 
structural change. 
11 The notion of the 'deposit-compelling power' of a WFC is taken from Brown (1940: 154). 
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Part II - The Making and Reproduction of the American World Financial 
Order 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the British world financial order in 
1931, the prospects for a New York-based, liberal American world financial 
order that mirrored the previous British world financial order were bleak. 
Within US state-society, the response to the Wall Street Crash and the 
Depression that followed was a series of legislative moves that increased state- 
based regulatory authority over credit creation and formed a major plank of the 
'New Deal'. ` As Buck (1992: 152) asserts, "These were stormy times in the 
relationship between the financial community and Washington, as both sides felt 
their way in the new em of sharply increased Federal regulation of markets". 
Across Europe a similar societal and legislative backlash against 'open' and 
'liberal' approaches to finance formed part of a reversal of macroeconomic 
policy priorities. The maintenance of an international balance as an important 
priority under the influence of liberal economic orthodoxy now took second 
place to the creation and maintenance of high levels of domestic employment 
under Keynesian policies. The use of capital controls alongside trade 
protectionism in support of the new priorities of what Cox (1987) has termed the 
"welfare-nationalist" form of state became, for the first time, a permanent 
feature of the peacetime structures of the world financial orders (Helleiner 
1993: 22-3). That the organisation of banking and finance within the confines of 
'closed' national political economies could not be reconciled with the creation 
of credit at a world-scale was reflected in the failure of inter-state agreements, 
such as the 1933 London Monetary and Economic Conference, to address the 
shortfalls in world-wide credit creation. 
The failure to establish a relatively stable American world financial 
order continued into the immediate post-war years. This view contrasts with 
those who cast the American world financial order as part of the liberal 
international economic order or 'Bretton Woods system' established at the 
Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 (Krasner 1976). It is supported by writers 
12 The Banking Act of 1933 (commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act) divorced deposit 
taking by commercial banks from investment banking. The Securities Act of 1933 required that 
all new securities issues were registered and that basic disclosure procedures were followed to 
increase investor protection and transparency. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
tightened regulation at the Federal level by establishing a new regulatory institution - the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - and empowering the Federal Reserve to regulate 
stock exchange profit margin rates. 
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such as Helleiner (1993,1994) who, concerned primarily with the organisation 
of world credit practices during the post-war world order, highlight the 
unilateral use of capital controls as one of the defining features of that order. In 
this sense, then, to cast the American world financial order as part and parcel of 
a liberal world order established under the auspices of the 'Bretton Woods 
system' is misleading. 
Equally, however, the Bretton Woods agreement did not institutionalise 
a relatively stable alternative to liberal economic orthodoxy in the American 
world financial order. Informed by the Wilsonian tradition and Keynesian 
economics, the US delegation at Bretton Woods led by Harry Dexter White 
clearly identified the rise of trade protectionism in the 1930s as exacerbating the 
Great Depression and leading to an escalation of inter-state conflict which 
culminated in the Second World War (Maier 1987: 122-3; Leyshon & Thrift 
1997: 261). " White and the chief British negotiator, John Maynard Keynes, 
were united in attempting to establish a multilateral framework for trade and 
payments while at the same time retaining a large degree of national 
macroeconomic policy-making autonomy. "' However, Keynes' proposals to 
include within the agreement the subordination of the freedom of capital to the 
multilateral framework for trade and payments through co-operative capital 
controls, and a genuinely multilateral framework for credit creation under the 
auspices of his 'Clearing Union', were both rejected by the US delegation. 
Consequently, the Bretton Woods agreement failed to address sufficiently the 
organisation of world credit practices in the post-war era. 
The US national political economy emerged from World War II as the 
dominant creditor economy to such an extent that the majority of capital goods 
necessary for European reconstruction could only be imported from the US. 
After the war the European political economies were in no position to generate 
large amounts of foreign exchange and, consequently, there was a massive 
demand for dollar-denominated credit to pay for imports from the USA. " 
13 The Wilsonian commitment to free trade had previously been confirmed amongst the allies by 
the Atlantic Charter (1941) that had established trade liberalisation as amongst their war aims 
(Frieden 1987: 61-2). 
14 For excellent overviews of the negotiations at Bretton Woods and the commitments embodied 
in the agreement, see Ruggie (1982) and Helleiner (1993). 
15 Between 1946 and 1949, foreign countries purchased $72 billion worth of US goods and 
services (not including military goods shipped under aid programs), while the value of US 
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However, under the Bretton Woods agreement, little had been done to address 
this 'dollar shortage' (Walter 1993: 160; Germain 1997: 70). Credit was to be 
provided by bilateral loans between creditor and debtor states, inter-state 
institutions with insufficient resources, and through the usual channels of the 
institutional networks of the principal financial market institutions. Given that 
market institutional networks had been shattered by war and that world credit 
practices remained severely restricted by wartime capital controls and their 
likely continuation, the Bretton Woods agreement fell far short of providing the 
requirements for a relatively stable American world financial order (Brett 
1983: 38). It was only with a significant departure from the Bretton Woods 
arrangements by US policy-makers that the foundations for a relatively stable 
American world financial order were finally laid. This took the form of 
Marshall Plan aid, granted amidst a perceived deepening of the crisis of west 
European reconstruction and a solidifying of Cold War tensions 
In the course of 1947, with the granting of Marshall Plan aid by the US 
state to the governments of western Europe, the foundations which were to 
become the defining characteristics of the American financial order were finally 
laid. " Over the next twenty-five years the American world financial order 
assumed a structural form which was "a complete reversal of matters in 
comparison with the post First World War period" (Burk 1992: 365) and, as 
such, marked the fall from ascendancy of classical liberal economic orthodoxy 
in guiding understandings of the organisation of world finance. State-based 
forms of authority in the organisation of credit practices ensured that a key 
feature of the American world financial order was its "quasi-public form" 
(Germain 1997: 7 1). Under the American world financial order, civil and market 
forms of authority were largely subordinated to state-based authority, especially 
that of the United States. The main mechanism for the subordination of civil 
and market forms of authority to the state-based authority was the unilateral 
imports of foreign goods and services over the same period was less than half this amount 
(Nadler, Heller & Shipman 1955/1994: 194). 
16 The view that the foundations of the American world financial order did not become 
established until 1947 is both informed and supported by Cerny (1993: 12-13). He has identified 
three sets of beliefs as coming to dominate in US policy circles from the 1930s. First, the 
Wilsonian belief in free trade as contributing towards world-wide economic growth and peace. 
Second, the need to institutionalise these beliefs officially at an international level. Third, an 
awareness of the need to use the authority and resources of the United States to underpin and 
guarantee these institutions. The final belief did not take root in concrete form until the 
extension of Marshall aid. 
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adoption of capital controls, both by the majority of the major states throughout 
the American world financial order and by the United States after 1963. " 
Informal Authority 
In previous world financial orders, the material, social and political 
power of the social forces of the predominant WFC had manifested itself in their 
'informal authority' - that is, their capacity to propagate the predominant world 
view which guides understandings of the manner in which world credit practices 
come to be organised, leading to the centralisation of the ideational structures of 
successive world financial orders in the principal WFC. However, under the 
American world financial order, the "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1982) that 
characterised the order contrasted with the liberal orthodoxy of New York's 
social forces. " As Hawley (1987: 7) notes, capital was not accorded the same 
status as, and became subordinated to, movements of goods and services 
through the use of unilateral capital controls. As such, the American world 
financial order was characterised not by the liberal principles that were applied 
in trade. 
Embedded liberalism became established in the American financial order 
only after 1947, as New York's social forces continued to hold informal 
authority in the immediate post-war years. While a broad-based consensus had 
existed in US policy-making circles with the regard to the significance of 
multilateral exchange and currency convertibility, this did not extend to the 
organisation of world finance (Maier 1987: 124-34,136-8; Frieden 1987: 64). 
New York's social forces sought orthodox liberal solutions to post-war 
reconstruction which, given the strength of the US national political economy, 
would place New York-centred market institutional networks firmly at the heart 
of world-wide credit creation. The views and objectives of New York's social 
17 Even after the fixed exchange rate monetary system became operative following the 
restoration of currency convertibility by western governments from 1958, unilateral capital 
controls tended to remain in place on capital accounts. These prevented the purchase of foreign 
securities and the making of foreign loans. The only exception was West Germany that restored 
convertibility on both current and capital account. Having restored currency convertibility in 
1964, Japan retained even more restrictive controls as all current and capital account 
transactions were carried out through state institutions or authorised foreign exchange banks 
(Helleiner 1994: 71-5). 
18 What Ruggie (1982: 393) describes as the "essence" of "embedded liberalism" was that 
"unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the 
liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon 
domestic interventionism". 
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forces contrasted with the 'New Dealers' of the US State Department and 
Treasury (Cox 1987: 213-4; Henwood 1997: 93; Maier 1987). Despite the 
increased regulation of their activities in the mid-1930s, New York's social 
forces had retained sufficient social power and political power institutionalised 
through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to ensure that "the social and 
economic reforms of the New Deal had lacked ideological consistency and 
programatic coherence" (Ruggie 1982: 394). The pattern of ideological 
inconsistency and programmatic incoherence of the US New Deal became 
largely mirrored in the Bretton Woods arrangements for credit creation at a 
world-scale. Through an important amendment to the original Bretton Woods 
proposals of White and Keynes and in conjunction with their counterparts in 
western Europe, New York's social forces succeeded in preventing US policy- 
makers from adopting unilateral capital controls at Bretton Woods. As a 
consequence, rights to permanent capital controls and US involvement in a more 
co-operative form of capital control program were also precluded (Helleiner 
1993: 30-37; Gill 1991: 284; Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 283). The 'embedded 
liberal' world financial order initially promised at Bretton Woods proved a false 
dawn. 
The continued position of precedence enjoyed by the orthodox liberal 
approach of New York's social forces to the organisation of world finance in the 
immediate post-war years, and its deficiency in the face of the scale of economic 
dislocation emanating from the war, can be clearly seen in the failure of the 
British Loan of 1945-6. Huge sterling balances held in London by foreign 
governments and colonial firms had been frozen at the outset of the war. Given 
the wartime debts incurred by the British state and the inability of the crippled 
British political economy to generate sufficient foreign exchange to fulfil her 
obligations, unfreezing these balances in peacetime was highly problematic 
(Bom 1977: 299-300; Walter 1993: 158). The British state agreed an emergency 
loan of $5 billion in December 1945, three-quarters of which was to be provided 
by the US and the remainder by Canada, alongside an agreement to cancel 
British war debts. In return, Britain accepted the condition that sterling 
convertibility would be restored by July 1947. Such a condition had been a 
central plank of the 'Key Currency Plan' that the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York had put forward, with the full support of New York's social forces, as an 
alternative to the Bretton Woods framework. Underlying the Key Currency Plan 
was the assumption that rapid re-establishment of sterling convertibility would 
allow London to re-emerge as a centre for the creation of the credit necessary for 
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European reconstruction (Frieden 1987: 65). The restoration of sterling 
convertibility in July 1947 proved disastrous. Capital flight prompted efforts to 
prop up the value pound which, combined with purchases of imports, ensured 
that the loan was all but frittered away and that Britain was forced to impose 
exchange controls and import restrictions (Born 1977: 300-1). The British loan 
served to illustrate the essential inadequacy of the Bretton Woods arrangements 
and the orthodoxy of New York's social forces for the provision of credit in the 
post-war context. 
The emergence of the American world financial order as "a new phase in 
international finance" (Nadler, Heller & Shipman 1955/1994) rested on the 
sidelining of the orthodoxy of New York's social forces within US state-society. 
In addition to the fiasco of the British loan, several other factors brought about 
the disintegration-reintegration of social forces within US state-society that 
underpinned the change in US financial policy towards the embedded liberalism 
of the Marshall Plan. The consequence of the war for the national political 
economies of Western Europe was an economic and political crisis of 
reconstruction that deepened in 1947. Constrained by welfare-nationalist forms 
of state-society relations, west European governments seemed to have little 
choice but to sacrifice their tentative commitment to the emerging multilateral 
framework of trade and payments in favour of 'closed' solutions to 
reconstruction (Brett 1983: 162; Germain 1997: 70-1). In US state-society, 
perceptions that the Bretton Woods arrangements were in jeopardy combined 
with fears of a threat to US interests by the Soviet Union, as the contours of the 
Cold War began to solidify under the Truman Doctrine, to produce a shift in 
state-society relations (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 284; Frieden 1987: 67-70; Maier 
1987: 139). An unlikely internationalist coalition of US social forces emerged 
uniting industrialists, labour, New Dealers, liberal internationalists and forces of 
the right concerned with the perceived Soviet threat. New York's social forces 
were unable to prevent the displacement of liberal economic orthodoxy over US 
foreign economic policy in the face of such a coalition. " The granting and 
organisation of Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe finally marked the 
application of the principles of embedded liberalism to the American world 
financial order. 
19 In addition to the impact upon the organisation of the American world financial order, the 
manner in which the crisis of post-war economic reconstruction and the Cold War resonated with 
changes in US foreign economic policy effected other areas. For instance, by 1948 the anti- 
monopoly thrust of much post-1945 US policy had been dropped (Maier 1987: 132-4). 
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Wider World Order 
Embedded liberalism legitimated the exercise of formal authority 
through US state institutions in Washington. The position of these institutions 
at the forefront of the reproduction of relative stability in the American world 
financial order also rested upon and reflected the insertion of US state-society 
into the wider world order. The wider world order itself was characterised by 
the bi-polarity of the Cold War, with the western sphere distinguished by the 
Pax Americana. As a consequence, US policy-makers sought to maintain an 
(open', liberal world order in the western sphere where US business could 
dominate and prosper, while simultaneously protecting that sphere from Soviet 
domination. The Par Americana itself was distinguished not just by a simple 
predominance of US material resources (Keohane 1984: 37), but by an 
internationalisation of US state-society relations across the western sphere (Cox 
1987: 211-268; Rupert 1995: 57). The processes of internationalisation were 
mediated by existing welfare-nationalist forms of state in the western sphere 
which were established in the course of the 'great transformation' of the 1930s 
and '40s (Polanyi 1944; Maier 1987). As Ruggie (1982: 388) has noted, 
"The extension of the suffrage and the emergence of working-class political 
constituencies, parties, and even governments was responsible in part; but 
demands for social protection were very nearly universal, coming from all sides 
of the political spectrum and from all ranks of the social hierarchy (with the 
possible exception of orthodox financial circles). ... the post-war international 
economic order would have to reflect this change in state-society relations if the 
calamities of the interwar period were not to recur". 
The Cold War and Pax Americana structures of the wider world order 
had, then, a considerable impact on the organisation of the American financial 
order (Walter 1993; Germain 1997: 71-2). US state-directed flows of sovereign 
credit, whether in the form of aid or military expenditure, tended to have 
conditions attached that sought to reinforce the liberal multilateral framework 
for trade and payments and the Pax Americana more broadly. For instance, 
attached to Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe was conditional membership of 
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which worked 
towards the liberalisation of intra-European trade (Cooper 1968: 39; Cox 
1987: 214-5; Rupert 1995: 58). Further, the structures of the wider world order 
also framed the distribution of long-term US corporate capital outflows. 
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Outflows of US MNC FDI into Latin America, Africa and the former colonial 
areas of Asia such as South Korea and Taiwan were backed by informal 
guarantees of US military might and direct interventionism (Augelli & Murphy 
1993; Gills 1994). 
Formal Authority 
The principles of embedded liberalism contributed to and helped to 
legitimise the partial displacement of the more 'formal authority' of New York's 
social forces. Embedded liberalism underpinned a largely-state based structure 
of authority in the reproduction of the American world financial order, leaving 
the civil and market institutions centralised in New York to play a subordinate 
and yet supportive role. Particularly in the first decades of the American world 
financial order, the US Treasury, State Department and Economic Co-operation 
Administration stood at the apex of the order, effectively managing and 
manipulating world credit practices (Cox 1987: 300; Helleiner 1994). While 
often created through the civil and market institutions of New York, the 
effective allocation of long-term sovereign credit was subject to the authority of 
US state institutions. US state influence over the IMF also ensured that its 
formal authority extended into the provision of offsetting finance (Frieden 
1987: 65). In contrast to the firm centralisation of authority in London under the 
British world financial order, then, a 'Washington-New York axis' in which the 
former predominated characterised the structure of authority under the American 
world financial order. 20 
In sum, alongside the eventual adoption of the Bretton Woods 
framework by the major western states, the relative stability of the American 
world financial order was reproduced through the largely state-based structure of 
authority of the Washington-New York axis which organised long-term US 
capital outflows, all resting on US state-society and its insertion into the 
structures of the wider world order. The material (capital, knowledge and 
technology), ideational (embedded liberalism) and institutional (US state, US 
MNCs, inter-state and New York-centred civil and market) forces of the 
American world financial order were broadly centralised in the US state and 
20 The notion of a 'Washington-New York axis' is an attempt to capture the interdependent 
nature of state, civil and market authority under the American world financial order while 
recognising that US state authority centralised in Washington predominated. The roots of the 
notion are in a reversal of Shefter (1993: 11) who talks of a post-war "New York-Washington 
Axis", as "... New York and Washington were complementary, not competing, centers of power 
during the New Deal and the post-war decadee' (Shefter 1993: 15). 
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economy. The coherent conjunction generated by the centralisation of these 
forces in the US state and economy was reproduced by the 'Washington-New 
York axis'. Drawing on the material resources of the US economy and 
informed and legitimated by an embedded liberal world view, US state and 
societal forces reproduced the American world financial order through a largely 
state-based structure of authority. US state, corporate and inter-state institutions 
exercised formal authority in manipulating the organisation of the long-term 
capital outflows from the US national political economy which marked the 
American world financial order. Within this structure of authority, the authority 
of New York's social forces played a subordinate and yet supportive role. 
Part III - The Unravelling of the American World Financial Order: The 
Rebirth of London 
The roots of the unravelling of the American world financial order lay in 
two main interrelated contradictions that struck right at the heart of the manner 
in which the order was reproduced. First, as Robert Triffin highlighted, the 
reliance of the American world financial order on long-term US capital outflows 
could not be maintained alongside continued confidence in the value of the 
dollar. Outflows manifested themselves in continual long-term balance of 
payments deficits that could only be maintained by foreign holdings of dollar- 
denominated assets. Second, the largely state-based structure of authority of the 
Washington-New York axis failed to articulate sufficiently a role for the 
authority of New York's social forces. The authority of New York's social 
forces was only supportive of the reproduction of the American world financial 
order while credit creation remained centralised in New York. Once the 
perceived self-interests of New York's social forces were undermined by the 
imposition of US capital controls in 1963, state, civil and market forms of 
authority no longer displayed the interdependent coherence necessary for the 
stable reproduction of the American world financial order. 
These two contradictions were exacerbated and their destabilising 
consequences intensified by US state policies that actually contributed to the 
unravelling of the American world financial order. Taken together, the main 
contradictions of the American world financial order combined with the 
adoption of unilateral capital controls and support for the emergent Euromarkets 
by the US state to present London's social forces with a structural opportunity to 
re-establish London as a key social space for credit creation. The 
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decentralisation of the American world financial order between Washington and 
New York on the one hand and the London-centred Euromarkets on the other 
heralded the gradual unravelling of the order during the 1960s. It was not until 
1973-4 amidst increased relative instability in the wider world order, the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, and the 
liberalisation of US financial policies, however, that the final remnants of the 
American world financial order were blown away. 
The first contradiction which marked the American world financial order 
lay in the reliance of the order on the large volumes of long-term capital 
outflows from the USA and, therefore, on the ability of the US to run a 
continual long-term balance of payments deficit. Given the predominance of the 
US political economy in the world economy and the widespread adoption of 
unilateral capital controls which restricted other potential sources of 
international liquidity, the relative stability of the American world financial 
order was marked by US exports of long-term capital that provided economies 
with the means to purchase the products of US producers. Long-term US capital 
outflows manifested themselves in continual long-term balance of payments 
deficits. These were effectively financed by the willingness of foreign central 
banks to hold dollars as reserves and of individuals and firms to transact their 
business in dollars (Hawley 1987; Cooper 1968: 42-3). As Hawley (1987: 8 
original emphasis) notes, "These de facto loans by foreign governments, 
individuals, and firms transformed the United States into a defacto central bank 
able to create global liquidity, promote trade expansion, and simultaneously run 
a long-ten-n payments deficit". In short, as the effective demand for dollar- 
denominated credit increased in a world economy experiencing unprecedented 
levels of growth, so to did the US deficit. 
While confidence in the convertibility of the dollar into gold remained, 
so to did the willingness of foreigners to hold dollar-denominated assets. 
However, from the early 1960s confidence in the value of the dollar began to 
slowly evaporate, reflected in a series of speculative attacks, and with it the 
willingness of foreigners to hold dollars. As Ingham (1994: 44) posits, in 
contrast to the London-centred British world financial order, under the 
American world financial order "Liquidity and confidence were inversely 
related ...... The creation of this 
dangerous 'dollar overhang' by US capital 
outflows was recognised in the early 1960s by Robert Triffin in his reports to the 
US Congress (Ingham 1994: 44). While rebuilding confidence in the US dollar 
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and ultimately in the system of fixed exchange rates required a reduction in the 
long-term US deficit, this would effectively undermine the US long-term capital 
outflows organised through the relative stable American world financial order. 
The gradual realisation of this contradiction in the American world 
financial order resulted itself from a combination of the dynamics of "the 
inconstant geography of capitalisnf' (Storper & Walker 1989) with the nature of 
US state-society relations and their insertion into the wider world order. The 
continuation of the long-term US capital outflows rested upon the continued 
dominance of the US political economy within the world economy (Brett 
1983: 163; Swyngedouw 1996: 141). While the US political economy continued 
to dwarf the other major industrial economies well into the 1970s (Walter 
1993: 190), by the 1960s German and Japanese economic growth was outpacing 
American economic growth. This manifested itself in an increase in levels of 
US imports that placed ftu-ther pressures on US balance of payments. For 
instance, during the 1960s the percentage of imported automobiles in the US 
increased from 4% to 17% and consumer electronics from 4% to 31% (Rupert 
1995: 177). 
Alternative policy options to capital controls for alleviating the pressures 
on US balance of payments would not have to undermined the US long-term 
capital outflows which marked the American world financial order. However, 
such alternatives were constrained by US state-society relations and their 
insertion into the structures of the wider world order. Policies aimed at 
restructuring the US political economy to encourage exports and dampen 
imports would have entailed large wage cuts. Such restructuring would have 
constituted a direct challenge to the welfare-nationalist form of state and "the 
politics of productivity" (Maier 1987) which characterised US state-society 
relations. Cutbacks in military expenditure against the backdrop of US Cold 
War aspirations were equally unattractive (Calleo 1982). In the light of these 
constraints, a capital controls program was undertaken from 1963 that attempted 
to restrict US capital outflows. 
Ingham's (1994) comparison of the British and American world financial 
orders is suggestive of a second and related contradiction in the American world 
financial order; that is, that the state-based structure of authority that 
characterised the reproduction of the American world financial order failed to 
integrate sufficiently state, civil and market forms of authority in the 
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reproduction of the order. In Ingham's (1994: 45) terms, there was "a basic 
dislocation of state and market in the Bretton Woods system ...... While civil 
and market authority within the Washington-New York axis remained 
centralised in New York it remained subordinated to, and broadly supportive of, 
the largely state-based structure of authority which reproduced the order. 
However, the unilateral imposition of capital controls in the US from 1963 
threatened to subordinate the authority of New York's social forces still ftirther. 
Restrictions on US capital outflows simultaneously generated a demand for 
alternative sources of dollar-denominated credit that were not met by state-based 
structures of authority. Hampered from conducting New York-centred credit 
creation, New York's bankers began to create credit through the London-centred 
offshore Euromarkets that circumvented both US and British capital controls. 
The gradual break up of the Washington-New York axis throughout the 1960s, 
then, saw the emergence of an alternative offshore space of credit creation 
centred in London and organised world credit practices through largely civil and 
market forms of authority. The institutional edifice that reproduced the 
American world financial order began to unravel as the order became 
increasingly decentralised between New York and London. 
While the roots of the unravelling of the American world financial order 
lay in these two principal contradictions, their destabilising consequences were 
intensified by the unilateral adoption of capital controls and support for the 
Euromarkets by the US state. As already noted, the immediate context for the 
unilateral adoption of controls on capital account was an attempt to reduce US 
long-term balance of payments deficits and shore up confidence in the value of 
the dollar. The relative stability of the American world financial order was 
effectively sacrificed in favour of US macroeconomic policy-making autonomy 
and support for the multilateral framework for trade and payments established at 
Bretton Woods (Hawley 1987: 7-8). The imposition of capital controls and the 
motivations which underpinned the decision reflected the predominance of the 
US Treasury in the making of foreign economic policy (Mendelsohn 1980: 35), 
which, in turn, rested on US state-society relations that tended to isolate the 
interests of New York's social forces (Helleiner 1994: 86-7; Hawley 1987: 21, 
64-5). Taken together, the Interest Equalisation Tax (IET), Voluntary Credit 
Restraint Program (VCRP) and Mandatory Control Program (MCP) which 
formed the major legislative planks of US capital controls served to generate a 
gradual decentralisation of credit creation in the American world financial 
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order. " As Frieden (1987: 82) has asserted . ..... American 
international banking 
was pushed out of Wall Street by a US government afraid of its domestic 
consequences". 
The outflows of US long-term capital that characterised the American 
world financial order became increasingly supplemented by dollar-denominated 
short- and medium-term credit based upon short-term holdings of dollars 
already residing offshore in the Eurocurrency markets. While partly a 
consequence of foreign dollar holdings such as those of the Soviet Union and 
communist China (Frieden 1987: 81), the build up of offshore short-term dollar 
deposits was also a consequence of the profit-making aspirations of US bankers. 
This led to the identification of the returns available by circumventing the 
Federal Reserve's Regulation Q that dated from the 1930s. Regulation Q 
imposed interest rate ceilings on short-term deposits of less than 90 days, 
whereas dollar deposits in foreign banks were not subject to the same ceilings. 
While short-term rates were negligible between the 1930s and mid-1950s this 
difference mattered little. It became significant as interest rates increased and 
US banks held short-term dollar deposits in foreign accounts to gain greater 
returns, effectively shifting a large part of the US money-market to the 
Eurocurrency market. In short, while Regulation Q had stimulated the growth of 
the Eurocurrency markets, US capital controls built on this and stimulated the 
issuing of Eurobonds and Eurocredits (Cooper 1968: 118-9; Strange 1976: 180; 
Mendelsohn 1980: 23-25). 
The significance of the emergent Euromarkets lay in the structural 
transformation that they implied, and the contribution that this made, to the 
unravelling of the American world financial order. The very offshore nature of 
the Euromarkets meant that credit practices could circumvent the state-based 
structure of authority that reproduced the relative stability of the American 
world financial order. In this sense, it is tempting to cast the Euromarkets as 
supranational and 'stateless' (Wachtel 1990). The Euromarkets, however, are 
not stateless. Governments often searching for an alternative source of 
sovereign credit to finance imbalances did little to control, and much to 
encourage, the formation of these markets (Ruggie 1982: 403; Frieden 
1987: 116). In particular, alongside British policy makers seeking to establish 
London as the key social space for Euromarket practices, US policy makers did 
21 For a detailed review of US capital controls, see Hawley (1987). 
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little to restrict and actually gave their blessing to Euromarket practices (Strange 
1986: 47-50; Helleiner 1995: 320-1). 
Given the contribution of the Euromarkets to the unravelling of the 
American world financial order, US state support for the Euromarkets would 
seem somewhat paradoxical. Yet, US support for the Euromarkets reflected the 
very contradictions of the American world financial order. This is illustrated by 
the two main motivations of US policy makers in their support for the 
Euromarkets (Helleiner 1995: 321; 1994: 84-91). First, the attractive rates of 
interest available in the Eurocurrency markets encouraged foreigners to hold US 
dollars which, in turn, allowed US policy makers to maintain greater autonomy, 
postpone addressing the US long-term deficit and maintain the dollar's position 
in the fixed exchange rate monetary order. 
Second, following the imposition of capital controls from 1963, US 
policy makers recognised that the Euromarkets were necessary to finance the 
continued overseas expansion of US MNCs. Facilitating the Euromarket 
practices of New York-centred financial market institutions also ensured that 
they retained their dominant position in world finance. For instance, 
Mendelsohn (1980: 33) describes the 1967 decision to exempt the dollar- 
denominated Eurocredits of US banks from the IET as "the most important 
single development in the birth and initial growth of international medium-tenn 
Eurocredit bank lending". By 1970, for every dollar US banks lent abroad from 
US soil, they were lending between six or seven in the Euromarkets (Frieden 
1987: 85). The reliance of US MNCs on Euromarket credit practices more 
broadly is evidenced by their domination of Eurobond issues. Between 1965 
and 1974, US MNCs accounted for one-third of all Eurobond issues valued at 
$9 billion out of a total of $27 billion (Mendelsohn 1980: 136). In a similar 
manner to the adoption of capital controls, then, US support for the Euromarket 
exacerbated the existing contradictions that lay at the roots of the unravelling of 
the American world financial order. 
The contradictions of the American world financial order combined with 
US capital controls and support for the Euromarkets to present London's social 
forces with a 'structural opportunity' to re-establish London as a WFC. 22 The 
London-centred Euromarkets and the resulting decentralisation of the American 
22 The notion of a 'structural opportunity' is taken from Gills (1994). 
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world financial order were not the inevitable outcome of the contradictions of 
the order. They also entailed both support for London's standing as a VYTC 
from British state officials and the initiative of London's merchant and overseas 
bankers in developing Euromarket practices (Zysman 1977: 212; Mendelsohn 
1980: 19-20). " The capacity of London to stand as the key social space for 
Euromarket credit practices and related practices such as foreign exchange 
dealing rested on the continued promotion of London as a VYTC by the 'City- 
Bank-Treasury' nexus (Ingham 1984) throughout the first decades of the 
American world financial order. 24 Harold Wilson as President of the Board of 
Trade had allowed the post-war re-opening of London's commodity markets for 
international trading in 195 1, effectively re-opening London as a financial centre 
for sterling-denominated commercial credit creation and foreign exchange 
dealing (Strange 1986: 37-8). However, a series of sterling currency crises 
ensured that maintaining London's position as a principal financial centre 
through the conventional creation of sterling-denominated credit was 
problematic. In contrast to the rise of London as a WFC in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, it was the nature of the response to this 
problematic that facilitated the standing of London as the centre of the 
Euromarkets. As Moran (1991: 85) posits, 
"When London re-emerged in the 1950s as a great world centre it did so 
in a very different way. London's new prominence rested neither on the 
strength of the British economy, nor on the competitive capacities of 
British firms. It was, instead, largely a regulatory creation: the informal 
and consensual style practised by the Bank of England made London 
attractive to the emerging 'Euromarkets', especially to the American 
institutions trying to escape a complex home regulatory system". 
23 London's position as the key social space for Euromarket credit practices is reflected in the 
domination of Euromarket transactions. Born's (1977: 307) claim that 75-80% of all Euromarket 
transaction were conducted in London in the 1960s does, however, seem overstated. While 
Eurodeutschmark. transactions were centralised in Luxembourg and Eurosterling in Paris, 
London predominated as the key space for Eurodollar transactions. London's domination of the 
Euromarket, then, reflected the prevalence of Eurodollar business within the Euromarkets. For 
instance, between 1963 and 1977,60% of Eurobond issues were denominated in dollars 
(Mendelsohn 1980: 137). Therefore, Germain's (1997: 89) suggestion that by 1971 40% of all 
Euromarket transactions took place in London is probably an accurate representation of 
London's dominance. 
24 Following from London's dominant standing as the key space for Euromarket practices was its 
ascendancy as a space for foreign exchange trading practices. This was a consequence of the 
nature of Euromarket practices - i. e. borrowing on the Euromarkets for the purpose of re-lending 
to 'onshore' banks and businesses required the 'swapping' of dollar-denominated Eurocredits 
and Eurobonds for domestic currencies. By the late 1960s, around one-third of all world-wide 
foreign exchange trading took place in London (Cooper 1968: 125-6; Coakley 1992: 62). 
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In particular, London's standing as the key space for the Eurocurrency 
markets rested upon the decision in 1957 by the Bank of England to permit 
London's market institutions to organise clearance and commercial credit 
practices in US dollars. This followed the suspension of both the clearance of 
sterling transactions and the creation of sterling-denominated commercial credit 
for third party trade. The suspension of the international clearance of sterling 
transactions and the creation of commercial credit for third party trade by the 
Bank of England was motivated by attempts to prepare for currency 
convertibility in a situation of depleted reserves. The depletion of Bank of 
England reserves was an outcome of both a run on the pound amidst the fall out 
from the Suez crisis and a shift to deutschmark-denominated assets amidst 
rumours of revaluation (Strange 1976: 180,1986: 36-7; Cooper 1968: 117-8; 
Mendelsohn 1980: 19-20). Similarly, the decision by the Bank of England in 
1962 to permit foreign market institutions to organise the issue of foreign 
securities denominated in foreign currencies stimulated the growth of London- 
centred Eurobond practices (Bum 1997). As Helleiner (1994: 84) notes, "By 
shifting their business to a dollar basis, the London operators found a way to 
preserve their international business without being encumbered by British 
capital controls". London's social forces and British state officials ensured that 
the structural opportunity offered to them by the contradictions of the American 
world financial order was seized by producing and reproducing London as an 
entrep6t financial centre for offshore, dollar-denominated practices. 
In our terms, the decentralisation of social practices from New York 
from the late 1950s and particularly after 1963, and the associated unravelling of 
the American world financial order that this implies, would appear to suggest 
that by the mid-1960s an alternative London-centred, offshore world financial 
order was being established. Clearly the Euromarkets were an alternative, 
offshore social space. Euromarket credit creating practices were organised 
through a largely civil- and market-based structure of authority around liberal, as 
opposed to embedded liberal, norms and values. The ma or market institutions 
that now predominated in the organisation of world credit practices were indeed 
centralised in London. However, insufficient capital as a material resource was 
centralised in London in the mid-1960s for such an alternative world financial 
order to become established. The capital centralised in London that formed part 
of the material basis of Euromarket practices was largely short-term in nature, 
residing in the Eurocurrency markets. This restricted the volume of long-term 
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credit creation in the Euromarkets throughout the 1960s and into the early 
1970s. " For instance, in 1970,86% of all UK bank assets in the Euromarkets 
matured in less than one year, while 93% of liabilities were guaranteed for less 
than one year (Germain 1997: 89-90). 
The short-term nature of capital deposits in the Euromarkets; was 
reflected in the very nature of the credit created and the manner in which credit 
practices were organised. Up to the early 1970s, as much as half of the credit 
creating transactions were money-market practices to facilitate inter-bank 
transactions for the profitable use of short-term funds (Germain 1997: 89-90; 
Frieden 1987: 79; 93-4; Born 1977: 306). Medium- and, to a lesser extent, long- 
term corporate credit creation was organised through a series of innovations 
including syndicated loans, floating rates of interest and 'roll over' loans all 
aimed at minimising the risks of borrowing short and lending long in a more 
volatile enviromnent. 16 As such, given their short-term nature, up to the early 
1970s the London-centred Euromarkets did not constitute an alternative to the 
American world financial order. Rather, the Euromarkets remained subsumed 
within the American world financial order, the movements of short-term funds 
that characterised them contributing to the partial decentralisation of the order 
between London and New York. 
In the course of the 1960s, then, despite the relative instability of the 
American world financial order associated with its partial decentralisation and 
the rise of the London-centred Euromarkets, the order retained its broad 
structural contours. As Helleiner (1994: 82) has noted of the 1960s, "The decade 
was one of transition", marked as much by continuity as change. Despite the 
imposition of capital controls from 1963, the US political economy remained a 
net provider of long-term capital. This has led Germain (1997: 88-9) to assert 
that New York maintained its position throughout the 1960s as the key social 
space for the recycling of capital. Given the dollar-denomination of credit 
25 The short-term nature of capital deposits in the Euromarkets, has led Bom (1977: 306) and 
Strange (1976: 176-9) to include the short-term nature of the Euromarkets within their respective 
definitions. 
26 Syndicated lending marked an increase in co-operation between financial market institutions 
in credit creation. Individual institutions came together to form a syndicate or consortia, 
effectively pooling the capital required for credit creation (Bom 1977: 308). Mendelsohn 
(1980: 65-6) describes the use of floating rates of interest linked to the prevailing rate for short- 
term deposits as "the single most important feature of the Eurocredits market ... the foundation 
of its existence". 'Roll over' loans were effectively the renewal of a loan every six months, with 
the terms of repayment re-negotiated accordingly through floating rates of interest. 
172 
created through Euromarket practices, New York remained the key social space 
for clearing practices (Frieden 1987: 102-3). The relatively high rates of interest 
in the Euromarkets compared with rates for new long-term bond issues in New 
York also reinforced New York's position (Cooper 1968: 132). It was only in 
the course of 1968 that new issues of Eurobonds marginally exceeded new 
foreign issues in New York (Mendelsohn 1980: 211). 
In addition, embedded liberal frameworks of thought continued to 
inform policy makers in the major states. As such, the largely state-based 
structure of authority remained, albeit despite the wavering commitment of US 
and British state officials. Unilateral controls on capital accounts were held in 
place in an attempt to preserve policy-making autonomy and exchange rate 
stability in the face of the increased volatility of short-term capital flows carried 
through the institutional channels of the Euromarkets (Helleiner 1994: 91 -5). 
This was accompanied by increased recourse to sovereign credit for offsetting 
finance, provided through the expanded borrowing of the IMF and BIS. This 
served to circumvent the need to impose exchange controls to maintain 
macroeconomic policy-making autonomy in the face of disequilibrating short- 
term capital flows (Helleiner 1994: 96-9). 
The gradual unravelling of the American world financial order 
culminated in its final collapse in 1973-4 amidst the disintegration of the 
Bretton Woods monetary order, increased relative instability in the wider world 
order, and the liberalisation of US financial policy. " As Strange (1986: 5-6) has 
noted in her examination of the relationship of world financial and monetary 
orders to the crisis of the wider world order in the early 1970s, 1973 was a 
benchmark year that "seemed to mark a sort of change of gear, as the system 
moved from a more stable period into a much more unstable one". The post- 
1973 collapse of the American world financial order was closely related to the 
disintegration of the Bretton Woods monetary order. In August 1971 the so- 
27 Following Cox (1987: 270-9) and Rupert (1995: 175-6), the world economic crisis of 19734 
notable in terms of the oil crisis and the combination of inflation and stagnation ('stagflation'), is 
viewed in diachronic terms as representative of an increase in the relative instability of the wider 
world order. This suggests that increased inflation and indebtedness were the principal 
indicators of an intensification of social and political conflict associated with the contradictions 
of welfare-nationalist state-society relations. Inflationary pressures were internationalised 
through the US balance of payments deficit, increased raw material prices (including oil), and 
the institutional channels of the Euromarkets. For a theoretical approach to inflation that 
explains the need to view inflation in social and political terms in the first instance, see Maier 
(1987: 187-224). 
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called 'Nixon shock' saw the US government suspend the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold. Attempts to maintain the fixed exchange rate system through 
the Smithsonian agreement, which negotiated the realignment of the US dollar 
to the Japanese yen and German deutschmark, finally collapsed in 1973 with the 
adoption of floating exchange rates. Against a background of relatively high 
domestic inflation and unemployment, a combination of heightened speculation 
against the dollar carried through the Euromarkets, the inability of the US state 
institutions to manage US balance of payments, and the perception that a 
worsening of the latter and a weakening of US international manufacturing 
competitiveness was a result of an overvalued dollar all served as motivations 
behind the Nixon shock (Germain 1997: 97; Maier 1987: 15 1; Brett 1983: 164). 
While 1971 may have been a watershed year marking the end of the 
post-war monetary order established at Bretton Woods (Cerny 1993: 13; Bom 
1977: 305; Brett 1983: 1), the Nixon shock did not in itself destroy the 
foundations of the American world financial order broadly considered. In our 
terms, its significance lies in the increase in civil and market authority over the 
organisation of world credit practices that it both reflected and contributed to in 
the American world financial order (Germain 1997: 98-9; Walter 1993: 209-10). " 
The Nixon shock stood alongside other key monetary policy 'non-decisions' by 
US state institutions both not to support the Smithsonian agreement by engaging 
in central bank co-operation, and to advocate floating exchange rates in 
generating increased civil and market authority over the organisation of world 
credit practices (Strange 1986: 38-41). " As Frieden (1987: 88) asserts, the move 
to floating exchange rates "reinforced the position of financial markets in the 
world economy ...... In short, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods monetary order 
precipitated by US policy makers was a necessary precondition for the final 
collapse of the American world financial order. 
28 Between 1969 and 1975, global liquidity measured in dollars trebled from $78 billion to $225 
billion, "the overwhelming source of this explosion was in foreign exchange, primarily in the 
Eurocurrency system" (Hawley 1987: 19). 
29 For Strange (1986) 'Non-decisions' are those made by states that increase non-state and, in 
particular, market forms of authority. For Strange (1986: 7), the immediate motivation for these 
non-decisions in monetary policy represented a belief "that the markets could be used as allies, 
helping the United States to engineer a devaluation of the dollar which other countries could 
neither resist nor matclf'. Under floating exchange rates, the burden of international adjustment 
was effectively turned on its head, with countries in current and capital account surplus with the 
US now expected to face adjustment pressures rather than the deficit prone US political 
economy. 
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The largely state-based structure of authority which had been significant 
in the reproduction of the relative stability of the American world financial order 
was paralysed by the crisis of the wider world order, and it was left to the largely 
civil and market authority of the London-centred Euromarkets to organise the 
creation of the credit necessitated by the crisis (Strange 1986: 71). " The four- 
fold increase in the price of oil from late 1973 generated both a demand for 
credit to maintain consumption amongst oil importers, and a supply of capital 
accumulated by oil exporters. Much of the capital accumulated by oil exporters 
became centralised in the Euromarkets and formed the material basis for 
sovereign and corporate credit creation in the wake of the crisis - so-called 
'petrodollar re-cycling'. In 1974 alone, $30 billion worth of deposits in the 
Euromarkets from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
provided the material basis for $60 billion worth of credit creation (Frieden 
1987: 88). " This built dramatically on a surge of credit creation already 
underway in the Euromarkets in 1972-3, fuelling and responding to the world 
economic boom of that year (Mendelsohn 1980: 41). In terms of sovereign 
credit practices, the Euromarkets, displaced the authority of the IMF in financing 
balance of payments deficits after 1974 (Germain 1997: 92-3). In particular, the 
governments of underdeveloped state-societies expanded their borrowing 
dramatically which was to culminate in the so-called 'debt crisis' of the early 
1980s. " In terms of corporate credit practices, the London-centred Euromarkets 
provided much of the credit for MNC restructuring. For instance, new issues of 
Eurobonds increased dramatically from $2.1 billion in 1974 to $8.6 billion in 
1975, $14.3 billion in 1976 and $17.6 billion in 1977 (Mendelsohn 1980: 211). 
What is particularly significant about the unravelling of the American 
world financial order is that although it was associated, in the first instance, with 
a partial decentralisation between New York and the London-centred 
30 Strange (1986: 43-5) links the paralysis of the state-based structure of authority in the 
American world financial order and the resulting high profile position of the non-state authority 
of the Euromarkets to two key related 'non-decisions' by US state officials. First, in the 
immediate aftermath of the oil price hikes, the US government chose not to directly negotiate 
with OPEC leaders. Second, the US failed to act on British and French goverriment proposals to 
expand the capital resources of the IMF and World Bank to cope with the problems experienced 
by the non-oil producing countries 
31 Overall, Frieden (1987: 88) has calculated that between one-half and one-third of a total of 
$150 billion of OPEC surpluses between 1974 and 1980 were absorbed by the Euromarkets. 
32 In the course of the 1970s the governments of underdeveloped state-societies borrowed $200 
billion from offshore markets (Frieden 1987: 88). 
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ftý, 
Euromarkets, pivotal in shaping the very nature of the unravelling of the order 
were the policies of the US state in the context of the crisis of the wider world 
order. As Walter (1993: 240-4) suggests, in contrast with the unravelling of 
previous world financial orders, the unravelling of the American world financial 
order tended not to be driven by the rise of other state and societal forces. US 
6structural power' (Strange 1988) in world finance ensured that the changed 
policies of the US state would be of prime importance in contributing to both 
the unravelling of the American world financial order and the making of the 
contemporary world financial order. Underlying the changed policies of the US 
state was a reconfiguration of US state-society relations which manifested itself 
in policies which sought to broadly liberalise the American world financial 
order. The integration of US societal forces which had underpinned the 
embedded liberalism of American financial policies since the 1930s began to 
disintegrate from the mid-1960s as financial and corporate interests coalesced 
around support for the Euromarkets (Helleiner 1994: 100). The alternative 
reintegration of US societal forces around a liberal approach to the organisation 
of world finance that this implied was reinforced by the views of US state 
officials. US Treasury officials in particular held that a liberal financial and 
monetary order would preserve US macroeconomic policy-making autonomy in 
the face of growing trade and budget deficits (Helleiner 1994: 112-5; Strange 
1986: 7). In addition, liberal approaches gained credence amidst the rupture of 
the wider world order that revealed itself in the world-wide economic crisis of 
19734. 
The liberal thrust of US financial policies took three main interrelated 
forms. First, US state officials took the lead in maintaining the organisation of 
the existing Euromarkets when they were threatened with potential collapse in 
1974 by the foreign exchange losses of two medium-sized Euromarket 
institutions, Bankhaus I. D Herstatt and the Franklin National Bank (Frieden 
1987: 117-9). Second, US state officials effectively vetoed several sets of 
proposals made by their west European and Japanese counterparts which would 
have strengthened the state-based structure of authority which had characterised 
the American world financial order. This included opposition to more co- 
operative forms of capital controls (Helleiner 1994: 102-111), reigning in the 
Euromarkets (Helleiner 1994: 104-6), and proposals which would have placed 
the IMF at the heart of a 'quasi-public' recycling of petrodollars (Helleiner 
1994: 111-2). Third, US state officials liberalised the unilateral capital controls 
that had been place since 1963 and set about the deregulation of American 
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finance to encourage its international competitiveness. The dismantling of 
capital controls had been planned for the end of 1974, but in the wake of the oil 
crisis in the latter months of 1973 it was brought forward to January 1974 "so 
that the US banking system could play its part in the recycling of oil exporting 
countries newly enlarged surplus earnings" (Mendelsohn 1980: 209). May Day 
1975 saw the deregulation of the New York Stock Exchange and the beginning 
of a deregulation of American finance which continued throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s (Moran 1991; Vogel 1996). Taken together, then, the liberalisation 
of US financial policy shaped the nature of the intense restructuring which 
accompanied the final collapse of the American world financial order. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that although New York was the principal VvTC 
from the 1930s, the making of a relatively stable American world financial order 
did not begin in earnest until 1947. The structural transformation that 
characterised the American world financial order from 1947 was associated with 
a change in the predominant form of those credit practices which generated the 
long-term US capital outflows to the western world and which were a defining 
feature of the order. As a consequence, in contrast to the standing of WFCs in 
previous world financial orders, New York was of more 'indirect' significance 
as a key social space for credit practices. In diachronic terms, the centralisation 
of material, ideational and institutional forces in the US state and economy 
realised a coherent conjunction that was reproduced through the largely state- 
based structure of authority of the Washington-New York axis. This rested on 
US state-society relations and their insertion into the Cold War and Pax 
Americana structures of the wider world order. Within the Washington-New 
York axis, the authority of New York's social forces played a subordinate and 
yet supportive role. 
Two contradictions within the American world financial order were 
posited to be at the roots of the unravelling of the order: the inability to maintain 
both long-term US capital outflows and the value of the dollar, and the failure to 
articulate sufficiently a role for the authority of New York's social forces in the 
reproduction of the order. The adoption of unilateral capital controls after 1963 
combined with support for the emergent Euromarkets by the US state to 
intensify the destabilising consequences of these contradictions, offering 
London's social forces a structural opportunity to re-establish London as a key 
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social space for Euromarket practices. The partial decentralisation of the 
American world financial order between New York and London throughout the 
1960s contributed to a gradual unravelling of the order, as the largely state- 
based structure of authority of the Washington-New York axis was undermined. 
The final collapse of the American world financial order came with the 
disintegration of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the 
liberalisation of US financial policy and the relative instability of the wider 
world order which, taken together, confirmed the rise of London-centred civil- 
and market-based forms of authority over the organisation of world finance. 
From this and the preceding two chapters, then, four related historical 
insights have been generated that will inform future research into the 
contemporary world financial order which has been in the making since 1973-4 
are thus generated. First, in contrast to the American world financial order in 
which world credit practices effectively took the predominant form of inter- 
governmental and corporate capital exports, the contemporary world financial 
order has been marked by a transformation in the predominant forms of credit. 
While world credit practices have once again come to take the form of banking 
and capital market practices as during the Amsterdam-centred and British world 
financial orders, the exact form of practices has several distinctive features. 
Second, the corresponding unravelling and making of previous world financial 
orders have tended to be characterised by the decline of one WFC and the rise of 
another as the key social space for world credit practices - i. e. shifts from 
Amsterdam to London to New York. In the American world financial order, 
however, the rebirth of London as the key social space for the Euromarkets did 
not mark the permanent decline of New York. Both London and New York 
have stood as WFCs in the contemporary world financial order, joined in the 
1980s by Tokyo as a third VVTC. In our terms, a first order question must be to 
seek to explain the appearance of a 'triad' of WTCs at the apex of the 
contemporary world financial order as key social spaces for newly predominant 
forms of credit practices. This is the task of the chapter six, the opening chapter 
of Part III. 
Third, the hierarchical organisation of world credit practices in which a 
single VvTC stands as the key social space has been shown to be shaped by the 
material, social and political power of the social forces associated with the 
dominant VvTC, resting on the structures of the wider world order. 
Consequently, transformations in the organisation of world credit practices 
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which coincided with the unravelling of both the Amsterdam-centred and British 
world financial orders - in which a new WFC rose to the apex of the hierarchy 
of financial centres - have been shown to have been driven by the rise of other 
state and societal forces. However, pivotal to the unravelling of the American 
world financial order and the associated re-organisation of world credit practices 
has been the continued power of New York's social forces and the US state. 
Inquiry into the structure of power in the contemporary world financial order is, 
then, essential to an understanding of the making of the contemporary world 
financial order in which the organisation of world credit practices has been 
transformed. 
Fourth, and most significantly, the reproduction of periods of relative 
stability in world financial orders in which market, civil and state forms of 
authority come together in the organisation world credit practices have been 
shown to be centralised in a single VvTC as a key space of authority. As the 
unravelling of the American world financial order once again illustrates, state, 
civil and market forms of authority would appear to be interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing in the reproduction of relative stability in a world financial 
order. Given the 'triad' of WFCs at the apex of the contemporary world 
financial order, contemporary world finance seems to contain an inherent 
contradiction that renders it relatively unstable. How does the decentralised 
structure of authority in the contemporary world financial order relate to the 
relative instability of the order, and what new forms of authority have been 
established in an attempt to organise world credit practices? An explanation of 
the structures of power and authority in the making and reproduction of the 
contemporary world financial order is, then, the task of chapter seven, the 
concluding chapter of Part III. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The 'Triad': New York, London, Tokvo and Contemporary World Credit 
Practices 
Introduction 
This and the following chapter utilise the insights generated through an 
Historical IPE reading of previous world financial orders to apprehend 
contemporary world finance. Consequently, an 'historical' alternative is offered 
to the predominant mode of knowledge derived from neo-classical economics. 
We begin here by addressing the relationships between the changing forms of 
credit practices and the emergence of New York, London, and Tokyo as the 
'triad' of world financial centres in the contemporary world financial order. As 
a starting point for apprehending contemporary world finance, this follows 
clearly from an Historical IPE approach. An Historical IPE began by identifying 
the ontological significance of the historicity of human thought and action, 
developing a focus for inquiry which, in the first instance, is concerned with 
structured social practices. In terms of inquiry into world finance, this led to a 
conceptualisation of world finance as constituted over the longue durJe by five 
sets of world credit practices - commercial, sovereign, corporate, clearing and 
money-market practices. A synchronic understanding of changes in world credit 
practices across the Amsterdam-centred, British and American world financial 
orders has subsequently been offered by utilising the notion of the forms of 
credit. This has facilitated the capturing of conjunctural variations in both the 
nature of credit instruments employed and the manner in which credit practices 
become institutionalised. Further, given the inherent spatiality of structured 
social practices, such an understanding of world finance has necessarily entailed 
concern with world financial centres. Amsterdam, London and New York have 
been shown to have been the key social spaces for world credit practices in 
successive world financial orders. The resulting explanation of world credit 
practices in their own, synchronic terins has proved a necessary prelude to a 
diachronic understanding of the organisation of world credit practices. This has 
revealed the power and authority relations that have shaped the manner in which 
practices have been organised in successive world financial orders. 
Part I of this chapter begins, then, by illuminating the changes in the 
forms of credit in the contemporary world financial order. At first glance, the 
prevalence of bank loans and capital and equity market practices is suggestive of 
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both a contrast with the American world financial order, in which corporate 
FDI, bilateral and multilateral inter-governmental loans predominated, and 
considerable parallels with the Amsterdam-centred and British world financial 
orders in which these forms of credit also predominated. However, it is the 
conjunctural distinctiveness of contemporary forms of credit that is emphasised 
through the isolation of six major interrelated dimensions of change - 
marketisation and dollar-denomination; syndication; disintermediation and 
securitisation; decompartmentalisation. and institutional re-organisation; 
expansion and innovation; globalisation, regionalisation and bifurcation. 
Part II of the chapter moves to consider the standing of New York, 
London and Tokyo as the 'triad' of WFCs in the contemporary world financial 
order. Each is examined as a key social space for world credit practices in the 
light of the changing forms of credit. As such, close attention is paid to the 
differences between each of the triad of WFCs. Despite its displacement from 
the apex of the hierarchy of WFCs as part and parcel of the unravelling of the 
American world financial order, New York continues to be a key social space 
for world credit practices in the contemporary world financial order. This is 
rooted in the lasting primacy of dollar-denominated credit, the significance of 
New York-centred financial market institutions, and the sheer depth and 
liquidity of New York's capital and equity markets. London's standing as a key 
space in the contemporary world financial order, meanwhile, is founded on its 
position as an offshore entrep6t for Euromarket practices, a position which was 
established in the last decades of the American world financial order. London 
continues to be the key space at a world scale for the issue and trading of bonds, 
the trading of equities, foreign exchange dealing, and international bank lending. 
New York and London were joined as WFCs by Tokyo during the 1980s. Based 
upon the large capital surpluses of the Japanese political economy and the 
corresponding expansion of Japanese MNCs and financial market institutional 
networks, Tokyo has been the key space for both practices of capital allocation 
in support of securities issues and trading in New York and London, and 
regionally-orientated banking practices in Asia. 
Part I- The Changing Forms of Credit 
Since 1974 world credit practices have taken forms which contrast 
sharply with the corporate FDI, bilateral and multilateral inter-governmental 
loans which predominated during the American world financial order. The 
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contemporary world financial order has been marked in different periods by a 
prevalence of both bank loans and capital and equity market practices as the 
predominant forms of credit. Considered over the longue durie, considerable 
parallels can be drawn between the predominant forms of credit in the 
contemporary world order and those of the Amsterdam-centred and British 
world financial orders from the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries. However, 
contemporary transformations in the nature of credit instruments employed and 
the manner in which credit practices become institutionalised are also pivotal to 
an understanding of the changing forms of credit. In order to capture the 
distinctiveness of contemporary forms of credit, then, six interrelated major 
dimensions of change are outlined below. These are marketisation and dollar- 
denomination; syndication; disintermediation and securitisation; 
decompartmentalisation and institutional re-organisation; expansion and 
innovation; globalisation, regionalisation and bifurcation. 
Marketisation and Dollar-denomination 
In most general terms, world credit practices in the contemporary world 
financial order have become 'marketised', that is, increasingly institutionalised 
within the networks of the principal financial market institutions. This contrasts 
with the American world financial order in which the practices of allocating 
credit in particular were largely organised through institutional networks 
dominated by the US state. Given the "design capacity" (Vipond 1993: 187) of 
states over financial market structures, IPE scholars have been at pains to stress 
that the marketisation of credit practices has rested on the widespread policies of 
deregulation and liberalisation pursued by the major states (Strange 1986; 
Underhill 1991; Helleiner 1994). 
Whilst commonly understood in qualitative terms by notions such as the 
increased 'structural power of capital' (Gill & Law 1989), increased 
marketisation can also be illustrated quantitatively in the changing private and 
public shares of net long-term capital movements. Under the American world 
financial order, the ratio of private to public was approximately 1: 1. During the 
period 1972-76 this was transformed to roughly 2: 1, and by 1992-3 stood at 
83% private and 17% public (Germain 1997: 119). The marketisation of credit 
creating practices is shown more specifically by what Walter (1993: 199) has 
termed a "lack of quantitative power on the part of central banks", represented 
by the shifting ratio of official reserves to bank assets. Based on the assets of 
the fifty largest banks headquartered in the USA, UK, Germany, France and 
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Japan and the total official reserves of their corresponding central banks, the 
ratio of official reserves to bank assets has fallen from 11% (1972) to 3% (1995) 
(Germain 1997: 120). 
While the contemporary world financial order has been marked by a 
marketisation of the predominant forms of credit when compared with the 
American world financial order, then, credit has continued to be largely 
denominated in US dollars. As Walter (1993: 190) has asserted, "the growing 
role of private financial markets did not remove a fundamental asymmetry in the 
structure of the system: the key role which the US financial system and its 
offshore adjuncts play in the system as a whole". The continued standing of the 
dollar as 'world money' is clear from the share of dollar-denominated official 
central bank reserves and world trade (Frankel 1995). ' The position of the 
dollar as world money is, however, less apparent from the breakdown of the 
main forms of credit by currency. As Table I below illustrates, since the mid- 
1980s the dollar-denomination of international bank loans has fluctuated and 
international bond issues have become diversified away from the dollar. 
Table I- Dollar-denominated Share of Forms of Credit 
Year % dollar denominated of dollar denominated of 
1985 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Adapted from Walter (1993: 199). 
total intemational bank 
loans 
62.5 
64.2 
70 
58.9 
84.5 
total international bond 
issues 
70.9 
35.4 
45.9 
33.3 
28.5 
Changes in dollar-denominated rates of interest clearly contributed to 
changes in the dollar-denomination of both forms of credit. However, the 
apparent decline of the share of international bond issues denominated in dollars 
' Public and private working balances have been held predominantly in dollars throughout the 
contemporary world financial order, despite some fall since the late 1970s. For instance, by the 
late 1980s, around 60% of official reserves remained dollar-denominated, compared to 19% 
deutschmark-denominated and 8% yen-denominated (Helleiner 1993a: 214). Similarly, world 
trade transactions for goods and services remain largely denominated in dollars (Walter 
1993: 200-1). 
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obscures the practice of quickly 'swapping' bonds issued in other currencies into 
dollars (Walter 1993: 199-200). ' For example, 80% of the 3.5 trillion yen worth 
of Euroyen bond issues in 1989 were accompanied by swaps into dollar- 
denominated bonds (Nakao 1995: 84). The combination of the dollar standing 
on one side of 83% of foreign exchange transactions and over half of foreign 
exchange turnover being accounted for by 'forward' business, which is 
principally swaps related, is also illustrative of these practices more broadly 
(Bank of International Settlements 1996: 7). In the contemporary world financial 
order, the US dollar remains the principal currency in which reserves, 
transactions and credit are denominated. 
Syndication 
During the period from the mid-1970s through to the early 1980s, 
sovereign credit practices in particular predominantly took the form of bank 
loans. The distinctive feature of sovereign bank lending was that credit 
practices were 'syndicated': institutionalised within syndicates or consortia of 
financial market institutions. At the forefront of syndication were the 
Euromarket branches of the major market institutions - especially the American 
Gmoney centre' banks such as Citicorp and BankAmerica - that were able to 
access the vast pools of 'petro-dollars' generated by the oil crises which resided 
off-shore in the Eurocurrency markets. ' Alongside innovations in loans as credit 
instruments which included the use of floating rates of interest and the 'roll- 
over' of existing loans (Mendelsohn 1980: 65-6), the syndication of sovereign 
bank lending sought to minimise the risks involved in lending over the long- 
term. 
A combination of negative real interest rates and stagflation in the 
developed national political economies encouraged syndicated sovereign credit 
practices to focus primarily on the provision of credit to the governments of the 
underdeveloped political economies of the 'third world' (Frieden 1987: 88). ' 
2A 'swap' is "a financial transaction in which two parties agree to exchange a predetermined 
series of payments over time ... which serves to circumvent market imperfections and inefficiencies" (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 125). In this instance, 'imperfections and inefficiencies' 
stem from the perceived exchange rate risk of holding yen-denominated bonds. 
3 By 1979, the value of outstanding syndicated loans organised through the Euromarkets stood 
at $80 billion (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 120). 
4 Between 1970 and 1979 the value of the Euromarkets grew from $57 billion to $475 billion 
(Walter 1993: 182). During this period, less developed country borrowing in the Euromarkets 
totalled around $200 billion (Frieden 1987: 88). 
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However, the provision of sovereign credit more broadly took the form of 
Euromarket practices. For instance, the Euromarkets displaced the IMF as the 
main source of short-term offsetting finance for alleviating balance-of-payments 
problems (Helleiner 1994: 114). This formed part of a wider dominion of 
Euromarket institutions and instruments in shaping the predominant forms of 
credit during this period. Corporate and commercial practices that provided 
long- and short-term credit respectively for the corporations of the OECD 
political economies also took the form of Euromarket practices, a greater 
universalisation of the move to off-shore corporate credit which was begun by 
American financial market institutions and their customers during the 1960s. 
Nevertheless, unlike sovereign credit practices, corporate and commercial credit 
practices in support of the multinational expansionary strategies of OECD 
corporations increasingly came to take the predominant form of issues of 
Eurobonds and short-term debt instruments as opposed to syndicated loans 
(Walter 1993: 217). The 'disintermediation' of world credit practices that this 
entailed became far more widespread from the early 1980s, engulfing sovereign 
and corporate credit provision both on- and off-shore. ' As such, as Cerny 
(1993a: 59 original emphasis) asserts, the Euromarkets played "a central role ... 
in shifting the composition of financial exchanges away from loans to negotiable 
securities". 
Disintermediation and Securifisation 
Disintermediated practices organised through the institutions of the 
capital and equity markets have been the predominant forms of world credit 
practices since the early-to-mid 1980s, displacing bank lending. This can be 
seen in the changing breakdown of world capital movements during the 
contemporary world financial order. Bank lending has fallen from a peak of 
37% of total capital movements (1977-81) to 14% (1982-6) and between 5 and 
10% in the early 1990s, while portfolio investment has grown from 3 6% of total 
capital movements (1972-76) to between 60 and 65% in the early 1990s. Direct 
forms of investment which prevailed for much of the post-war American world 
financial order have come to account for between 30 and 35% of world capital 
movements in the early 1990s (Sinclair 1994: 136-7; Germain 1997: 124). 
5 Credit practices become 'disintermediated' when "... flows of fimds between borrowers and 
lenders avoid direct use of financial intermediaries, for instance, in cases in which companies 
withdraw their funds from banks and lend them directly to each other, or when corporations 
issue commercial paper that may be merely underwritten by a bank or investment bank! ' (Sinclair 
1994: 136). Commercial paper is "an unsecured, short-term debt obligation, which matures 
within one year of issue" (Sinclair 1994: 155). 
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The debt crisis of 1982, in which many underdeveloped states threatened 
to default on their syndicated loans, proved to be the "watershed" for bank 
lending as the predominant form of sovereign credit (Plender 1987: 43). Leyshon 
and Thrift (1997: 120-1) provide a concise summary of the consequences of the 
debt crisis for syndicated lending; 
"Developing debtor countries were severely affected by the worldwide 
deflationary trend that followed the oil price rise from 1981 onwards, 
which brought in its wake high real interest rates and damaging new 
repayment obligations. Furthermore, the monetarist policy of the Reagan 
administration and its expansion of the US budget deficit simultaneously 
pushed interest rates higher and strengthened the dollar, which ftirther 
increased the real repayment cost of dollar-denominated debt. 
Consequently, borrowers started to suspend payments in 1982. In doing 
so they immediately revealed the vulnerability of the leading banks who 
had become dangerously exposed to repayment default as a result both of 
their imprudence in lending and their involvement in oversyndication. 
By 1984 some thirty-five sovereign borrowers were unable to service 
their debt ....... 
By the mid-1980s syndicated international bank loans were largely restricted to 
renewals and rescheduling of previous rounds of credit creation! Other factors 
including relatively high inflation and nominal interest rates, the deregulation of 
national securities markets, the widespread privatisation of nationalised 
industries, new capital market instruments and improved information and 
trading technologies all further encouraged the disintermediation of the 
predominant forms of credit during the 1980s (Sobel 1994: 51; Noyelle 
1989a: 95; Walter 1993: 203). 
Against the backdrop of disintermediation, long-term sovereign and 
corporate credit practices have increasingly been organised through the 
institutional networks of capital and equity markets. Capital and equity markets 
bring together a wide range of market, civil and state institutions. These include 
investment banks, fund managers, institutional investors, commercial banks, 
6 The significance of the debt crisis for the displacement of bank lending as the predominant 
form of credit creation is reflected in the sudden nature of the collapse in the volume of foreign 
bank lending from $124 billion in 1981 to only $19 billion by 1985, the lowest level since 
syndicated bank lending had began to take hold in 1972 (Sassen 1990/1994: 26 1). 
7 By 1985, of the $167.7 billion total worth of new credit creation at a world scale, 81% was 
accounted for by interest bearing bonds, especially Eurobonds (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 12 1). 
187 
;, I'f 
stock exchanges, credit rating agencies, inter-state organisations, state 
institutions and MNCs (Germain 1997: 125). Closely intertwined with the 
disintermediation of world credit practices has been the 'securitisation' of the 
claims and obligations arising from the creation of credit. ' While essential to 
providing sufficient liquidity for primary issues of capital and equity market 
instruments (Cerny 1993a: 62-3), securitisation has also enabled the dramatic 
growth in speculative secondary trading practices. ' Consequently, the portfolio 
forms of investment which dominate total world capital movements under 
disintermediated forms of credit are the collective outcome of both the creation 
of fresh credit and the arrangement and re-arrangement of ownership claims. 
The newly predominant disintermediated forms of credit focused on the 
provision of sovereign and corporate credit for the developed political 
economies of North America and Western Europe throughout the 1980s 
(Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 121,201), embracing the so-called 'emerging markets' 
of underdeveloped political economies from the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Krugman 1995). 
Decompartmentalisation and Institutional Re-organisation 
The predominance of disintermediated forms of credit from the early-to- 
mid-1980s broadly undermined the traditionally strong position of the market 
networks of commercial banks in the organisation of world credit practices (The 
Economist 1992). In particular, regulations framing market practices in national 
political economies which approximated to the 'Anglo-American' and 'Roman 
Law' models restricted the ability of commercial banks to organise 
disintermediatcd practices. The practices of commercial banks in Anglo- 
American political economies, particularly the US, Britain and Australia, which 
tended to collect retail deposits and provide short-term loans for companies 
were separated from capital and equity market practices institutionalised within 
investment banks (Underhill 1997b: 109). Meanwhile, a combination of 
substantial elements of state ownership of financial market institutions and strict 
8 'Securitisation' is "a process whereby a financial instrument is created on the value of another 
asset. In the event of default, the underlying asset stands as security against the liability of the 
financial instrument created" (Budd 1995: 360). For example, mortgage-backed securities are 
bonds issued on the basis of a future strewn of mortgage payments. 
9 "A speculative market can be defined as one in which prices move in response to the balance 
of opinion regarding the future movement of prices, as distinct from normal markets in which 
prices move in response to objective changes in the demand for, or supply of a useable 
commodity or service" (Strange 1986: 111). Speculative trading practices are also known as 
'arbitrage', that is, the buying of assets in one market for rapid sale in another market at a higher 
price. 
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legal and regulatory codes in Roman Law political economies such as Japan, 
France and Italy once again constrained the capacity of commercial banks to 
participate in disintermediation (Underhill 1997b: 108). The position of 
commercial banks in both Anglo-American and Roman Law political economies 
contrasted with those domiciled in 'universal banking' political economies, 
particularly Germany, Canada and the Netherlands, where "banks performed all 
manner of financial operations, from consumer lending to stock market issuance 
and secondary trading" (Underhill 1997b: 10 8). 
A central pillar of the regulations that restricted the ability of commercial 
banks in Anglo-American and Roman Law to organise disintermediated credit 
practices was the 'compartmentalisation' of credit practices, especially the 
institutionalised separation of commercial banking from investment banking 
(Cemy 1993a: 54). " Compartmentalisation had been a preventative type of 
regulation, mitigating against disturbances in one sector of credit practices from 
affecting other sectors, the emergence of conflicts of interests within financial 
market institutions, and the destabilising consequences of intense competition 
(Cerny 1993a: 56). Tecompartmentalisation' was necessary if commercial 
banks in particular were to respond to disintermediation and the competitive 
pressures emanating from the relative freedoms enjoyed by Euromarket 
practices. 
The decompartmentalisation of credit practices across different national 
political economies has been a divergent, uneven and incomplete set of 
processes (The Economist 1994; Cerny 1993a: 59-60). " It has, nevertheless, 
provided a necessary prelude to the institutional re-organisation of credit 
practices in the contemporary world financial order. While clearing the ground 
for so-called 'non-banks' to institutionalise credit practices, 
decompartmentalisation has in many instances enabled commercial banks to 
extend their operations on both sides of their business into practices traditionally 
10 As Cerny (1993a: 56-7) notes, 'compartmentalisation' in different national political economies 
was not restricted to the sectoral separation of commercial and investment banking practices, but 
also included geographical separation (for example, prohibitions on inter-state banking within 
the US) and separation within sectors (for example, the polarisation of stock broking from 
jobbing in Britain). 
11 Decompartmentalisation has not only been the result of national legislative changes governing 
the institutionalisation of credit practices. For instance, within the European Union the Second 
Banking Directive implemented in January 1993 "represented a clear victory for the universal 
banking principle of the northern European statee' (Underhill 1997b: I 10). 
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institutionalised within other market institutions. " In terms of liabilities, many 
commercial, banks have come to offer new savings products, insurance and 
pension schemes. In terms of assets, commercial banks have tended to expand 
their investment banking, fund and risk management practices. National 
alliances, cross-border alliances, national mergers and acquisitions, and cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions have all facilitated this institutionalised 
reorganisation of credit practices (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 101-9). National level 
alliances and mergers and acquisitions have tended to be largely defensive in 
nature, undertaken by commercial banks which already focused primarily on 
retail credit practices bounded largely within their 'home' political economy. 
Meanwhile, cross-border alliances, mergers and acquisitions have tended to 
develop linkages between commercial banks and investment banks, as such re- 
organising the institutionalisation of world credit practices. Ultimately, such 
institutional re-organisation has tended to intensify the collective and 
hierarchical tendencies of financial markets (Smith 1992). 
Expansion and Innovation 
The related marketisation, decompartmentalisation, institutional re- 
organisation, disintermediation and securitisation of the forms of credit has also 
coincided with a rapid expansion in the volume of credit created at a world- 
scale. This has formed part of a more generalised growth of wholesale and retail 
credit creation which is visible in the growth of claims on aggregate individual, 
corporate and sovereign borrowers (Palan 1993). For instance, total US 
individual, corporate and sovereign indebtedness alone has almost doubled since 
the early 1970s to stand at well over $7 trillion, around 250% of US GDP by 
1995 (Henwood 1997: 59). OECD governments collectively have not achieved a 
budget surplus since the early 1970s. Indeed, aggregate OECD sovereign 
borrowing has increased nearly seven-fold since the early 1970s (Shutt 
1998: 112). Palan (1993) has termed the general expansion of credit creation the 
"debt for growth syndrome", as corporations and states have increasingly relied 
upon credit rather than existing revenues to fund investments against a 
background of circularly reinforcing slow growth and under-consumption from 
the early 1970s. " 
12 On this point I am indebted to the insights provided by staff from the British Bankers 
Association. Confidential interview, London, I Ith June 1998. 
13 In addition to Palan (1993), on the relationship between under-consumption tendencies and 
the increasing recourse to corporate and sovereign credit, see MacEwan (1994). 
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In our terms, however, what is significant is the disproportionately large 
extent to which, beginning with the explosion of Euromarket practices, world 
credit practices have contributed to the general expansion in the volume of 
credit (Cox 1992b/1996: 299-300). The growth in the volume of credit created 
by world credit practices has far outstripped the pace of growth in the world 
economy. For instance, cross-border bank lending as a percentage of gross 
world output increased substantially from 6.3% in 1972 to 16.2% in 1980 and 
37% by 1991 (Perraton et al 1997: 266). Increasingly large amounts of surplus 
capital have been absorbed by world credit practices as the material basis for 
this expansion (Allen 1994; Shutt 1998). 
With such massive expansion has also come increased volatility of 
interest rates and exchange rates. This encourages a combination of both risk- 
adverse short-termism in capital investment and speculative secondary financial 
trading practices (Strange 1990: 262). As a consequence, the expansion in the 
volume of credit created by world credit practices has been accompanied by 
innovations in credit instruments which, in'particular, seek to minimise the risks 
arising from increased price volatility while maximising potential capital gains 
(Strange 1998: 22-42). While the contemporary world financial order has been 
marked by a proliferation of credit instruments, of principal significance are 
derivatives as a class of instruments that include financial futures, options and 
swaps. " Bank of International Settlements (1996) figures show a phenomenal 
increase in derivatives practices such that, by the end of 1995, the $50 trillion 
worth of total risks outstanding in derivatives contracts were equivalent to about 
double the world's collective GDP (Shutt 1998: 131). Ostensibly designed to 
allow the 'hedging' of risks arising from price fluctuations, especially 
movements in interest and exchange rates, derivatives also offer the opportunity 
to buy on margin and, therefore, the potential for high-risk and high-yield 
speculative practices (Strange 1998: 94-5; Shutt 1998: 121). " As the most 
notable innovation in the instruments of credit creation, then, derivatives have 
both underpinned the massive expansion of the volume of credit created by 
14 Derivatives are "contracts specifying rights and obligations which are based upon, and thus 
derive their value from, the performance of some underlying instrument, investment, currency, 
commodity or service index, right or rate" (Comford 1995, in Strange 1998: 30). 
15 Strange (1998: 30) suggests that around 98% of derivatives practices are related to attempts to 
either avoid risks arising from, or to profit from, fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates. 
Also, see Bank of International Settlements (1996). 
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moderating risk, and offered an avenue for the speculative practices that 
themselves have contributed considerably to expansion. 
Globalisation, Regionalisation and Bifurcation 
Attempts to capture the changing forms of credit in the contemporary 
world order tend, in different ways and with diverging emphasis, to highlight the 
major features outlined above. There is also a disposition to conflate the 
dimensions of change within the overarching processes of change which are 
characterised as 'globalisation'. " While considerable disagreement surrounds 
whether technology, markets, or states have been the driving force behind the 
processes of globalisation, there is general agreement amongst scholars that 
world credit practices have become genuinely global in orientation. " The 
assertion by Strange (1990: 260), a leading and influential proponent in IPE of 
'global finance', of a shift from "a predominantly state-based system with some 
transnational linkages to being a predominantly global system with some local 
differences" is broadly representative of this consensus. Indeed, the assumption 
that world credit practices have become globally-orientated extends well beyond 
IPE scholars to the fields of economics (Allen 1994; Ghosh & Oritz 1997), 
urban studies (Sassen 1991; Warf 1995) and economic geography (Thrift & 
Leyshon 1997; Knox & Taylor 1995). With retail credit practices held to have 
remained largely national in orientation, the result is a somewhat rigid 'two- 
tier', global-national understanding of the orientation of credit practices in the 
contemporary world financial order. " 
16 'Globalisation' is understood here as a set of historical processes whereby credit practices, 
and the intersubjective meanings that frame them, become globally-orientated, realising the 
increased integration of the contemporary world financial order. This contrasts with 
understandings amongst orthodox IPE scholars of world finance which, informed by neo- 
classical economics, tend to view globalisation as a dramatic increase in international capital 
mobility (Goodman & Pauly 1993; Andrews 1994; Cohen 1996; Dombrowski 1998). 
17 The literature in IPE concerned with the forces of change in the globalisation of world finance 
is substantial. For views positing the overriding significance of technological and market 
factors, see Wriston (1988), McKenzie and Lee (1991) and Cerny (1994b). For views asserting 
the centrality of state officials, institutions and inter-state relations, see Helleiner (1994), 
Underhill (1991), Loriaux et al (1997), Vogel (1996) and Moran (1991). For relatively recent 
reviews of the literature, see Cohen (1996) and Dombrowski (1998). 
18 Germain (1996: 214-5) has highlighted three main reasons why retail banking practices remain 
largely nationally-orientated. First, a lack of profitability in retail banking due to low returns and 
large fixed costs of creating and maintaining retail institutional networks discourages new market 
entrants. Second, national cultural differences continue which prevent the emergence of a 
uniform, transnational approach to retail banking. Third, even in Europe where attempts have 
been made to codify European law into national law, legal institutional barriers persist. In 
addition to these reasons, instances of national banks utilising their domestic political power to 
obstruct foreign competition are also apparent. For instance, Barclays Bank's attempt to 
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It is held here, however, that the two-tier orthodoxy understates the 
extent to which world credit practices themselves have become bifurcated 
between globally-orientated capital and equity market practices, and banking 
practices which have become regionally-orientated in North America, Europe 
and Asia. " Two threads of existing research are broadly suggestive of the 
global-regional bifurcation of world credit practices. First, the identification of 
the emergence of globally-orientated world credit practices by the two-tier 
orthodoxy has fuelled a research program which seeks through empirical 
investigation to 'test' these claims. Such empirical 'testing' of global finance 
has, however, only realised an inconclusive set of conclusions (Allen 1994; 
Epstein 1996; Hirst & Thompson 1996; Perraton et al 1997: 265-71). As a 
consequence, more nuanced perspectives have come to acknowledge that not all 
world credit practices are globally-orientated, reflected in the uneven trajectory 
of integration (Underhill 1997c; Vipond 1993: 186; Cerny 1993a: 68). The 
restructuring of fonns of credit in the world financial order is more uncertain 
than the dominant two-tier understanding would suggest. This has stimulated 
calls for a "deeper analysis" to form the heart of future research programs 
(Cohen 1996: 294-6). The use of globalisation as an all-encompassing 
descriptive term clearly obscures a more complex situation in which a single, 
integrated and universal market structure for world credit practices has not been 
realised. 
Second, attempts to conceptualise the restructuring of the contemporary 
world economy more broadly have tended to give rise to a dichotomy between 
globalisation and regionalisation. Liberal advocates of globalisation hold that 
markets for goods and services are becoming perfectly integrated at a global 
scale, rendering the national economy largely dead as an economic unit (Ohmae 
1990; Reich 1991). Similarly, while critical of liberal reasoning, others have 
introduce an interest-bearing account in France in the early 1990s was thwarted by collusion 
between the major French banks and their domestic regulators (Economist 1994: 33). 
'9 'Regionalisation' is understood here in the context of the contemporary world order as a set 
of historical processes whereby credit practices, and the intersubjective meanings that frame 
them, become regionally-orientated, realising the increased and distinct integration of the credit 
practices of a region. Regionalisation in this sense has been rarely considered in relation to the 
contemporary world financial order. Instead, existing research has tended to focus on either the 
formation of regional currency blocs (see, for instance, Jameson 1990), or upon 'economic 
regionalism' not regionalisation - that is, "a conscious policy of states or sub-state regions to co- 
ordinate activities and arrangements in a greater region! ' (Wyatt-Walter 1995: 77 original 
emphasis) (see, for instance, Underhill 1997b; Vipond 1993). 
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highlighted the rise of transnational. enterprises and markets as part and parcel of 
the emergence of a genuinely 'global political economy' (Gill & Law 1988). 
In 
contrast, critics of the globalisation thesis have often fallen back on 
regionalisation and the identification of the emergence of a more "multi-polar" 
(Carnoy et al 1993: 6) world economy. " This view is often rooted in the 
identification of economic activity as remaining fundamentally nationally-based, 
with contemporary increases in international flows of trade and investment held 
to have generated distinct patterns of economic regionalisation in North 
America, Europe, and Asia (Hirst & Thompson 1996; Ruigrok & van Tulder 
1995; Zysman 1996). " The result of these conflicting interpretations has been 
to produce a dichotomy which has effectively served to 'close off inquiry. 
Neither the possible coexistence of globalisation and regionalisation, nor the 
nature of this coexistence in different sectors and areas of the world economy, 
are reflected upon. 22 
Drucker's (1986) reading of what he terms 'the changed world economy' 
does, however, facilitate consideration of the coexistence of globalisation and 
regionalisation and the nature of this coexistence in the contemporary world 
financial order. Drucker (1986: 781-8) posits that the world economy has been 
marked by the emergence of what he terms the "symbolic economy" of massive 
volumes of capital and credit flows alongside the flows of goods and services in 
the "real economy". " Walter (1993: 20 1) concurs, asserting that "financial flows 
now utterly dominate real flows between countries in quantitative terms". 
20 During the post-1945 era the world economy was largely luni-polar' in nature, with the 
American political economy at its hub. Under the Pax Americana and Cold War structures of 
the wider world order, the American core of the world economy expanded the production of 
goods and services under Tordist' social relations. Asian and Latin American state-societies 
especially became subject to the competitive pressures of the world economy (Cox 1987: 244-53, 
298-300; Rupert 1995). From the 1960s, the relative competitiveness of Southeast Asia in 
particular and also Germany over the old North American heartland of the world economy 
contributed to the emergence of a more multi-polar world economy. 
21 For each of the loosely defined regions of Europe, North America, and Asia, the bulk of 
international trade appears to be intra-regional, as trade outside of each region contributes less 
than 10% of the GDP of each. An intra-regional pattern of foreign direct investment is also 
apparent, reflecting the regional strategies of MNCs (Zysman 1996: 159-60). 
22 One notable exception here is the research of Wyatt-Walter (1995). He states that "... while 
regionalizing and globalizing tendencies are both at work in the contemporary world, these 
tendencies are at present more symbiotic than contradictory" (p. 77). 
23 Gordon (1988: 55) traces the emergence of the symbolic economy to the early 1970s and the 
combination of falling levels of corporate profitability, increased interest rate and exchange rate 
instability, and the re-cycling through the Euromarkets of the large volumes of petro-dollars 
generated by the first oil crisis. 
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Contrary to neo-classical economics which holds that international trade in 
goods and services determines international capital flows and foreign exchange 
rates, the symbolic economy seems to have become 'de-coupled' (Strange 1986) 
from the real economy and to be operating largely independently. For instance, 
the value of foreign exchange trading practices world-wide stands at over $1 
trillion per day, around flfty times the level of world trade (Perraton et al 
1997: 265). 
Building on Drucker's (1986) analysis and incorporating the research 
into world finance by Germain (1996; 1996a; 1996b), globally-orientated capital 
and equity market practices can be socially situated firmly at the heart of the 
symbolic economy. Investment banking, fund and risk management practices 
collectively create the massive short-term speculative flows that are the 
signature of the symbolic economy. As such, globally-orientated capital and 
equity market practices can be distinguished from banking practices. Banking 
practices that provide non-capital market corporate and commercial credit 
remain largely embedded in the real economy. The continuing close 
relationships between commercial banks and their medium-sized corporate 
customers has ensured that regional arcs of trade and investment have been 
mirrored by the regionalisation of banking practices in the contemporary world 
financial order. " The regional-orientation of banking practices in both North 
America and Europe have been further facilitated respectively by the 
regionalism of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
European Single Market Program (Germain 1996b, 1996c). Significantly, given 
the decompartmentalisation and institutional re-organisation of world credit 
practices, banking practices are not simply identifiable with commercial banks 
as a set of financial market institutional networks. Instead, regionally-orientated 
banking practices, which are driven by different motivational dynamics to those 
which guide capital and equity market practices, are visible within the principal 
market institutions. 13 
24 On the continuing close relationships between commercial banks and their medium-sized 
corporate customers, see Pauly and Reich (1997). 
25 In our terms, the short-term speculative tendencies of the symbolic economy are contradicted 
by the longer-term close relationships between banks and corporations in the real economy. As 
New York banker Lowell Bryan has argued, these divergent motivational dynamics which 
inform investment and commercial banking practices translate into problems of management 
when attempts are made to integrate them within a single financial market institution (Economist 
1994: 25). This has consequences for the manner in which world credit practices become 
institutionalised. For instance, the recently acquired London-centred investment banking arms 
of European commercial banks have tended to retain considerable intra-institutional autonomy 
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In summary, the utility of framing a synchronic understanding of 
contemporary world finance in the 'historical' terms pursued here, then, appears 
to be to offer a more nuanced assessment to the usual 'global-national' 
orthodoxy. A focus for inquiry in the first instance upon the actual practices of 
world finance facilitates an awareness of the conjunctural distinctiveness of the 
changing forms of credit. This distinctiveness stems from the main features of 
change outlined, and cannot be easily captured by conflating change under the 
rubric of 'globalisation'. Contemporary 'global finance' is rather a far more 
complex set of world credit practices than is commonly acknowledged. It is to 
another rarely recognised distinctive feature of contemporary world credit 
practices that we now turn, that is, their decentralisation between the WFCs of 
New York, London and Tokyo. Ii 
Part 11 - The 'Triad': Key Social Spaces 
Considered over the longue durie since the seventeenth century, modem 
world credit practices have become centralised in successive single WFCs as the 
key social spaces for practices - Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries; London in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and New York 
for the four the decades in the middle of the twentieth century. Periods in which 
two or more financial centres have coexisted at the apex of the hierarchy have 
thus tended to be largely transitionary, coinciding with the fall of the former 
WFC and the ascent of the future WFC. The contemporary world order has 
been marked, however, by the coexistence of New York, London and Tokyo as 
the triad of financial centres at the apex of hierarchy of WFCs - or what 
Hamilton (1986) has termed "the three-legged stool". No single centre appears 
likely to emerge as dominant (Sassen 1991; Drennan 1996; Roberts 1994). 
In seeking to understand the emergence of the triad, the standing of each 
as a key social space is explored below in relation to the changing forms of 
credit. This serves to reveal the relative and mutable significance of each WFC 
as a social space for world credit practices, contrasting with the tendency to 
emphasise the similarities between each WFC of the triad. For instance, in an 
introduction to a recently edited volume concerned with New York, London, 
and Tokyo as 'global financial centres', Roberts' (I 994: xiii) notes that, 
(Interview with representatives of the research and strategy departments of a major German 
universal bank, Frankfirt, I September 1997. See also Financial Times (1996, May 29, p. 6). 
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"The trio of London, New York and Tokyo form the apex of the 
hierarchy of international financial centres. Their common 
characteristics, and that which sets them apart from other centres, is the 
global reach of their financial ties. Of course, each also has particularly 
strong ties with other centres and financial institutions in its own region 
and time zone". 
Similarly, Budd (1995: 350) has commented in relation to the urban studies 
literature concerned with 'global cities' (Sassen 1991) as WFCs that "The 
temptation to configure these cities homogeneously appears strange". A 
nuanced assessment of New York, London, and Tokyo as key social spaces for 
the changing forms of credit reveals considerable asymmetries between them. 
New York: Key Social Space 
For the first three decades of the American world financial order, New 
York was the key single WFC in that order. While this was challenged by the 
centralisation of short-term Eurocurrency market practices in London 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, it was the increased centralisation of 
long-term credit creation in the Euromarkets from 19734 that finally displaced 
New York from the apex of world finance. The removal of US capital controls 
in early 1974 did little to revive New York to its previous standing. During 
1974, $25 billion of additional international short-term capital did flow into 
New York, facilitating $18 billion worth of short-term credit creation. 
However, between 1974 and 1977 new issues of foreign bonds in New York 
were the equivalent to only 15% of new issues of Eurobonds (Mendelsohn 
1980: 209). International syndicated bank lending, which was the predominant 
form of sovereign credit during this period, also remained firmly centralised in 
London. 
Despite the centralisation of the predominant forms of long-term credit 
in London during the first years of the contemporary world financial order, New 
York's position as a key social space was largely guaranteed by the continued 
prevalence of dollar-denominated credit. Claims and obligations arising from 
dollar-denominated credit practices ultimately have to be cleared through 
American payments and banking practices which are centralised in New York 
(Walter 1993: 209; Frieden 1987: 102-3; Noyelle 1989a: 110-12). As Nakao 
(1995: 79-80) asserts, 
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"No matter how much the Euromarket expands, all transactions 
denominated in dollars can only be completed through transfers of funds 
in and out of US-based dollar accounts: no matter how multipolar 
international finance may become, New York remains the hub as long as 
dollar-denominated transactions predominate". 
Outstanding dollar-denominated obligations throughout the contemporary world 
financial order have been settled largely by inter-bank transfers organised 
through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) of the New 
York Clearing House Association, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. In 1995, CHIPS cleared 200,000 transactions daily worth 
around $1.3 trillion (Strange 1998: 24). In addition, the New York-centred 
Society for Worldwide International Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) 
system has acted as a verification mechanism for the electronic transfer of funds 
(Gramm 1992). 
The centralisation of clearance practices in New York has fed the 
significance of New York as a key social space for money-market practices. 
Financial market institutions, corporations and central banks all hold working 
balances in New York to facilitate clearance practices that also find their way 
into the money-markets. Consequently, the significance of New York as a space 
for money-market practices has increased alongside the vast expansion in the 
volume of dollar-denominated credit in the contemporary world financial order. 
For instance, the value of foreign bank working balances held in New York 
increased twenty-fold between 1973 and 1990 to $536.5 billion (Vogel 
1993: 58). New York-centred money-market practices have, in particular, been a 
significant source of short-term credit for inter-bank lending in the 
contemporary world financial order. 
New York has been a key social space for the disintermediated forms of 
credit that have been predominant from the early-to-mid 1980s. In terms of 
capital market practices, while London has been a key space for the issue and 
trading of international bonds, New York is the key space for US Treasury bond 
(T-bond) market practices. Given the position of the US as the world's largest 
economy and sovereign debtor, the US T-bond market is the largest single bond 
market world-wide. US T-bonds are "the linchpin of the global financial order" 
(Taggart Murphy 1996: 111) in the sense that they set the benchmark against 
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which other investment opportunities are judged . 
26 From the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s, it was the buying and placement of T-bonds by Japanese investment 
banks operating in New York that provided much of the basis for their high 
profile global expansion as part of the development of the Japanese political 
economy (Emmott 1993: 144-5 1). 2" During the 1990s the Bank of Japan, partly 
in an attempt to restrict the appreciation of the yen, has become the largest 
single purchaser of US T-bonds, holding bonds valued at $200 billion (Strange 
1998: 49). The value of daily secondary trading in the combination of 'bills', 
'notes' and 'bonds' available averaged between $400 and $550 billion at the end 
of 1992.1' Significantly, the vast majority of these trading practices are 
centralised in New York, as only 4% of total trading takes place in London and 
1% in Tokyo (Henwood 1997: 24-6). 
In addition, New York's deep and highly liquid capital markets more 
broadly have proved significant to capital market practices in the contemporary 
world financial order. New York's capital markets have been a fulcrum for both 
the placement of foreign government and corporate bonds issued elsewhere, and 
the portfolio investment practices of foreign fund managers and institutional 
investors. Further, New York as a key social space has been very much at the 
forefront of the securitisation of the forms of credit in the contemporary world 
financial order. New York's financial market institutions have led the way in 
the packaging and re-packaging of capital market instruments for sale and 
trading (Hamilton 1986: 117; Taggart Murphy 1996: 108). These have included 
innovations in securitised forms of credit such as mortgage-backed securities, 
junk bonds and bonds with wan-ants attached. 
In terms of equity market practices, the disclosure rules governing new 
listings on the NYSE set by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
have served to limit, at least to some extent, foreign issues and secondary 
trading in New York in the contemporary world fmancial order (Ultz 1997). 
Around 30-34% of foreign equity trading practices by value were, however, 
26 During the period 1977-198 1, the US political economy underwent a reversal of its post-war 
role from a net provider to a net recipient of international long-term capital flows, leading to 
average annual deficits of $24 billion between 1982 and 1986 and $32 billion between 1987 and 
1991 (Germain 1997: 111). 
27 Around 40% of total new T-bond issues were bought by Japanese investment banks and 
placed with institutional investors in Japan during the mid- I 980s (Emmott 1993: 146). 
28 'Bills' have between 3 and twelve months maturity, 'notes' between I and 10 years maturity, 
and 'bonds' over 10 years maturity. 
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undertaken in New York in 1997.1" It appears that much of this trading in New 
York takes place through the over-the-counter electronic market provided by the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System 
(NASDAQ) established in 1971 (Smith 1989: 7-29). By 1996,416 foreign 
corporations had listings on NASDAQ, second only to the LSE with 533. " 
NASDAQ has, however, not simply contributed to the significance of New York 
as a social space for equity trading practices (Honeygold 1989: 58). The 
electronic link-up between London and NASDAQ via London's Stock 
Exchange Automated Quotation International (SEAQ International) system, in 
place since 1985, has also been important in facilitating the centralisation of 
over-the-counter foreign equity trading practices in London. 
In terms of banking practices which provide commercial and non-capital 
market corporate credit, New York appears to occupy a relatively insignificant 
position when compared to London and Tokyo. In 1997, American cross-border 
international bank lending centralised in New York accounted for only 9% of 
total lending volume, compared with 18% from London and 14% from Japan. " 
Attempts during the 1980s to promote New York as a space for banking forms 
of credit, such as the creation of off-shore International Banking Facilities 
(IBFs), seem to have been relatively unsuccessful (McGahey et al 1990: 136-7). 
However, a simple comparison between the WFCs of the triad obscures the 
extent to which New York has stood throughout the contemporary world 
financial order as the key social space for regionally-orientated banking 
practices in North America (Germain 1996a). New York has been the key space 
for the regional expansion of banking practices, institutionalised particularly 
within the networks of Canadian and Mexican commercial banks. As "the core 
practice of regional finance in North America" (Germain 1996a: 196), 
commercial credit practices that service the credit needs of a regional arc of 
trade have, in particular, been centralised in New York. This has facilitated the 
capacity of Canadian and Mexican banks to cater for the credit needs of their 
29 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12th June 1998. 
30 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12th June 1998. 
31 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12th June 1998. A focus 
on share of total cross-border bank lending by volume is significant in revealing the relative 
standing of New York. For instance, Drennan's (1996) identification of New York as the 
'home' of the highest number of foreign commercial bank branch offices in 1993 of 342 
(compared to 312 in London and 97 in Tokyo) leads him to over-emphasise the significance of 
New York as a centre for corporate and commercial banking at the expense of the other two 
WFCs of the triad. 
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domestic customers who themselves have become increasingly drawn into 
producing for the US market. 
London: Key Social Space 
In the context of the changes in the predominant forms of credit that 
have characterised the contemporary world financial order, London has 
remained a key social space for world credit practices throughout the order. 
London's rebirth as a WFC can be dated from the early 1960s as it re-emerged 
as the key entrep6t social space for off-shore Eurodollar practices in the 
Euromarkets. In particular, this led to the firm re-establishment of London as 
the key social space for syndicated banking practices and foreign exchange 
trading (Born 1977: 310). Largely in response to the short-term nature of the 
capital available in the Euromarkets up to 19734, it was the London-centred 
international banks that developed the practices of syndicated lending. London- 
centred syndicated lending became the predominant form of sovereign credit 
creation during the first years of the contemporary world financial order 
(Coakley 1992: 52-72). Given the significance foreign exchange trading in off- 
shore banking practices, the emergence of London as the key social space for 
syndicated banking practices and off-shore Euromarket practices more broadly 
fed the position of London as the key space for foreign exchange trading. 
London has retained this primacy throughout the contemporary world financial 
order, accounting for an average of $464 billion worth of daily turnover in 1995 
(around 30% of total turnover), compared with $244 billion for New York as the 
next largest foreign exchange centre. 32 
As the predominant forms of credit in the contemporary world financial 
order became disintermediated from the early-to-mid 1980s, London was able to 
continue to stand as a principal WFC within the triad. Given that a major 
feature of disintermediated credit practices in the 1980s was Japanese 
investment in US securities, especially US T-bonds, it has been suggested that 
London was largely by-passed as a social space for these practices (Leyshon & 
Thrift 1997: 93; Taggart Murphy 1996: 105-126). However, closer examination 
of international capital flows during the 1980s by Nakao (1995: 37-42) has 
revealed that large volumes of Japanese capital was channelled through London, 
as only one quarter of Japanese capital outflows went directly to the United 
States. For instance, between 1983 and 1987 London was the source of around 
32 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12th June 1998. 
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40% of US private capital inflows, virtually all of which were financial flows 
organised through Japanese off-shore market institutional networks centralised 
in London. Indeed, given the rapid growth of Japanese financial market 
institutional networks in the 1980s, the position of London as "the second 
financial capital of Japan" (Warner 1991: 196) contributed considerably to 
London's position as a key off-shore space for banking and capital market 
practices. Throughout the 1980s, between 40% and 60% of the overseas assets 
of Japanese banks were created in London (Nakao 1995: 110). Issues of 
Eurobonds by Japanese banks and corporations in London, organised through 
the 'big four' Japanese investment banks, underpinned Japanese expansionary 
direct investments world-wide (Nakao 1995: 46-9). From a less than 10% share 
of the total value of all new London-centred Eurobond issues in 1985, the big 
four investment banks of Nomura, Daiwa, Yamaichi and Nikko accounted for 
around 40% by 1989 (Emmott 1993: 151-2). 
London, then, is clearly a key social space for capital market practices at 
a world-scale in the contemporary world financial order, accounting for 60% of 
primary international bond syndication and 75% of secondary international bond 
trading at the end of 1994.11 At the roots of London's standing in international 
capital market practices was the organisation of the issue of Eurobonds for 'blue 
chip' OECD corporations from the mid-1970s. As the predominant forms of 
credit became disintermediated and securitised. during the 1980s, London's 
continued position as the key space for Eurobond issues ensured its centrality to 
world credit practices. For instance, in 1987 the $150 billion worth of new 
Eurobond issues in which London prevailed constituted around half of the total 
of all international medium- and long-term credit creation in that year (Frieden 
1987: 109). 
In addition to its position as a key social space for international capital 
market practices, London has become firmly established as a space for the 
practices of trading foreign equities. This is a consequence of both the 
comparatively global-orientation of the London Stock Exchange and the 
centralisation in London of the over-the-counter international trading practices 
of the principal investment banks and institutional investors. "' In 1997, London 
33 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, l2th June 1998. 
34 On this point I am indebted to the insights of a London-based representative of an American 
owned investment bank. Confidential interview, 2nd June 1998. Sobel (1994: 57-8) provides 
figures which illustrate the comparative global-orientation of the London Stock Exchange. The 
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accounted for approximately 60-65% of world turnover in foreign equities 
trading, compared to 30-34% in New York. " Around two-thirds of London's 
trading practices are in European equities, adding a regional dimension to 
London's position as a WFC for equity market practices (Coakley 1992: 65; 
16 Honeygold 1989: 59-61; Stafford 1992: 48). Such a centralisation of trading in 
European equities in London has been facilitated by mergers, acquisitions and 
alliances between ma or continental European universal banks and British 
investment banks, bringing together, for example, Deutsche Bank and Morgan 
Grenfell (1989), Dresdner Bank and Kleinwort Benson (1995), ING and Barings 
Bank (1995) and Swiss Bank Corporation and SG Warburg (1996). 
London's standing as a key social space for banking practices has been 
closely related to the vigorous changes in the forms of credit that have marked 
the contemporary world financial order. As such, three broad periods or 
'phases' of London's position are broadly distinguishable. First, for much of the 
first decade of the world financial order, London's position as the key space for 
syndicated bank lending practices through the institutional networks of the 
Euromarkets ensured that London dominated banking practices. For instance, in 
1980 London accounted for 27% of the total volume of cross-border bank 
lending among BIS reporting countries (Davis & Latter 1989: 518). During this 
first phase, then, London was an off-shore entrep8t VvTC for banking practices. 
The period from the early-to-mid 1980s through to the end of the decade 
marked a second phase of London's standing as a key space for banking 
practices in the contemporary world financial order. During this period the 
value of outstanding cross-border bank lending out of London continued to 
increase, growing from $462.8 billion in 1982 through to $894 billion by 1989 
(Sassen 1991: 178-9). However, London's share of the total volume of cross- 
border bank lending among BIS reporting countries fell to 20.5% by 1989 
(Davis & Latter 1989: 518). The relative decline of London as a key space for 
banking practices during this second phase would appear to have been related in 
numbers of foreign companies listed as a percentage of all listings on the three principal 
exchanges are as follows - LSE 12.5%, NYSE 2.4%, TSE 1.06% (1980 figures); LSE 21.6%, 
NYSE 5AO16, TSE 7.1% (1990 figures). The volume of overseas equities as a percentage of total 
trading volume on each of the three principal exchanges are as follows - LSE 20.3%, NYSE 
4.4%, TSE 0.8% (1989 figures). 
35 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12th June 1998. 
36 According to the Bank of England, some 90% of foreign equity turnover within Europe 
involved LSE member firms in 1996 (private correspondence, 12th June 1998). 
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particular to two dimensions of the changing forms of credit - disintermediation 
and bifurcation. 
The processes of the disintermediation of world credit practices proved 
uneven, as the shift in the predominant forms of credit to capital and equity 
market practices centred in London and New York coincided with an expansion 
of Tokyo-centred bank lending practices. " This was reflected in the share of 
Tokyo-centred, Japanese cross-border bank lending increasing from 5% of the 
total volume among BIS reporting countries in 1982 to 20.5% by 1989 (Davis & 
Latter 1989: 518). As a mature off-shore entrepOt WFC, London provided a 
social space for those banking practices, especially inter-bank lending, which 
facilitated this expansion. Japanese banks located in London lent short-term 
funds to their Tokyo-centred counterparts for longer-tenn 're-lending'. " As a 
consequence, from a marginal position at the beginning of the 1980s, Japanese 
commercial banks came to dominate London-centred bank lending by the end of 
the 1980s. In 1990, Japanese commercial banks in London accounted for 38% 
of outstanding loans, compared with 15% for US banks and 14% for British 
banks (Coakley 1992: 60-1). Meanwhile, reflecting the bifurcation of world 
credit practices, Tokyo-centred, regionally-orientated banking practices provided 
the necessary credit for the expanding arc of trade and investment in Asia. " 
The period from the beginning of the 1990s has marked a third, current 
phase of London's standing as a key social space for commercial banking 
practices. BIS statistics show that in the course of the 1990s London has once 
37 The disintermediation of London-centred credit practices is illustrated by the considerable 
withdrawal from London by US commercial banking networks alongside an influx of US 
investment banking networks. Between 1980 and 1989 the number of US financial market 
institutions in London overall fell by 31%, while the number of US investment banks with 
operations in London increased by 28% (Lee & Schmidt-Marwede 1993: 496). 
38 For an excellent account of the borrowing by Japanese banks in London and New York as 
underpinning the position of Japan from the mid- I 980s not simply as the world's largest creditor 
nation but as a "re-lending nation" see Nakao (1995). The outstanding net short-term overseas 
liabilities of Japanese banks increased from $44 billion in 1985 to peak of $265.9 billion by 
1989 (Lapavitsas 1997: 31). 
39 The regionally-orientated expansion of commercial banking practices in Asia is shown by 
comparative growth rates for the expansion of the institutional networks of commercial banks. 
Between 1981 and 1993 the average annual growth world-wide in the number of foreign 
branches of commercial banks slowed from over 11% in the previous two decades to only 2.3%. 
Simultaneously, sharp growth took place in Asia. For instance, foreign assets of banks 
undertaking practices in Tokyo, Singapore and Hong Kong increased by an average of 22% a 
year during 1981-1993 (CRP 1995). 
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again regained its position as the key social space for banking practices, 
accounting for 18% of cross-border lending in 1997, compared with 14% for 
Japan and 9% for the USA . 
40 London continues to stand as an off-shore entrep6t 
WFC for banking practices broadly, providing non-capital market corporate 
credit and commercial credit for the world's major MNCs (Drennan 1996). 
What characterises this current phase particularly, however, is that London's 
standing has been partially eroded by second-tier continental European financial 
centres. "' Paris and Frankfurt especially have increased in significance as social 
spaces for regionally-orientated banking practices as intra-European trade and 
investment has become consolidated (CRP 1995: Section 10). 41 Europe's 
medium-sized companies have intensified their trade and investment links with 
neighbouring European political economies, encouraging their 'home' banks to 
expand their pan-European institutional networks and re-organise practices by 
replacing nationally-based institutional divisions with various functional market 
divisions (Germain 1996b: 368; Canals 1993: 162). As such, a presence across 
Europe's financial centres is necessary to service the commercial and corporate 
credit needs of Europe's companies (Br6ker 1993). Consequently, the 
importance of France and Germany within European trade translates into the 
significance of Paris and Frankfurt respectively as spaces for regionally- 
orientated banking practices in Europe. 
Tokyo: Key Social Space 
During the 1970s Tokyo did not constitute a key social space for the 
practices of the creation of credit at a world scale. Even within the Japanese 
political economy itself, the role of Tokyo as a social space for credit creation 
was restricted by the structure of ... repressed' finance" (Lapavitsas 1997) 
dominated by the authority of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 
Since the mid-1970s, however, Tokyo's markets have become increasingly 
40 Figures provided by the Bank of England, private correspondence, 12di June 1998. 
41 This is reflected in London's current share (18%) of the total volume of cross-border bank 
lending. While London has regained its comparative position as the principal WFC for 
commercial banking practices amongst the triad, its overall share of the total continues to 
decline. It is also supported by the breakdown by currencies and financial centres of the 
volumes of foreign exchange trading practices. London is the principal WFC for foreign 
exchange practices, with the vast majority of transactions $-DM trades. However, only 10% of 
total intra-European foreign exchange transactions take place in London, compared with over 
20% in Frankfurt (Interviews with representatives of the research and strategy departments of a 
major German universal bank, Frankfint, I st September 1997). 
42 This view is also supported by a range of confidential interviews conducted with 
representatives of major German universal banks, Frankfurt, September 1997. 
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significant as a source of sovereign and corporate credit for the Japanese 
political economy (Kalder 1997). " Tokyo also became established in the early- 
to-mid 1970s as the key social space for foreign credit creation and capital 
investment practices in the Northeast Asian region (Reed 1980). The gravity of 
Tokyo as Asia's principal regional financial centre has subsequently expanded 
to Southeast Asia, reflected in the displacement of the importance of American 
and western credit and capital. For instance, the collective yen-denominated 
liabilities of Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines 
rose from 19.5% to 37.9% of total external liabilities between 1980 and 1988, 
while the share of dollar-denominated liabilities fell from 47.3% to 27% 
(Helleiner 1993a: 222). 
Tokyo emerged as the third leg of the triad of WFCs in the early-to-mid 
1980s. As credit practices became disintermediated, Tokyo differed 
considerably from London and New York as a key social space for credit 
practices. Rather than standing as a key social space for issuing and trading of 
capital and equity market instruments, Tokyo has been a key space for the 
practices of international capital investment. " As Table 2 illustrates, Japanese 
net long-term capital outflows increased dramatically during the early-to-mid 
1980s, as Japan became the principal creditor economy in the world economy. 
Indeed, for the period between 1986 and 1988, Japanese net long-term capital 
outflows were between three and four times greater than those of the next largest 
creditor economy (Germain 1997: 113). Although, as already noted, a 
considerable share of Japanese capital outflows found their way to London and 
New York for allocation through the networks of Japanese financial market 
institutions, Tokyo was a key space for the practices of capital allocation at a 
world scale (Taggart Murphy 1996: 5; Germain 1997: 116). Portfolio forms of 
investment as a share of the total of Japanese net long-term capital outflows 
prevailed over direct forms of investment throughout the 1980s, accounting for 
between 66% and 77% of the massive flows that took place between 1985 and 
1987 (Nakao 1995: 29; Helleiner 1993a: 209). As such, the combination of the 
relatively large volume of Japanese capital outflows on the one hand, and the 
43 Outstanding Japanese government bonds increased from 7% of GNP (1974-5) to 32% of 
GNP (1981-2) (Eken 1984/1994: 304-8). 
44 An understanding of the practices of credit creation in successive world financial orders 
necessarily includes the allocation of capital alongside the creation, allocation, trading and 
clearance of credit. As Strange (1990: 259 my emphasis) asserts of "the field of finance", it 
constitutes "the system by which credit is created, brought and sold and by which the direction 
and use ofcapital is determined'. 
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orientation of Tokyo-centred capital allocation practices towards portfolio 
investment on the other, contributed particularly during the mid-to-late 1980s 
towards the predominant forms of credit in the contemporary world financial 
order. 
Table 2- Japanese net long---term capital outflows by year 
Year 
1972-1977 
1982-1986 
Japanese net long-term capital outflows 
(US$ billions) 
4* 
57* 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1987-1991 
1993 
*- Average per year over five year period. 
Adapted from Germain (1997: 113). 
134 
138 
121 
87* 
87 
While significant as a social space for practices of capital allocation, 
then, the relative weakness of Tokyo as a space for the practices of issuing and 
trading capital and equity market instruments at a world scale can be traced to 
three sets of factors. Taken together, these three sets of factors have served to 
constrain the capacity of Tokyo to stand as a key space for the creation and 
trading of disintermediated forms of credit. First, by comparison with London 
and New York, the regulations framing Tokyo's capital and equity market 
structures remain relatively restrictive (Lapavitsas 1997). The 'big bang' in 
Tokyo which began on Ist April 1998 appears likely to resemble a series of 
small explosions as regulations are gradually removed, continuing and following 
the gradual pattern of deregulation began in the mid-1970s (Kalder 1997; Vogel 
1996). "' The combination of a relatively slow pace of Japanese regulatory 
reform with the more rapid liberalisation of Japanese capital and exchange 
controls facilitated the global expansion of Japanese financial market 
institutional networks, thereby effectively reinforcing the position of London 
and New York as WFCs at the expense of Tokyo. 
45 For details of the Japanese 'big bang', see The Financial Times, Survey, 'Japan's Financial 
Revolution', 26/3/98. 
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Second, the capacity of Tokyo to stand as a key social space for the 
creation of disintermediated forms of credit has also been hampered by the 
relatively slow development of money-market practices (Honeygold 1989: 107- 
115). " Short-term money-market practices are significant in building the 
critical mass of liquidity for capital and equity market practices at a world scale 
in a WFC. The relative weakness of Tokyo's money-markets has been rooted in 
the denomination of Japanese trade and payments with the US and Europe in 
currencies other than yen, primarily US dollars and German Deutschmarks 
respectively. This has led to weak demand for Tokyo-centred yen-denominated 
clearing practices and commercial credit creation that would bring greater 
liquidity to Tokyo's money-markets (Eken 1984/1994: 327; Warner 1991: 187-8). 
Finally, the capacity of Tokyo to stand as a key space for 
disintermediated credit practices has been hampered in the 1990s by the 
continuing malaise of Japanese finance in the wake of the collapse of 'bubble 
economy' (Lapavitsas 1997: 37). The huge volumes of bad debts bequeathed 
upon Japanese financial market institutions of not less than 77 trillion yen (E335 
billion) and the massive indebtedness of Japanese industry have reduced the 
involvement of Tokyo-centred financial market institutions in capital and equity 
markets at a world scale. "' Further, it has also manifested itself in the 
retrenchment of foreign involvement in Tokyo. For instance, in 1990 there were 
125 foreign corporations listed on the TSE, falling to 92 by 1994 (Drennan 
1996: 369). 
In terms of banking practices, Tokyo came to stand alongside London at 
the apex of lending by the end of the 1980s (Helleiner 1993a: 212; Davis & 
Latter 1989: 518). As already noted, the increased significance of Tokyo as a 
space for banking practices during the 1980s was largely the result of the 
expansion of regionally-orientated banking practices. These provided the credit 
necessary for the expanding regional arc of trade and investment in Asia, rooted 
46 The relatively 'shallow' nature of Tokyo's money-markets is shown by comparison with the 
United States. Japanese money-markets are the equivalent of 19.6% of nominal Japanese GDP 
compared with American money-markets which are the equivalent of 29.4% of nominal US GDP 
(Lapavitsas 1997: 28). 
47 The figure of 77 trillion yen of bad debts has been admitted to by the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance, although it seems likely that this understates the extent of the problem. US estimates of 
the bad debts of Japanese financial market institutions have been as high as equivalent to $1 
trillion ('Big Bang Stock Takes a Tumble in Edgy Tokyo', The Guardian, 10/6/98, p. 2 1). 
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in the expansion of Japan-centred, hierarchical regional production networks 
into Southeast Asia and the maintenance of institutionalised relationships 
between Japanese banks and corporations (Bernard & Ravenhill 1995; Bernard 
1996,1996a). "' Given that much of Japan's trade surplus with the rest of Asia is 
accounted for by intra-firm exports of parts for assembly within Japanese 
corporations, the provision of commercial credit was particularly significant. As 
a result, Tokyo came to stand as "the core of the Pacific basin financial markets" 
(Suzuki 1992: 102). The profile of credit practices undertaken in the other 
principal financial centres of the region came to reflect this domination. For 
instance, in the latter half of the 1980s, credit practices in Hong Kong "skewed 
dramatically toward Tokyo" (Nakao 1995: 135). Between 1985 and 1989, as a 
percentage of all overseas borrowing from Hong Kong, Japan's share increased 
from 10% to 65%. Over the same period, from a marginal position Japan 
became the focus for 52% of the volume of credit created in Hong Kong. In 
addition, by 1989,60% of Hong Kong's foreign-currency-denominated lending 
to non-residents, excluding inter-bank lending, was accounted for by Japanese 
MNCs (Nakao 1995: 134-5). 
Tokyo has continued to stand as the key Asian financial centre 
throughout the 1990s. In part this has been a consequence of the continuation of 
the pattern of Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated banking practices established 
from the mid-1980s. For instance, 44% of loans granted by Japanese banks in 
the region in 1996 were to the low-wage assembly plants of Japanese MNCs 
(Bevacqua 1998: 415). However, regionally-orientated Tokyo-centred bank 
lending from around 19934 more broadly supported the "credit boom" 
(Goldstein 1998) throughout Asia, especially Southeast Asia, that sowed the 
seeds of Asian currency crisis which took hold from July 1997. The "credit 
boom" in Asia (excluding Japan) is reflected in staggering rates of growth in 
total capital formation, that is, the sum of corporate, government, and housing 
investment. Total capital formation in Asia increased by nearly 300% between 
48 "Analyses that begin with a regional structure of production highlight how the regional 
political economy does not correspond to relations between states. The organisation of 
production across a range of industries from consumer electronics to machinery and automobiles 
reveal regionalised industries featuring inter-related manufacturing sectors organised in 
hierarchical networks of firms built around production and innovation centred in Japan and 
dependence on exports of finished products to the United states and other extra-regional 
markets" (Bernard 1996a: 6534). The expansion of production networks into Southeast Asia 
accelerated considerably after the 'success' of the 1985 Plaza Accord. This depreciated the 
value of the US dollar and appreciated the value of the yen, thereby encouraging the use of 
Southeast Asia as a low-wage assembly base for Japanese MNCs. 
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1990 and 1996, compared with slightly over 40% growth in Japan and USA and 
only 10% in Europe (Bevacqua 1998: 414). The credit boom is widely 
recognised to have rested on a massive increase in foreign-currency 
denominated borrowing, such that by 1996 the total foreign debts of the Asian-5 
(Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and South Korea) had ballooned to 
$464.8 billion. 55.7% of this debt was accounted for by bank loans, of which 
41 33.6% were created through the institutional networks of Japanese banks. 
By 1996,42% of Japanese bank loans to Asia were to foreign 
corporations, financial market institutions and states. Outstanding Japanese 
loans to South Korea, Taiwan and the ASEAN-4 (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines) increased by 76% between the end of 1993 and the end of 
1996 (Bevacqua 1998: 415). Tokyo-centred credit practices in support of this 
regional splurge in credit creation tended to take the form of short-term, dollar- 
denominated inter-bank lending organised through Japanese financial market 
institutional networks in the region. In particular, the key space for these 
practices was the Japanese Offshore Market (JOM), established in Tokyo in 
1986. This marked an expansion of the position of the JOM which, after its 
establishment, had quickly become a space for offshore money-market practices 
providing dollar-denominated inter-bank facilities for the Asian region (Warner 
1991: 189-91; Pew 1992: 111-2). Inter-bank credit was extended through JOM- 
centred institutional networks which extended across the regions other offshore 
financial centres, principally Hong Kong and Singapore but also the Bangkok 
International Banking Facility (Bevacqua 1998: 415; Goldstein 1998: 13). As 
Bevacqua (1998: 413) has noted, having provided much of the credit for the 
domestic credit boom in Japan in the latter half of the 1980s, Tokyo-centred 
bank lending effectively exported the bubble economy to Asia in the 1990s. 
Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter has offered a synchronic understanding of the 
relationships between the changing fonns of credit pmctices and the emergence 
of New York, London, and Tokyo as the 'triad' of world financial centres in the 
contemporary world financial order. This is a necessary prelude to the 
diachronic understanding of the making and reproduction of contemporary 
world finance as a social order to be developed in the following chapter. 
49 Authors own calculations based upon figures provided by Deutsche Bank Research (1998: 6- 
7). 
210 
Contemporary world credit practices have taken the predominant forms 
of bank loans and capital and equity market practices. The conjunctural 
distinctiveness of contemporary forms of credit has been emphasised through 
the isolation of six ma or interrelated dimensions of change - marketisation and j 
dollar-denomination; syndication; disintermediation and securitisation; 
decompartmentalisation and institutional re-organisation; expansion and 
innovation; globalisation, regionalisation and bifurcation. By contrast with the 
American world financial order, contemporary world credit practices have taken 
a more marketised form, that is, become increasingly institutionalised within the 
networks of the principal financial market institutions. As during the American 
world financial order, however, world credit practices have remained primarily 
denominated in US dollars. From the beginning of the contemporary world 
financial order in 1974 through to the early 1980s, sovereign credit practices in 
particular took the predominant form of syndicated bank loans. Since the debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, world credit practices have tended to become 
disintermediated and securitised, taking the predominant form of capital and 
equity market practices. This has entailed the decompartmentalisation and re- 
organisation of the manner in which world credit practices are institutionalised. 
Changes in the forms of credit have also coincided with a massive expansion in 
the volume of credit created by world credit practices and considerable 
innovations in credit instruments. In addition, the orthodox two-tier, global- 
national understanding of the orientation of credit practices in the contemporary 
world financial order has been challenged. It was posited that contemporary 
world credit practices have become bifurcated, that is, marked by a coexistence 
of globally-orientated capital and equity market practices with regionally- 
orientated bank lending practices. Meanwhile, retail credit practices remain 
largely nationally-orientated. 
Our account of the triad of New York, London, and Tokyo as WFCs and 
their relationships to the changing forms of credit has emphasised the 
differences between each as key social spaces for world credit practices. The 
continuing dollar-denomination of world credit ensures that New York is the 
key space for clearing practices and a large share of closely related money- 
market practices. New York has and continues to be the key space for the issue 
and trading of large volumes of US sovereign credit. The depth and liquidity of 
New York's securities markets also encourages the centralisation of the 
practices of the placement of bonds issued elsewhere and foreign investment and 
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trading in domestic and foreign securities. Indeed, New York has been at the 
forefront of the innovations that have been involved in the securitisation of 
world credit practices. While relatively weak when compared to the other 
WFCs of the triad as a space for banking practices, New York remains the key 
space for those practices which provide commercial and non-capital market 
corporate credit in support of regional arcs of trade and investment in North 
America. 
In contrast to New York, London's position as one of the triad is based 
upon its standing as an offshore entrepOt WFC. Throughout the contemporary 
world financial order, London has been a key social space for the predominant 
forms of credit practices at a world scale including the globally-orientated 
practices of issuing and trading bonds, trading equities, and foreign exchange 
dealing. Three broad phases have been distinguished in London's standing as a 
key space for banking practices. First, from the beginning of the contemporary 
world financial order through to the early-to-mid 1980s, London dominated 
banking by virtue of its position as the key space for syndicated lending. 
Second, from the mid-1980s through to the end of the decade, London retained 
its position as a banking centre chiefly as a consequence of its support through 
inter-bank lending for the expansion of Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated 
banking throughout Asia. Finally, during the 1990s, London has retained its 
position as the premier offshore banking centre despite the challenge of Paris 
and Frankfurt as key spaces for regionally-orientated banking practices in 
support of European patterns of trade and investment. 
In contrast to both New York and London, at the beginning of the 
contemporary world financial order Tokyo was of marginal significance as a 
financial centre. It was in the course of the 1980s that Tokyo's importance as a 
WFC developed, based upon the rise of Japan as the world's principal creditor 
nation. In particular, Tokyo stood as a key space for the practices of capital 
allocation and investment during the latter half of the 1980s in support of 
securities issues and trading in New York and London. The relative incapacity 
of Tokyo to offer a space for the predominant practices of issuing and trading 
securities at a world scale has reflected comparative weaknesses in terms of 
restrictive regulations, money-market practices and the indebtedness of Japanese 
financial market institutions in the wake of the bubble economy. Tokyo's 
standing as the financial centre for the Asian region was confirmed from the 
mid-1980s, as Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated banking practices extended 
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into Southeast Asia alongside the production networks of Japanese MNCs- The 
scope of Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated banking broadened from 19934 to 
provide much of the foreign-currency denominated loans upon which the Asian 
credit boom, which has recently translated into the Asian currency crisis, was 
based. 
N 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
The 'Triad': The Making and 'Unstable Reproduction' of the 
Contemporarv World Financial Order 
Introduction 
Utilising the insights generated by an Historical IPE reading of previous 
modem world financial orders, this and the preceding chapter explore 
contemporary world finance. An 'historical' alternative is thus offered to the 
predominant mode of knowledge derived from neo-classical economics. 
Chapter six developed a synchronic understanding of the relationships between 
the changing forms of credit practices and the emergence of New York, London, 
and Tokyo as the 'triad' of world financial centres. Here we move to develop a 
diachronic understanding of the making and reproduction of contemporary 
world finance conceptualised as a social order. 
The making of each of the Amsterdam-centred, British, and American 
world financial orders was characterised by an hierarchical structure of power. 
The social forces associated with Amsterdam, London and New York 
respectively occupied pivotal positions in the making of successive modem 
world financial orders. This reflected their standing at the apex of the structure 
of power in material terms, itself a consequence of the tendency for the material 
capabilities of capital, knowledge and technology to be centralised in the 
dominant WFC. Social and political power relations and the structures of the 
wider world order also frame the making of a world financial order. This is 
illustrated by the incapacity of New York's social forces, despite their 
undoubted material power, to establish a relatively stable American world 
financial order that reflected their perceived shared interests. Welfare- 
nationalist forms of state-societal relations and the Cold War and Pax 
Americana structures of the wider world order constrained the making of a 
relatively stable American world financial order, subordinating the perceived 
shared interests of New York's social forces. 
Part I of this chapter addresses the making of the contemporary world 
financial order. Facilitated by comparative historical inquiry, it is argued that 
three main features distinguish the making of the contemporary world financial 
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order. First, in the making of the other modem world financial orders, the social 
forces associated with the dominant WFC had already established their pivotal 
position as part and parcel of the unravelling of the previous world financial 
order. In contrast, the unravelling of the American world financial order was 
not driven by the rise of state and societal forces to surpass the dominant 
position of New York's social forces and the US state. Second, the making of 
the contemporary world financial order has been shaped by a less hierarchical, 
more decentralised structure of power relative to other orders. Material, social 
and political power is, however, unevenly distributed. The social forces of New 
York and, to a lesser extent, London enjoy greater power than their counterparts 
in Tokyo. Third, the major structural features of the wider world order have, in 
the main, constrained the making of the world financial order within a 'matrix' 
of liberalisation and deregulation. As such, this has served to reinforce and 
crucially magnify the power of the social forces of New York and London in the 
making of the order. 
Part II of the chapter moves to consider the reproduction of the 
contemporary world financial order. The reproduction of relative stability in 
previous world financial orders has been shown to rest upon the firm 
centralisation of the order in a single WFC. Periods of relative social stability, 
recognisable as a coherent conjunction between the material, ideational and 
institutional forces of the order, have been reproduced by the structures of 
authority centralised respectively in the dominant WFCs of Amsterdam and 
London and the Washington-New York axis. The informal and formal 
dimensions of authority come together, reproducing relative stability by 
articulating interdependent relationships between state, civil and market forms 
of authority in the organisation of world credit practices. In the Amsterdam- 
centred and British world financial orders in particular, the significance of 
market and civil forms of authority to the organisation of world credit practices 
ensured that Amsterdam and London were the key spaces of authority, the social 
loci for reproduction. The unravelling of a world financial order is closely 
associated with the proliferation of financial centres at the apex of the hierarchy. 
Inherent contradictions come to the surface in the absence of a centralised 
structure of authority to reproduce relative stability, reflected in the restructuring 
of the organisation of world credit practices. 
It is argued that, when viewed in comparative historical terms as a social 
order, contemporary world finance is characterised by relative instability. This 
215 
is reflected in the incoherent relationship between the configuration of material 
power, ideas and institutions in the order. The informal dimension of authority 
is marked by ongoing tensions over the norms, values and meanings that prevail 
in the organisation of world credit practices. The formal dimension of authority 
is distinguished by the fragmentary and overlapping exercise of authority 
through a wide range of institutions in the organisation of world credit Practices. 
The resulting decentralised structure of authority fails to articulate 
interdependent relationships between state, civil and market forms of authority 
in the organisation of world credit practices. The unravelling of the 
contemporary world financial order has, however, been mitigated against up to 
this point by the emergence of international forms of authority based, in the 
main, upon inter-state co-operation. These have ensured that disturbances to 
world credit practices emanating from financial crises have remained essentially 
superfici4 not translating into structural disruptions in the contemporary world 
financial order. The contemporary world financial order is distinguished, then, 
by what will be termed 'unstable reproduction'. 
Part I- The Making of the Contemporary World Financial Order 
A comparison between the three previous modem world financial orders 
and the contemporary order reveals something of a paradox that will be utilised 
here to frame inquiry into the making of the contemporary order. On the one 
hand, the making of the Amsterdam-centred, British, and American world 
financial orders was characterised by an hierarchical structure of power in which 
the social forces associated with Amsterdam, London, and New York as the 
dominant WFCs respectively occupied pivotal positions. The decentralisation 
of the contemporary world financial order between the triad of New York, 
London and Tokyo is suggestive of a less hierarchical, more decentralised 
structure of power in the contemporary order. On the other hand, much existing 
new IPE scholarship emphasises the continuing 'structural power' of the United 
States in the contemporary world financial order (Strange 1990; Germain 
1997: 164-8; Walter 1993: 2404; Helleiner 1992), that is, "power derived from 
the unique depth and liquidity of U. S financial markets and the global 
importance of the dollar" (Helleiner 1994: 148). For instance, Moran's (1991) 
research into regulatory change provides a clear illustration of the impact of US 
structural power on the making of the contemporary world financial order, 
highlighting the "diffusion" (Moran 1991: 121) of American regulatory practices 
throughout the order. 
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Three key features which distinguish the making of the contemporary 
world financial order and which help to explain this seeming paradox are 
outlined here. First, as already noted in chapter five, the unravelling of the 
American world financial order was not, in the main, driven by the rise of other 
state and societal forces. The social forces associated with the single WFC in 
the making of each of the British and American world financial orders had 
established their dominance as part and parcel of the unravelling of the previous 
world financial order. By contrast, the inherent contradictions of the American 
world financial order were exacerbated by changing US state policies and the 
disintegration-reintegration of social forces in US state-society. The US 
adoption of unilateral capital controls from 1963 and support for the emergent 
London-centred Euromarkets presented London's social forces with a structural 
opportunity to firmly establish London as an offshore entrep8t WFC. The 
resulting decentralisation and related gradual unravelling of the American world 
financial order during the 1960s was effectively confirmed by US state policies 
of liberalisation amidst relative instability in the wider world order during the 
early 1970s. The liberalisation of US state policies was itself rooted in a 
reconfiguration of US social forces from the mid-1960s, and the associated 
increase in the social and political power of New York's social forces. 
Second, while the making of the contemporary world financial order has 
taken place in the context of a relatively decentralised structure of power, the 
social forces of New York and, to a lesser extent, London have enjoyed greater 
material, social and political power than their counterparts in Tokyo. As will be 
explored in greater detail below, material power relations surrounding 
ownership, control or access to capital, knowledge and technology as the 
principal material capabilities fi-aming world credit practices have been 
comparatively less hierarchical, broadly reflecting the advent of a more multi- 
polar world economy. However, material, social and political power has also 
been dispersed unevenly amongst the social forces of the triad of WFCs. As 
such, the social forces of New York and, to a lesser extent, London have 
occupied a more pivotal position in the making of the contemporary world 
financial order. 
Third, given the decentralised and yet uneven structure of power in the 
contemporary world financial order, three principal structural features of the 
wider world order have combined to ensure the pivotal position of New York 
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and London in the making of the order. Taken together, the "politics of 
economic slowdown7' (Vogel 1996: 3941); intensified inter-state competition 
for market shares in the world economy; and continued US predominance in 
terms of both security and economic consumption, have all constrained the 
making of the world financial order within a 'matrix' of liberalisation and 
deregulation. As such, this has served to effectively and crucially magnify the 
power of the social forces of New York and London in the making of the order. 
Material Power 
In previous modem world financial orders, the centralisation of capital, 
knowledge and technology as material resources in the dominant WFC has been 
significant in conferring material power upon the social forces associated with 
it. Capital has become centralised in dominant WFCs as a result of a 
combination of the rise of national financial centres to world status, linked to the 
ascendancy of their respective national political economies; the tendency for 
WFCs to be major centres for commercial trade; and the diversion of mobile 
capital to WFCs in search of relatively high rates of return. The centralisation of 
knowledge and technology in the dominant WFCs has, meanwhile, stemmed 
from the intersection of several more or less institutionalised market, civil and 
state networks. An understanding of the distribution of material resources in the 
contemporary world financial order is illustrative of both a less hierarchical, 
more decentralised structure of material power than has characterised previous 
world financial orders, and of the greater material power of the social forces of 
New York and London compared to that of those associated with Tokyo. 
The centralisation of capital in the triad of WFCs is partly related to the 
growth trajectories of their respective national political economies (Helleiner 
1993a). However, the centralisation of capital in the triad has taken place in the 
context of what Drucker (1986) terms "the changed world economy" in which 
the "symbolic economy" has emerged alongside the "real economy". On the 
one hand, the real economy of production and exchange has become more multi- 
polar in nature. Capital accumulation in the real economy has become 
fragmented between the three principle economic regions of North America, 
Europe, and Asia (Hirst & lbompson 1996; Ruigrok & van Tulder 1995; 
Zysman 1996). On the other hand, greater volumes of capital have become 
simultaneously concentrated in the symbolic economy in support of the 
globally-orientated speculative capital and equity market practices of the world 
financial order (Allen 1994; Shutt 1998). The centralisation of capital in each 
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WFC of the triad has resulted, then, from different combinations of relationships 
to their respective national political economies and to both the real and symbolic 
dimensions of the world economy. 
Knowledge and technology have been important sources of material 
power throughout successive world financial orders, but have become of greater 
consequence in the contemporary world financial order. In general terms, 
capital accumulation in the contemporary world economy has become more 
knowledge-intensive (Castells 1989; Daniels 1993; Carnoy et al 1993). As Cox 
(1987: 244) notes of the contemporary era, "Knowledge, in the form of 
technology and market information, is the principal resource in the world 
economy, especially knowledge in its dynamic form as the capacity to generate 
new technologies and to market new products". The greater consequence of 
knowledge and technology in the contemporary world financial order both 
reflects this broad development and is amplified specifically by their 
significance as material resources for world credit practices. In particular, 
knowledge and technology facilitate new innovations in credit instruments 
(Strange 1986: 27), the proliferation of all kinds of short-term transactions which 
are often speculative in nature (Strange 1990: 262), and the assessment of the 
increasingly complex risks arising from the creation of credit (Hamilton 
1986: 16; Noyelle 1989a: 109). It is largely as a result of this greater 
consequence of knowledge and technology that geographers have tended to 
assert the expanded significance of the continued centralisation of knowledge 
and technology in WFCs (Thrift 1994). Such centralisation underpins the 
capacity of WFCs to stand as "command posts" (Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 201) in 
the making and reproduction of the contemporary world financial order. 
Amongst the WFCs of the triad, New York has stood as the "capital of 
capital" (Hamilton 1986: 113) throughout the contemporary world financial 
order. Capital is centralised in New York as a result primarily of the continued 
weight of the US political economy, both in the real economy broadly and the 
North American region in particular. The transaction-based as opposed to bank- 
based nature of American finance helps to ensure that pools of accumulated 
capital within the wealthiest political economy in the world became centralised 
in New York, channelled through institutional investors such as pension funds 
and insurance companies (Henwood 1997). The centralisation of capital in New 
York is also a consequence of the "deposit-compelling power" (Brown 
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1940: 154) of New York as a WC. ' New York's deposit-compelling power has 
realised the centralisation of massive volumes of mobile capital in search of 
profitable investment in the contemporary world financial order. This includes 
the centralisation of both the short-term working balances of foreign financial 
market institutions, central banks and corporations (Vogel 1993: 58), and the 
huge volumes of capital for portfolio investment directed through the market 
institutional networks of foreign investment and commercial banks, fund 
managers, and institutional investors. The deposit-compelling power of New 
York, which is evidenced by the depth and liquidity of its capital, equity and 
money-markets, rests upon the continued significance of both the US dollar as 
'world money' and the US political economy in the real economy. ' 
New York's position as the "capital of capital" in the contemporary 
world financial order is accompanied by the centralisation of several more or 
less institutionalised knowledge and technological networks. New York 
remains a key space for the headquarters of US MNCs, the production networks 
of which provide a steady inflow of political and economic knowledge 
informing corporate investment strategies (Drennan 1996; Sassen 1991). The 
centralisation of several networks including those of the press (Parsons 1989), 
'producer services' industries including accountants, legal services and 
management consultants (Sassen 1991), and the financial wire services such 
Reuters, Dow Jones and Bloomberg combine to ensure that New York is 'home' 
to the key "knowledge industries" (Henwood 1997: 101) of the contemporary 
world financial order. More specifically, in the context of the disintermediation 
of world credit practices, the intersection of more specialised knowledge and 
technological networks has conferred considerable material power upon New 
York's social forces. The New York-centred market institutional networks of 
1 Brown's (1940: 154) notion of -deposit-compelling powee,, which was originally applied to 
London as the WFC during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been utilised 
throughout this thesis to assist in the explanation of the tendency for mobile capital to become 
centralised in WFCs. Such has been the influx of mobile capital into New York in the 
contemporary era that foreign claims on US borrowers had increased to 19.8% of US GDP by 
1995, while US claims on foreign borrowers remained fairly static at 5.5% of US GDP 
(Henwood 1997: 61). 
2 The significance of US government bond markets to New York's deposit-compelling power is, 
of course, dependent upon the continuation of the US deficits (Hamilton 1986: 114). Contrary to 
the usual assumption that the US deficits are a source of relative weakness vis-A-vis other 
national political economies, in the sense of advancing New York's deposit-compelling power 
they are a source of relative strength. As Strange (1990: 267) asserts, US deficits are an indicator 
of US structural power in finance, as "no other country was in so favourable position that it 
could draw so heavily on other people's savings to finance its own overspending". 
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the major US investment banks are widely regarded as pivotal to New York's 
strong competitive position as a space for knowledge-intensive disintermediated 
credit practices (Noyelle 1989a; McGahey et al 1990; Hamilton 1986). 1 These 
have been supplemented by the expertise of the NYSE (Buck 1992), Moodys 
and Standard and Poors as the principal credit rating agencies (Sinclair 1994, 
1994a), and the SEC which, according to Moran (1991: 34), is "the single most 
important repository of information about the securities industry". 4 In addition, 
New York heads the other VVTCs of the triad in the implementation of fibre 
optic networks and advanced digital communication systems (McGahey et al 
1990: 171-3). 
In contrast with New York, the centralisation of capital in London in the 
contemporary world financial order has been primarily reliant upon London's 
deposit-compelling power. London's deposit-compelling power is itself rooted 
in the standing of London since the 1960s as an off-shore entrepOt WFC. The 
deregulatory basis for London's deposit-compelling power relative to the other 
main financial centres has continued throughout the contemporary world 
financial order. ' For instance, during the 1980s, Japanese and continental 
European financial market institutional networks tended to fimnel huge amounts 
of capital into London largely in support of their own credit practices (Nakao 
1995: 3742; Leyshon & Thrift 1997: 109). These massive inflows of mobile 
capital have been boosted by those carried by institutional investors, collectively 
providing the deep and liquid resources for London's standing as the principal 
centre for capital and equity market trading practices. ' The British political 
economy has also contributed to the centralisation of capital in London. 
Relative to its comparative size, the British political economy has contributed a 
disproportionately high share to net long-term international capital outflows 
3 This view tends to be underpinned by the assumption that the creation of disintermediated 
credit is, in particular, highly sensitive to social proximity. See Thrift (1994: 336) for a 
comparison with other forms of credit creation that emphasises the differences between the 
spatiality of credit practices. 
4 On the authority exercised through the SEC in the organisation of disintermediated world credit 
practices, see also Ultz (1997). 
5 On the significance of regulatory fi-ameworks for the competitiveness of financial centres, see 
Martin (1994) and Budd (1995). 
61 am indebted to a London-based representative of an American-owned investment bank for 
highlighting the somewhat circularly reinforcing nature of the relationship between London's 
deposit-compelling power and its standing as a key social space for capital and equity market 
trading practices. Confidential interview, London, 2 June 1998. 
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during the contemporary world financial order. ' Given the dominance of 
London as Britain's undisputed national financial centre, large volumes of these 
outflows have been channelled through credit practices centralised in London. 
The capital centralised in London has been complemented by the 
centralisation of knowledge and technology as material resources. Given 
London's standing as an offshore entrep6t WFC, the centralisation of knowledge 
and especially telematics technology has been of particular significance for 
facilitating globally-orientated capital and equity market practices. ' The 
intersection of several more or less institutionalised knowledge and 
technological networks in London underpins this role. Not dissimilarly to New 
York, London is a key space for the market networks of producer services firms 
(Sassen 1991). Specifically, London's long history as a WFC has enabled the 
development of specialised services such as insurance and accountancy which 
assist world credit practices (Michie 1992: 176-7). London has increasingly 
become a key space for the world's financial press, with Euromoney, The 
Banker, The Economist, and The Financial Times all headquartered in London 
(Thrift 1994: 350). In addition, the research departments of continental 
European financial market institutions have come to be centralised in London, 
both accessing and contributing to London's knowledge base. ' London's 
standing as a knowledge exchange has been supplemented by the centralisation 
of key telematics networks. The development of the SEAQ-Intemational system 
by the LSE has been significant in enabling globally-orientated capital and 
equity market trading practices from London. " More broadly, the privatisation 
7 Throughout the mid-1970s, net long-term international capital outflows from the British 
political economy averaged around $1 billion per year. By the mid-1980s, this had increased 
more than ten-fold to $25 billion per year and, while fluctuating considerably since, the British 
political economy continues to consistently average net long-term international capital outflows 
(Germain 1997: 113). 
1 Confidential interviews conducted in London in the course of June 1998 suggested that the 
centralisation of knowledge and communications technology networks in London was of great 
significance in particular for globally-orientated capital and equity market practices that require 
the co-ordination of risk management and clear secondary trading strategies. This view is 
reinforced by a wide range of surveys that, alongside the significance of London's relatively 
benign regulatory environment, identified communications linkages as most important in framing 
the decision to locate world credit practices in London (CRP 1995; HMSO 1991). 
9 On this point I am indebted to the insights provided by representatives of the research 
department of a major German universal bank. Confidential interviews, Frankftirt, I September 
1997. 
10 Confidential interview with a London-based representative of an American-owned investment 
bank. London, 2 June 1998. 
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and deregulation of telecommunications from the early 1980s has ensured the 
centralisation of new innovations in London, replacing previous commitments to 
universal provision throughout Britain (Graham 1992; Moss 1987: 85). 
The capital centralised in Tokyo in the course of the contemporary world 
financial order, meanwhile, has and continues to have three major sources 
(Helleiner 1993a: 209). First, in direct contrast to both New York and London, 
large volumes of capital are centralised in Tokyo for investment as the 'flip- 
side' of the massive current account surpluses of the Japanese political economy 
(Vogel 1993: 61; Germain 1997: 118). " The second major source of the capital 
centralised in Tokyo is the huge volume of accumulated capital in the Japanese 
political economy in the form of personal savings. Japanese personal savings of 
1,200,000 billion yen are the equivalent of one-third of the world's total. 12 
Throughout the 1980s, with the decline of Japanese fiscal deficits and the 
liberalisation of Japanese capital controls, Japanese personal savings tended to 
be centralised in Tokyo in search of profitable employment abroad (Helleiner 
1993a: 209). The third major source of capital centralised in Tokyo is 
overlooked by 'orthodox' analyses of the rise of Japanese finance in the 
contemporary world financial order (see, for example, Taggart Murphy 1996). 
Particularly during the period of the 'bubble' of booming stock prices in the 
Japanese political economy from the middle to the end of the 1980s, and 
enabled by the strengthening of the yen following the Plaza Accord of 1985, 
capital became centralised in Tokyo as a consequence of dollar-denominated 
foreign borrowing. " This tended to be organised through the overseas branches 
" Japanese current account surpluses which grew dramatically in the latter half of the 1980s are 
themselves largely the outcome of merchandise trade surpluses. While generated in part by 
Japanese competitiveness in the production of steel, automobiles and other consumer goods and 
the rise of the Asian region in a more multi-polar world economy (Kindleberger 1996: 195-200; 
Kahler 1993: 40), pivotal to the realisation of Japanese merchandise trade surpluses on such a 
huge scale has and continues to be the stagnation of merchandise imports (Nakao 1995: 9-28). 
This explains how the Japanese political economy has been able to generate such comparatively 
huge Current account surpluses while accounting for a smaller share of world exports than the 
other major national political economies. At the height of Japanese current account surpluses in 
1989, Japan accounted for 10.2% of world exports, compared with the 12.4% shares of both the 
United States and Germany. 
12 Figures provided by The Financial Times, Survey, 'Japan's Financial Revolution', 26/3/98. 
Wright and Pauli (1987: 46-8) highlight the social and political factors which underpin the 
comparatively high rates of personal saving in the Japanese political economy. These combine 
education costs, an absence of adequate pension provision in the context an ageing population, a 
long-standing tradition of thriftiness, and a range of government incentives, especially the 
promotion of the postal savings system. 
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of Japanese financial market institutional networks in London, New York, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, in the main taking the form of short-term inter-bank 
borrowing (Nakao 1995; Lapavitsas 1997: 31). While this pattern was initially 
reversed in the early 1990s as the 'bubble economy' burst (Nakao 1995: 146, 
181), it quickly re-established itself as Japanese short-term inter-bank borrowing 
once again expanded during the mid-1990s. "' 
In our terms, what is significant is that unlike New York and London, 
Tokyo lacks considerable deposit-compelling power. Helleiner (1993a) also 
notes this through a more state-centric comparison of the standing of Japan in 
the contemporary world financial order with that of the United Provinces, 
Britain, and America respectively in previous modem world financial orders; 
"Because of Japan's emergence as an international financial intermediary 
in the 1980s - importing short-term capital and re-lending long-term 
capital - many have concluded that Japanese markets have been 
increasingly developing this kind of 'pulling power'. This interpretation 
is, however, inaccurate. Japan's short-term capital inflows came, not 
from foreigners looking to Japanese financial markets as an attractive and 
safe place to hold money, as was true in the Dutch, British and American 
cases. Rather they represented Japanese bank borrowing in London and 
New York markets where short-term financial instruments were cheaper 
and more attractive than those in the overregulated Japanese financial 
systea' (Helleiner 1993a: 213 original emphasis). 
As a result of Tokyo's relatively weak deposit-compelling power, the material 
power of Tokyo's social forces is limited and somewhat parochial in comparison 
with that of the social forces of New York and London. Consequently, the 
capacity of Tokyo's social forces to shape the making of the contemporary 
world financial order has been undermined. 
The relatively limited nature of the material power of Tokyo's social 
forces would appear to be compounded by the comparatively poor standing of 
Tokyo as a centre for knowledge and technology in the contemporary world 
13 According to Helleiner (1993a: 209), as much as one-third ($205 billion) of total long-term 
capital exports from Japan of $620 billion between 1983 and 1989 were funded by short-term 
borrowing abroad. 
14 The outstanding net short-term overseas liabilities of Japanese banks increased from $44 
billion in 1985 to reach a peak in 1989 of some $265.9 billion. While some $190 billion worth 
of these outstanding liabilities were repaid over the next three years and Japanese inter-bank 
borrowing curtailed (Nakao 1995: 181), by 1994 the outstanding net short-term overseas 
liabilities of Japanese banks had once again climbed to $216 billion (Lapavitsas 1997: 3 1). 
224 
financial order. For instance, with reference to the competitive challenge of 
Tokyo to New York as a WFC, McGahey et al (1990: 161) identify a general 
absence of knowledge networks informing key sets of credit practices. These 
include money-market and sovereign credit practices. In addition, closer 
linkages between credit practices and knowledge-intensive market and civil 
networks are broadly mitigated against by the tendency for decisions regarding 
creditworthiness to be less transparent than in the other WFCs of the triad. As 
Taggart Murphy (1996: 49) notes, "External oversight by accountants, 
investment analysts, financial journalists, or stock market participants is largely 
ceremonial". Further, technological networks facilitating the greater integration 
of Tokyo with the social space of the world financial order also appear to have 
been at best slow to develop. For instance, Tokyo is relatively weak when 
compared to the other major Asian financial centres in terms of fibre-optic cable 
linkages to the US (Moss 1987: 83-4). 
Social and Political Power 
In previous modem world financial orders, the capacity of social forces 
associated with the dominant WFC to exercise their material power in the 
making of the orders was dependent upon social and political power relations. 
Social and political power relations tend to frame what, following Gill 
(1991: 280), we can term "the sociopolitical conditions for existence" of a world 
financial order. As a result, the pivotal position of the social forces of the 
dominant VTC in a world financial order is reliant upon broadly supportive 
forms of state. This also seems to have been apparent in the contemporary 
world financial order, as the liberalisation of capital controls by their respective 
states has been a "precondition for the dominant position of New York, London, 
and Tokyo in the open global financial system of the 1980s ... " (Helleiner 
1994: 147). However, important differences remain between the social and 
political power of the social forces associated with each WFC of the triad. The 
form of the American and British states at once reflects and underpins the 
relatively greater social and political power of the social forces of New York 
and London than that enjoyed by their counterparts in Tokyo. 
The contemporary American and British forms of state have been 
characterised by Cox (1991/1996: 199-201) as displaying "hyperliberal" 
tendencies. " Such tendencies are rooted in a change in the pattern of social 
13 "The hyperliberal tendency actively facilitates a restructuring, not only of the labor force, but 
also of the social relations of production. It renounces tripartite corporatism. It also weakens 
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power that has realised the ascendancy of the perceived interests of the social 
forces of capital, particularly those groups seeking to expand their involvement 
in the world economy. The hyperliberal American and British forms of state 
have entailed not only considerable restructuring of state-societal relations, but 
of the institutions of the state proper. Gill (1991,1995) terms this 'new 
constitutionalism'. Notions of constitutionalism under previous welfare- 
nationalist forms of state dcfined the rights, obligations and freedoms of 
citizens; identified those policy-making institutions through which authority was 
to be exercised; and provided mechanisms of enforcement and ratification (Gill 
1995: 413). By contrast, new constitutionalism is the discourse which seeks to 
sustain the institutionalisation of neo-classical economics that emphasises 
market efficiency and discipline as binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal, 
monetary, trade and investment policies (Gill 1995: 412). Cerny (1993b, 1994a) 
captures this as the rise of "embedded financial orthodoxy" in macroeconomic 
policy-making. 
The hyperliberal tendencies of the American and British states clearly 
reflect the social and political power of the social forces associated with New 
York and London respectively. However, the political power of the social 
forces of New York and London is far from uniform and cannot be understood 
in a simple instrumentalist sense. As a wide range of literature concerned with 
the deregulation of American and British finance illustrates, state policy- 
decisions have often been taken which have cut against the grain of the 
perceived sclf-interests of New York and London (Moran 1991; Vogel 1996). 
What is significant is the manner in which the hyperliberal state form of 
America and Britain broadly buttresses the material power of the social forces of 
New York and London. As Martin (1994: 271) asserts, the hyperliberal form of 
the American and British states represents "a reassertion by the state of an 
underlying disposition towards financial interests after several decades of 
welfare and national industrial-economic concerns" (my emphasis). Such "an 
underlying disposition" contributes to the reproduction of New York and 
London as key spaces for world credit practices and, therefore, to the power of 
their associated social forces. 
bipartism by its attack on unions in the state sector and its support and encouragement to 
employers to resist union demands in the oligopolistic sector. Indirectly, the state encourages 
the consolidation of enterprise corporatist relations for the scientific-technical-managerial 
workers in the oligopolistic sector, a practice for which the state itself provides a model in its 
treatment of its own permanent cadres. Finally, state policies are geared to an expansion of 
employment in short-term, low-skill, high-tumover jobs that contribute to ftirther labor-market 
segmentation" (Cox 1991/1996: 199-200). 
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In contrast, the contemporary Japanese form of state seems far less 
certain (Cox 1989/1996: 265-6), with considerable consequences for the social 
and political power of Tokyo's social forces. Japanese finance occupied a 
"repressed" (Lapavitsas 1997) position within the post-war Japanese "capitalist 
developmental state" (Johnson 1982). While this has changed somewhat with 
the deregulation of Japanese finance and effective questioning of the coherence 
of the existing state form by the expansion of Japanese production networks 
throughout Southeast Asia, the underlying social structures of the Japanese form 
of state have not been ft-ansformed. 
The pace and direction of Japanese financial deregulation was driven in 
the main by the Japanese bureaucracy (Vogel 1994; Moran 1991; Taggart 
Murphy 1996), ensuring the continued centrality of the Ministry of Finance as 
"the supreme governor of the financial systein" (Moran 1991: 96). Indeed, the 
combination of the relatively slow pace of Japanese financial deregulation with 
the liberalisation of capital controls enabled the expansion of Japanese financial 
market institutional networks throughout the contemporary world financial order 
without a concurrent transformation of embedded domestic credit relations. The 
continuing tensions surrounding the gradual introduction of the 'big bang' in 
Tokyo since April 1998 ftirther illustrate the uncertainty of the social and 
political power of Tokyo's social forces. " As Vogel (1996: 32) suggests, the 
promotion of Tokyo as a WFC through more extensive deregulation of Japanese 
finance would strike right at the heart of the Japanese form of state. Lapavitsas 
(1997: 22) agrees and posits that "The underlying structures of Japanese 
capitalism cannot yet tolerate freely operating financial markets of the Anglo- 
Saxon type". 
Wider World Order 
The structures of the wider world order tended to either reinforce or 
constrain the already pivotal position of the social forces of the dominant WFC 
in the making of the successive Amsterdam-centred, British, and American 
world financial orders. In the contemporary era, a combination of three 
principal structural features of the wider world order have constrained the 
making of the world financial order within a 'matrix' of libemlisation and 
deregulation. As a consequence, the structures of the wider world order have 
16 For details of the Tokyo 'big bang', see The Financial Times, Survey, 'Japan's Financial 
Revolution', 26/3/98. 
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effectively and crucially served to magnify the power of the social forces of New 
York and, to a lesser extent, London in the making of the order. 
First, the disruptions to the world economy following the oil crisis of 
1973 manifested themselves in what Vogel (1996: 3941) terms "the politics of 
economic slowdown". State governments were confronted by a "fiscal crisis" 
(O'Cormor 1973) - the outcome of a combination of economic 'stagflation' and 
growing demand for public expenditure - that struck at the heart of the 
configuration of social and political power relations underpinning the 
predominant welfare-nationalist form of state. In rejecting the alternative policy 
responses of increased taxation or reduced public spending, governments 
increasingly funded budget deficits through recourse to sovereign credit. The 
impact of the politics of economic slowdown on the making of the 
contemporary world financial order were, then, principally two-fold. At one 
level, the increased reliance of some states upon sovereign credit, most notably 
Japan, set in motion the deregulation of national financial arrangements in order 
to facilitate its market-based creation (Kalder 1997; Eken 1984/1994: 304-8; 
Helleiner 1993a: 211-2). At another level, increased sovereign indebtedness 
alongside the perceived inability of Keynesian macroeconomic policy-making to 
alleviate economic stagflation prompted a much wider disintegration- 
reintegration of social forces and the questioning of state intervention in the 
economy (Clarke 1987; Vogel 1996: 40). While undoubtedly uneven in their 
impact upon existing forms of state, policies of liberalisation and deregulation 
gained credence throughout the governments of the western world. 
Second, the emergence of a more multi-polar, knowledge-intensive 
world economy marked by slower growth relative to the post-1945 'golden 
years' has contributed to a shift in the nature of inter-state rivalry in the wider 
world order (Cox 1987: 304). This has had considerable implications for the 
making of the contemporary world financial order. Inter-state rivalry in the 
wider world order focusing on the expansion of territory or access to raw 
materials has been largely displaced by "the imperative necessity of acquiring a 
more or less secure share in one or another sector of the world markef' (Strange 
1990: 266). Given the inherent mobility and fungibility of accumulated capital, 
the expanded importance of finance under knowledge-intensive production, and 
the potential balance-of-payments problems generated by capital flight, such 
rivalry in the world financial order is especially acute. Indeed, as Helleiner 
(1992: 3 5 original emphasis) notes, 
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"... the dynamics of state-to-state interaction in the financial sector are 
the opposite of those in trade. Whereas collective action - in the form of 
collective adherence to liberal rules - is said to be necessary to maintain 
an open order in trade, it is the move towards closure which requires co- 
operation in the financial sector. 
Against this backdrop and that provided by the politics of economic slowdown, 
the US government's decisions to unilaterally liberalise capital controls in 1974 
and deregulate the NYSE in May 1975 set in motion a competitive 
"deregulatory dynamic" (Helleiner 1994: 18) in the contemporary world financial 
order. " 
Confronted by the socially and politically unpalatable repercussions of 
not engaging in this competition in laxity, the governments of the major states 
have had little alternative but to follow the American lead (Walter 1993: 208-9; 
Cerny 1993: 15; Strange 1988: 131; Vogel 1996: 36). " London has occupied an 
important position in accentuating the competitive pressures emanating from the 
unilateral financial liberalisation and deregulation by the US government. " 
Given the capacity of foreign financial market institutions to avoid regulatory 
restrictions at 'home' and undertake credit practices in London and other off- 
shore financial centres, London has been "the most important arena through 
which the American financial services revolution has been exported" (Moran 
1991: 121). Not surprisingly, pivotal to inter-state financial competition has 
been the promotion through deregulation by state governments of their 
respective national financial centres as key spaces for world credit practices 
(Martin 1994; Plender 1987: 41; Walter 1993: 242). While liberalisation and 
17 Others have asserted the presence of this dynamic in world finance. See, for example, 
Strange (1988: 108) and Hawley (1987: 142-3). According to Strange (1998: 169), it was 
originally recognised in the 1840s by the German political economist Friedrich List. It should be 
noted that the unilateral decision of the US to remove capital controls in 1974 was motivated by 
inter-state rivalry for world market shares alongside a belief among US Treasury officials that 
this would assist in the maintenance of a high degree of monetary policy-making autonomy in 
the face of large fiscal deficits (Helleiner 1994: 147-9). 
's The literature detailing the processes of financial liberalisation and deregulation across the 
major national political economies is vast. For example, for comparative studies of America, 
Britain, and Japan, see Hamilton (1986), Moran (1991), Vogel (1996). For national studies on 
Germany, see Story (1996,1997), Moran (1992) and Ultz (1997), and on France, see Loriaux 
(1997) and Coleman (1997). 
19 For highlighting this point, I am grateful to a representative of the Bundesbank. Confidential 
interview, Frankfurt, 3 September 1997. 
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deregulation have been by no means uniform in pace or extent and have not 
brought about the convergence of national financial arrangements (Moran 1991; 
Vogel 1996; Loriaux et al 1997), the shifting nature of inter-state rivalry in the 
wider world order has had major ramifications for the making of the 
contemporary world financial order. 
Third, the continued predominance of the United States in the economic 
and security structures of the wider world order has, alongside US liberalisation 
and deregulatory initiatives in finance, tended to effectively support the making 
of the contemporary world financial order along these lines. " Contrary to the 
view of Cox (1987: 302), the marketisation of world finance is not simply a 
consequence of the "weakening hegemony" of the US and the resulting "lack of 
any agreement on how the official intergovernmental structures in the system 
could be reformed". Rather, continued US predominance in key areas has 
constrained the capacity of other state and societal forces to make an alternative 
to the contemporary world financial order (Helleiner 1993a: 209; Walter 
1993: 235; Arrighi 1994: 16). For the Japanese in particular, dependence upon 
both the US national political economy as a market for exports and the umbrella 
of protection provided by the US military in the last decades of the Cold War 
mitigated against alternatives in the field of finance. " Indeed, the massive 
investment of Japanese capital through New York in US T-bonds from the 
early-to-mid-1980s does, albeit somewhat indirectly, reflect this dependence. 
As Bevacqua (1998: 412) highlights, the US political economy provided the key 
market for Japanese exports, "and its ability to continue importing goods from 
Japan was determined in part by the willingness of Japanese investors to 
20 For orthodox IPE approaches that rely upon begemonic stability theory (IIST) for their 
explanatory power, the making of the contemporary world financial order presents particular 
problems. As Strange (1990) highlights, orthodox IPE explanations that focus on the declining 
material power of the US national political economy and its impact on the weakened relational 
power of the US government as evidence of hegemonic decline (see, for example, Keohane 
1984) have proved unable to capture continued US structural power. In addition, IIST expects 
hegemonic decline to be accompanied by the erosion of liberal principles derived from neo- 
classical economics in the organisation of the world economy. For instance, Gilpin (1987: 88) 
posits that "protectionism and economic nationalism are once again threatening the liberal 
international economic order with the relative decline of American powee,. 
21 The US national political economy accounts for 60% of world's resource consumption 
annually (Gill 1991: 290), and is especially important as market for Japanese exports. For 
instance, in 1989 the US was the destination for 34% of all Japanese merchandise exports, far 
ahead of South Korea as next largest with 6% (Nakao 1995: 12). On Japanese dependence upon 
the US in security and its implications for the contemporary world financial order, see Walter 
(1993: 237-40). 
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purchase US bonds, thus keeping interest rates in the USA low and thereby 
supporting US economic growth". 
In sum, the social forces of New York and, to a lesser extent, their 
counterparts in London have occupied a pivotal position in the making of the 
contemporary world financial order. This contrasts with the making of previous 
world financial orders in which rising as opposed to existing state and societal 
forces had been at the forefront of social change. The structure of power 
underpinning the making of the contemporary world financial order has, 
however, been less hierarchical than in previous orders. Despite the social 
forces of New York and London enjoying greater material, social and political 
power than their counterparts in Tokyo within the resulting decentralised 
structure of power, it has been the principal features of the wider world order 
which have reinforced the pivotal position of New York's social forces. Taken 
together, the politics of economic slowdown; intensified inter-state competition 
for market shares in the world economy; and continued US predominance in 
terms of both security and economic consumption, have all constrained the 
making of the world financial order within a 'matrix' of liberalisation and 
deregulation. As such, this has effectively served to crucially magnify the power 
of the social forces of New York and London in the making of the order. 
Part 11 - The 'Unstable Reproduction' of the Contemporary World 
Financial Order 
A comparison with previous modem world financial orders reveals 
something of a paradox that will be utilised here to frame inquiry into the 
reproduction of the contemporary world financial order. The paradox will be 
termed that of 'unstable reproduction'. On the one hand, it has been shown that 
once the foundations of a world financial order are in place, the reproduction of 
relative stability in that order rests upon its firm centralisation in a single WFC. 
Periods of relative social stability - recognisable as a coherent conjunction 
between the material, ideational and institutional forces of an order - have been 
reproduced by a structure of authority centralised respectively in the dominant 
WFCs of Amsterdam and London and the Washington-Ncw York axis. The 
informal and formal dimensions of authority come together, reproducing relative 
stability by articulating interdependent relationships between state, civil and 
market forms of authority in the organisation of world credit practices. The 
unravelling of a world financial order is closely associated with the proliferation 
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of financial centres at the apex of the hierarchy. Inherent contradictions come to 
the surface in the absence of a centralised structure of authority to reproduce 
relative stability, reflected in the restructuring of the organisation of world credit 
practices. 
On the other hand, as will be argued below, the contemporary world 
financial order is marked by relative instability, reflected in the incoherent 
relationship between the configuration of material power, ideas and institutions 
in the order. The informal dimension of authority is distinguished by ongoing 
tensions over the norms, values and meanings that prevail in the organisation of 
world credit practices, while the fragmentary and overlapping exercise of 
authority through a wide range of institutions characterises the formal dimension 
of authority. Taken together, the resulting decentralised structure of authority 
fails to articulate interdependent relationships between state, civil and market 
forms of authority in the organisation of world credit practices. The absence of 
a centralised structure of authority to reproduce the contemporary world 
financial order has not, however, manifested itself in structural dislocation and 
the unravelling of the order. The defining characteristic of the contemporary 
world financial order, then, is a paradox of 'unstable reproduction'. 
In seeking to explain unstable reproduction, inquiry proceeds by 
exploring the decentralised structure of authority in the contemporary world 
financial order. This serves to highlight both the relative instability of the order, 
and the incapacity of the decentralised structure of authority to organise of world 
credit practices with a semblance of coherence. It will be asserted that the 
unravelling of the contemporary world financial order has been mitigated 
against largely as a consequence of international forms of authority which, up to 
this point, have ensured that disturbances to world credit practices emanating 
from financial crises have remained essentially superficial. 
Decentralised Informal Authority 
With the notable exception of the American world financial order, 
authority relations in previous world financial orders tended, during periods of 
relative stability, to be rooted in the world view of the social forces of the 
dominant WFC as the collectively accepted image of the order. Consequently, 
the informal dimension of authority in previous world financial orders - that is, 
the social mechanisms through which the values of the dominant social forces 
came to inform the organisation of world credit practices - has been marked, in 
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the main, by broad-based agreement. Existing IPE inquiry into the 
contemporary world financial order tends to emphasise the all-pervasive reach 
of neo-classical liberal values as coming to frame understandings of the meaning 
of world credit practices and the ends to which they are put. For instance, 
Sinclair (1994,1994a) posits that the practices which create, allocate, buy and 
sell credit have come to reify criteria derived from neo-classical economics. 
This results from the emergence of credit rating agencies as "exemplars" 
(Sinclair 1994: 151) of the increased authority of market and civil institutions 
over the organisation of world credit practices. Not dissimilarly, Krugman 
(1995) identifies the presence of what he terms the 'Washington consensus' 
surrounding understandings of economic development. " The neo-classical 
criteria of institutional investors ensures that governments of underdeveloped 
state-societies that adopt the policies of the Washington consensus are rewarded 
with massive inflows of portfolio capital. Existing IPE research suggests, then, 
that despite the decentralisation of the contemporary world financial order, 
values derived from neo-classical economics are socially accepted and 
contribute to the reproduction of the order by framing the shared meanings 
which surround world credit practices. 
Following from the widespread acceptance amongst IPE scholars of the 
pervasive reach throughout the contemporary world financial order of values 
derived from neo-classical economics, the main thrust of IPE inquiry has been to 
show that the adoption of neo-classical values results from social and political 
processes. This challenges the teleological assumption advanced by neo- 
classical economists themselves that the adoption of neo-classical values stems 
from the inherent benefits of the allocative efficiency of the market mechanism 
(see, for example, McKenzie and Lee 1991). For instance, Helleiner (1994: 19) 
highlights the monthly meetings of central bankers at the Bank of International 
Settlements as forming an 'epistemic community' necessary for the propagation 
of values derived from neo-classical economics. " An alternative thread of IPE 
22 Pauly (1997: 121-2) provides a good summary of the content of the 'Washington consensus, 
and its propagation through the IMF. "The advice for all countries was to adopt outward. 
orientated trade and investment policies, monetary policies aimed at price stability, fiscal 
policies aimed at balance in the medium term, unified systems of currency convertibility at 
realistic exchange rates, and liberal financial policies designed to build open, transparent, and 
solid capital markets. The incentive to move in such a direction was the promise of restructured 
and reduced bank debt and new financing, mainly in the form of private portfolio and direct 
investment". 
23 Helleiner (1994) follows Haas (1992: 2) in his understanding of 'epistemic communities' as 
constituting "networks of knowledge-based experts", or "thought collectives". For more details 
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research examines the consequences of the rise of neo-classical economic 
values. As Perraton et al (1997: 270-1) stress, the significance of neo-classical 
values in the world financial order lies not in the their capacity to infonn 
rational and objective practices as is assumed by neo-classical economics. 
Rather, neo-classical values serve to legitimate the inherently subjective 
exercise of authority through market institutional networks by reifying the 
facade of the market mechanism. 
The informal dimension of the structure of authority in the contemporary 
world financial order is not, however, as coherent as existing IPE inquiry would 
suggest. While neo-classical economic values are indeed prominent, contrasting 
particularly with the "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1982) prevalent during the 
American world financial order, they do not inform the intersubjcctive meanings 
framing all sets of world credit practices. The presence of alternative and 
competing shared meanings has, in the main, been obscured to IPE scholars by 
the orthodox representation of the changing forms of credit practices as 
'globalisation'. At one level, this fuels a temptation to represent world credit 
practices as an homogenous global whole, the organisation of which has become 
subject to the values of neo-classical economics. At another level, globalisation 
itself contributes to the telos of neo-classical economics (Amoore et al 1997). 
As part of frameworks of thought, globalisation encourages world credit 
practices to approximate to the ideal of global markets present in neo-classical 
economics. A more nuanced 'historical' understanding of the changing forms of 
credit that, in particular, recognises the global-regional bifurcation of world 
credit practices and their decentralisation between the WFCs of the triad 
facilitates the identification of the presence of competing shared meanings. 
Globally-orientated capital and equity market practices do indeed appear 
to be framed by meanings derived from neo-classical economics. 
Understandings surrounding the issue of securities appeal to the evaluation of 
the risks involved against perceptions of the prospects of future returns. 
Secondary trading strategies focused on short-term returns and shareholder 
value prevent 'back sliding' from neo-classical economic criteria by sovereign 
and corporate borrowers alike. " By virtue of their standing as the signature 
on the notion of epistemic communities and its application, see the special issue of International 
Organisation, vol. 46, no. 1,1992. 
24 On the role of secondary trading practices in preventing 'backsliding', that is, a deviation of 
corporate or government policy from neo-classical economic criteria, I am indebted to the 
insights provided by a former IMF economist. Confidential interview, London, 3 June 1998. 
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practices of the symbolic economy that is largely "de-coupled" from the real 
economy (Strange 1986), capital and equity market practices are able to 
effectively commodify credit relations as is demanded by neo-classical 
economics . 
25 In contrast, regionally-orientated banking practices remain 
embedded in the real economy and, as such, are subject to broader societal 
motivations which mediate against commodification. As Germain's (1996a, 
1996b) research into the coexistence of globally-orientated and regionally- 
orientated credit practices in both North America and Europe illustrates, these 
embedded relationships ensure that banking practices are driven by motivational 
dynamics which are different to those prompted by neo-classical economics. 
The presence of alternative shared meanings in the two tiers of world 
credit practices is further permeated by the divergent understandings of credit 
creation present in the WFCs of the triad. In particular, the norms and meanings 
surrounding credit practices in Tokyo vary considerably from those in New 
York and London. For instance, Taggart Murphy's (1996: 43-59) investigation 
into "the credit decision" reveals diverging understandings of the assessment of 
risk between New York and Tokyo. Assessments of risk that in New York 
hinge upon expectations of future profitability contrast with those in Tokyo 
which, in the first instance, focus upon collateral. New York- and Tokyo- 
centred financial market institutional networks also differ in terms of the 
understandings that frame their competitive strategies. New York-centred 
market institutional networks tend to focus on their capacity to generate value- 
added services for their corporate customers and upon trading, deal-making and 
the creation of new financial instruments. In contrast, the competitive strategies 
of Tokyo-centred market institutional networks tend to focus upon increasing 
market share and reducing the cost of capital to their customers (McGahey et al 
1990: 142-3; Levich & Walter 1989: 52-3). " At the root of the divergent 
understandings of risk and competitiveness in Tokyo is Japan's "banking- 
industrial complex" (Camoy et al 1993: 82), built upon the persistence of 
25 On the commodification. of money under the neo-classical liberal logic of the self-regulating 
market, see Polanyi (1944). 
26 It was the very success of Japanese financial market institutional networks in expanding their 
market share that fuelled what Nakao (1995: 103-23) terms the "hegemonic threat" interpretation 
of the rise of Japanese finance in the 1980s. The success of Japanese financial market 
institutions in gaining market share was reflected in their growing assets. For instance, the 
Japanese share of the total assets of the largest fifty banks world-wide measured by assets 
increased from 18% in 1970, to 27% in 1980 and to 48% by 1990 (Arrighi 1994: 325). 
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keiretsu relationships between financial market institutions and corporations 
(Taggart Murphy 1996: 28-42; Kindleberger 1996: 201-3). As Wright and Pauli 
(1987: 32) summarise, 
"Viewing Japanese financial services through traditional western 
assumptions can yield wildly misleading interpretations and conclusions. 
If we try to explain competitive strategies of Japanese companies in the 
near-term profit-maximising objectives we expect of private business in 
the West, we see behaviour that seems bizarre. If we examine the 
leverage and cash flow ratios of Japanese corporate balance sheets, we 
conclude that most large Japanese companies are on the brink of 
bankruptcy. If we look at the price/earnings ratios prevailing on Japanese 
stock exchanges, it seems that a major bust must be imminent". 
The presence of alternative values to those derived from neo-classical 
economics has been ensured by the combination of the global-regional 
bifurcation of world credit practices and the presence of divergent shared 
meanings across the WFCs of the triad. Particularly significant is the junction 
of Tokyo's alternative shared meanings with Tokyo-centred regionally- 
orientated bank lending. Tokyo-centred credit practices continue to partially cut 
against the grain of disintermediation, taking the form of banking practices that 
are embedded in the real economy of Japan and the Asian region. This has been 
starkly illustrated in recent times by the response of US state and societal forces 
to the Asian financial crisis. As Bello (1998: 434) highlights, the response has 
been in large part an attempt to transform the shared understandings which 
frame credit practices throughout Asia by calling for the increased transparency 
and disclosure of the financial market institutions of the region. Contrary to the 
suggestions of existing IPE scholarship, then, the dominant social forces of New 
York, London and Tokyo do not simply share values derived from neo-classical 
economics as the basis of a world view which represents their perceived shared 
interests. Rather, authority relations which, by their nature, require a collective 
image of order upon which to rest, remain open to question. 
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Decentralised Formal Authority 
In the reproduction of relative stability in previous world financial 
orders, the formal authority exercised through market, civil and state institutions 
has waxed and waned. A commonality shared by each order has been, however, 
that the position of market, civil and state institutions in the organisation of 
world credit practices has been clearly demarcated, closely related to the 
informal dimension of authority. For instance, under the Amsterdam-centred 
world financial order, the widespread acceptance of the cosmopolitan values of 
Amsterdam's social forces provided the basis for the exercise of authority 
through market and civil institutions in the organisation of world credit practices 
relatively free from state interference. Pivotal to the formal exercise of authority 
through interdependent state, civil and market institutions in the reproduction of 
an order has been both the centralisation of those institutions in the dominant 
V, TC and their 'reach' throughout the order. 
Two main interrelated features distinguish the exercise of formal 
authority in the contemporary world financial order. First, the balance of 
authority exercised through state, civil and market institutions has shifted, as the 
authority exercised through market institutions has increased considerably since 
the American world financial order. Second, in contrast with periods of relative 
stability in previous world financial orders, formal authority is decentralised 
with the effect that authority over the organisation of world credit practices is 
fragmentary and overlapping. As such, the formal exercise of authority, which 
necessarily requires social acceptance, remains subject to clarification. 
In comparison with the American world financial order, formal authority 
over the organisation of world credit practices exercised through state 
institutions has contracted considerably. Essentially, as Cerny (1996: 93) notes, 
financial liberalisation and deregulation involve a shift of responsibility and 
authority. In terms of both active intermediation and the regulation of capital 
and credit flows, the liberalisation and deregulation of credit practices involves a 
major weakening of the authority of state institutions over their organisation 
(Germain 1997: 162). While a future reversal is far from impossible as states 
retain "design capacity" (Vipond 1993: 187) over market structures, authority 
over the volume of credit created and its allocation in the contemporary world 
financial order currently rests largely within the principal market institutions. 
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The "operational capacity" (Vipond 1993: 187) of state institutions is 
consequently eroded. However, the operational capacity that does remain is, at 
one and the same time, more evenly distributed than under periods of relative 
stability in previous world financial orders and yet continues to be asymmetrical. 
For instance, as Germain's (1997: 137-61) account of the authority of state 
institutions illustrates, the capacity of US Federal Reserve to decisively 
manipulate the organisation of credit practices through interest rate changes has 
been partially circumscribed in the contemporary world financial order. Amidst 
the emergence of a more multi-polar world economy, the Bundesbank and Bank 
of Japan - as the central banks of those national political economies which 
predominate in the European and Asian regions - chart increasingly independent 
interest rate policies. At the same time, however, the continued dollar- 
denomination of the majority of world credit practices, the large volume of 
outstanding US sovereign debt, and the importance of New York's capital and 
equity markets ensures that the Federal Reserve retains the capacity to 
authoritatively influence credit creation in the short-term through open market 
operations. " Unlike, for example, the position of the Bank of England in the 
British world financial order, the institutions of any single state lack sufficient 
reach throughout the order to contribute significantly to the control of the 
organisation of world credit practices. 
In comparative terms, the increased formal authority over the 
organisation of world credit practices wielded through market institutions is 
suggestive of several parallels with the Amsterdam-centred and British world 
financial orders. In general terms, both orders were also characterised by 
market-based authority over the organisation of world credit practices relative to 
the American world financial order. More specifically and reminiscent of the 
position of the great merchant houses in the Amsterdam-centred and British 
world financial orders, disintermediated credit practices in the contemporary 
order have been organised largely through the institutional networks of the 
major investment banks. However, several important conjunctural distinctions 
feature in the market-based exercise of authority in the contemporary world 
financial order. For instance, the tendency for institutionalised linkages to be 
27 Open market operations are concerned with the manipulation of liquidity in response to 
monetary policy targets. As Germain (1997: 153) summarises, "If a central bank is concerned 
with an over hasty expansion of the money supply, it sells government bonds from within its own 
portfolio, thereby reducing the immediately available funds which banks and other financial 
sector firms have to lend to their clients. To pump liquidity into the system, a central bank need 
only to buy discounted bonds offered on the market (or encourage them to be put up for sale), 
thereby increasing the availability of cash to monetary agents for lending and other uses". 
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established between the major commercial and investment banks through 
mergers and acquisitions constitutes "a new departure in the historical balance 
of power between public and private authority" (Germain 1997: 106). The 
primary market institutions now possess an increased capacity to exploit 
regulatory differences between political economies and to hold significant 
shares of new issues, expanding their authority over the organisation of credit 
practices. 
More importantly, however, what is particularly distinctive in the 
contemporary world financial order is the extent to which the exercise of 
authority through market institutional networks is decentralised. The market 
institutional networks of New York, London and Tokyo each lack the reach 
throughout the world financial order to sufficiently control the organisation of 
world credit practices. In simple terms, while New York- and London-centred 
market institutions are key to the exercise of authority over capital and equity 
market practices, banking practices have been increasingly organised through 
Japanese and continental European commercial banks. In terms of globally- 
orientated capital and equity market practices more narrowly, investment 
banking networks such as J. P Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley which are all anchored in New York do 
enjoy considerable authority. This is reflected in their strong market positions 
(McGahey et al 1990: 150-1). " The authority of US investment banks has been 
pivotal to the propagation of shared meanings surrounding capital and equity 
market practices which are derived from neo-classical economics, supplemented 
by the authority of New York-centred institutional investors and their criteria 
surrounding investment decisions (Harmes 1997; Minns 1996). " Given the 
additional authority exercised through New York-centred civil and state 
28 For example, four of the top five book runners by value in world bond markets in 1996 were 
US investment banks (The Guardian, 'Grim Global Banking Wars Loom for the 21st Century', 
6/2/97, p. 19). 
29 For instance, the practices of issuing capital and equity market instruments have become 
increasingly framed by the risk assessment models of New York's investment banks. On this 
point I am indebted to the insights provided by a London-based representative of a German- 
owned investment bank. Confidential interview, London, June 1998. By way of illustration, risk 
assessments of credit provided for corporate mergers and acquisitions have tended to be framed 
by understandings based upon the Modiglani-Miller propositions championed by New York's 
investment banks. Developed and named after two Nobel Prize winning economists and as with 
many schemas for risk assessment rooted in neo-classical liberal economics, the Modiglani- 
Miller propositions prescribe that corporations increase their indebtedness while at the same 
time lower their horizons to achieve short-term profit maximisation and share-holder value 
(Economist 1991). 
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institutions such as the NYSE (Moran 1991), the credit rating agencies of 
Standard and Poors and Moodys (Sinclair 1994,1994b), and the SEC (Ultz 
1997; Sassen 1997), a nascent New York-centred structure of authority in the 
organisation of capital and equity market practices would appear to be in place. 
However, this remains still-born while capital and equity market practices are 
largely undertaken offshore in the London-centred Euromarkets. The offshore 
status of London-centred capital and equity market practices ensures that the 
construction of the interdependent relationships between the authority of market, 
civil and state institutions that are essential to the explicit organisation of world 
credit practices is mitigated against. 
In our terms, then, what is significant is the extent to which, in contrast 
to periods of relative stability in previous world financial orders, the 
decentralisation of the world financial order undermines the authority of the 
institutions of a single WFC to come together and reproduce the order. As a 
consequence, a disjuncture has emerged between the global and regional reach 
of market institutional networks anchored in the VYTCs of the triad and the 
limited and fragmented reach of state institutions (Gill 1992; Strange 1998: 44). 
Authority is exercised through an increasingly complex array of institutions 
"falling over each other in a disorganised free-for-all" (Strange 1998: 171). The 
result is a situation in which authority is exercised in a fragmentary and 
overlapping manner. As Underhill (1997c: 315) notes, the fragmentation of 
authority leads to a "coherence problem" which "needs to be clarified as a 
means of stabilising expectations about global financial order". 
Unstable Reproduction 
The relatively instability of the contemporary world financial order and 
the associated decentralisation of the informal and formal dimensions of 
authority have not, however, led to the unravelling of the order. Instead, the 
order has been characterised by unstable reproduction. The relative instability 
of the order and the decentralised structure of authority have manifested 
themselves in a crisis-ridden organisation of world credit practices. 
International forms of authority based upon bilateral and multilateral co- 
operation between state and civil institutions have been developed largely in 
response to successive financial crises. It is the authority of these international 
arrangements which, in the main, has contributed to the reproduction of the 
contemporary world financial order by ensuring that financial crises constitute 
240 
superficial disturbances to world credit practices rather than realising the 
structural dislocation of the order. 
The decentralised structure of authority in the contemporary world 
financial order and the associated incoherence in the organisation of world credit 
practices has revealed itself in a high incidence of financial crises. For instance, 
a recent study by IMF economists (Lindgren et al 1996) suggests that of the 
Fund's 181 member states, 133 had experienced disruptions to banking practices 
between 1980 and early 1996. Overall, the findings classified 108 instances of 
disruption as "significant", and 41 instances in 36 states as "crisis". In many 
instances of "crisis", disruptions generated a sizeable reduction in GDP. Both 
the record of frequency of banking crises and the extent of their detrimental 
consequences for economic growth was found to be worse than for any similar 
period since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
More significant in our terms, the contemporary world financial order 
itself has lurched from one major financial crisis to another. These have 
included the 'debt crisis' of the early 1980s (Aggarwal 1987), the stock market 
crash of 1987 (Toporowski 1993), the Mexican crisis of 1994-5 (Krugman 
1995), and most recently the Asian crisis (Goldstein 1998; Haggard & 
MacIntyre 1998; Bevacqua 1998). These have been accompanied by more 
narrow instances of the failure of market institutional networks including the 
Franklin National Bank, the Banco D'Ambrosiano, the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, Barings Bank, and Yamaichi (Dombrowski 1998: 5). 
In the context of the increased exercise of authority over the organisation of 
world credit practices through market institutions and alongside the failure to 
develop interdependent relationships between state, civil and market 
institutions, at the roots of the major crises has been the imprudent and reckless 
over-extension of credit (Germain 1997: 136; Strange 1998: 44). 
Of course, previous modem world financial orders were not immune to 
financial crises. What has been striking about the contemporary world financial 
order, however, has been the way in which financial crises have engendered 
responses built upon international co-operation. As Helleiner (1994: 170) notes, 
two main threads of this international authority are observable. First, in the 
aftermath of crises, officials from state and civil institutions have initiated co- 
operative regulatory and supervisory initiatives in an effort to discourage the 
overly risky expansion of credit and, therefore, to forestall future crises. 
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Second, state officials have come together in the provision of tender of last 
resort facilities to manage financial crises and prevent them from spiralling out 
of control. 
Regulatory and supervisory co-operation began following the panic 
created by the losses sustained in the Eurocurrency markets by the Franklin 
National Bank and Bank I. D Herstatt in 1974 (Frieden 1987: 117-9; Porter 
1993: 56; Underhill 1997a: 25). Under the auspices of the BIS, the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision was formed which was comprised of 
officials from the relevant state and civil institutions of the G-10 states (Porter 
1993: 56-7; Underhill 1997a: 23). The result was the Basle Concordat of 1975. 
This established the responsibilities of 'home' and 'host' national regulatory and 
supervisory institutions with regard to the credit practices organised within the 
institutional networks of commercial banks (Porter 1993: 58-9; Underhill 
1997a: 25-6). The Concordat was subsequently revised in 1983, following the 
Banco DAmbrosiano affair, by placing greater responsibility with the 'home' 
regulatory and supervisory institutions (Porter 1993; 59-60; Underhill 1997a: 26- 
7). International co-operation regarding banking practices culminated in the 
1988 Basle Capital Adequacy Accord which established minimum capital base 
requirements for commercial banks (Porter 1993: 61-5; Underhill 1997a: 28-30). 
According to Kapstein (1996: 6), the. 1988 Accord is "the cornerstone of 
international financial regulation". This re-regulatory thrust meant that national 
supervisory institutions shifted from a focus upon the market broadly to 
concentrate upon the adherence by individual banks to minimum prudential 
capital requirements. " 
International co-operative forms of authority have not been limited to 
banking practices. In the wake of the 1987 world stock market crash and 
through the forum provided by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the national regulatory and supervisory institutions 
framing capital and equity market practices came together. 31 International co- 
operation in the regulation and supervision of securities practices has been 
subsequently pursued in two complementary directions (Underhill 1997a: 32). 
First, led by the US SEC through bilateral agreements called 'Memoranda of 
30 On this point I am indebted to the insights provided by a representative of the British Banker's 
Association. Confidential interview, London, 3 June 1998. 
31 The IOSCO was founded in 1984 to bring together the regulators and supervisors of North and 
South America (Porter 1993: 112; Underhill 1997a: 3 1) 
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Understanding' (MOUs), regulatory and supervisory institutions have developed 
information sharing agreements to assist their activities (Liltz 1997; Porter 
1993: 112-7; Underhill 1997a: 32-3). This is widely agreed to have encouraged 
state institutions in many instances to take up the responsibilities for regulation 
which previously resided with stock exchanges as civil institutions (Moran 
1991; Vogel 1996; Liltz 1997). Moran (1991) casts this as the growing 
"'codification, institutionalisation and juridification" of financial regulation, 
rooted in the diff-usion of regulatory practices from the SEC. Second, 
international co-operation with regard to the capital adequacy of securities firms 
has been undertaken. Agreement has, however, proved more difficult to achieve 
than in banking, complicated by the complexities of measuring 'market risk' and 
the resulting discord surrounding the appropriate formula for calculating an 
adequate capital base (Porter 1993: 118-9; Underhill 1997a: 33-5). " 
International co-operation in terms of the more immediate management 
of financial crises, meanwhile, has been particularly ad-hoc and increasingly 
undertaken under the auspices of the IMF. According to Strange (1998: 163-9) 
and Pauly (1997: 116), the position of the IMF in crisis management was secured 
following its role in the aftermath of the debt crisis during the early 1980s. This 
constituted "a profound transformation" (Pauly 1997: 99) from the role that the 
IMF had played previously of providing short-term offsetting finance. Such a 
transformation was enabled by the expansion of the IMF's mandate throughout 
the 1970s to include the surveillance of obligations arising from world credit 
practices (Pauly 1997: 116-7). Contrary to the view of Strange (1998: 163-9), the 
IMF in itself has not become the world's lender of last resort. Responses to the 
debt crisis, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-5, and most recently the Asian crisis 
have tended to follow a similar pattern. The IMF, backed by the principal central 
banks, provides short-term bridging loans to forestall default, prescribes the 
adoption of the policies of the 'Washington consensus', and organises the re- 
scheduling of outstanding credit obligations (Pauly 1997: 117-9,124; Goldstein 
1998: 31-44). 
32 "Capital adequacy for securities firms is similar in principle to capital reserves for 
international banks, but there are important differences. For banks, the main concern is with the 
creditworthiness of their loan portfolios and clients, and off-balance sheet activities are 
converted into the equivalent of loan risks according to the Basle Accord. In contrast, for the 
most part risk in the securities sector is related to the firm's position in the market, called 
&position' or 'market risk'" (Underhill 1997a: 33 original emphasis). Such 'positions' in the 
market result from securities firms holding their own portfolio of equities that are subject to 
price fluctuations. 
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The contribution to the unstable reproduction of the contemporary world 
financial order of the authority generated through international co-operation 
should not, however, obscure the extreme fragility of the order. Indeed, three 
factors suggest that the international co-operation that lays at the heart of the 
unstable reproduction of the order may itself prove unsustainable. First, 
regulatory and supervisory co-operation has been found wanting in several 
respects. For instance, under the Basle Capital Adequacy agreement, Japanese 
banks were permitted to count 45% of their so-called 'hidden reserves' from 
holdings of equities towards their capital base (Suzuki 1992: 98). " Given the 
huge bad debts accrued by Japanese banks as a consequence of their 
involvement in credit boom that preceded the Asian financial crisis, and on top 
of those bad debts remaining from the collapse of the 'bubble economy', the 
solvency of many of the world's largest banks remains in doubt. " Meanwhile, 
broadly reflecting the uncertainty resulting from the decentralisation of informal 
authority and also the practical problems of measurement and enforcement, the 
BIS has "virtually thrown in the towel on capital adequacy reserves" (Strange 
1998: 161). The use by banks of complex mathematical models derived from 
neo-classical economics to manage their own risk is increasingly gaining 
credence amongst regulators and supervisors (Underhill 1997a: 37-8). The 
publication by the BIS of a directive entitled '25 Core Principles of Effective 
Banking Supervision' in April 1997 signalled that the BIS was "abdicating 
regulatory responsibility to the banks themselves" (Strange 1998: 163). In stark 
contrast to the view of Kapstein (1996) that co-operation has rendered the world 
financial order "shockproof', the future of the institutional edifice of regulation 
and supervision is in doubt. 
33 The 'hidden reserves' of Japanese banks arise from the holding of equities valued on their 
balance sheets at the cost of acquisition and not at the market price. Consequently, the capital 
base of Japanese banks is subject to fluctuations in equity prices. On the linkages between 
'hidden reserves' and the embedded relations between Japanese banks and corporations, see 
Lapavitsas (1997: 36). 
34 Henderson (1998: 171) calculates that the loan exposure of Japanese banks to the Asia crisis 
political economies of Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea totalled 
around $150 billion that required rescheduling, placing huge stress on their solvency. Aside 
from the more 'direct' consequences of their loan exposure, Japanese banks have also suffered 
more 'indirectly' through the close investment and trade links between Japan and the rest of the 
Asian region. As Henderson (1998: 174) summarises, "the Asian crisis caused instability within 
the Japanese financial system given finther bad loans incurred by the banks, reduced stock 
portfolio profits on bank balance sheets, valuation losses to Japanese exporters in Asia, and a 
worsened outlook for Japan's trade". 
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Second, the capacity of international co-operation through the IMF to 
prevent future financial crises from realising the structural dislocation of the 
contemporary world financial order is far from assured. As Underhill 
(1997c: 315) notes, "the institutions and mechanisms of crisis management ... do 
not yet match the increased systemic risk inherent in the unwieldy financial 
order". This has been starkly illustrated by the Asian financial crisis. Intheface 
of the huge capital flows that marked the crisis, the IMF and the principal 
central banks clearly struggled to mobilise sufficient funds to prevent immediate 
defaults on outstanding credit obligations. In addition, the role of the IMF in the 
crisis has come under intense criticism. For instance, the prescription of the 
policies of the Washington consensus as part and parcel of the rescheduling of 
obligations is widely regarded to have exacerbated the deflationary 
consequences of the crisis (Goldstein 1998: 31-44). More significantly, as Pauly 
(1997: 141) asserts, the IMF remains "a coping mechanism, not a solving 
mechanism". As debates surrounding the 'moral hazard' problem generated by 
IMF organised bailouts reflect (Deutsche Bank Research 1998: 8-9), 
international co-operation in the management of crises alone does nothing to 
address the overly-risky expansion of credit through market institutions that lies 
at the root of financial crises in the contemporary world financial order. 
Third, the specific problems of sustaining international regulation, 
supervision and crisis management are constantly compounded by dependence 
upon continued inter-state co-operation. As Strange (1996: 164-71) has made 
clear concerning international organisations broadly in the contemporary world 
order, formal authority is not exercised through international institutions 
independently of negotiations between state officials. For instance, Andrew 
Crocket, BIS General Manager since 1994, describes the BIS as "less an 
organisation than a process". " Similarly, the IMF lacks autonomy from the 
major states in decision-making (Germain 1997: 141; Strange 1996: 167-8; Pauly 
1997: 99). Existing co-operation between the major states has tended to be 
sustained by a combination of shared economic interests and a deep-rooted 
awareness, fuelled by the experience of the Great Depression of the 1930s, of 
the social and political consequences of the collapse of the world financial 
order. As Pauly (1997: 17) asserts of the US-led response to the debt crisis, 
"Having collectively built an international economic system around more deeply 
connected financial markets, leading states had a common interest in avoiding 
35 See The Economist, 'Lenses of last resort', 6/6/98, pp. 1034. 
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the disintegration of those markets". Significantly, the unstable reproduction of 
the contemporary world financial order is reinforced by inter-state co-operation 
which, based upon the maintenance of the status quo, does not articulate an 
interdependent relationship between state, civil and market authority in the 
organisation of world credit practices. 
Conclusion 
The social forces of New York and, to a lesser extent, their counterparts 
in London have occupied a pivotal position in the making of the contemporary 
world financial order. This contrasts sharply with the making of previous world 
financial orders. In the British and American world financial orders, the social 
forces associated with the dominant WFC had already established their pivotal 
position at the apex of a structure of power as part and parcel of the unravelling 
of the previous world financial order. Conversely, the unravelling of the 
American world financial order was not driven by the rise of state and societal 
forces to surpass the dominant position of New York's social forces and the US 
state. As a consequence of a more decentralised structure of power in the 
contemporary world financial order, New York's social forces have not held 
material, social and political dominance over their counterparts in London and 
Tokyo. It has been the principal features of the wider world order, then, which 
have reinforced the pivotal position of New York's social forces. Taken 
together, the politics of economic slowdown; intensified inter-state competition 
for market shares in the world economy; and continued US predominance in 
terms of both security and economic consumption, all effectively served to 
crucially magnify the power of the social forces of New York and London in the 
making of the order. 
Understood in comparative historical terms, the contemporary world 
financial order has been shown to be distinguished by a paradox of unstable 
reproduction. On the one hand, the contemporary world financial order is 
marked by relative instability, reflected in on-going tensions surrounding 
informal authority and the fragmentary exercise of formal authority through a 
wide range of institutions in the organisation of world credit practices. As a 
result, the decentralised structure of authority has failed to articulate the 
interdependent relationships between state, civil and market forms of authority 
that are necessary to bring coherence to the organisation of world credit 
practices. World credit practices have been crisis-ridden. On the other hand, 
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however, the contemporary world financial order has not as yet unravelled. The 
unravelling of the order has been mitigated against by international forms of 
authority based, in the main, upon inter-state co-operation. International co- 
operation has focused upon regulation, supervision and crisis management. This 
has ensured that disturbances to world credit practices emanating from financial 
crises have, up to this point, proved essentially superficial, not translating into 
structural disruptions in the contemporary world financial order. Nevertheless, 
the order does continue to be extremely fragile, as inter-state co-operation does 
not articulate interdependent relationships between state, civil and market 
authority in the organisation of world credit practices. At the root of the 
distinctive nature of both the making and unstable reproduction of the 
contemporary world financial order, then, is the decentralisation of the order 
between the triad of V*TCs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Apprehendina World Finance: Prospects of an Historical ME 
Overview of the Thesis 
"History ... is the essential corrective for intellectual hubris" (Strange 1998: 20). 
This thesis has confronted a dual problematic - that is, attempts to 
apprehend contemporary world finance encounter not only significant structural 
change, but also the predominance of neo-classical economics as a mode of 
knowledge. Restrained by the imperial reach of neo-classical economics, 
understandings of world finance come to naturalise structural change through 
the reffication of the market mechanism. As such, the inherent social and 
political dynamics of the practices, structures and institutions of world finance 
are necessarily neglected. In contrast, a pathway to an alternative mode of 
knowledge of world finance has been followed that is at once broadly situated 
within, and built upon an engagement with, the field of IPE. In particular, in 
support of an ambitious 'historical turn' amongst new IPE scholars, history has 
provided the ontological and epistemological anchor for an alternative mode of 
knowledge of world finance. 
Before turning to reflect upon the utility of an Historical IPE of world 
finance, it is appropriate that we briefly reiterate the main claims that have been 
made. Inquiry began by identifying the field of IPE as fertile soil from which to 
generate an alternative to the predominant mode of knowledge of contemporary 
world finance derived from neo-classical economics. In practical terms, since 
the rebirth of the field amidst the world economic crisis of the early 1970s, IPE 
has emerged as a central avenue for apprehending world finance. More 
specifically, given that orthodox IPE shares much of its ontological and 
epistemological basis with neo-classical economics, the wide-reaching critique 
of orthodox IPE by new IPE offers a starting point from which to begin to 
construct an alternative mode of knowledge. Considerable ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical debates which lead to important variations 
across new IPE as a mode of knowledge of world finance ensure, however, that 
in itself new IPE is only a starting point. The processes of (re)thinking world 
finance that are indispensable for the articulation of an alternative mode of 
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knowledge necessitate a coherent new IPE approach. This was the purpose of 
Part 1, comprising of chapters one and two. 
Part I responded to the recent 'call to history' by new IPE scholars as the 
basis for (re)thinking world finance. The call to history in this sense is one form 
of critical reasoning that disputes the claims of orthodox IPE as to the 
knowledge which it accepts as legitimate and its focus for inquiry. Exploring 
the epistemological and methodological implications of an ontology of 
historicity led to the generation of an historical mode of thought. This provided 
an 'historical' warrant for alternative knowledge claims to those buttressed by 
empiricist epistemology and positivist methodology. In addition, and also 
following from an ontology of historicity, an Historical IPE approach suggested 
five main interrelated dimensions of a focus for IPE inquiry: structured social 
practices, social change, social space, social time, and social orders. These 
were subsequently developed with reference to world finance. Commercial, 
clearance, money-market, sovereign, and corporate credit practices were 
identified as the sets of structured social practices that comprise world finance. 
Considered over the longue durie of social time, it was posited that these world 
credit practices had taken on their modem configuration in the context of the 
Enlightenment in seventeenth century Europe. The notion of 'forms of credit' 
was used as a way of capturing conjunctural variations in world credit practices, 
that is, periodic differences in both the nature of credit instruments employed 
and the institutionalisation of world credit practices. Reflecting the concern of 
an Historical IPE with social space and the inherent spatiality of structured 
social practices, world financial centres (VYTCs) were also identified as the key 
social spaces for world credit practices. 
Furthermore, Part I advanced an understanding of world finance 
conceptualised as successive historical structures that span irregular 
conjunctures. In synchronic terms, world credit practices were shown to be 
framed by and to draw upon capital, knowledge and technology as material 
capabilities; intersubjective meanings and world views as types of ideas; and 
market, state and civil institutions. It was held that material, ideational and 
institutional forces tend to become centralised in WFCs as the key social spaces 
for world credit practices. In diachronic terms, historical structures were 
represented as social orders with the effect that world finance became 
understood as a succession of social orders, that is, world financial orders. 
Relationships between power relations and authority relations and the making 
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and reproduction of world financial orders respectively were also suggested. It 
was propounded that the reproduction of a relatively stable world financial order 
hinges upon the coming together of the informal and formal dimensions of the 
structure of authority within that order, facilitating the organisation of world 
credit practices. Given that the material, ideational and institutional forces of 
world finance tend to be centralised in WFCs, WFCs were identified in 
diachronic terms as key spaces of authority, the social loci for the reproduction 
of a relatively stable world financial order. Ultimately, it was posited that a 
relatively stable world financial order coincides with the firm ccntralisation of 
that order in a single WFC. A relatively unstable world financial order 
coincides with the fall of the previously dominant WFC and the rise of one or 
more others to the apex of the hierarchy. Both relative stability and instability in 
world financial orders are also related to the changing structures of the wider 
world order. 
Part II, comprising chapters three, four and five, effectively shifted gears 
to consider 'World Financial Orders and World Financial Centres' in more 
concrete terms. Inquiry proceeded across each of the Amsterdam-ccntred, 
British, and American world financial orders respectively by reflecting upon, in 
the first instance, the predominant forms taken by world credit practices and 
their centralisation in Amsterdam, London, and New York as successive single 
WFCs. In diachronic terms, the making of each order was related to the 
material, social and political dimensions of the structure of power and the 
structures of the wider world order. Periods of relative stability and instability 
in each order were identified, and the reproduction of the orders through the 
coming together of the informal and formal dimensions of the structure of 
authority related to the organisation of world credit practices. The 
contradictions and conflicts that marked the unravelling of each order and its 
associated decentralisation were also highlighted. Throughout Part 11, a 
comparative form of historical inquiry helped to ensure that close attention was 
paid to both the continuities and differences which marked the Amsterdam- 
centred, British, and American world financial orders. 
Part 11 yielded several historical insights that in the course of Part III 
acted as a guide for inquiry into the contemporary world financial order. 
Consequently, chapters six and seven provided an alternative mode of 
knowledge that captured the structural changes of contemporary world financc. 
Chapter six focused in synchronic terms on the changing forms of credit and the 
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emergence of the 'triad' of New York, London and Tokyo as the WFCs that 
stand as the key social spaces in the contemporary world financial order. 
Contemporary world credit practices have taken the predominant forms of both 
bank loans and capital and equity market practices. Six main interrelated 
dimensions of change in the forms of credit were identified to capture their 
conjunctural distinctiveness - marketisation and dollar-denomination; 
syndication; disintermediation and securitisation; decompartmentalisation and 
institutional re-organisation; expansion and innovation; globalisation, 
regionalisation and bifurcation. %ile in contrast with the American world 
financial order contemporary world credit practices have taken a more 
marketised form, they have simultaneously remained primarily denominated in 
US dollars as during the American world financial order. From the beginning of 
the contemporary world financial order in 1974 through to the early 1980s, 
sovereign credit practices in particular took the predominant form of syndicated 
bank loans. Since the debt crisis of the early 1980s, world credit practices have 
tended to become disintermediated and securitised, taking the predominant form 
of capital and equity market practices. This has entailed the 
decompartmentalisation and re-organisation of the manner in which world credit 
practices are institutionalised. Changes in the forms of credit have also 
coincided with a massive expansion in the volume of credit created by world 
credit practices and considerable innovations in credit instruments. In addition, 
it was posited that contemporary world credit practices have become bifurcated, 
that is, marked by a coexistence of globally-orientated capital and equity market 
practices with regionally-orientated bank lending practices. 
Chapter six's account of the triad of New York, London, and Tokyo as 
VvTCs and their relationships to the changing forms of credit emphasised the 
differences between each as key social spaces for world credit practices. The 
continuing dollar-denomination of world credit ensures that New York is the 
key space for clearing practices and a large share of closely related money. 
market practices. New York has been at the forefront of disintermediation and 
securitisation, continuing to be the key space for the issue and trading of large 
volumes of US sovereign credit, the placement of bonds issued elsewhere, and 
foreign investment and trading in domestic and foreign securities. New York 
also remains the key space for those practices that provide commercial and non- 
capital market corporate credit in support of regional arcs of trade and 
investment in North America. 
251 
In contrast to New York, London's position as one of the triad is based 
upon its standing as an offshore cntrep6t WFC. Throughout the contemporary 
world financial order, London has been a key social space for the predominant 
forms of world credit practices including the globally-orientated practices of 
issuing and trading bonds, trading equities, and foreign exchange dealing. Three 
broad phases were isolated to capture London's standing as a key space for 
banking practices. First, from the beginning of the contemporary world 
financial order through to the early-to-mid 1980s, London dominated banking by 
virtue of its position as the key space for syndicated lending. Second, from the 
mid-1980s through to the end of the decade, London retained its position as a 
banking centre chiefly as a consequence of its support, through inter-bank 
lending, for the expansion of Tokyo-centred regionally-oricntated banking 
throughout Asia. Finally, during the 1990s, London has retained its position as 
the premier offshore banking centre despite the challenge of Paris and Frankfurt 
as key spaces for regionally-orientated banking practices in support of European 
patterns of trade and investment. 
In contrast to both New York and London, Tokyo was of marginal 
significance as a financial centre at the beginning of the contemporary world 
financial order. It was in the course of the 1980s that Tokyo's importance as a 
VyTC developed, based upon the rise of Japan as the world's principal creditor 
nation. In particular, Tokyo stood as a key space for the practices of capital 
allocation and investment during the latter half of the 1980s in support of 
securities issues and trading in New York and London. Tokyo's standing as the 
financial centre for the Asian region was also confirmed from the mid- I 980s, as 
Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated banking practices extended into Southeast 
Asia alongside the production networks of Japanese MNCs. The scope of 
Tokyo-centred regionally-orientated banking broadened from 19934 to provide 
much of the foreign-currency denominated loans upon which the Asian credit 
boom, which has recently translated into the Asian currency crisis, was based. 
Chapter seven considered the making and reproduction of the 
contemporary world financial order. Three main features were argued to 
distinguish the making of the contemporary world financial order from previous 
orders. First, the social forces of New York and, to a lesser extent, London have 
occupied a pivotal position in the making of the order. The unravelling of the 
American world financial order was not driven by the rise of other state and 
societal forces to displace the standing of New York's social forces at the apex 
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of the hierarchy. This contrasts sharply with the making of previous orders in 
which the social forces associated with the dominant WFC had already 
established their pivotal position as part and parcel of the unravelling of the 
prior order. Second, the structure of power framing the making of the 
contemporary world financial order has, however, been less hierarchical than in 
previous world financial orders. Material, social and political power do remain 
unevenly distributed, ensuring that the social forces of London and New York 
enjoy greater power than their counterparts in Tokyo. Third, the structures of 
the wider world order have constrained the making of the contemporary world 
financial order within a matrix of liberalisation and deregulation. This has 
effectively served to crucially magnify the power of the social forces of New 
York and London in the making of the order. 
The reproduction of the contemporary world financial order was shown 
to be characterised by a paradox of 'unstable reproduction' when viewed in 
comparative historical terms. On the one hand, the contemporary world 
financial order is relatively unstable, reflected both in the tensions surrounding 
informal authority and the fragmentary exercise of formal authority. As a 
consequence, a decentralised structure of authority fails to articulate 
interdependent relationships between state, civil and market institutions in the 
Organisation of world credit practices. World credit practices are, therefore, 
crisis-ridden. On the other hand, despite the relative instability of the 
contemporary world financial order, it has not yet unravelled. Chief in 
mitigating against the unravelling of the order have been international forms of 
authority based, in the main, upon inter-state co-operation in regulation, 
supervision and crisis management. This has ensured that disturbances to world 
credit practices emanating from financial crises have, up this point, proved 
superficial and have not translated into structural dislocation and the unravelling 
of the order. In the absence of a single dominant WFC with sufficient reach to 
articulate interdependent relationships between state, civil and market authority, 
the contemporary world financial order does, however, remain extremely fragile. 
The Prospects of an Historical IPE of World Finance 
The utility of the historical mode of knowledge of world financc 
generated by an Historical IPE approach to world finance is primarily three-fold. 
First, in contrast to the predominant mode of knowledge derived from nco- 
classical economics, an Historical IPE exposes the social and political 
foundations of the organisation of world finance. Contrary to the assumption of 
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neo-classical economists that world finance is the outcome of the self-correcting 
operation of the international economy, the organisation of world finance is 
problematic and subject to shifting patterns of social power relations. 
While the identification of the social and political foundations of world 
finance is common to existing IPE research in world finance, an Historical IPE 
approach also makes a distinctive contribution. This stems, in particular, from 
the concern with the changing organisation of world credit practices. The focus 
upon world credit practices themselves challenges the use of categories in IPE 
research such as 'money capital' (Bonefeld & Holloway 1995) or 'international 
capital mobility' (Goodman & Pauly 1993; Andrews 1994). Financial flows are 
neither simply the monetary part of the circulation of capital broadly defincd 
(Bonefeld & Holloway 1995), or movements of accumulated capital linked to 
the functioning of the international economy (see, for example, Gilpin 
1987: 306). Rather, an Historical IPE draws attention to financial flows as 
resulting largely from the creation of credit which is itself the outcome of 
several sets of structured social practices. In short, an historical mode of 
knowledge of world finance recognises the human agency that necessarily 
underpins financial flows. 
Second, an historical mode of knowledge of world finance Teveals that 
the social and political foundations of world finance extend through and beyond 
the intersection of states and markets. In this sense, an Historical IPE approach 
contrasts with the majority of existing IPE research that has been shaped largely 
by concerns with the inter-relationships between states and markets. An 
Historical IPE disaggregates the categories of 'state' and 'market' as part of a 
broader re-focusing of inquiry upon the changing organisation of structured 
social practices in the context of social orders. This facilitates analysis that 
shows that world credit practices take a wide range of institutional of forms in 
different periods. As such, rather than an emphasis on the inherent qualities of 
states and markets as forms of social organisation, the various, changing and 
contingent social and political bases of states and markets themselves are also 
shown. It is not so much that states and markets as categories are replaced in the 
course of an Historical IPE approach. Rather, the often implicit recognition 
amongst new IPE scholars that changing relationships between state and markct 
are rooted in changing social power relations is rendered explicit through 
consideration of social orders. 
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The identification of the significance of WFCs to world finance is 
instrumental to the disaggregation of markets and states by an Historical IPE. 
WFCs are not simply key financial markets, but key social spaces in the 
organisation. of world credit practices, where practices and the various material, 
ideational and institutional forces framing them are centralised. The social 
forces associated with dominant WFCs also occupy a pivotal position in the 
making and reproduction of world finance. Indeed, once the significance of 
WFCs to world finance is recognised, it forms an essential part of the critique of 
orthodox IPE approaches to world finance. Orthodox IPE approaches typically 
focus upon the rise and fall of states and the organisation of their wealth and 
power as the key to understanding changing relationships between states and 
markets. Such approaches that focus upon state-market relations are unable to 
capture the continued importance of WFCs once the ascendant position of their 
associated states is challenged. This was clearly the case with Amsterdam from 
the middle of the eighteenth century, London from the 1870s, and with New 
York in the contemporary world financial order. 
Third, the utility of an historical mode of knowledge of world finance 
also lies in the potential of appropriating knowledge about the past in order to 
interpret that knowledge and so inform an emancipatory future. The 
transformative potential of an historical mode of thought is a consequence of 
recognition by an Historical IPE of the intimate connection between knowledge 
and social practice. Through critical self-reflection, agents have the ability to 
challenge the structural parameters with which they are confronted. The 
teleological and utopian view of the future of world finance prompted by nco- 
classical economics is undermined, then, by a firm awareness of the contingent 
nature of Past and future change. 
Through the use of a comparative historical method, an historical modc 
of knowledge of world finance has illuminated the distinctive features of the 
structures of contemporary world finance. This enables the identification the 
contradictions and conflicts that are likely to contribute to the future 
development of world finance. It has been suggested that the contradictions and 
conflicts that mark the 'unstable reproduction' of the contemporary world 
financial order have at their roots the decentralisation of the order between the 
triad of New York, London, and Tokyo. Given the development of international 
forms of authority, the result is the perpetuation of a crisis-ridden organisation 
of world finance. Major financial crises in the future, which hold the potential 
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to rupture existing social power relations, may offer structural opportunities that 
can be taken up through social action to help transform world finance. While 
history as "the essential corrective for intellectual hubris" (Strange 1998: 20) 
challenges neo-classical economics as the predominant mode of knowledge of 
world finance, the identification of emancipatory alternatives to the prevailing 
order must also be related to shifting patterns of social and political forces. 
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